The Role of Development Aid and Cooperation in Recent Spanish Immigration Policy 1.

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1 Paper for the 21st IPSA World Congress of Political Science, Santiago de Chile, July Rut Bermejo, University Rey Juan Carlos, Madrid (Spain) The Role of Development Aid and Cooperation in Recent Spanish Immigration Policy 1. Despite the continuous presence of ideas about development cooperation within Spanish immigration policy discourse as a key stream of the whole policy, different governments have delivered their own approaches to the development and migration nexus. Governments' perceptions and ideas are based on their own understanding of the migration phenomenon and their own interpretation of the importance of the development and migration nexus in order to cope with present or future flows. Overall, Spanish interest has prevailed in the design of migration policies since the 1990s. However, recently the emphasis on the need for improving sending countries development seems to have grown. This paper analyses whether the governmental discourse since 2000 has changed due to a real concern about development needs of countries of origin or whether it is just a new discourse in order to improve Spanish management of immigration flows. In order to answer that question the research deals with the new agreements and documents signed and published as "official policy". The comparison between "old" and "new" instruments leads to conclusions about whether development cooperation is relevant just in terms of discourse or in terms of real measures and actions and whether the renewed interest in the nexus is motivated by Spanish policy interests or by a broader understanding of the migration phenomenon. 1. Introduction Over the last decade, a surge of interest in the connection between immigration and development has emerged. Among scholars different explanations for the new attention have been stated. Firstly, some scholars depict the importance of this new link as a consequence of broader phenomena; for instance as a result of the current legitimation crisis of globalization as both an economic and a potential project (Castles and Delgado Wise 2008:7). Secondly, some others attribute the increased relevance of the immigration and development link to the failure of previous development policies that have not achieved the expected outcomes and so, have not changed the relative location of poor countries in international development and economic rankings. In this case, the new relationship is described as a hopeful path for development and a way in which under-developed and developing countries can use the advantages offered by globalisation processes to their advantage. Thirdly, some international organisations perspective assure that linking immigration and development might be the door to enter the space of northern national states and thus, influence their immigration policies. In this sense, Skeldon claims that nation-states do not consider any interference on their immigration policies from any outside power but if the management of migration 1 A first draft of this paper was delivered at the ESRC Seminar Narratives of Migration Management and Cooperation with Countries of Origin and Transit, University of Sussex, September

2 could be shown to promote development in some way, a role for multilateral involvement could be justified (Skeldon 2008: 4). From the point of view of northern developed countries different explanations of their attraction to this linkage between immigration and development have also been stated. Some authors portray northern governments and international agencies as committed to support development and then, naturally, attracted to the prospects offered by the ideas of managing international migration as a means to promote it (Skeldon 2008: 2). Nevertheless, other scholars and researches somehow declare doubts about northern developed countries real interest on the development of migration sending countries. Then, the increased interest and awareness of the need of linking migration and development is the consequence of a failure in governments immigration policies. In this sense, when Castles tries to answer the question: why should the rich cooperate with the poor?, he gives a plain pragmatic or interest-based answer: current arrangements are unsustainable. Migration policies are failing because it is not possible to permanently impose the interests of relatively small privileged groups (especially in the North) on the rest of the world (Castles, 2004: 878). On the whole, new strategies and instruments to prevent the departure of migrants from the South seems to be needed and claimed by anxious public opinions in receiving countries. This latter pragmatic rationale, along with the influence of northern countries in the definition of this fancy link, is analysed bellow as the main reason for the increasing relevance of the relationship between immigration and development among governments and policy-makers in Spain. Castles and Delgado assure that if migration cannot be prevented, policymakers want to introduce migration management to control movements and maximize migration s benefits for the receiving countries. However, successful migration management cannot take place without the cooperation of the governments of countries of origin and transit. This will only be forthcoming if migration also appears to bring benefits for them. Linking migration to development seems to be a way of achieving this, and securing the cooperation of southern states (Castles and Delgado Wise 2008:3). The paper shows that the linkage is being expanded from northern immigration receiving countries towards the southern immigration sending countries by means of diverse new instruments and compromises. However, what Castles and Delgado Wise neglect to appreciate is that, in defining this relationship between underdevelopment situations and immigration in southern countries, the governments of receiving countries do indeed wish not only to enhance their management of flows but also to prevent departures, at least in the long term. This paper draws attention to those different reasons stated by Spanish governments in order to acknowledge the rationales for bringing in this relationship between immigration and development in Spanish immigration policy. During the last three decades different Spanish governments had different rationales for linking immigration management and development s objectives and have designed and implemented several instruments in this policy area. The purpose of the analysis is to answer three interrelated questions. First, to what extent has that link been affected by elites in Spain? In this sense, the first part of the paper analyses government discourses in order to clarify the reasons why different governments consider crucial or not to link both policy areas as well as the expected effects on immigration policies derived from implementing development strategies and measures in sending countries. The second research question copes with the influence of external circumstances on the surge of the 2

