"US Resettlement for Displaced Persons from Myanmar: Protection in a Protracted Refugee Situation in Mae La Shelter"

Transcription

1 "US Resettlement for Displaced Persons from Myanmar: Protection in a Protracted Refugee Situation in Mae La Shelter" ผ เข ยน Sarinya Moolma

2 "US Resettlement for Displaced Persons from Myanmar: Protection in a Protracted Refugee Situation in Mae La Shelter" Sarinya Moolma ISBN : ASP Working Paper No.1/2012 American Studies Program The Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University Printing : Charansanitwong Printing Co,.Ltd. 219,221,223,225,227,229,231,233 Soi Phetkasem 102/2 Bangkae Nua Bangkae Bangkok Telephone: Fax:

3 i Foreword This study was written in As we readied it for publication in February 2012, there had been several months of unprecedented good news about liberalizing steps in Myanmar. We certainly hope that the process continues and that the Myanmar will evolve into a nation to which its refugees will want to return. Nevertheless, the reform process is only in its beginning stages and most analysts judge that it could reverse at any point. There have been announcements of ceasefires in the central government s military campaigns against ethnic minority groups. However, the situation on the ground remains unclear and there is considerable unease in the minority areas which have been the source of most of the refugees. In particular, the military campaign continues against the Kachin. That conflict has reportedly generated ten thousand new refugees, mostly along the border with China. Thus, we cannot anticipate that the refugee situation along the Thai border will be resolved anytime soon. Meanwhile, this study provides an important examination of the development of Thailand s policies toward the numerous refugees on its soil and of the plight of the persistent Myanmar refugee population. In particular, the study highlights the central role the United States has played with its programs for resettlement.

4 ii I would particularly like to thank John Cherry from the Chulalongkorn Masters in International Development Studies program who edited the manuscript for publication. Robert W. Fitts Director, American Studies Program Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University

5 iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This has been inspired by previous experience working with the Overseas Processing Entity (OPE). OPE is a part of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and provides assistance to refugees worldwide. I would like to thank all of my friends with OPE as well as the refugees I met in Mae La for their support to my field data collection. I would also like to thank my entire family for the complete support they have given me throughout the years, and my colleagues and classmates for never being short of encouragement and moral support during all of the challenges we faced together in school. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Supang Chantavanich and to the program director, Dr. Naruemon Thabchumpon, for their valuable guidance and recommendations both in theory and in practice. I am also deeply grateful to Dr. Nawita Direkwut and Dr. Vira Somboon for their thoughtful comments and suggestions as I wrote this. Lastly, I would like to thank the ASEAN Foundation for providing me with its scholarship and the opportunity to undertake this research. This study is especially dedicated to the thousands of refugees from Burma who are living in a state of misery with so little hope. Their plight evokes memories of when Aung San

6 iv SuuKyi once famously said, We must hope for the best, but prepare for the worst. As long as we believe in human kindness we have good reason to be hopeful for a future of peace in Burma.

7 v CONTENTS FOREWORD... i ACKNOWLEDGMENTS... ii CONTENTS... v LIST OF FIGURES... ix ACRONYMS... xi CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 1.1 Statement of Problem Research Objectives Research Questions Study Framework Methodology Key organizations within the US resettlement program Interview methods Data collection tool Criteria for site study: Mae La temporary shelter Significance of research Ethical considerations Limitations of the Study...15

8 vi CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 Human Migration Theory Forced displacements Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Internally Displaced Persons International Refugee Regime International Refugee Protection System Three Durable Solutions Third Country resettlement Resettlement and Protection Protracted Refugee Situations Push and Pull factor of forced migration National Interest and National Security Complexity of Forced Migration...30 CHAPTER III RATIONALE OF THAI GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS DISPLACED PERSONS FROM BURMA 3.1 Background: Thailand s Role as Host to Refugees Thai Policy on Displaced Persons from Burma Cold War: Post-Cold War: UNHCR and Displaced Persons from Burma: Refugee Registration Process in Thailand...37

9 3.2.5 Group Resettlement in the United States: 2005-Present Impact of Thai Government Policy on Resolving Refugee Problem Conflict with Hosting Refugees Conclusion...41 CHAPTER IV UNITED STATES REFUGEE ADMISSIONS PROGRAM AND RESETTLEMENT PROCESS 4.1 Background United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) US Resettlement: Selection, Transfer and Protection US Policy after 9/11: Increased Burden on Refugees Overview of USRAP Process...52 CHAPTER V RESEARCH FINDINGS 5.1 Mae La Temporary Shelter: Background Information Demographic Data Camp Administrative System Resettlement and Mae La Shelter Interviews with Mae La Residents Opinions from Registered Displaced Persons Opinions from Unregistered Displaced Persons Perspectives from Key Informants on USRAP...68 vii

10 viii Resettlement Fraud Resettlement Pull Factor Protection, a Durable Solution and Burden Sharing Significance The Future for Displaced Persons from Burma...73 CHAPTER VI ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDTIONS AND CONCLUSION 6.1 Resettlement as an Instrument of Protection US Resettlement Process Gaps Current Situation of Refugees Recommendations Further Research Conclusion...83 REFERENCES APPENDICES... 99

11 ix LIST OF FIGURES Figure... Page 1. Figure I: 2009 Top Ten Resettlement Destinations Figure II: USRAP Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 Proposed Ceilings for East Asia Figure III: Diagram Depicting USARP Process for Refugees in Thailand Figure IV: Burmese Refugee Camp Population Estimates Figure V: Resettlement Figures for Mae La Temporary Shelter... 58

12

13 xi ACRONYMS BPRM CCSDPT DHS DKBA EU IDPs IOM ICRC IRC KNU KRC MOI NGO NLD (United States) Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration Committee for the Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (United States) Department of Homeland Security Democratic Karen Buddhist Army European Union Internally Displaced Persons International Organization for Migration International Committee of the Red Cross International Rescue Committee Karen National Union Karen Refugee Committee Ministry of Interior (Thailand) Non-Governmental Organization National League for Democracy (based in Burma)

14 xii NLD-LA NSC OPE PAB PRS RSC RTG TBBC UNHCR UNRWA USCIS USRAP National League for Democracy- Liberated Areas (based in Thailand) National Security Council (Thailand) Overseas Processing Entity Provincial Admission Board Protracted Refugee Situations Resettlement Support Center Royal Thai Government Thai Burma Border Consortium United Nations High Commission for Refugees United Nations Relief and Works Agency (for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East) United States Citizenship and Immigration Services United States Refugee Admissions Program

15 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION If we cannot bring protection to refugees, we must bring refugees to protection UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Need 2011 (2010, p.1) In a world characterized by conflict and instability, millions of people are suffering from such forces as military oppression, poverty, famine and natural disaster. Many millions of people make the decision to flee these various forms of danger and to seek safety and asylum outside the boundaries of their nation of origin. Refugees can be found all over the world, as they are a byproduct of crisis (Loeschler and Monahan, 1989). Burmese refugees have now sought asylum in camps along the Thai border for more than two decades. Many refugees have spent more than twenty years in a status of exile, as they are trapped in camps because of the ongoing violence and human rights violations occurring in their homeland. The UNHCR now considers the situation for Burmese refugees along the border with Thailand as a Protracted Refugee Situation (PRS). According to UNHCR s mandate, there are three options leading toward a durable solution for refugees in this kind of situation. The first, repatriation, is not possible due to the ongoing violence in Burma. C H A P T E R I : I N T R O D U C T I O N

16 2 The second option of assimilating refugees into the host country is also not an option because of strong political opposition in Thailand and the fact that the Royal Thai Government (RTG) does not even recognize their status as refugees. Considering the current political and social context facing Burmese refugees, the option to resettle them to a third country offers the most fitting solution for their situation. The United States is a major participant in international programs intended to resolve protracted refugee situations all over the world. This reflects the fact that a major U.S. foreign policy objective is to tackle refugee issues due to humanitarian concerns. According to the U.S. State Department, the plight of Burmese refugees in Thailand is one of six areas of focus for protracted refugee situations (see Appendix A), and U.S. resettlement efforts have been strengthened to accelerate progress toward a durable solution for Burmese refugees living along the border with Thailand (BPRM, n.d.). C H A P T E R I : I N T R O D U C T I O N 1.1 Statement of Problem: There are currently approximately 35 million people around the world who have been forced to leave their homes and become temporarily or permanently displaced people. UNHCR provides relief and assistance to about 20 million people, of whom approximately 12 million people are refugees living in camps or temporary shelters (Mayell, 2003). Among this number approximately 10.3 million people in 30 countries worldwide are living in protracted refugee situations. This comprises two-thirds of

17 the entire global refugee population and includes the Burmese refugees living along the Thai-Burma border (BPRM, n.d.). According to UNHCR s mandate, protracted refugee situations are now a major concern. The term protracted refugee situation refers to any refugee population of more than 25,000 people who find themselves in an indefinite state for at least five consecutive years, and who are unable to obtain a durable solution for their situation (Loescher, 2006). Thailand has hosted refugees for centuries. The most widely recognized recent group of refugees in Thailand was caused by the exodus of refugees from Indochina in the 1970s. Ultimately, the plight of this group of refugees was resolved through a massive program of resettlement to third countries. A decade after the end of most fighting in Indochina, out-migration of refugees from Laos and Vietnam was stabilized at a low level and no longer posed a humanitarian crisis (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1989). In 1993 the RTG announced that it would no longer accept refugees within its borders. This is despite the fact that at the very same time fighting among ethnic minorities in Burma was forcing thousands of people to seek refuge in Thai territory. The ethnic conflicts in Burma were never of significant political interest in the climate of the Cold War (Risser, 1996). However, there is a compelling humanitarian interest. Burma is one of the most impoverished countries in the world because of the prolonged mismanagement of the country by an authoritarian military junta. The Burmese military government is well known for using violence against ethnic minorities within its territory. The 3 C H A P T E R I : I N T R O D U C T I O N

18 C H A P T E R I : I N T R O D U C T I O N 4 resulting armed conflicts between the government and various ethnic minority groups has resulted in the massive flight of ethnic minority noncombatants as they seek safety along the border with Thailand. However, Thailand is not a signatory to the UN Refugees Convention (1951) and therefore has no obligation to support or protect Burmese refugees on its territory. The RTG also lacks the internal legal framework for processing refugees. The result is that the RTG recognizes Burmese refugee camps only as temporary shelters, and Burmese refugees are designated officially as temporary displaced persons fleeing fighting, meaning that the Burmese refugees cannot remain permanently and cannot seek employment or leave their camp (Kenggoonchorn, 2006). It is within UNHCR s core mandate to find a durable solution for the Burmese refugees residing in camps along the Thai-Burma border. There are three main options for this: voluntary repatriation to their country of origin, local integration and resettlement in a third country. Repatriation is the return of refugees to their country of origin with safety and dignity, while local integration is to naturalize refugees and integrate them into the asylum country. Third country resettlement is the last option and is pursued when it is impossible to return a refugee to their home country or for them to remain in the country of asylum. According to UNHCR (2010), third country resettlement is a crucial tool to bring refugees protection. Currently, the results of Burma s 2010 general election and the formation of a new democratic government are unconvincing

19 because Burma s military leaders remain an overshadowing presence in the parliament and cabinet. Burma s internal situation remains tense as negotiations to integrate minority armed groups into the Border Guard Forces have failed. Moreover, the situation along the border remains violent, as there are ongoing clashes between government forces and ethnic guerilla groups. As a result, even as late as August 2010, thousands of civilians from Burma were fleeing from the fighting and seeking safety in camps in Thailand (Weng, 2010). At the same time, RTG policy has not changed. The RTG continues only to allow refugees from Burma to stay in camps temporarily until they can be safely repatriated. In April 2011 the Thai media uncovered a plan being considered by Thailand s National Security Counsel (NSC) to close the temporary shelters and repatriate their inhabitants to Burma (Saw Yang Naing, 2011). Replying to these rumours, the UNHCR regional spokeswoman countered that voluntary repatriation is unlikely to happen because those Burmese displaced persons wanted to return home only when Burma becomes a democratic country (ibid.). Therefore, the status of the Burmese refugees in Thailand has now come to a crossroads. The refugees country of origin remains mired in internal conflict making it unlikely that most refugees will voluntarily repatriate. At the same time, the asylum country is signaling its intention to close the camps on its territory and return asylum seekers to their country of origin. Considering UNHCR s three main options for obtaining a durable solution, third country resettlement is increasingly being looked upon as the 5 C H A P T E R I : I N T R O D U C T I O N