3 development and immigration nexus. It focuses particularly on how changing migration routes and pressures, but also mass media demands, increase the need for improving the management of flows and push for new strategies and instruments. 2 And third, the paper deals with another straight issue: how the interest in that link of migration and development is transferred into practice. And so, what kind of policy instruments are adopted and deployed to achieve those policy goals? In this sense, old instruments from the area of migration or from the area of development, can be adapted but also new ad hoc measures can foster the design of new and specific tools. In the first situation, the adaptation of old instruments, on the one hand, some instruments can be taken from the area of immigration such as agreements on temporary migration, funds for investment in bettering controls at borders or agreements for workers. On the other hand, some tools can be traditionally linked to the area of development cooperation such as official development assistance, different types of credits (also micro-credits), debt relief grants, delegated cooperation or direct budget support. In the second situation, the design and implementation of new tools might include different agreements on the treatment of remittances or mobility partnerships. In theory, all those types of instruments can be promoted; it will depend on the policy objectives (related to Government elites ideas) and migration and mass media pressure to act. Within this general framework and in order to answer those research questions, the present paper proposes to focus on the study of the political narratives and political discourse on migration and development from the perspective of receiving countries, looking at the case of Spain. The analysis of the narratives and rationales rests on political discourses, the particular way of speaking to which actors conform when they engage in discussion in the public sphere (Buonfino 2004: 2), primarily in parliamentary debates and presentations of government policies and instruments to media and to a broader public and within international or European forums. The aim of that analysis is twofold. First, it tackles whether members of government draw on narratives on immigration that link migration and development or, otherwise, both phenomena are observed as unconnected trends. In addition, this paper researches to what extent those notions change at the same time than government elites or depend greatly on variations in pressures. Discourse is relevant as a way of understanding reality and a way of identifying and present knowledge and thinking. Recently, Zapata-Barrero and Van Dijk proposed that the relationship between facts and interpretation is essential in the debate on immigration in Spain (Zapata-Barrero and Van Dijk 2007: 9). Second, this essay analyses how the existing narratives, norms and beliefs of policymakers about migration and development are put into practice. In this sense, governments narratives and discourse, as well as the policy goals stated on those discourses, are linked to the use of different policy instruments. Then, the analysis focuses on immigration instruments in order to know to what extend they are taking into account development ideas and the way it is being done. 2 Similar research questions have been asked by Gillespie (2005) about the Spanish politics and the Mediterranean. 3

4 2. The origins of the Spanish immigration policy and the relation with development cooperation a) Politicians beliefs about migration management and development. The Law 7/85 about foreigners' rights and freedoms in Spain is the first law that approached the topic of immigration in this southern European country. The scarce attention and debate received by this law is ascribed to the absence of a remarkable number of immigrants living in the country. And then, the passing of the law is related to the accession of Spain in the European Community, either as an imposition of the EEC (Casey 1998: 317; Delgado and Carrillo 1998: 7; Cornelius 2004: 404), or as an element of the Spanish government's strategy developed with the purpose of pleasing the rest of European countries in order to get a quicker entry (Pajares 2000: 79). The second important highlight, in terms of debates and policy on immigration in Spain came when the Congress approved some guidelines for the government s policy on immigration in the beginning of the 1990s, just after a government discussion document (Green Paper) 3. As a consequence, some administrative reforms were carried out and they showed the relevance, at that point in time, of the new migration phenomenon as well as politicians perceptions, ideas and rationales on how to cope with the new situation and its foreseeable evolution. Among the administrative changes, in October 1991, the Spanish Institute of Emigration was replaced by the General Directorate of Emigrations, in which a General Sub-bureau of Immigration was set up. This bureau took responsibility over a whole range of policies directed to improve actions as well as to better the humanitarian and proper treatment of immigrants (HC 1992, núm.193, p. 9492, 27 may). Congress guidelines introduced what has been the Spanish immigration policy for nearly three decades. Since then, three pillars or dimensions were recognised as leading this policy area: control of borders, integration of immigrants living in the country and cooperation to development. Nevertheless, at that time only a few of the scholars disagree with categorizing the policy as a three pillar s policy but a two pillar s one. In this view, development cooperation is seen as a supplementary measure or another way of controlling the flows in origin with the aim of diminishing the migratory pressure (Sainz 1997: 124). Within this framework cooperation to development would be part of the first dimension, control of immigration flows. At this instant, it would be interesting to clarify the origin of the relationship between cooperation for development with countries of origin and what the rationale for cooperation and help the development of sending countries is. The foreword of the aforementioned Green Paper stated that the Spanish immigration policy action will be inspired by the solidarity with the developing countries, origin of the immigration flows towards our country, solidarity essentially meaning attendance to its social and economic development. Afterwards, the point 10 of the guidelines to government s action claimed that the government will work to enhance the aid devoted to the social and economic development of the countries of origin of the illegal immigration toward 3 Proposición no de Ley, 20 March 1991, adopted 9 April. This Green Paper comes after some Parliamentary groups in the Congress asked for a real governmental policy. 4

5 Spain, in particular those of the Maghreb, being the priorities of this assistance employment creation and the development of human resources. Additionally, within the debates in the Congress, some important arguments to understand and sustain that connection were set out by the MP in charge of explaining the guidelines. Lloret Llorens, assured that: It is necessary to point out the supranational dimension of the immigration phenomenon. Necessarily, this proposal had also to take into account the causes or the roots of the problem. With no doubt, the origin [of migration] is the social and economic development situation of the countries of origin of immigration; countries to which it is necessary to design a policy of aid, of economic development, and of social development, in particular to those in the Maghreb region. If that kind of measures and some other complementary ones are not designed in the following years we might be in a situation in which, due to the population pressure of these countries, the southnorth migratory pressure, through the Mediterranean, will increased and intensified. Some data, given by the Foundation Agnelli, point to that state when they assure that for the year 2020 the population of the group of countries of the north of Africa and Turkey will be superior to that of the group of the European Economic Community. It is a fact that should be valued and kept in mind. (HC 1991, num.100, p.4887, 9 April). This point takes up what will be the nexus between migration and cooperation in the beginning of Spanish immigration policy and its high-priority geographical areas. At this point in time, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security was responsible for implementing the immigration policy while the responsibilities for development cooperation and aid were attributed to a special agency (Spanish Agency for International Cooperation) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That Agency was set up in and, as it is stated in the historical review of the first Law on International Cooperation for Development 5, the Agency (AECI) was to join-up all initiatives on bilateral cooperation with developing countries; responsibilities previously spread among different departments. The guidelines for the Spanish policy on development aid were formulated in 1992, by the Parliament, in a report on the Aims and Guidelines for the Spanish Policy on Cooperation and Aid to Development passed in November that year. This report was related to the Spanish new membership, since December 1991, to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and was the updating of the previous Government guidelines for Development cooperation agreed by the Spanish Cabinet Office in December Those guidelines stated that: 4 Real Decreto 1527/1988, 11 November, establishing the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation as an autonomous organisation and part of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (de creación de la Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional como organismo autónomo adscrito al Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores). 5 Law 23/1998, 7 July, on international cooperation for development (de cooperación internacional para el desarrollo). 5

6 17. The cooperation policy, as already mentioned, should be related to the aims of security, peace and stability. This means to wider our concepts as a result of the new ways of thinking imposed after the end of the Cold War and the upsurge of new or potential antagonisms Our cooperation policy s aim should be the reinforcement of aid particularly towards those areas where the gap of development among adjacent countries makes foreseeable the increment of the migratory flows. The aid to these conflict areas will be part of a new and more intense neighbouring concept, within which cooperation in general is to be intensified. 6 Generally speaking, the 1990s political discourse related the number of arrivals to under-development situations in countries of origin. Cooperation towards development and immigration policy were detached in practice but theoretically closely interlinked and shaped by a similar rationale: migration is a consequence of underdevelopment, so thus the increase in the amount of aid and cooperation to those underdeveloped countries would help to halt potential immigration flows. That prospective evolution was also the key in selecting high-priority areas for cooperation. I.e. the rationale was based on the liberal economic ideas claiming that implementing development cooperation and endorsing funding was to help those countries to better their global position, and as a consequence it would lead to the end of population compulsory departure due to economic problems. In this sense, those areas of migration and development were understood as part of the same thing. In practice, the design and implementation of migration and cooperation to development policies were undertaken by different Ministries within the Spanish departmental organisation. However, immigration began to be perceived not only as a labour issue, as it was during its recent emigration past, but as a wider phenomenon related to other factors and causes. Something similar occurs with aid to development now directly linked to the new global order and world s security and stability. Both policies seemed to be closely related to foreign relations. In these early years Huntoon (1998: 439) pointed out the two main elements in the Spanish-Moroccan relationship which were deemed as emblematic of EU-wide problems: [1] the control of unauthorized entries and [2] the effective implementation of a plan of development aid to forestall outmigration from Morocco to Spain. b) Policy mechanisms and instruments As mentioned earlier, in the 1990s a particular focal point of Spanish immigration policy was the Maghreb region. No special instruments were implemented in order to tie immigration and development but particular initiatives were discussed from time to time. For example, one of the amendments to the point 10 of the 1991 Green Paper on immigration policy, that the IU Party tried to introduce, included the reference to international agreements: "To that end, bilateral or multilateral agreements on technical and financial aid will be negotiated. Those agreements will focus on [what is call labour re-integration] the training or professional updating of existing skills of those who 6 Report on the objectives and general lines of the Spanish cooperation policy and aid to development (HC, Serie E, 27 February 1992). 6