20 6 most viable approach for achieving a durable solution to the plight of Burmese refugees living in camps in Thailand. Open Door for Group Resettlement to the United States: C H A P T E R I : I N T R O D U C T I O N According to the UNHCR website (2009), the third country resettlement option for Burmese refugees living in Thailand was initiated in In 2005 it received an enormous boost when the United States made a significant offer to refugees living in the camps. With the permission of the RTG and the cooperation of UNHCR, the U.S. resettlement agency would begin a group resettlement program to the United States, beginning with refugees living in Tham Hin camp. Since then, group referrals for resettlement to the United States have been processed in all nine Burmese refugee camps in Thailand. The United States has sought to cultivate an image of being a country where the politically oppressed might find relief (Loescher 1993, p.18). The United States is consequently the largest recipient in terms of numbers of resettled refugees in the world (see Figure I). From 1975 to the present, nearly three million refugees worldwide have been transplanted to the United States. Moreover, according to UNHCR resettlement statistics the United States resettled approximately 73.5% of globally resettled refugees in 2009 (Department of State, 2011). For Burmese refugees living in Thailand, more than 48,000 Burmese refugees from all nine camps in Thailand have already been resettled in the United States ((TBBC, 2010b). Because of the large role that the

21 United States plays as a resettlement destination, this focus of this research will be the U.S. resettlement program for Burmese refugees at the Mae La temporary shelter. Figure I: Top Ten Destination Countries for Resettlement (2009) 7 Source: UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2011 (2010, p. 47) This study will explore the U.S. resettlement program as a mechanism for resolving the protracted situation of Burmese refugees in Thailand. The U.S. resettlement program will be examined with an emphasis on the dimensions of selection, transfer and protection. In looking into these dimensions, the main actors in the process will also be considered, including the international refugee regime, the RTG and the refugees themselves. Through careful analysis it is intended to determine whether or not there are more suitable approaches for providing a durable solution to protracted refugee situations. C H A P T E R I : I N T R O D U C T I O N

22 8 1.2 Research Objectives: To explore the policy and security rationale of the RTG and the U.S. resettlement mechanism for Burmese refugees in Thailand. To identify protection gaps for displaced persons from Burma in the resettlement process. To propose alternative approaches in optimizing durable solutions for Burmese refugees in temporary shelters. C H A P T E R I : I N T R O D U C T I O N 1.3 Research Questions: What are the policies and rationale of the U.S. and Thai governments in finding durable solutions for displaced persons from Burma? What are the gaps in protection of displaced persons from Burma in the U.S. resettlement process, particularly at Mae La shelter? How can the U.S. resettlement program be improved to increase the achievability of a durable solution for Burmese refugees living in Thailand?

23 1.4 Study Framework: Methodology: 1) Desk Review: Documents related to RTG s policy toward Burmese refugees in Thailand have been examined, along with available literature on resettlement from UNHCR and U.S refugee-related agencies. The emphasis was on the resettlement process and protection of refugees throughout that process. 2) Field Research: Field research was conducted in the Mae La temporary shelter with the primary objective of obtaining perspectives from its residents and conducting in-depth interviews with members of the camp committee. The researcher was also able to conduct an interview with the Deputy District Governor of Mae La temporary shelter, who is C H A P T E R I : I N T R O D U C T I O N

24 10 responsible for supervising and monitoring refugees in Tha Song Yang District. 3) Bangkok-based Interviews: The researcher conducted an indepth interview with a senior policy analyst from the RTG NSC whose area of expertise is in Burmese refugees. A private interview was also conducted with the former field team leader of the Mae La OPE, who wished to remain anonymous. Finally, an in-depth interview was conducted with the Refugee Coordinator from the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok. C H A P T E R I : I N T R O D U C T I O N Key Organizations within the U.S. Resettlement Program Ministry of Interior (MOI) is the RTG ministry responsible for registration of Burmese refugees who are screened by the Provincial Admission Board (PAB). MOI is also holds overall responsibility for administration and management of temporary shelters. National Security Council (NSC) is the RTG body responsible for making policy recommendations to the Prime Minister regarding displaced persons. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the UN refugee agency. Its mandate includes determining the refugee status of displaced persons, providing protection and humanitarian aid services and facilitating durable solutions to refugee situations. The role of UNHCR in the U.S. resettlement program consists primarily of receiving and initial processing of Resettlement Referral Forms to OPE (Harkins, Direkwut and Kamonpetch, 2011).

25 Overseas Processing Entity (OPE) is the U.S. resettlement organization contracted by the U.S. Government to facilitate the application and admission process for refugees (ibid). In Thailand the International Rescue Committee is the organization that performs OPE duties and responsibilities. OPE s primary function is to initial screening applicants to determine whether or not they qualify for admission. In 2011 OPE was renamed as the Resettlement Support Center (RSC), but for the purposes of this study it will continue to be referred to as OPE. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the U.S. government department with overall responsibility for adjudication of refugee admission. It is the successor organization to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which was restructured following the 9/11 attacks. International Organization for Migration (IOM) is responsible for facilitating pre-resettlement preparations for selected refugees, including medical examinations, travel arrangements and even transportation to the airport (ibid.) Interview Methodology: Semi-structured interviews were conducted with camp residents at Mae La temporary shelter to obtain their opinions and expectations toward resettlement. The duration for each interview ranged from 15 to 30 minutes, depending on the subject s background and level of interest in USRAP. Interview questions varied according to C H A P T E R I : I N T R O D U C T I O N

26 12 background and category of each interviewee. For example, questions for registered refugees varied slightly from questions for unregistered refugees based upon their engagement and interest in resettlement to the United States. In-depth interviews were used to obtain perspectives of key informants from the Mae La camp committee, Thai authorities and international agencies. The questions in these interviews also varied depending upon each interviewee s role in the U.S. resettlement program. Interviewees can be divided into three basic categories: C H A P T E R I : I N T R O D U C T I O N 1) International Refugee Regime: Interviews with this group were conducted to obtain background knowledge on resettlement and to develop a better understanding of Burmese refugee resettlement: Interviewees included: U.S. Embassy, Bangkok: East Asia Regional Refugee Coordinator, Refugee and Migration Affairs OPE: former field team leader, Mae Sot area IOM, Bangkok: Regional Program Coordinator, Resettlement and Voluntary Return 2) Thai Authorities: Interviews with this group were conducted to determine RTG s policy framework and implementation. Interviewees included: NSC: Senior plan and policy analyst with expertise in displaced persons from Burma

27 MOI: Deputy District Governor of Mae La temporary shelter, Tha Song Yang District, Tak Province 3) Displaced Persons of Mae La Temporary Shelter: Interviews with this group were conducted to obtain first-hand information regarding perspectives of the U.S. resettlement program and its challenges. Interviewee categories included: Mae La residents: Forty interviewees participated in interviews selected randomly from within each camp zone Mae La camp committee: The camp leader, a zone leader and a section leader were interviewed Data Collection Tools: The qualitative research tools used in this study include literature review, first-hand observation, semi-structured interviews and in-depth interviews. During field data collection basic demographic information was collected, such as age, occupation and family member background Criteria for Selecting Mae La Temporary Shelter for Site of Study: Mae La temporary shelter is located in Tha Song Yang District, Tak Province, approximately eight kilometers from the border with Burma. On the opposite side of the border is Karen State, which is under the control of the ethnic insurgent group known as the Karen National Union (KNU). The camp was established in 1994 after the KNU leadership negotiated permission to create a safe haven for Karen minorities on the Thai side of the border. C H A P T E R I : I N T R O D U C T I O N

28 14 Mae La camp is strategically located and has become a vital center for Karen refugees and guerillas due to its proximity to a main road. Mae La s significance is in its large population and high numbers of refugees who have departed for resettlement from the camp. The camp s significance also comes from the fact that the experiences of Burmese refugees in Mae La are likely similar to that of refugees in other camps. Finally, selecting Mae La as the study site for this research will help to broaden the knowledge base of Burmese refugee camps in Thailand, since most other scholarly work has tended to focus on other locations. C H A P T E R I : I N T R O D U C T I O N 1.7 Significance of Research: Because there is relatively little current academic work on the resettlement of Burmese refugees in Thailand to the United States, it is hoped that this research will contribute to broaden and improve the understanding of the resettlement program. This research will also provide knowledge of U.S. resettlement programs from within the framework of the RTG and can lead to improving protection for Burmese refugees in protracted refugee situations in Thailand. Finally, this research can generate more interest in the topic and hopefully lead to further research that can contribute to identifying better options for Burmese refugees seeking a durable solution to their current situation.

29 1.8 Ethical Considerations: There may be a minimal amount of risk generated by this study due to the sensitivity with which the RTG handles the issue of Burmese refugees living in Thailand. Therefore, the researcher is obliged to protect the identities of interviewees and other key informants so that confidentiality and anonymity are maintained to the greatest extent possible Limitations of the Study: The most significant limitations facing this study are the sensitivity of the Burmese refugee issue in Thailand and the opaque nature of the RTG s handling of refugee admissions. Due to these limitations access to Mae La was limited and some key informants and camp residents requested anonymity. Other obstacles encountered included the limited duration of the visits to the camp and the requirement that all visits had to be approved by local authorities in advance. Nonetheless, once access to the camp was obtained, Mae La residents were very helpful in the interviews and other data collection. This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter I comprises the introduction and methodological approach. Chapter II consists of a literature review addressing the refugee regime and resettlement as a durable solution for refugees. Chapter III examines the rationale of the RTG toward Burmese refugees in Thailand. Chapter IV explores the background of USRAP. Chapter V reviews the findings from data collection in Mae La temporary shelter. Chapter VI provides analysis, recommendations and the conclusion. C H A P T E R I : I N T R O D U C T I O N

30

31 CHAPTER II LITERATURE REVIEW Refugees have been deprived of their homes, but they must not be deprived of their futures UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, World Refugee Day 2010 This literature review is intended to examine existing literature on the international refugee regime and its three durable solutions, of which resettlement is one. This section encompasses the following issues: 2.1 Human Migration Theory There is no single, comprehensive theory on human migration patterns (Cohen 1996 cited in Berg, 2009) because of the many factors influencing decisions on migration. Although economics has always played an important role in society, its role in human migration seems less significant. Motives for migration are a complex convergence of other factors, such as security (Taft and Robbing, 1995). Theoretically, migration refers to the movement of person or group from one place of origin to stay in a place of destination with the intention to settle and earn a living (Chantavanich, 2007). By this definition there are two major types of migration: C H A P T E R I I : L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W

32 18 1) Voluntary Migration: Economic migrant leaving his or her established residence to settle away from their place of origin to improve their quality of life. 2) Forced Migration: Asylum seekers, refugees and displaced persons compelled by conflict-induced forced migration. Broadly speaking, forced migration refers to the movement of people who are forced to leave their homes due to armed conflicts or generalized violence where the state is unable or unwilling to protect them (FMO, n.d.). C H A P T E R I I : L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W Forced Displacements: In The Global Migration Crisis by Weiner (1995), forced migration is the means to achieve cultural homogeneity and dominance over another ethnic group. Many post-independence popular movements can be linked to nationalism as newly formed nation states emerge. In some instances the objective of the state is to build a sense of nationalism around a homogenic ethnic identity. This threatens minority groups who become the focus of antagonistic policies of the state that are intended to suppress minority religious, linguistic and cultural identities. In many cases this leads to an exodus of minority groups to their homeland s neighbors. In the case of Burma however, there is widespread agreement that it is a combination of coercive and economic forces that is behind the flow of refugees to camps in Thailand. In many cases, Burmese migrants are subject to forced labor, extortion and land confiscation by the military. The coercive actions of the military

33 lead to widespread poverty and leave the people with few options other than to leave their homes (ibid.). This is challenged by Therese Caouette and Mary Pack (Bosson, 1997), who argue that even though there may be the pretext of economic hardship on the surface, the underlying causes of the displacement of persons in Burma is rooted in persecution and human rights abuses Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Internally Displaced Persons 1) Refugees: Under the 1951 Refugee Convention, a refugee is any person who is outside his or her country of origin or habitual residence and is unwilling to return there owing to: - A well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. - Serious and indiscriminate threats to life, physical integrity or freedom resulting from generalized violence or events seriously disturbing public order (UNHCR, 2005). 2) Asylum Seeker: This term refers to an individual who is seeking international protection whether as on individual or on a group basis (ibid, p. 13), or who crossed a border and has not yet obtained refugee status (Chantavanich, 2007). 3) Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): IDPs are people who have been forced to flee their homes as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, human rights violations, or natural or manmade disasters and who are within the territory of their own country C H A P T E R I I : L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W

34 20 (UNHCR 2005: 14). Additionally, in the Handbook for Applying the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Bosson, 2007), the author notes that in some cases the internal displacement may be caused by a combination of coercive and economic factors (ibid p.7). By these definitions refugees and asylum seekers are forced migrants who flee their homes to escape persecution or conflict, which differs from voluntary migrants who move for economic benefits (Castel and Miller, 2009, p. 188). Whatever the case, the growing number of asylum seekers and refugees has become a political issue in many parts of the West, where it is feared there will be yet another massive wave of migration from developing countries that will strain social welfare systems and alter demographics (ibid.). Curiously, relatively few refugees from the South ever end up resettled in the West. C H A P T E R I I : L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W 2.2 International Refugee Regime: The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol are the key documents guiding the current international regime. The Refugee Convention was the result of negotiations between western countries to deal with the massive number of displaced persons in post-war Europe (Loescher and Monahan, 1989). However, the convention was insufficient for refugee problems outside Europe and therefore necessitated the 1967 Protocol, which removed the time and geographical limitations from the refugee definition (ibid, p. 190).