7 intend to return to their countries of origin through the launch of cooperatives, craftsperson shops or self-employed businesses" (HC 1991, Serie D, num. 172, p. 8, 11 April). The standard instrument to cope with issues of interest in Spanish-Moroccan relations was bilateral agreements. Thereafter it is not surprising that the first readmission agreement between Spain and an immigrant sending country was signed with Morocco in The agreement s title included for the first time the term `readmission and was named agreement on flows of persons, transit and readmission of foreign illegal entrants. This treaty focused on the readmission of those persons of third countries who enter illegally in one of the countries that signed the agreement and who were coming from the territory of the other. As Huntoon stated the entry of third-country nationals into Spain through Morocco, either entering to the enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta or by boat across the Strait of Gibraltar, was characterised as a major source of current disagreement (Huntoon 1998: 439) in the mid 90s. 3. Broadening the scope of readmission agreements. The Popular Party in government ( ) a) Politicians beliefs about migration management and development. The two Popular Party s terms in office can be conceptualised as very dissimilar, with quite diverse discourses on immigration. The first term in office ( ) was one of no wide debate about the immigration phenomenon, and thus characterised by quite focused discussions on specific concerns in Parliament. In general, those debates dealt with the arrival of boat people to the Spanish Mediterranean coast, particularly each and every summer. The mass media had a huge impact on those yearly debates after the summer, as long as they covered extensively the arrival of boat people (pateras) during those months of good weather conditions 8. For instance, the 1996 summer shaped the political debate for the following months. Autumnal debates were impinged with questions related with control and repatriation as well as the authorities behaviour, inside Spain s territory, towards irregular immigrants. One of the relevant issues was the operation Melilla, implemented in June 1996 and cause of different parliamentary written questions to the members of government. Its name depicts a transfer operation of nearly a hundred of African immigrants removed, secretly and under conditions denounced as vexatious, from Melilla. The reason claimed for the operation was the high number of irregular immigrants concentrated in that city but the government admitted that maybe the "operation Melilla" had not been a success (HC 1996, num.24, p. 1013). The government maintained its discourse on immigration 7 This agreement seems to be the origin of different bilateral agreements between Morocco and Netherlands in 1993 to check the identity of offenders susceptible to be expelled to Morocco and readmit them or in 1994 the confidential agreement between France and Algeria to make this latter country to take back expelled illegal aliens believed to be Algerians (Guiraudon 2001: 36) 8 The lack of relevant political and parliamentary information on those months of holidays has also been argued to trigger mass media news on people arriving on boats at the Spanish sea border. 7

8 policy and when asked about that, they assured to be following the inherited policy with a third pillar devoted to impelling cooperation, specially with those countries of origin of the immigrants that come to Spain, including return programs and development programs (HC 1996, num.24, p. 1014). Due to an urgent questioning of the Socialist Group in Parliament, some days later, on 24 September 1996, the Congress approved a new immigration programme for Government's immigration policy containing 16 measures. The following year, Mayor Oreja, Minister of Interior, presented a review of those statements. The point number 12 was on cooperation and the government assured that the budget for development cooperation had been expanded and as a consequence, the AECI s budget for that year [1997] was of millions of pesetas (approximately 156 millions of Euros) while the 1996 budget had amounted to millions of pesetas (approximately 114 millions of Euros). The following point was devoted to cooperation with Morocco, particularly readmissions, in the realm of the bilateral agreement of The Minister of Interior pointed out that several meetings had been carried out and he emphasised that by the end of the 1996 the first repatriation of an important number of immigrants (35) had been successfully accomplished (HC 1997, Home Affairs Committee, num. 363, p ). During these years, the government tried to coordinate its high-priority areas of policy with those of Europe or those globally defined. Thereafter, despite the fact that Latin America and the Mediterranean were not less developed areas as the stated in the Lomé Agreement, Spain regarded them as high-priority areas (HC, Aid and Development Cooperation Committee 1997, num. 169, p. 4676). Those Spanish priority areas were said to be maintained and preferred due to historical bonds and geographical proximity but not necessarily to immigration flows. To conclude, it can be said that during these four years the debates in Parliament gave place to different appearances but the general political climate and the level of politisation of immigration policy did not changed much compared to previous years. In addition, Spanish policies towards the Mediterranean stay unchanged, Gillespie assures that with the exception of Turkey Spanish diplomatic effort became less active 9 than with previous socialist governments. Most of the efforts on migration and cooperation were devoted to get the active participation of sending countries in the migration control or in channelling through legal routes as part of what has been called the de-nationalization of controls (Guiraudon 31 y ss.) or delegation to different kinds of actors (third-party states). In terms of foreign policy by the time of the second Aznar government (2000-4) the traditional preoccupation with the western Mediterranean and even the fixation with Morocco seemed to return (Gillespie 2005: 201). Regarding to migration policy, the electoral manifesto of the Popular Party, who won the general election in 2000, had again several paragraphs devoted to their intended immigration policy. The titles of the paragraphs were: A EU common asylum and migration policy, Cooperation with countries of origin, Integration, Management of immigration flows, A common European asylum system. In this framework, the second point on cooperation with countries of origin states how the party understand the global focus of the EU policy: 9 The dialogue and meetings with Morocco during the previous socialist government had been very fluent. There were high-level meetings since 1994; meetings on the context of the Good Neighborhood Treaty signed in 1991 and implemented since 1993 and different European initiatives such as the MEDA Project to help patrolling borders or the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 8

9 We will act, in coordination with the rest of the countries of the European Union, in accordance with a global focus of the migration that treats the political problems, of human rights and of development of the countries and origin regions and the emigrants' traffic. To guarantee this focus we will contribute to fight against poverty, to improve the conditions of life and the working conditions, to prevent the conflicts, to consolidate the democratic States and to assure the respect of the human rights, in particular the rights of the minorities, of women and children. (PP, 2000 General Election Manifesto) Thus, in this context cooperation with countries of origin was directly related to immigration policy, and a relevant part of that cooperation, but no explicit mentioned, was aimed at reducing immigration flows. The Manifesto stated extensively the need to cooperate with countries of origin in the management of flows especially in three different tasks. First, to tackle illegal immigration there, in the origin of the flows, second, to enhance voluntary return and, third, to improve their capacity to fight against human trafficking (PP, 2000 General Elections Manifesto). Besides the paragraphs devoted to cooperation with countries of origin within their statements about their future immigration policy, most of Popular Party s proposals on development aid and cooperation were placed in another part of the manifesto and within the foreign policy s proposals. In this area the government s promise is to design a Law on aid to development and to establish as priority areas those traditionally pointed out, Latin America and the Mediterranean. This includes a desire of paying special attention to Sub-Saharan Africa due to their low profile in the development indicators. No mention or link between migration and development is stated in terms of deciding what countries to cooperate with. In addition to the reference to the European Union as the framework and source of PP s immigration policy, something that would be relevant during these four years, Spain was sometimes probably leading what was being done at the European level. One example of the ideas about the need for cooperation was stated at the European Council of Seville in 2002 in which it was claimed that:...it is crucial for the European Union and its Member States that migration flows should be managed in accordance with the law, in cooperation with the countries of origin and transit of such flows. The European Council therefore welcomes the results achieved over the last six months, in particular the comprehensive plan to combat illegal immigration, the plan for the management of external borders and the Directive laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers in Member States, and calls on forthcoming Presidencies to continue to give migration issues a special place in their work schedules... (European Council, Presidency conclusions, Seville, June 2002) So, part of the discourse of cooperation is clearly focused on cooperation to control the flows. In this sense, management of migration flows meant to make countries of origin help in combating illegal immigration and patrolling borders. Nevertheless, in a following statement this document connects EU s foreign policy, the fight against 9