35 The primary agency for the international refugee regime is UNHCR. It is built upon a collection of conventions, treatise and government and non-governmental organizations that have emerged to support and protect displaced persons from persecution or war (Keely, 2001). The overall objective of the international refugee regime is to provide one of three durable solutions to refugees. The preferred option is voluntary repatriation to their place of origin. Failing that however, are local integration into the country of asylum, or if not possible, resettlement to a third country (ibid). According to, An Introduction to International Protection (UNHCR, 2005) the responsibility to provide protection to displaced persons rests upon both the nations involved and UNHCR. Based on both international human rights law and customary international law the country of asylum would be responsible for providing protection. This is especially the case if the country of asylum is signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention. However, UNHCR is the only international organization with the mandate to protect displaced persons on a global level (ibid.). In 2007 UNHCR introduced A 10-Point Plan of Action, which redefined the approach to global refugee management. Among the ten points of the plan, the seventh point is especially pertinent to refugee protection. It offers a variety of options for providing refugee protection, which are situation dependent. According to this point, both host and receiving country may benefit from international assistance to strengthen national protection capacities (UNHCR, 2007b, p. 4). 21 C H A P T E R I I : L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W

36 C H A P T E R I I : L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W 22 Bali Process: In 2009 there was an initiative for discussion of refugee flows in Asia known as the Bali process. This was a response to increasingly complex global migration patterns that obviated a practical approach. The Bali Process provides a mechanism for member states to engage in dialogue on migration, to examine push-pull factors causing migration and to promote regional cooperation in addressing refugee problems (UNHCR, 2009b). Despite all the initiatives however, UNHCR continues to face a massive refugee problem, especially since there seems to be a globally pervasive attitude that is less tolerance and more hostility. Countries from the North and South alike are closing their doors to refugees (Deardorff, 2009). As a result, the United States and UNHCR have come to a convergence where both parties realize the utility of third country resettlement as a means for a durable solution to protracted refugee situations. The United States is a country that actively supports efforts to provide protection, assistance and durable solutions to refugees (Department of State, 2011). 2.3 International Refugee Protection System Protection of its citizens is the traditional responsibility of the state. However, there are times when governments are unwilling to protect their citizens and instead even persecute them, causing those people to suffer and to flee their homes to seek safety in another country. In situations like this, when governments no longer protect the basic rights of their citizens, the international community becomes involved to ensure respect for basic human

37 rights (UNHCR, 2011). This also requires that another state be assigned responsibility for protecting these rights. In theory, refugees and asylum seekers fall under the protection of international refugee law. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention is intended to uphold non-refoulement of refugees, meaning that a state cannot forcibly repatriate refugees when it is known that their well-being will be threatened (Loescher, 2001). A state has the choice of whether or not to protect refugees on its territory when they are present. In having a choice, International refugee law is thus not only protecting individuals, but also protecting the integrity of the state system (Newman and Van Self, 2003: p. 89) Three Durable Solutions A durable solution for refugees is one that ends the cycle of displacement or life in exile. Traditionally, the three durable solutions are: (1) Voluntary Repatriation: Refugees return to their country of origin in safety and with dignity. (2) Local Integration: The country of asylum grants permanent residency to refugees. (3) Third Country Resettlement: Refugees are transferred from the country of asylum to a third country willing to admit them on a permanent basis. The implications for each solution are: C H A P T E R I I : L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W

38 24 Voluntary repatriation is the durable solution which has historically benefited the largest number of refugees. Resettlement is a key protection tool and a significant burden- and responsibility-sharing mechanism. Local integration is a complex and gradual process and comprises distinct but inter-related legal, economic and socio-cultural dimensions. (UNHCR, 2008a: p. 10) C H A P T E R I I : L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W As mentioned earlier, voluntary repatriation is the first option. Voluntary repatriation requires an international monitoring system to guarantee peace and security to returnees. When repatriation is determined to be not feasible UNHCR will explore the possibility of local integration with the host country. Finally, if refugees are put into a dilemma where they cannot be safely repatriated to their home country and the country of asylum is unwilling to accept their integration into its society is resettlement. Resettlement in effect is a burden-sharing strategy to ease pressure on the country of asylum (UNHCR 2007b). The consensus within the international refugee regime is that the preferred solution is voluntary repatriation (Loescher and Monahan, 1989). However, repatriation to countries of origin ruled by oppressive regimes is a very contentious issue. Human rights agencies often express concern for the physical and economic security of refugees repatriated under these conditions. For the process to succeed, development assistance, in order to create a favorable economic and social environment, must be channeled into those areas to which the refugees wish to return (ibid., p.28).

39 If local integration is a viable solution for the refugees, the key to success is the attitude of the host country and the local authorities. In reality, most states have concerns about letting refugees remain on their territory. This is due to a number of factors, including concerns over impact on government resources, security concerns and concerns regarding migration control (UNHCR, 2005). In Thailand, memory of the Indochina refugee experience is a major source of opposition to local integration of Burmese refugees. In that case, the Kingdom refused local integration of Indochinese refugees because of the economic hardships facing ordinary Thai citizens. The RTG didn t have the capacity to absorb yet more poor people (Songprasert, 1998). For Burmese refugees in Thailand, voluntary repatriation and local integration are not viable options. The situation in Burma makes voluntary repatriation impossible. RTG policy toward Burmese refugees living in Thailand makes local integration of Burmese refugees into Thai society equally impractical. Third country resettlement appears to be the only remaining option for providing a durable solution to the protracted refugee status of Thailand s Burmese refugees. 2.5 Third Country Resettlement When voluntary repatriation and local integration are not feasible, third country resettlement becomes the default option. The most receptive countries for resettlement of refugees include the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. However, 25 C H A P T E R I I : L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W

40 26 before they can be resettled refugees still must meet the resettlement criteria of both UNHCR and the destination country (UNHCR, 2001). According to UNHCR, resettlement is defined as, [it] involves the selection and transfer of refugees from a state in which they have sought protection to a third state which has agreed to admit them as refugees with permanent residence status (UNHCR, 2004a; p. 2). Resettlement not only brings refugees protection, but also resolves their protracted refugee status. Moreover, it also reflects burden-sharing between the recipient country and developing countries (ibid). C H A P T E R I I : L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W 2.6 Resettlement and Protection: UNHCR and the international resettlement agencies have eight prioritized categories for resettlement (Loescher and Milner, 2006): Refugees with legal and physical protection problems in the country of asylum Women at risk, especially female-headed households who do not benefit from traditional support structure Survivors of violence and torture Medically vulnerable cases Unaccompanied minors Elderly refugees Refugee with family members abroad Refugees with no local integration prospects in their country of first asylum

41 2.7 Protracted Refugee Situations (PRS) The term PRS refers to a refugee population of 25,000 or more persons who have been in a displaced state for five consecutive years or more, excluding Palestinians refugees, who fall under the mandate of UNRWA (UNHCR, 2004b). The issue of PRS has become a major problem for UNHCR as it seeks to improve conditions for the world s long-term refugees in spite of running a large financial deficit (UNHCR 2008b). Currently there are 10.3 million refugees in 30 countries that can be categorized as PRS. To improve the situation, UNHCR is devising strategies to strengthen the self-reliance of refugees, as well as provide basic education and development (UNHCR, 2011). The long-term nature of PRS also leads to security concerns by the country of asylum, and there are even regional security implications. To help alleviate the situation in Thailand, the United States began to accept Burmese refugees in six focus areas in 2005 (BPRM, n.d.). The U.S. resettlement program was implemented in 2005 in cooperation with UNHCR and the RTG. According to IOM, in 2010 the program reached the 62,000 milestone for Burmese refugees in Thailand resettled to the United States (Lom, 2010). Resettlement can be considered as a type of migration made possible by the cooperation between UNHCR, the country of asylum and the country of resettlement. On the receiving end, the resettlement of refugees is a foreign policy issue, suggesting that their voluntary reception reflects the implicit political intent and consequence, such as the Indochinese refugees who were 27 C H A P T E R I I : L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W

42 28 given widespread international support in the 1970s and 1980s (Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo, 1989: p.176). C H A P T E R I I : L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W 2.8. The Push and Pull of Forced Migration Push and pull factors are behind the motivations that cause people to flee their homelands. This is yet another perspective from which to view the refugee issue, putting it among war, repression and external intervention. Push factors tend to be negative conflict, political instability, social inequalities and a lack of economic opportunities in the home country. On the other hand, pull factors are generally positive and are based upon the positive aspects of the asylum country, such as higher standard of living, employment opportunities, safety and freedom of expression. Additionally, ethnic and migrant networks also play an important role in mobilizing refugee movements (Loescher, 1993). Theoretically it could be said, if you are pushed you are a refugee and if you are pulled you are an ordinary migrant (ibid, p.16). The push-pull approach has become a topic of debate for policy makers as they attempt to assess the motivation causing refugees to leave their home country, especially when their home country is poor. Refugee flows have become increasingly complex and there is a linkage to the global pattern of migration from South to North (Loescher and Monahan, 1989). This linkage contributes to create the sense of a grey area between politically motivated refugee flight and economically motivated migration.

43 2.9 National Interest and National Security In State System and the Humanitarian Regime (Loescher and Monahan, 1989), political fashion is identified as a major force in humanitarian action. There are two streams in society; emotions of conscience and the state system. Normally the former is held in check by the latter. States are on the opposite side of the humanitarian spectrum from emotional conscience because states are devoid of sentiment and have no friends. States only have interests (ibid, p. 64). State behavior is assumed to be motivated by the pursuit of national interests. As rational actors, the pursuit of national interests by states would avoid intervention in humanitarian and refugee situations. National Security, similar to national interest, is the concept that certain core values of the state must be protected. According to Alangappa, the object of national security is preservation of the state (1987, p.14). The question of whether or not and to what extent national security has been violated depends on the perspective of the state s decision makers. National Security has no real bounds either, since it involves both national and international dynamics (ibid). The existence of refugees in an asylum country can certainly have national security implications, especially when there is the presence of armed wings (Loescher, Betts and Milner, 2008). Refugees may cause concerns for economic security as local residents perceive unfair access to humanitarian benefits and competition for employment in the local economy. There is also 29 C H A P T E R I I : L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W

44 30 a link between crime and insecurity in areas that host large numbers of refugees (ibid.). C H A P T E R I I : L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W 2.10 Complexity of Forced Migration Anybody who flees their homeland for economic reasons is not recognized as a refugee. This reflects the complexity in defining refugees. To this day, the international refugee regime continues to ignore economic refugees and other vulnerable groups, such as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). UNHCR doesn t even have a definition for IDPs, partially because IDPs are so difficult to define operationally (Barnet, 2002: p.11). However, poverty and severe economic underdevelopment play are significant factors in refugee flows in the Third World. Authoritarian rule and government instability combine to aggravate economic development (Hakovirta, 1993). Government mismanagement can lead to crisis and resistance. Military governments allocate large swaths of their budget to procuring armaments while ignoring social welfare (ibid). On top of this is the ineffectiveness of the international refugee regime in dealing with the root causes of the refugee problem. Normally the regime will refrain from intervening into a state s internal politics (Loescher and Monahan, 1989). These overlapping obstacles create a very complex situation in which there are no easy solutions for the global refugee problem.