10 illegal immigration and the long-term objective of diminishing illegal immigration with closer economic cooperation and development assistance. 33. The European Council considers that combating illegal immigration requires a greater effort on the part of the European Union and a targeted approach to the problem, with the use of all appropriate instruments in the context of the European Union s external relations. To that end, in accordance with the Tampere European Council conclusions, an integrated, comprehensive and balanced approach to tackling the root causes of illegal immigration must remain the European Union s constant long-term objective. With this in mind, the European Council points out that closer economic cooperation, trade expansion, development assistance and conflict prevention are all means of promoting economic prosperity in the countries concerned and thereby reducing the underlying causes of migration flows. (European Council, Presidency conclusions, Seville, June 2002). This European Council also introduced the ideas about countries of origin s absence of cooperation. The lack of cooperation in controlling flows could lead to negative measures as it is said in the following points: 35. The European Council considers it necessary to carry out a systematic assessment of relations with third countries which do not cooperate in combating illegal immigration. That assessment will be taken into account in relations between the European Union and its Member States and the countries concerned, in all relevant areas. Insufficient cooperation by a country could hamper the establishment of closer relations between that country and the Union. 36. If full use has been made of existing Community mechanisms but without success, the Council may unanimously find that a third country has shown an unjustified lack of cooperation in the joint management of migration flows. In that event the Council may, in accordance with the rules lay down in the treaties, adopt measures or positions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and other European Union policies, while honouring the Union s contractual commitments but not jeopardising development cooperation objectives. (European Council, Presidency conclusions, Seville, June 2002) That European Council was mainly devoted to find a way to get third countries cooperation in controlling immigration flows i.e. to get their compliance to manage immigration. Some important ideas and rationales can be pointed out from the discourse. First, the last sentence of the 36 point of the conclusions has to be read contrary. Negative measures, including the suppression of development aid, wanted to be introduced by Spain and UK but moderating EU influences prevented the introduction of the idea of punishing third countries that failed to regulate migration to Europe adequately. The Spanish context at that time was one of a soaring number of arrivals since 2000 and in which there were impatient government demands that Morocco do more to regulate the passage of its citizens and sub-saharan Africans en route to Spain (Gillespie 2005: 206). That is the reason why the clearing up of the fact that the lack of cooperation in controlling flows cannot be punished to the extent of jeopardising development cooperation objectives was introduced in order to avoid 10

11 that Spain could cut the financial aid to development to Morocco. However, that kind of punishment was in everyday governmental discourse towards Morocco. The second important point of this discourse is that manage migration meant or was linked to cooperation but cooperation in controlling flows of immigrants not cooperation to development. Despite the fact that this is a European and not a Spanish statement, this Summit s discourses were particularly suitable to this analysis due to the fact that those senior civil servants specially active in setting the agenda for the Spanish Presidency and, particularly this European Council, were those in charge of designing and implementing the Spanish national policy. 10 The new government set up a new unit in charge of immigration matters, Delegación del Gobierno para la Extranjería y la Inmigración, as part of the Ministry of Interior. One of the key initial documents of this unit was the GRECO Programme (Programa Global de Regulación y Coordinación de la Extranjería y la Inmigración en España) designed as a global programme to regulate and coordinate the migration phenomenon in Spain. The Programme was implemented between 2001 and The fourth area of activity designated in this document was called co-development of countries of origin and transit of immigrants. For some authors, this was the origin of the link between cooperation and development, and followed the French ideas of co-development and the background of EU ideas. The new co-development strategy was directed not only to Morocco but extended to other countries such as Ecuador (Cortés 2006: ). Codevelopment seems to be based on a rationale that ties immigrants to development of their own countries in an attempt to show to their countries of origin the benefit of their migration. Nevertheless, the link between northern countries desire to manage/control immigration flows and the use of different kinds of cooperation to achieve the official cooperation of developing countries was still more important in the discourse than the new broader ideas of co-development. While the Spanish immigration policy was getting closer to the EU, the problems with Morocco grew. In 2001 the Moroccan Ambassador left Madrid and different incidents impinged both countries relationships in the following years until the beginning of In February 2003 their Ambassador came back but the relations might be still considered cold. b) Policy mechanisms and instruments As stated above, during the PP first term in office the topic of the irregular immigration and the relationships with Morocco in order to enhance its cooperation and improve its controls on the departure of irregular immigrants to Spain from its territory was a recurrent topic as a consequence of the arrival of pateras. In September 1998, the Minister of Interior was asked about the way to improve Moroccan cooperation to control those irregular flows in the Mediterranean and his answer was there is no wand to do that, we just can keep on working, permanent dialogue, to tighten the relations with Morocco and to intensify the number of bilateral summits as well as strengthen the existing mixed committees (HC 1998, num. 177, p. 9483). When the Minister is asked 10 Interviews with some senior civil servant of the Ministry of Interior in

12 about a law for development aid and cooperation as part of a medium and long term policy, he did not touch upon. Development aid, in different forms, was linked to bilateral relations with Morocco, and also related to immigration policies. In July 1996, the PP obtained a similar agreement that the one negotiated by the previous government in 1995 although none of them seemed to led to practical achievements (Huntoon 1996: 440). As the Minister said in the Congress, those agreements included the creation of Comité de Enlace or mixed committee. The later was set up on the light of the agreement and provided for a development credit and positive talks focused on the forgiveness of Moroccan debt for development spending in the RIF region (El País, 12 de February de 1996 quoted in Huntoon 1998: 440). So that, Huntoon assures that this proposal which fits the development aid to forestall immigration policy... provided an additional incentive for Morocco to control such migratory movements (Huntoon 1998: 440). Nevertheless, as it has been said above the relationships with Morocco got worse during the PP second term in office. On the other hand, the proximity of Spain to the EU and to its policies could also be observed in the increase of instruments designed in EU forums to cooperate in managing flows between EU countries and third countries of origin. Readmission agreements were the key in that policy as it was said at the Seville European Council meeting. And here again, Spanish government ideas on migration management as cooperation in managing flows, and cooperation in general, were interrelated: 33. The European Council urges that any future cooperation, association or equivalent agreement which the European Union or the European Community concludes with any country should include a clause on joint management of migration flows and on compulsory readmission in the event of illegal immigration. 34. The European Council stresses the importance of ensuring the cooperation of countries of origin and transit in joint management and in border control as well as on readmission. Such readmission by third countries should include that of their own nationals unlawfully present in a Member State and, under the same conditions, that of other countries nationals who can be shown to have passed through the country in question. Cooperation should bring results in the short and medium term. The Union is prepared to provide the necessary technical and financial assistance for the purpose, in which case the European Community will have to be allocated the appropriate resources, within the limits of the financial perspective. (European Council, Presidency conclusions, Seville, June 2002) The second PP government is one of a particular focus in signing bilateral agreements (table 1). Cachón 2004 relates the beginning of bilateral agreements with the policy that followed the reform of the 2000 immigration law but particularly with the following GRECO programme. The third field of activity within the GRECO programme was related to agreements; agreements not only devoted to readmission but also with the aim of organising the arrival of immigrants from the countries of origin, by means of the signature of agreements that contemplate all the aspects of the migratory phenomenon (GRECO Programme). The Delegación del Gobierno para la Extranjería y la inmigración began to negotiate agreements in a logic of cooperation between states. The 12

13 priority was to conclude agreements with those states with large immigration flows towards Spain, so the Spanish Government began negotiations with Ecuador to sign a migratory agreement, but the first one that was signed was the agreement with Colombia. Cachón assures that in 2004 there were more than 40 States that had requested to sign migratory agreements with Spain to channel those (current or possible) migrants' flows. Some of those were countries with many citizens in Spain, as were Argentina or Mexico (Cachón 2004:43). Table 1. Bilateral agreements signed by Spain with third countries (origin of flows) until 2004 Country Year/s Main features Other data Morocco 1992 Return of third country nationals 1999 Administrative agreement on seasonal workers 2001 Regulation and management of flows/labour migration agreement Colombia 2001 Regulation of flows/labour migration agreement Ecuador 2001 Regulation of flows/labour migration agreement República 2001 Regulation of flows/labour Dominicana migration agreement Nigeria 2001 Readmission agreement Rumania 2002 Regulation of flows/labour migration agreement Polonia 2002 Regulation of flows/labour migration agreement Guinea Bissau 2003 Regulation of flows/labour migration agreement and readmission of nationals Mauritania 2003 Regulation of flows/labour migration agreement and readmission of nationals visa 1991 Problematic agreement signed but not ratified until May 2005 visa visa 2003 visa Readmission of their nationals but also those of Mali and Senegal Bulgaria 2003 Regulation of flows/labour migration agreement Algeria 2004 Readmission agreement Visas were also made compulsory to Cuba in 2001 and Bolivia April 2007 As it has been said, Cortés (2006) perceived the signature of different labour migration and readmission agreements, especially with Latin American countries as the origin of co-development. However, this same author points out that one of the meanings related to the agreement signed between Ecuador and Spain, but also between Spain and other Latin American countries, is the management/control of migration flows. In this sense, she assures that one of the aims that Spain tries to accomplish is to externalise the fight against illegal migration and border controls towards sending countries and, with the agreement, the equatorial government assumes the same aim that is fight against mafias and clandestine immigration. The second aim seems to be shared by both countries and is to select and recruit workers from Ecuador according to Spanish labour needs. Within this new framework the Ecuadorian government was to get its citizens selected and to avoid the search for workers in other countries (Vallejo 2004 quoted in Cortés 2006: 261). 13