45 CHAPTER III RATIONALE OF THAI GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS DISPLACED PERSONS FROM BURMA Conflicts create refugees, but refugees also create conflicts (Weiner 1995: p. 137) 3.1 Background: Thailand s Role as Host to Refugees Thailand has been a host to refugees since at least the Vietnam War, when refugees from the Kingdom s two neighbors looked to Thailand as a sanctuary from violence and upheaval. The massive influx of refugees during this period easily makes it the most recognized refugee group in Thai history. The precise number of Lao, Cambodian and even Vietnamese refugees entering Thailand from the 1970s until the early 1990s is unknown, but it is believed to have easily surpassed one million persons (Loescher, 1989). The RTG took a stern position toward the Indochinese refugees both because of the concerns they raised about Thailand s national security and because of the difficult state of Thailand s economy at the time. The presence of massive numbers of refugees on Thai soil was seen as a real threat, making local integration all but impossible. The only feasible solution to the Indochinese refugee problem was third country resettlement (Songprasert, 1988). C H A P T E R I I i : R A T I O N A L E O F T H A I G O V E R N M E N T P O L I C Y T O W A R D S D I S P L A C E D P E R S O N S F R O M B U R M A

46 C H A P T E R I I i : R A T I O N A L E O F T H A I G O V E R N M E N T P O L I C Y T O W A R D S D I S P L A C E D P E R S O N S F R O M B U R M A 32 As the Indochina war raged o in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, the RTG established large-scale refugee camps along its eastern border. These camps came complete with basic humanitarian services and quickly became a burden to the already overwhelmed RTG. Deciding that it would no longer maintain humanitarian services for Indochinese refugees, the RTG introduced the Humane Deterrence Policy to limit refugee flow into Thailand. This was motivated by the perception and even fear that refugees were seeking to resettle in Thailand and were fleeing economic hardship rather than an imminent threat (Loescher and Monahan, 1989). The Humane Deterrence Policy had three main elements: refugees were restricted to living only within established refugee camps, new arrivals would be denied the opportunity to resettle in Thailand and the arrival of new refugees would be prohibited (ibid.) Although draconian, the policy was successful in curbing the in-flow of refugees. The number of new arrivals from Laos in 1981 was about half that of the previous year and the arrival of Vietnamese boat people also dropped off considerably (ibid.). Part of the policy s success was likely due to the prohibition on resettlement in Thailand, which must have acted as a disincentive. In 1979 repatriation was introduced as an alternative and in 1983 UNHCR began to encourage repatriation of Indochinese refugees (Chantavanich, 1988). By 1993, the Indochinese refugee situation had dissipated considerably with virtually all refugees having either voluntarily returned home or having been repatriated to a third country. After signing the Paris Peace Accords in 1993 that

47 officially put an end to the civil war in Cambodia, the RTG prohibited any further refugee arrivals into Thailand (Risser, 1996) Thai Policy on Displaced Persons From Burma Despite its considerable experience in hosting refugees, Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and lacks any kind of formal asylum law. Learning from its experience with Indochinese refugees, the RTG deliberately avoids any move that would internationalize refugee situations on its territory because of the concern that it will be more difficult to persuade refugees to voluntarily repatriate (go home on their own) (HRW, 1998; Muntarbhorn, 1992). Nonetheless, the internal conflict in Burma has created another refugee problem for Thailand, mostly ethnic Karen and Karenni. The RTG s Security Policy establishes the framework through which Thailand approaches security issues and emphasizes cooperative engagement with neighboring countries and regional communities (NSC, 2010). This cooperative engagement with neighbors can be seen in the manner in which the RTG does not recognize asylum seekers from Burma as refugees because of the negative fallout it would cause (Berg, 2009). Instead, the RTG avoids contentious international legal issues by categorizing them as displaced persons from fighting. Moreover, the last Thai law related to the Burmese refugee issue is the 1979 Immigration Act. Under this law all undocumented asylum seekers are considered illegal immigrants and are subject to deportation (HRW, 1998). The RTG avoids any C H A P T E R I I i : R A T I O N A L E O F T H A I G O V E R N M E N T P O L I C Y T O W A R D S D I S P L A C E D P E R S O N S F R O M B U R M A

48 34 type of formal legal framework and instead issues policy related to Burmese refugees through cabinet resolutions (Pongsawat, 2007). The policy making process for Burmese displaced persons is administered by a joint body known as the Sub-committee for Displaced Persons. The ministries and departments represented on the sub-committee are the Foreign Affairs Division of MOI, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and the NSC (Vungsiriphisal et al, 2011). The deputy district governors of the temporary shelters, who are subordinate to MOI, implement the policies formulated by the subcommittee. C H A P T E R I I i : R A T I O N A L E O F T H A I G O V E R N M E N T P O L I C Y T O W A R D S D I S P L A C E D P E R S O N S F R O M B U R M A Cold War: : According to Jirattikorn (2001), Thai policy toward Burmese refugees during the Cold War was largely shaped by the omnidirection of security-oriented policy. Fearing communism, the RTG viewed the ethnic minority insurgency as a form of buffer state. NakornSivali (2001) also describes the omni-direction during the period and argues that the government had security first, economic prosperity second mentality (p. 90) Post-Cod War: From battlefield to marketplace The turning point in Thai policy toward Burma s ethnic minorities occurred during the leadership of Chartchai Chunhawan, who served as Prime Minister of Thailand from 1988 until During this period the Open Door Economic Policy was formulated, paving the way toward constructive engagement and putting national security concerns behind considerations of mutual benefit

49 with Burma. Thai investment in Burma increased steadily. Proceeds from the investment improved the finances of Burma s military government, allowing it to purchase more weapons with which to fight ethnic guerillas. As the military situation improved for the government and worsened for the ethnic guerillas, there was a significant increase in the number of displaced persons from Burma seeking sanctuary in Thailand. This occurred at the same time as an economic bubble in Thailand that had led to a construction boom. The demand for laborers led to a concurrent wave of Burmese migrants hoping for employment in the Thai construction industry (Jirattikorn, 2001). Despite mounting pressure from the international community to apply sanctions to Burma, Thai policy makers during the period resisted, believing that sharing a long border with Burma made sanctions especially impractical for Thailand. According to Boonma-klee (1997), the Chatchai Government believed that the sanctions were a western concept and not applicable to Thailand. In effect, Thailand s policy toward Burma was based on economic and security considerations, and not on any concern for human rights. The RTG continued to cooperate with the Burmese Government, believing that its approach would encourage human rights and strengthen regional stability (Sivilai, 2001). From 1984 until 1987 the RTG would not permit UNHCR or ICRC access to Burmese refugees in Thailand with the exception of permitting the protection of Burmese student activists ((Muntarbhorn, 1992). However, in 1984 it invited the Committee for the Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT) and NGOs to 35 C H A P T E R I I i : R A T I O N A L E O F T H A I G O V E R N M E N T P O L I C Y T O W A R D S D I S P L A C E D P E R S O N S F R O M B U R M A

50 36 provide basic humanitarian assistance to Burmese refugees in Thailand. The Thai MOI expected their presence to be short-term since it was being careful not to provide so many amenities that it would serve to draw refugees (TBBC, n.d.). Specifically, the RTG was opposed to a UNHCR presence because it believed UNHCR would serve as a pull factor as they believed it had with the Indochinese refugees. The RTG feared that UNHCR would attract a massive wave of refugees that would be a burden to Thailand and would undermine relations with Burma (Vatcharcup, 2001). C H A P T E R I I i : R A T I O N A L E O F T H A I G O V E R N M E N T P O L I C Y T O W A R D S D I S P L A C E D P E R S O N S F R O M B U R M A UNHCR and Displaced Persons from Burma: As pressure from the international community mounted, Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai officially invited UNHCR to Thailand in UNHCR would act as observers to the screening and registration processes in the Burmese refugee camps. The RTG also agreed to allow UNHCR to provide protection to Burmese refugees under three conditions (Sivilai, 2001: p.98): 1) Displaced persons from Burma are permitted on Thai soil on a temporary basis for temporary safe shelter based on humanitarian concern. 2) The areas will be recognized as temporary shelters and not as refugee camps, and displaced persons are only permitted to reside within these shelters. 3) Once fighting has ceased and the peace process is resumed all displaced persons must return to Burma. The Kingdom of Thailand will facilitate and assist their return with safety and dignity.

51 Following this agreement, the official screening and status determination body known as the Provincial Admission Board (PAB) was established. In 2003 the Appeal Board was established, and in 2005 the MOI signed a Memorandum of Understanding with UNHCR to create a registration system for Burmese displaced persons living in temporary shelters in Thailand (Vungsiriphisal et al, 2011) Refugee Registration Process in Thailand UNHCR has assisted MOI in all activities related to the process of refugee registration and status determination since Around MOI and UNHCR established a new border-wide registration system to handle the influx of asylum seekers along the Thai-Burma border (TBBC, 2010a). Approval criteria vary according to the specific considerations of the PAB in each province. Steps in the PAB screening process are as follows (Chantavanich, 2010): (1) Thai authorities explain process to asylum seekers (2) Screening Task Force classifies and registers personal data (3) PAB determines whether or not applicant is person fleeing from fighting (4) Screen-in persons are accepted to stay temporarily in the shelter (5) Screen-in persons unable to return to Burma are permitted to wait for third country resettlement C H A P T E R I I i : R A T I O N A L E O F T H A I G O V E R N M E N T P O L I C Y T O W A R D S D I S P L A C E D P E R S O N S F R O M B U R M A

52 38 (6) Screen-out persons are sent to holding area for deportation, where they can submit a petition for reconsideration C H A P T E R I I i : R A T I O N A L E O F T H A I G O V E R N M E N T P O L I C Y T O W A R D S D I S P L A C E D P E R S O N S F R O M B U R M A Group Resettlement in the United States: present Negotiations for U.S. resettlement began in 2004 when representatives from the U.S. Government met with members of the Thai NSC to discuss the possibility of resettling Burmese refugees in the United States (NSC analyst, pers. Comm., 2011). In 2005 RTG agreed to permit the resettlement of the latest group of Burmese displaced persons to be registered with UNHCR/MOI (ibid). At first it was believed that allowing U.S. resettlement would ease the burden of hosting displaced persons on the RTG as well as address RTG s stance that Burmese displaced persons were authorized to stay in Thailand only on a temporary basis. However, third country resettlement has not led to a significant decrease in camp population. According to the TBBC population database, the number of unregistered refugees from Burma stood at 55,042 in June 2010, or thirty-eight percent of total camp population (TBBC 2010). 3.3 Impact of Thai Government Policy on Resolving Refugee Problem Purpose behind U.S. Resettlement: According to a former OPE field team leader, it appears that there are only two solutions available to the RTG; resettlement or repatriation. Learning from the Indochinese refugee experience, the RTG believed that

53 resettlement to western countries would exacerbate the situation as economic refugees would swell the flow of refugees already headed for Thailand. This consideration led the RTG to avoid resettlement until the situation along the border clearly became a protracted refugee situation, with some displaced people having lived in camps for more than twenty years. Resettlement finally began in 2005 when the United States began to accept admissions in what can be described as burden sharing (pers. Comm., 28 April 2011). Local Integration: During the Indochinese refugee crisis local integration was raised for consideration by international refugee agencies. This was bluntly rejected by the RTG, responding, There is no government in the world daring to give assistance to such an extent while her own people are suffering from hardship (Songprasert, 1998: p.30). This attitude of the RTG continues today. According to the NSC analyst, the RTG s ultimate objective for coping with displaced persons from Burma remains to repatriate them with dignity and safety (NSC Analyst, pers. Comm., 19 Jul 2011). Overpopulated and under developed countries are less likely to accept large numbers of refugees (Kunz, 1981). Developing countries are normally restrictive toward refugees due to concerns of consequent foreign policy problems, risks to political stability and insufficient guarantees of assistance from the international community (Hakovirta, 1986). Moreover, more lenient policies could draw other people living in impoverished conditions or under 39 C H A P T E R I I i : R A T I O N A L E O F T H A I G O V E R N M E N T P O L I C Y T O W A R D S D I S P L A C E D P E R S O N S F R O M B U R M A

54 40 authoritarian regimes to emigrate in the hope of starting over in another country (Weiner 1995). Repatriation: Voluntary repatriation currently remains the preferred solution for Burmese displaced persons by the Thai authorities. Local integration is unacceptable and third country resettlement has not had a significant effect in lowering camp populations. Repatriation with safety is of questionable feasibility and would be an entirely different ordeal. C H A P T E R I I i : R A T I O N A L E O F T H A I G O V E R N M E N T P O L I C Y T O W A R D S D I S P L A C E D P E R S O N S F R O M B U R M A 3.4 Conflict with Hosting Refugees The Burmese refugee problem in Thailand is a source of tension between the two countries. The Burmese military government is suspicious that Thailand is hosting ethnic insurgents and that other political dissidents are living safely in Thailand, outside the reach of Burma s junta. For its part, Thailand has no choice but to accept the burden of Burmese refugees because of pressure from the international community regarding human rights. Thailand is therefore caught in a dilemma between tension with its neighbor on the one hand, and pressure from the international community on the other. Conflicting pressure on the country of asylum from the international community and the country of origin for the refugees is nothing new (Jacobsen, 1996). The international refugee regime often attempts to persuade the receiving country to provide assistance to refugees. In doing so, organizations like UNHCR are under pressure from donor countries. Donors may decrease or withhold contributions to UNHCR and other aid agencies if they are

55 not satisfied with the assistance provided. This pressure is transferred to the host country, which wants to remain in good standing with the international community (ibid). At present, almost all refugee movements originate in the Third World. This presents a challenge to the international refugee regime, since first countries of asylum have their own internal problems such as poverty and political instability and are less able to manage support for refugees (Kritz, 1983). Moreover, the presence of a refugee group in one country may be viewed upon as the sanctuary of a dissident group by the group s country of origin, leading to conflict. 3.5 Conclusion: The refugee policy of the Kingdom of Thailand depends upon the political climate and economic conditions of the time. Nonetheless, Thailand has become the de facto country of asylum for refugees in Southeast Asia time and again and has responded with a harsh stance on refugees to defend its national interests and maintain political stability. Learning from its experience with refugees from Indochina, the RTG s preferred solutions for refugees are voluntary repatriation and third country resettlement. Local integration is not a viable option because of the destabilizing effects it is perceived of having on Thailand s national security and its economy. This is confirmed by interviews with MOI personnel working at Mae La shelter and with the policy analyst from the NSC in Bangkok. 41 C H A P T E R I I i : R A T I O N A L E O F T H A I G O V E R N M E N T P O L I C Y T O W A R D S D I S P L A C E D P E R S O N S F R O M B U R M A

56 42 National policy is about the state and interest. It is natural therefore that states would respond to refugee situations by attempting to contain them and then to resolve the situation by removing the refugees from state territory (Gordenker, 1987). Efforts to contain and end refugee situations in the country of asylum are driven by the objective of protecting national interests. Large in-flows of refugees can be socially and economically disruptive, especially in states already suffering from political instability and economic hardship (Loescher, 1993). In this sense, Thailand is no different. C H A P T E R I I i : R A T I O N A L E O F T H A I G O V E R N M E N T P O L I C Y T O W A R D S D I S P L A C E D P E R S O N S F R O M B U R M A

57 CHAPTER IV UNITED STATES REFUGEE ADMISSIONS PROGRAM AND RESETTLEMENT PROCESS Four years ago I believed that humanitarian relief was above politics. Now I know that humanitarian relief is politics. (Loescher and Monahan, 1989: p. 65) 4.1 Background The United States Congress passed the Refugee Act in 1980 as an effort to provide the permanent authority for admission and assistance to refugees (Chantavanich and Reynolds, 1988). The United States draws millions of refugees from all around the world. Since it s founding, it has sought to project the image of being a symbol of hope where people fleeing oppression might find relief (Loescher, 1993). Refugees from all parts of the world are drawn to the United States because of its cultural diversity, political freedom and economic opportunity. Among Southeast Asian refugees to the United States, the motivation for fleeing their homelands was mostly political, as in the case of Indochinese refugees after the fall of Phnom Penh and Saigon in April The exodus of refugees from Indochina is among the largest refugee movements in modern history (Stein, 1986), and the United States has become home to more than 800,000 of them C H A P T E R I V : U N I T E D S T A T E S R E F U G E E A D M I S S I O N S P R O G R A M A N D R E S E T T L E M E N T P R O C E S S

58 44 (Chantavanuch and Reynolds, 1988). After this massive resettlement, the West has become reluctant to absorb similarly large refugee migrations and has tended to avoid open-ended commitments to further resettle refugees (Loescher, 1989). The United States has drawn its own lessons from the Indochina refugee crisis, causing a readjustment in immigration policy. C H A P T E R I V : U N I T E D S T A T E S R E F U G E E A D M I S S I O N S P R O G R A M A N D R E S E T T L E M E N T P R O C E S S 4.2 United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP): The key U.S. government stakeholders in the resettlement program are the Department of State (DoS), Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (BPRM) and the office of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS/USCIS). BPRM is tasked with coordinating USRAP and with determining which individuals and groups worldwide are eligible for resettlement in The United States. Over fifty different nationalities are resettled each year, including Burmese refugees starting in The U.S. resettlement program is a useful instrument for resolving protracted refugee situations in focus areas. According to BPRM, protracted refugee situations arise from political constraints that prevent refugees from returning home safely or in integrating into their countries of asylum. The U.S. government aims to resolve these situations out of humanitarian concern. Burmese refugees in Thailand are considered among the focus areas of the resettlement program. The United States immigration policy permits legal entry to migrants, asylum seekers and resettled refugees. After one year of

59 residence in the United States resettled refugees are eligible for upgrading their status to permanent resident (Green Card Immigrant) and are exempted from the annual ceiling that the United States has in place for issuing green cards (Newman and Van Self, 2003). Each year the United States establishes ceilings for worldwide refugee admissions. Since they are ceilings and not quotas they are not required to exactly meet ceiling targets (UNHCR, 2009c). Below is the proposed ceiling for refugee admissions to the United States for Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 for East Asia, including refugees from Thailand: 45 Figure II: USRAP FY 2011 Proposed Ceilings for East Asia Source: DoS, 2011 According to Section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the resettlement program allocates admissions to refugees of special humanitarian concern as determined by the President after C H A P T E R I V : U N I T E D S T A T E S R E F U G E E A D M I S S I O N S P R O G R A M A N D R E S E T T L E M E N T P R O C E S S

60 46 appropriate consultation (DoS, 2011). There are three priority categories as well as Visa 93 that are processed through USRAP: C H A P T E R I V : U N I T E D S T A T E S R E F U G E E A D M I S S I O N S P R O G R A M A N D R E S E T T L E M E N T P R O C E S S Priority 1 Individual cases referred to the resettlement program. Priority 1 allows consideration of refugee claims from persons of any nationality in any location. Priority 1 refugees often have compelling protection needs making resettlement appear to be an appropriate solution for them. With its international mandate for protection of refugees, UNHCR refers the majority of cases in this category to USRAP, but cases can also be identified by a U.S. Embassy or a designated NGO (ibid). Priority 2 Group Referrals Priority 2 refers to group cases. Group referrals are normally based on UNHCR recommendation using eligibility criteria applicable to individuals in specific locations. Specific groups (by nationality, ethnicity or clan) are identified as being in need of resettlement. Once the U.S. agrees to permit resettlement of the group in the United States, UNHCR or another referring entity would furnish applicant bio data for processing. Often predefined groups are composed of persons with similar persecution claims. Burmese refugees in Thailand fall into this category. Priority 3 Family Reunification On an individual basis applicants may be granted permission to resettle in the United States for reunification with anchor family members. This category allows resettlement of members

61 of designated nationalities who have immediate family members living in the United States who originally entered as refugees or were granted asylum. BPRM determines eligible nationalities for processing each fiscal year. Burmese is one of the nationalities eligible for this category (ibid). 47 Visa 93 Family Reunification Following-To-Join Petitions Visa 93 is the category of petition for immediate family members of individuals who entered the United States under USRAP. The spouse and any unmarried minor children of a refugee receive refugee status on a derivative basis, as long as the relationship existed prior to the entry of the original refugee (UNHCR, 2009c). The process is initiated when a refugee arrives in the United States. He or she can request a petition for following-to-join for his or her spouse and unmarried children under twenty-one years of age (ibid). The difference between Visa 93 and Priority 3 is that Visa 93applies to any nationality. 4.3 US Resettlement: Selection, Transfer and Protection Selection: The U.S. definition of a refugee derives from the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which closely adheres to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Under certain circumstances the definition can be specified by the President to apply to certain persons in their home country. An applicant desiring admission must meet the following criteria (UNHCR, 2002): C H A P T E R I V : U N I T E D S T A T E S R E F U G E E A D M I S S I O N S P R O G R A M A N D R E S E T T L E M E N T P R O C E S S

62 48 1. Meets the definition of a refugee contained in Section 101(a)(42) of the INA; 2. Be among those refugees determined by the President to be of special humanitarian concern to the United States; 3. Be otherwise admissible under U.S. law; and 4. Not be firmly resettled in any third country C H A P T E R I V : U N I T E D S T A T E S R E F U G E E A D M I S S I O N S P R O G R A M A N D R E S E T T L E M E N T P R O C E S S Background Check: Prior to interviewing with DHS all refugee applicants are required to undergo background security checks. DHS conducts the security checks in partnership with the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (DoS, 2011). Eligibility under USRAP in Mar La Shelter: Only registered refugees in the camps who have been referred by UNHCR or by the U.S. Embassy are eligible for USRAP. Registered refugees achieve their status through the Thai MOI. Refugees who have not been registered through the MOI process are not eligible for USRAP (OPE, 2009). Priority-2 Cut-off Date: Due to their flight from conflict in their homeland, Burmese refugees are categorized as Priority-2. The registration cutoff date for admission in all nine temporary shelters has already been finalized. For Mae La the eligible registration date is June 27, 2006 (OPE, 2009). This means that any registration after July 27, 2006 is ineligible for the current USRAP. The cutoff dates in the other temporary shelters vary by location according to the considerations of each camp s respective PAB.

63 The Mae La PAB ceased consideration of refugees for admission in Refugees arriving after 2007 have been categorized as pending PAB consideration, meaning that they are unregistered refugees but are still living in the shelter. If the Mae La PAB resumes the registration process UNHCR and MOI will begin to screen new arrivals for PAB submission. Observing the reduced pace of PAB, the NSC policy analyst suggests that it may be due to the fact that the provincial district governors are preoccupied with other duties and have limited time for PAB approval (NSC Policy Analyst, 19 July 2011). Transfer: Processing Times: Time required to process resettlement packages varies according to several factors including the capacity of individual U.S. immigration officers and turnaround for security and individual background checks. For Burmese refugees in Thailand, a rough estimate of six to ten months is given (OPE, 2009). However, emergency cases can be expedited and completed more quickly. Before departure to the United States, time must also be given for a cultural orientation of the United States to prepare refugees for what will become a life-altering event (DoS, 2011). Transportation: U.S. DoS funds transportation costs through IOM. Refugees admitted to the United States are provided interest free loans to cover transportation and resettlement costs. They must begin to repay the loans within six months of arrival in the United States. Besides the loan, USRAP pays for basic living expenses for the first thirty days as well as for English language classes and 49 C H A P T E R I V : U N I T E D S T A T E S R E F U G E E A D M I S S I O N S P R O G R A M A N D R E S E T T L E M E N T P R O C E S S

64 50 for health services (OPE, 2009). The U.S. Government emphasizes that refugees should become self-sufficient as quickly as possible (ibid). C H A P T E R I V : U N I T E D S T A T E S R E F U G E E A D M I S S I O N S P R O G R A M A N D R E S E T T L E M E N T P R O C E S S Protection: According to the U.S. Government, the definition of protection refers to any of the activities that provide safety, meet basic needs or secure the rights of refugees in the places to which they have fled (BPRM, n.d.). In some cases, U.S. resettlement enhances the opportunity to expedite refugees who are considered at risk, and their processing is expedited. In order for a case to be expedited however, it must be referred by UNHCR. Aside from emergency cases, there are other special categories intended to address situations with unique concerns (UNHCR, 2002): 1. Refugees with medical needs 2. Survivors of violence and torture 3. Women at risk 4. Minors: children who are following to join refugee parents in the United States, or unaccompanied minors who seek admission to the United States without parents Family Reunification Refugees: Family unity is an important element of USRAP, so certain family members are permitted to join relatives in the United States by way of Priority-3 and Visa 93. All family reunification cases count against the annual regional refugee admission ceiling (ibid).

65 4.4 US Policy after 9/11: Increased Burden on Refugees Major concerns were raised about U.S. immigration policy in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in For FY 2002 and FY2003 there was a distinct drop in refugee admissions to the United States (Saleyhan, 2008). In addition, the Patriot Act 1 came into law in October 2001, authorizing the U.S. government with new powers to fight terrorism. A consequence of the Patriot Act has been that applicants from Muslim countries now face much more scrutiny and suspicion than before (ibid). There have also been consequences for Burmese refugees seeking resettlement in the United States. Some applicants have been denied entry because of suspected affiliation to certain rebel movements that the U.S. Government categorizes as terrorist organizations. Since USRAP began operations in 2005, this sort of restriction has effectively blocked resettlement in the United States affiliated with such prominent rebel movements as KNU, NLD and NLD-LA. There is a significant difference in context between the current situation of Burmese refugees in Thailand and the refugee crisis that was generated by the Vietnam War. The U.S. Government views armed ethnic groups in Burma with concern and blocks the resettlement to the United States of anybody affiliated with them because it considers them terrorist organizations. In stark contract, 1 Officially, USA PATRIOT Act, the name is actually an acronym probably devised by a congressional staffer, which in its long form is, Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism. 51 C H A P T E R I V : U N I T E D S T A T E S R E F U G E E A D M I S S I O N S P R O G R A M A N D R E S E T T L E M E N T P R O C E S S

66 52 the U.S. military and CIA worked closely with ethnic minorities in Laos and Vietnam during the Vietnam War and the U.S. Government encouraged their resettlement to the United States after the war. Nonetheless, in 2008 some groups were removed from the U.S. terrorist list including KNU and NLD, but other more extreme groups remain a concern (former OPE team leader, pers. Comm., 28 April 2011). C H A P T E R I V : U N I T E D S T A T E S R E F U G E E A D M I S S I O N S P R O G R A M A N D R E S E T T L E M E N T P R O C E S S 4.5 Overview of USRAP Process There are six major steps for the resettlement of Burmese refugees in the United States (see Figure IV) (OPE, 2009): 1) Refugee is determined to be registered 2) Interested refugee expresses interest in resettlement to UNHCR 3) Refugees are prescreened by OPE 4) Refugees are interviewed by DHS 5) If approved, pre-travel arrangements are made. IOM arranges medical examinations and transportation. DoS provides cultural orientation 6) Upon arrival in the United States, refugees receive assistance from volunteer organizations.