14 The content of the agreements is then a superb instrument to understand how the concepts, ideas and narratives are defined and applied. Thus, despite the theoretical nice discourse on co-development the text of the agreements shows that no reference to remittance is done (Cachón 2004: 86) and the aim is to regulate flows of irregular immigrants but also of legal immigration (workers) and that is understood as codevelopment. In this sense, Cortés also claimed that the new instruments fulfilled the purpose of making the state s interests transnational (control of flows), i.e. managing migration, but in order to get those aims co-development entered within the content of the readmission agreements signed between Spain and some Latin American countries. Co-development became part of migration policies and so immigration policies were linked to foreign policy (2006: 261). While migration was part of the tasks of the Ministry of Interior, the emphasis on readmission agreements linked migration directly with the area of foreign affairs, the particular field within which aid and development cooperation were being designed. So, migration and foreign policy became more closely related during these years that previously. In this sense, López-Sala (2005: 155) assures that immigration policies depend on the principle of national interest so that the aims of a state s foreign policy and international relations, as part of the action on that base, have an impact on immigration policy actions. This author distinguishes two different ways in which influences of international relations into immigration policies take place. First, international relations help to explain flows direction and duration by different kinds of links (colonial, commercial, recruitment programmes...). Second, migration can be determined or service to external affairs aims, for example as part of the bilateral agreements among sending and receiving countries (López-Sala ). However, the tale these years is that foreign policy became prominent in serving the interests of immigration policies. Another kind of measures stated in the GRECO Programme seemed to be a new instrument or a new type of bilateral agreements devoted to ensure the admission of immigrants of third countries but it was not exactly a new measure devoted to help their development through migration. The admission was shaped according to the Spanish labour market needs, and so, as long as immigrants could be a profit for Spain. Those bilateral agreements are not depicted as readmission agreements but mainly designed to order migration (make it legal) and they were said to be comprehensive of all the aspects of the immigration phenomenon. The countries that were allowed to send migrant workers were those with particularly significant migratory flows toward Spain. The selection of the countries for those agreements was to be determined by the Spanish migratory reality, the relationships of our country (historical, political, economic, geographical vicinity, etc.), and the characteristics of the countries of origin. Finally, the GRECO Programme announced another kind of overall guidelines for the content of the agreements. The pacts were to regulate all the aspects of migration flows and so, Spain will subscribe Agreements on different aspects of the migratory phenomenon. The object of those agreements will be plural, varied and, a function of Spanish s objectives and priorities in this respect. In this sense, they would cover the recruitment of foreign workers, visa requirements, readmission of nationals and of national of third States in traffic, co-development aid, etc. In all these Agreements the obligations and responsibilities of the parts were to be clearly established... (GRECO Programme). 14

15 Cachón compares the bilateral agreements of Colombia and Ecuador. From his work it can be said that most of the agreements content is related to how to select and under which conditions workers from those countries. Nevertheless, the article 13 and 14 respectively, tackle the question of non-voluntary return and each country s obligations towards the readmission of those who arrive irregularly, being the costs assumed by the country who ask for the readmission. Both have also an article on cooperation, article 15 and 19 respectively that states that Both parties commit to deepen the bilateral cooperation in the control of the migratory flows and so that the fundamental rights of the migrants are respected. This cooperation embraces a bigger coordination in the fight against irregular immigration, the exploitation and the violation of the social rights, the documental counterfeit and the illicit traffic of human beings. Those agreements were also related to visa requirements and the citizens of these countries were not demanded entrance visa in Spain up to January 2001 in the case of the Colombians, and up to August 2003 in the case of the Ecuadorians (Cachón 2004: 29) onwards. An emphasis on foreign policy to cope with a globally defined phenomenon. a) Politicians beliefs about management and cooperation of immigration. The previous table 1 also shows that there was a clear trend to negotiate agreements with Latin American countries, what in Gillespie s words portrays a clear official preference being shown for Latin American and eastern European migrants over southern migrants, seen as harder to integrate for cultural reasons (Gillespie 2005: 206). The endorsement of the agreement with Morocco, ratified in 2005, is the first of the consequences of an apparently new period of narratives and ideas on immigration policies, as well as seems to be the origin of a high-profile international diplomatic effort for dialogue and understanding with Morocco and other sub-saharan countries. The origin of this new phase is the win in the 2004 General Election of the Socialist Party (PSOE) that allowed them to come back to government. It meant a redesign in narratives on immigration policies and a renewed focus and emphasis on the need for closely linking development cooperation and immigration between sending and receiving countries. In this sense, Cortes (2006: 263) assures that the changes observed in Ecuador, particularly at the Spanish Cooperation Technical Office (OTC, Oficina Técnica de Cooperación Española) show that the new discourse of the Secretary of State for Spanish Cooperation, Leire Pajín, clearly associated the concepts of migration and development. This was also perceived by the coordinator in Ecuador. The concepts of cooperation to development and immigration but also co-development began to be part of the vocabulary within the area of development aid and cooperation in Spain. For example, while the main Plan for Spanish Cooperation (Plan Director de la Cooperación Española), ( ) only mentioned the word migration once, saying that within the strategies of cooperation, possible solutions to the migration phenomenon will be included (Plan de Cooperación Española , p.9). The 2007 Annual Plan for International Cooperation referred 22 times to migration, frequently linked to development. In this Plan, one of the seven main lines for action is said to be enhancing the positive effects of migration in development from a bilateral 15