67 Figure III: Diagram Depicting USARP Process for Refugees in Thailand 53 Source: OPE, 2009 C H A P T E R I V : U N I T E D S T A T E S R E F U G E E A D M I S S I O N S P R O G R A M A N D R E S E T T L E M E N T P R O C E S S

68

69 CHAPTER V RESEARCH FINDINGS They may take away our homes; they may take away our land; But they cannot take away our will to survive Klo Say, a Karen refugee Former Mae La resident now resettled in the United States This chapter is divided into two major parts: data collection from residents in Mae La temporary shelter and in-depth interviews with key informants working in refugee relief organizations and the Thai Government. In the first part the interviews with inhabitants of Mae La will illustrate the opinions of displaced persons in temporary shelters with an emphasis on the challenges of USRAP. The second part will reveal the perspectives of key figures involved in the resettlement program at Mae La. 5.1 Mae La Temporary Shelter: Background Information Mae La temporary shelter is located in Tha Song Yang District, Tak Province, Kingdom of Thailand. The camp covers approximately 1,150 rai, or 573 acres. It is divided into three zones (A, B and C), and further divided into sections A1 A5, B1 B5, C1A, C1B and C2 C5 (UNHCR, 2007a). It was first established in 1984 as one of a number of small shelters for refugees fleeing from the fighting in Burma. A decade later, the flow of refugees from Burma increased significantly due to a Burmese Army offensive against armed ethnic C H A P T E R V : R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S

70 56 minority groups. This was followed in 1996 by a massive relocation program initiated by the Burmese Army that moved entire villages to eliminate support for ethnic insurgents like the KNU, and to control ethnic minorities. Between 1984 and 1996 refugees from several other shelters were moved to Mae La, making it the largest temporary shelter on the Thai-Burma border (TBBC, n.d.). The camp s ethnic breakdown is ninety-seven percent Karen, two percent Burman and one percent other minorities (UNHCR, 2007a). The religious composition is forty-seven percent Christian, followed by thirty-eight percent Buddhist, thirteen percent Muslim and two percent Animist (ibid) Demographic Data: Figure IV: Burmese Refugee Camp Population Estimates C H A P T E R V : R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S Source: TBBC 2010a There are two different sets of figures for tabulating the number of displaced persons in temporary shelters. The first set is maintained by the RTG and only records registered refugees, and the second set is the general population maintained by TBBC that

71 also includes unregistered displaced persons arriving after the 2005 MOI/UNHCR registration system was implemented. In 2010 the total registered population according to the Thai authorities stood at 30,278, while the total population recorded by TBBC was 45,692 (TBBC, 2010a). According to the Karen Refugee Committee (KRC) there were 19,759 new arrivals in the Mae La Shelter in 2010 (KRC, 2011). However, the actual population of Mae La fluctuates as refugees come and go for various reasons. During a conversation with the Deputy District Governor in July 2011 it was revealed that the hidden population of Mae La may be as many as 22,000 people. Moreover, approximately 5,000 Mae La residents were not counted in the latest headcount in The reasons that so many people are unaccounted aren t certain, but it is likely that many of them leave the camp to find work Camp Administrative System 1) Security Internal Security: Internal security is under the supervision of the Camp Commander from MOI. External Security: External Security is under the supervision of the 4 th Infantry Task Force, Royal Thai Army, based at Mae Sot. 2) Camp Management KRC based in Mae Sot provides refugee leadership for several camps. They have administrative oversight of seven Karen camps and also have an office in Mae Sot that serves as a headquarters for coordination activities. C H A P T E R V : R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S

72 58 Administration of Mae La camp is overlapping, with KRC, UNHCR and MOI all providing some form of guidance. KRC facilitates communication with the Thai authorities, donors, NGOs and the camp committees. The camp committee is responsible for all aspects of daily camp administration, including reporting new arrivals, births and deaths. Camp Committee: Camp committee members are elected to three-year terms. The committee is comprised of fifteen members and also has subcommittees that focus on areas such as education, health, food distribution, arbitration, women s issues, security and youth. Operationally, the camp leader heads the camp administration. Each zone is administered by a zone leader and zone committees, and each section is under the section of a section leader (MOI, 2011). 5.2 Resettlement and Mae La ShelterFigure V: Resettlement Figures for Mae La Temporary Shelter C H A P T E R V : R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S Source: Mae La Camp Committee, as of July 2011

73 There are currently eleven countries that have been destinations for resettlement of Mae La camp residents. Of the eleven countries, Japan is the newest resettlement destination and the only one in Asia. The resettlement country that has received the most residents from Mae La is the United States, accounting for 85% of the total (MOI, 2011; Mae La Camp Committee, 2011). As of June 2011 more than 22,900 displaced persons have been resettled abroad from Mae La (ibid). With the number of departures from the camp, the registered population has fallen to about 30,000 residents, yet Mae La remains the largest camp along the Thai-Burma border as new arrivals of displaced persons continues Interviews with Mae La Residents During field research conducted in July 2011 data collection consisted of interviews with 40 residents of Mae La Camp. Data was collected from each of Mae La s three zones, with interviewees being selected randomly. All interviewees were assured that their personal information would be handled confidentially. The number of interviews is in numerical order. The demographic breakdown of interviewees is reflected below: Gender: Female 20, Male 20 Ethnicity: Karen 38, Burman 1, Kachin 1 Religion: Christian 16, Buddhist 17, Muslim 7 C H A P T E R V : R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S

74 60 Registered Persons: 20 cases 1) Registered and enrolled in the U.S. resettlement process: 4 cases 2) Registered with no wish to resettle in a third country: 4 cases 3) Registered and waiting to resettle in another third country (Australia): 3 cases 4) Registered and in U.S. resettlement process but some family members are unregistered: 9 cases Unregistered Persons: 20 cases 1) New arrivals or unregistered residents: 14 cases - New arrivals after 2005 MOI/UNHCR registration: 12 cases - Formerly registered in 1999: 2 cases 2) Family reunification and Visa 93 cases: 6 cases C H A P T E R V : R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S Opinions from Registered Displaced Persons 1) Registered and in the USRAP process (4 cases) In general, the registered refugees are satisfied with the current U.S. resettlement program and are waiting for the results of the process. In terms of the future prospects offered by USRAP, a majority of registered refugees in Mae La agree that they want to settle in the United States because they cannot perceive a better future remaining in the camp. There is also one applicant whose case for resettlement in the United States has been pending for more than a year. Interviewee 2 is a registered refugee who fled Burma and has been living with his parents and siblings in the camp for roughly fifteen

75 years. He decided to apply for resettlement in the United States because he believes life would be better and there would be better opportunities for employment with higher wages. He doesn t want to remain in Mae La and doesn t want to return to Burma because there is still fighting. His only problem is that he has been waiting for an unusually long time (since 2008). He was told that his package was being held up by USRAP because his name had been flagged in a name check. Once the name check issue is resolved he plans to leave the camp for resettlement in the United States (pers. Comm., 01 July 2011). 61 2) Registered with no wish to resettle (4 cases) Many of the long-term refugees with registered status prefer to remain in the camp because they feel comfortable in the majority-karen environment of Mae La. They feel that the camp provides adequate security and they do not want to resettle to a third country or go back to Burma. Some of them wish there were better job opportunities for them in Thailand The group seems to be content to remain in the camp as long as they cannot return home. They would also like more freedom to work, if possible. For example, Interviewee 7 has been living in the camp for more than ten years. She is not educated. Her eldest son has already resettled to the United States but she does not want to follow him because she is afraid of life there and she cannot speak English. Her son rarely contacts her so she in unsure of what life is like there or how his life is. She is satisfied with her life in the camp because it is a safe Karen community with adequate food (Interviewee 7, pers. Comm., 05 Jul 2011). C H A P T E R V : R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S

76 C H A P T E R V : R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S 62 3) Registered and wish for resettlement in other countries (Australia): (3 cases) Among the interviewees there were three refugees who would prefer to resettle in Australia rather than the United States. One claimed that they believe that resettlement in the United States would lead to difficulties because they have heard rumors of people having problems after resettlement there, whereas the feedback coming from Australia is that resettled refugees are treated properly there. Interviewee 38 fled Burma more than twenty years ago and is living with his three children in the camp. He says his children want to resettle in Australia, so he will comply with their wish. Although he hasn t made any final decision about resettlement, it seems he wouldn t choose the United States because, I m not healthy and I am uneducated, so I m afraid I would face a hard life in the U.S. When asked about the benefits of Australian resettlement, he replied, I heard that if you don t work, the government still takes care of you (Interviewee 38, Pers. Comm., 07 July 2011). 4) Registered and in USRAP, but some family members are unregistered (9 cases) This group comprises interviewees who are registered and enrolled in USRAP but have one or more family members who are unregistered, making their family member(s) ineligible for USRAP. These families remain in the camp because they do not want to become separated. They are also waiting and hoping for the

77 possibility that they will be able to resettle as a family unit. Many of them would like to appeal to the RTG to seek a waiver based on the principle of family unity. They are hoping that the PAB process will resume and that they will not be separated. Interviewee 31 s entire family is registered and approved for USRAP, except for his seventeen-year old daughter. There is no way he can leave her alone in the camp and up until now there is no alternative that will keep his family together. If they cannot resolve the registration issue for his daughter then they would have to divide the family, with him staying in the camp with his daughter while his wife and the rest of his children resettle in the United States. He explains, This is for the better future of our children. (Interviewee 31, Pers. Comm., 06 July 2011) Similarly, Interviewee 15 is an ethnic Kachin woman with four children. Two of her children are unregistered because they fled to Thailand after the PAB registration process had already been suspended. Her husband decided to resettle in the United States before the rest of the family so that he could find work and earn an income to support them. Her husband departed for the United States in 2007 and filed a family reunification petition for his two unregistered children. Interviewee 15 was interviewed by USRAP as a normal case in 2007, while her unregistered children were interviewed as separate cases (family reunification). Until now, no progress has been made on her unregistered children. She learned subsequently that this is because the RTG does not issue exit permits to unregistered persons. Interviewee expresses that her main concern is for family reunification. Sometimes my 63 C H A P T E R V : R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S

78 64 husband falls ill because there is nobody to look after him while he is alone in the U.S. As a family, we want to take care of each other (Interviewee 15, Pers. Comm., 05 Jul 2011) Opinions from Unregistered Displaced Persons The results of field data collection indicate that the majority of unregistered displaced persons in Mae La are interested in resettling in a third country. All of the unregistered residents interviewed agree that they wish the RTG would re-start the PAB registration process so that they can register and become protected by the international refugee regime. They are also all looking for employment opportunities so that they can earn a living for their families. C H A P T E R V : R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S 1) New arrivals and deregistered residents: (14 cases) - Deregistered residents (2 cases): The refugee registration process was held on two separate occasions at Mae La shelter, in 1999 and Some individuals who took part in the previous registration missed the 2005 MOI/UNHCR registration and as a result were deregistered. One interviewee missed the 2005 registration, while the other interviewee was deregistered because she was implicated in fraudulent resettlement. Interviewee 10 was substituted by her older sister in USRAP. She was registered with her family in 2005, while her older sister was not. When USRAP was initiated in 2005 she was gone from the camp for work. While she was absent her sister used her UNHCR

79 household registration to enroll in USRAP and go to the United States. She was subsequently deregistered by PAB and become ineligible for USRAP. When asked if she wanted to resettle in the Unite States she replied, Yes, I believe resettlement is the best choice because my son would gain a better education. Besides, I would have a chance to work and earn more money. Considering her deregistered status, she admits that she lost the opportunity to resettle in the United States (Interviewee 10, pers. Comm., 05 July 2011). - New arrivals after the 2005 MOI/UNHCR registration: (12 cases): The number of unregistered persons in Mae La is remarkably high, possibly as many as 22,000 persons, as mentioned by the deputy district governor. Therefore, the researcher interviewed a large number of unregistered persons and found out that many of them wish for a better life. Interviewee 32 fled to Thailand in 2006 with his family and all of them are unregistered. He explains that the Burmese Army forced the people to do hard labor or to pay a tax. Unable to bear the injustice, he fled for Thailand. When he thinks about it in terms of rule of law and protection he feels that life in Burma is awful because of the way the authorities abuse the Karen people. He says that in Mae La shelter its better than Burma because at least in the shelter he isn t abused and they are given food rations every month. Still, the camp regulations don t function properly. In his opinion, resettlement to a third country would be the best option because he would have legal residency status and 65 C H A P T E R V : R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S

80 66 would have the protection of a well-functioning legal system. More importantly, he believes that his children would have better educational opportunities. He expects PAB to resume registering refugees because it is fair for unregistered persons to be given the appropriate refugee status. He believes conditions will improve, too and that refugees will gain more freedom than they currently enjoy; I know I cannot become a Thai citizen, but at least please provide me with basic rights and freedom (Interviewee 32, pers. Comm., 07 Jul 2011). C H A P T E R V : R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S 2) Family reunification (Priority-3 or Visa 93): (6 cases) This category comprises unregistered residents in Mae La who have been enrolled in USRAP through the Family Reunification Program. All of them are being processed as Priority-3 or Visa 93 cases after being petitioned for by family members already in the United States. This category not only addresses husband-wife separations, but also some cases when parents leave their unregistered children behind. All interviewees agreed that a decision was made as a family to let registered members go ahead to resettle in the United States because they believe that it would bring about a better future. More importantly, they believe that life will improve and become more secure after resettlement because they will obtain legal residency status. Four of these interviewees have been sponsored by spouses and have completed the entire USRAP process. Their departure from Mae La is on hold however, as the RTG considers whether or not to issue exit permits to unregistered persons. The other two interviewees are at the beginning of their family reunification cases

81 and are aware of the obstacle presented by the RTG s regulation regarding exit permits for unregistered persons. All of the interviewees are hopeful that the RTG will sympathize with their circumstances and assist in reunifying their families. Interviewee 18 is a Karen refugee whose wife and two children have resettled in the United States. He claims that he fled Burma for Mae La in 2004, but that he was outside the camp during the MOI/UNHCR registration in When he returned to the camp in 2006, he and his wife agreed to separate the family and shortly afterward she left with all of their children for resettlement in the United States. Once she reached the United States she filed a petition to sponsor him on a Visa 93. He completed the process and has been cleared to move to the United States but has been stuck in Mae La for the last four years because his unregistered status makes him ineligible for an exit permit. Living apart from his family, he expresses concern for their welfare and his desire to be reunited. I just want to stay with my family, with freedom and right to life (Interviewee 18, pers. Comm., 05 July 2011). The reunification of Burmese refugee families separated by the resettlement process should increase in the future. Several interviewees who have successfully been processed through USRAP have been waiting as long as four years for an exit stamp from the RTG. It is hopeful that in the near future the RTG will cooperate more fully with the refugee agencies and help to reunite the families of Burmese refugees. 67 C H A P T E R V : R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S

82 Perspectives from Key Informants on USRAP In-depth interviews have been used to collect detailed information and clarify government positions regarding Burmese displaced persons and USRAP. The interviews were conducted with key informants, including officers from the U.S. Embassy, OPE, IOM, the deputy district governor at Mae La camp and a policy analyst at NSC in Bangkok. In-depth interviews were also conducted with the Mae La camp committee. C H A P T E R V : R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S Resettlement Fraud Resettlement Fraud is essentially when an individual or individuals misrepresent their refugee status to obtain resettlement when they would not otherwise be entitled to it (UNHCR, 2008c). During field research, several key informants mentioned that resettlement fraud is one of the significant difficulties arising from USRAP. The issue has been confirmed by the Mae La camp leader, a camp zone leader, a former OPE team leader and is even included in an MOI report titled, Summary Document: Mae La Temporary Shelter (2011). According to the former OPE team leader, fraudulent applicants were a major problem for USRAP, and approximately 75% of the fraudulent cases occurred in Mae La (pers. Comm., 28 April 2011; TBBC, 2010). In response to allegations of fraud, UNHCR conducted an investigation in 2009 and suspended the resettlement program in Mae La for six months as a punitive sanction (ibid). Following the incident, training of UNHCR and NGO staffs involved in the resettlement has been improved to make

83 them more vigilant on resettlement fraud. Once the resettlement program was resumed the number of reported fraudulent cases has declined and the UNHCR response seems to have been successful (ibid). Because of the confidential nature of the topic, no other information was available Resettlement Pull Factor The significant numbers of Burmese refugees departing Mae La for resettlement in third countries has not led to a decrease in camp population because as resettling refugees depart, new refugees arrive at the camp to take their place. According to the TBBC population database, as of June % of the combined population of all camps are unregistered refugees (TBBC, 2010). As the flow of refugees continues seemingly unabated, there is the growing perception that Burmese refugees are drawn to Thailand by the opportunity to be resettled in a western country. The resettlement program can be perceived by the country of asylum as a pull factor when camp populations and refugee inflows remain steady. The Mae La camp leader partially agrees with this point. He claims that when USRAP was launched in Mae La in 2007 there was a significant upsurge in new arrivals from Burma. At Mae La alone there were 38,000. The in-flow only began to decline once new arrivals realized that eligibility was not easy to come by due to lengthy PAB process and unfriendly policies by the Thai authorities. Of the new arrivals that subsequently left Mae La, some went on to become migrant workers in Thailand while others returned to Burma. Still however, C H A P T E R V : R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S

84 70 new arrivals continue to come to Mae La as the conflict inside Burma continues (Mae La Camp Leader, pers. Comm., 04 Jul 2011). On the other hand, zone leaders and section leaders disagree, claiming instead that Burmese refugees are being pushed into Thailand by the ongoing conflict. Moreover, most new arrivals seem to be aware that they are not eligible for USRAP, since it is only for registered refugees (Mae La zone leader, pers. Comm., 06 Jul 2011). The section leader stated, Even though there is no resettlement people would come to Mae La anyway because the Burmese government always oppresses people (Mae La section leader, pers. Comm., 07 July 2011). C H A P T E R V : R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S 5.4.3Protection, a Durable Solution and Burden Sharing Among Mae La residents there is a fairly common perception that USRAP leads to a positive future because of the success stories they have heard from those who have already resettled in the United States. An important concept to the Mae La residents who were interviewed is protection. Protection is perceived as being legally recognized in the country of resettlement, the right to work and the right to move about the country of resettlement freely in search of work. Many interviewees believe that life would be more secure in resettlement countries. U.S. Resettlement: Burden-sharing? According to the deputy district governor of Mae La, third country resettlement has succeeded as a burden-sharing mechanism because it reduced the registered population in Mae La. However,

85 he also notes that the total number of departures has not reduced the general population because of new arrivals and newborns. Moreover, resettlement is voluntary and many of the refugees are not interested in third country resettlement: From my point of view resettlement should be compulsory, e.g. set up the timeframe that within five years you have to decide whether to apply for third country resettlement, or else return to your country (Deputy District Governor at Mae La, pers. Comm., 01 July 2011). An officer from the NSC also states that the primary goal of RTG permitting USRAP is to function as a burden-sharing mechanism. Theoretically this would lead to camp closure at some point in the future. In 2004, negotiations to launch USRAP were looked at positively as a sign that the program would help to reduce the burden and responsibility on Thailand. From the point of view of the analyst, the resettlement program seems to work well, but there are still too many Burmese refugees who are either ineligible or uninterested in the program. In Kanchanaburi Province for example, only half of the residents in its camp expressed interest in the program (NSC policy analyst, pers. Comm, 19 Jul 2011). Arguably, the effectiveness of the program in burden sharing remains questionable to Thai authorities. According to the refugee coordinator at the U.S. Embassy however, the question of the effectiveness of burden-sharing 71 C H A P T E R V : R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S

86 72 should be limited to registered Burmese refugees only, since they are the genuine protracted refugees that are the primary concern of the program. USRAP has significantly reduced this category of refugee, although there has been a recent wave of new arrivals. Solving the entire refugee problem in Thailand will be a step-bystep process (Refugee Coordinator, U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, pers. Comm., 22 July 2011). C H A P T E R V : R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S Significance The United States is the largest resettlement country in the world. Aside from the high number of refugees admitted every year, USRAP also imposes fewer limitations and qualifications on screening criteria. The Mae La camp leader agrees that USRAP is effective, in part because the program imposes so few conditions making virtually every registered resident eligible for the program (Mae La camp leader, pers. Comm., 04 Jul 2011). This conforms with my personal observation that whether a refugee was registered or not, there was widespread agreement that the program offered the opportunity to become free of their protracted refugee situation and to pursue a better future. USRAP fulfills another important role for the residents of the camp. According to the former OPE team leader, during the Indochinese refugee crisis a change in U.S. resettlement policy would always have implications for other resettlement programs. He believes that if USRAP slows it will trigger a cycle where 1) it will be the first country to terminate its resettlement program, 2) other third country resettlement programs will follow, 3) RTG and UNHCR would reconsider the repatriation program and 4) voluntary

87 repatriation would lead to camp closure (former OPE team leader, pers. Comm., 28 April 2011) The Future of Displaced Persons from Burma All key informants seemed to agree that the future for Burmese displaced persons in Thailand would be a resettlement slowdown followed by camp closure and the repatriation. There is widespread agreement by the Thai authorities who believe that Thailand s role as a country of asylum was only supposed to be temporary in the first place. According to the NSC policy analyst, there have been negotiations with international donors such as the EU to discuss the issue of budget deficits and the possibility of naturalization of Burmese refugees, but the topic is always received coolly by the RTG because it is counter to Thai policy. Thailand s policy is guided by the principle that the displaced persons are only in Thailand for humanitarian reasons and that once the situation improves in Burma the displaced people can be repatriated without any threat to their lives (NSC policy analyst, pers. Comm., 19 July 2011). The deputy district governor of Mae La agrees, but believes it will be a long time before camp closure because the situation in Burma is still not good. The former OPE field team leader believes that camp closure and resettlement are two separate processes that are likely to occur in parallel. From his experience with Indochinese refugees, he believes that as resettlement winds down, camp closure will begin to occur. In 2009 ThamHin temporary shelter in Rachaburi Province is the first camp to close the Priority-2 USRAP process. Other camps will likely follow in the future. Still, the internal C H A P T E R V : R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S

88 C H A P T E R V : R E S E A R C H F I N D I N G S 74 situation in Burma remains a problem for repatriation, since it hasn t improved much yet. But USRAP can t last forever. It is designated to solve refugee problems for only a certain period of time (former OPE team leader, pers. Comm., 28 April 2011). The camp leader believes that repatriation is possible in the future, but maybe not for other five or six years. Neutralization of Burmese refugees is out of the question, since the Kingdom is hosting so many of them. He believes that repatriation would be the best solution, but that it is not possible now, given the ethnic conflict that is rooted in human rights violations and political instability. He hopes that democracy will return to Burma and pave the way for repatriation with safety and dignity (Mae La camp leader, 04 July 2011). The IOM Regional Program Coordinator also believes that repatriation would be the best solution, but that the situation in Burma needs to improve first before displaced persons can begin retuning home. To create the conditions where people can return home requires instruction in human rights to guarantee the rights of ethnic minorities. In the meantime, refugees should receive self-reliance and skills training to create more opportunities for them once they return home. When asked about the future of resettlement, he responds, The full cycle of resettlement would end up in the repatriation to the country of origin (IOM regional coordinator, 01 June 2011).

89 CHAPTER VI ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDTIONS AND CONCLUSION We must hope for the best, but prepare for the worst Aung San SuuKyi 6.1 Resettlement as a Tool of Protection The resettlement program has served an important, if limited, role for Burmese refugees because the other options for durable solution are not feasible, as follows: Difficulty of Repatriation: Many key informants agree that the voluntary repatriation of Burmese displaced persons will take a long time to achieve. It was only 2009 that the RTG finally forced Hmong refugees living in Thailand to return to Laos (Mydans, 2009). The Burmese refugees have already been in Thailand for over two decades, it seems they will be here for the foreseeable future due to conditions in Burma. Constraints on Local Integration: In the interviews with Thai authorities there was never any mention of the possibility of local integration. Currently local integration of Burmese refugees is nothing short of impossible. Moreover, humanitarian support to Burmese refugees in the camps is creating the perception of a disparity in the quality of life between refugees and ordinary Thai citizens, with the refugees enjoying the benefits of having the support of international donors (deputy district governor at Mae C H A P T E R V I : A N A L Y S I S, R E C O M M E N D T I O N S A N D C O N C L U S I O N

90 76 La, pers. Comm., 01 July 2011). Finally, the absorption of refugees into the host country can be economically, socially and politically destabilizing, especially in large-scale influxes (UNHCR, 2004a: p. 10). C H A P T E R V I : A N A L Y S I S, R E C O M M E N D T I O N S A N D C O N C L U S I O N Resettlement: Resettlement is currently the only option available for Burmese refugees in a protracted refugee situation in Thailand. USRAP has worked well as a durable solution for registered refugees who have been trapped in shelters for an extended period of time. Resettlement has freed them from a protracted situation and offered them a prosperous future. Resettlement is also an essential instrument for offering refugees protection when repatriation and local integration are not possible. In the country of asylum, the authorities may be unable or unwilling to provide protection. In situations like this, when the security of refugees cannot be guaranteed, third country resettlement becomes a priority (UNHCR, 2002). For UNHCR then, a key objective of resettlement is protection (UNHCR, 2010). Other benefits to resettlement include relieving the burden on the country of asylum in hosting the refugees, and in the longterm resettlement can become a source of development as skilled labor return to their country of origin when repatriation becomes possible (ibid).

91 6.2 US Resettlement Process Gaps Even though there seems to be widespread approval of USRAP, there are some problems that need to be addressed. The slow turnaround for security checks is one problem, while resettlement fraud is another. There is also the very significant problem of how the program addresses families with ineligible family members. The net effect is that families are forced to choose between staying together and passing up a better life or splitting apart so that some can pursue a better life while others are left behind. Another gap in the process is coordination with RTG processes. During field research several cases were encountered where family members were waiting for the MOI s PAB process to resume so that they could become eligible to participate in USRAP. There are other cases of family members completing the USRAP process who are prevented from leaving Thailand and are left in limbo because they are unable to obtain an exit permit from the RTG. Negotiations are currently underway with the RTG to resume PAB, but concerns about improving the screening system to screen out economic migrants need to be addressed first (OPE, 2009). According to the policy analyst from NSC, policy emphasizes the registered population because RTG s goal is to reduce the number of displaced persons in Thailand. For unregistered persons waiting on exit permits, the same officer explains that there is no need to jump the queue ahead of registered displaced persons. There are also concerns about the motivations behind a family mixed between registered and unregistered members (pers. Comm., 19 July 2011). 77 C H A P T E R V I : A N A L Y S I S, R E C O M M E N D T I O N S A N D C O N C L U S I O N

92 78 The reluctance of the RTG to take a more proactive stance in addressing the gaps in USRAP is in large part due to concern over the pull factor. This explains why the last registration period was The former OPE team leader believes that this reflects an outdated mindset that may have had credence during the Indochinese refugee crisis, but is now no longer relevant (pers. Comm., 28 April 2011). Recommendation for Family Reunification: C H A P T E R V I : A N A L Y S I S, R E C O M M E N D T I O N S A N D C O N C L U S I O N Many of the refugees at Mae La are being barred from resettlement by the host country. Many of the interviewees caught in this situation would like to petition the RTG to reopen PAB consideration for unregistered persons, but only for those who have been sponsored by their families and have already completed USRAP. Essentially this would make them eligible for an exit permit. If the PAB consideration process is reopened, then the RTG should consider cooperating with UNHCR, TBBC and camp-based organizations for the screening process. The camp committee already has a New Arrival Working Group that could assist the screening process (Mae La zone leader, pers. Comm., 06 July 2011). Another way to solve the exit permit problem would be for USRAP to work with UNHCR to reclassify individuals stuck in exit permit limbo as Priority-1 cases. This would circumvent specific criteria associated with Priority-2 cases, such as date of registration eligibility.

93 6.3 Current Situation of Refugees Diminished opportunities for U.S. resettlement: Although USRAP continues operations, the U.S. Embassy s refugee coordinator has mentioned that as the number of eligible refugees in Thailand decreases, the program will slow down. She expects the current Priority-2 group resettlement to terminate in the near future (pers. Comm., 22 July 2011). This does not mean USRAP will shutdown however, as other priorities of cases will still be processed. At its peak, USRAP processed packages in all nine temporary shelters. In 2009, USRAP operations were terminated at ThamHin, and the U.S. Government plans to terminate USRAP operations in two more camps by the end of FY 2011 (DoS, 2011). This indicates that the next step in providing a durable solution for Burmese refugees is on the way termination of USRAP in all camps and subsequent repatriation. Diminished International Support: TBBC reported in 2010 that its refugee aid budget started the year with a deficit due to a combination of the increasing number of refugees and global currency fluctuations (TBBC, 2010a). A solution to budget shortfalls would be to develop income generating capacity for refugees. This would make the refugees more self-sufficient and reduce the financial burden on the RTG and the international donor community. It would also satisfy the desire to work expressed by virtually all of the interviewees. The NSC analyst responded that displaced persons would not be able 79 C H A P T E R V I : A N A L Y S I S, R E C O M M E N D T I O N S A N D C O N C L U S I O N

94 80 to engage in migrant work and would be limited to work such as at a factory near the camp (pers. Comm., 19 July 2011). More flexible policies from the host country to provide vocational training and self-sufficiency programs would promote income-generating activities, increasing refugee self-sufficiency while reducing the burden on the RTG and international donors. It would also prepare refugees for resettlement in third countries. C H A P T E R V I : A N A L Y S I S, R E C O M M E N D T I O N S A N D C O N C L U S I O N 6.4 Recommendations: from resettlement to other solutions At present, USRAP has reached its peak of refugee admissions in all nine temporary shelters and the program is likely to slow down in the near future. The opinions of key informants are in agreement that the future of Burmese refugees in Thailand is likely to follow a path from resettlement slowdown to camp closure, and finally repatriation. For the time being at least, most of the refugees at Mae La are either unwilling or unable to return to Burma. And despite the resettlement of nearly 23,000 refugees to third countries, the number of total camp residents has never declined. Moreover, in the aftermath of the latest global financial crisis, the international refugee regime faces shrinking budgets as donors are willing to contribute less than in the past. UNHCR and humanitarian organizations will be unable to resolve forced migration on their own and will need the assistance that comes from stronger governmental, political and financial support (Loescher, 2001). Loescher (2001) describes a crisis in refugee protection as most western countries are unwilling to accept large numbers of

95 refugees and few states are freely willing to act as countries of asylum. There is also an increasingly negative perception of refugees, especially in host countries facing economic constraints. In short, refugees are unwelcome in most countries and are being stranded in countries of asylum. The protracted refugee situation in Thailand is rooted in Burma s internal upheaval, yet the presence of large numbers of Burmese refugees is raising political and security concerns in Thailand and may even have implications for regional stability. The protracted refugee situation in Thailand requires cooperation from all sectors, and multi-lateral negotiations are essential to resolving the crisis. Third party involvement could help to facilitate putting and end to what has until now been a no-end situation. As a future regional community, ASEAN could have a role in ameliorating political and economic conditions within Burma. On a global scale, UNHCR and international donors should be more proactive in reducing the strain caused by the protracted stay of Burmese refugees in Thailand. It must be a comprehensive problem solving mechanism with participation from the Burmese Government. Resettlement isn t without its problems, either. It can trigger a wide range of problems, such as a pull factor or a brain drain (Loescher and Milner, 2006). Resettlement needs to be wellmanaged in order to bring about a comprehensive solution for displaced persons in Thailand. If cooperation between RTG and the international refugee regime functions properly, the resettlement 81 C H A P T E R V I : A N A L Y S I S, R E C O M M E N D T I O N S A N D C O N C L U S I O N

96 C H A P T E R V I : A N A L Y S I S, R E C O M M E N D T I O N S A N D C O N C L U S I O N 82 dilemma would be resolved. It can also lead to solving the protracted refugee situation through engagement with Burma. There is widespread agreement among all key informants that the source of the genuine durable solution is Burma. The Mae La camp leader believes that this can only be achieved through the democratization of Burma. As long as the country of origin cannot guarantee security and protect human rights displaced people will be fearful and unwilling to return and new arrivals will continue to flow in. Regarding the repatriation of Burmese refugees, it is inevitable that this will happen, but the RTG and UNHCR have to be sensitive about the timing. If conditions in Burma have not yet improved to the point where refugees could safely return, a premature repatriation could cause an even worse humanitarian crisis and possibly affect other countries in the region. In summary, Burma as the refugee producer, plays the most important role in resolving the refugee situation along the border. Improvements in security and stability in Burma will lead Burmese displaced people in Thailand to return home. To bring this about however, first requires a return to democracy in Burma. 6.5 Further Research Further research in the following areas will contribute to developing an enduring solution for the Burmese refugee situation in Thailand:

97 The right to work for displaced persons from Burma, in case voluntary repatriation is not feasible in the near future The linkage between international aid and the development approach to camp management Democratization and development in Burma, in order to set the conditions for the safe return of displaced persons The role of ASEAN in taking a proactive stance to engage on the Burma issue Conclusion 1) With its experience from the Indochina refugee crisis the RTG is reluctant to allow the UN and international organizations to become involved with Burmese displaced persons living in Thailand. No solution to the problem was promoted for twenty-five years until USRAP was introduced in USRAP is the first, and so far only durable solution implemented to solve the Burmese protracted refugee situation. 2) USRAP is a response to address the protracted displacement of Burmese refugees in Thailand. This study reveals that USRAP is a suitable durable solution in the short run and that it functions as an instrument of international protection for refugees by transferring them to a third country. The program could be made more efficient by improving cooperation between the RTG and international C H A P T E R V I : A N A L Y S I S, R E C O M M E N D T I O N S A N D C O N C L U S I O N

98 C H A P T E R V I : A N A L Y S I S, R E C O M M E N D T I O N S A N D C O N C L U S I O N 84 relief agencies and may lead to more positive change in the long term. 3) From field research it became clear that a significant gap exists between U.S. resettlement criteria and RTG policy on eligibility. This creates challenges for individual refugees who have been approved for resettlement in the U.S. system but are nonetheless blocked from resettlement in the United States by Thai bureaucratic arrangements. This is especially unfortunate, as it results in splitting up families. Greater cooperation from the RTG would be helpful. 4) Internal conflicts in the home country lie at the heart of protracted refugee situations. Political stability and an end to internal ethnic conflict are the real durable solution for the protracted refugee situation in Thailand. In the meantime, economic development in Burma, at least in the ethnic-controlled areas could lead displaced persons living in Thailand to consider returning to Burma. 5) Multilateral negotiations and collective cooperation will be key to resolving challenges to USRAP. Resolution to problems regarding Burmese refugees living in Thailand requires a comprehensive plan with participation from all relevant stakeholders. If cooperation were to be arranged between Burma, Thailand and the international refugee regime it could lead to an end of the refugee problem in the future.

99 6) There are both push and pull factors behind the flight of Burmese refugees to Thailand. It is a complex convergence of multiple factors and represents the dynamic flow of people. Although there are many people leaving Burma because of real threats to their physical safety, there are also many being pulled to Thailand in search of economic opportunity. To end the flow of refugees into Thailand it will also be important to address the economic underpinnings causing the movement of people. 85 C H A P T E R V I : A N A L Y S I S, R E C O M M E N D T I O N S A N D C O N C L U S I O N

100

101 REFERENCES Alangappa, M The National Security of Developing States: Lessons from Thailand. Massachusetts: Auburn House Printing. Barnet, L Global governance and the evolution of the international refugee regime. Ontario: Feb 2002 working sheet no.54. Berg, J.E To go or not to go: factors influencing young educated Karen refugees considering resettlement. Master s Thesis, Department of Multicultural and International Education Thesis, Oslo University College. BPRM n.d. US Bureau of Population, Refugee and Migration Protracted Refugee Situations (PRS). [Online] pdf [30 Apr 2011] Boonma-klee, V Burma: Thai foreign policy under the Chatichai Choonhavan s Government. Bangkok: Thailand Research Institute. Bosson, A Forced Migration/ Internal Displacement in Burma. [online] R E F E R E N C E S

102 88 Documents)/D057F0FCA432F4B5C12572D7002B147B/$file/Bur ma_report_mai07.pdf [ 30 April 2011] Castel, S. and Miller, M.J The Age of Migration. 4 th edition. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Chantavanich, S. and Reynolds, E.B Indochinese Refugees: Asylum and Resettlement. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University. Chantavanich, S A Conceptual Model for Migration Management and Key Terminology. Workshop Training on Managing Labor Migration and Public Health: Key Public Goods in ASEAN. Bangkok: IOM. Chantavanich, S Chapter 10: Cross Border Displaced Persons from Myanmar in Thailand. Bangkok: Asian Research Center for Migration. Chulalongkorn University. (unpublished manuscript) Deardorff, S How long is too long? Questioning the legality of long-term encampment through a human rights lens. Working Paper Series No. 54. Oxford: Refugee Studies Center. R E F E R E N C E S Department of Homeland Security. n.d. 8 th Anniversary Celebration of Department of Homeland Security. [online] [04 June 2011]

103 Department of State United States Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2010: Report to Congress.[online] [6 May 2011] Department of State United States Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2011: Report to Congress [online] [13 June 2011] FMO. n.d. What is Forced Migration?. Forced Migration Organization [online] [01 August 2011] Gordenker, L Refugee in International Politics. Worcester: Billing & Sons Limited. Harkin, B., Direkwut, N., and Kamonpetch, A The Process and Prospects for Resettlement of Displaced persons on the Thai- Myanmar Border. Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn university. Hakovirta, H Third World Conflicts and Refugeeism: Dimensions, Dynamics and Trends of the World Refugee Problem. Helsinki: the Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters. 89 Hakovirta, H The Global Refugee Problem: A Model and Its Application. International Political Science Review. 14, 1 : [online] [04 April 2011] R E F E R E N C E S

104 90 HRW Human Rights Watch. Unwanted and Unprotected: Burmese Refugees in Thailand. [online] [17 June 2011] Jacobsen, K Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes, International Migration Review, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp [online] Apr 2011] Jirattikorn, A Thai-Burma: Do & don t. Bangkok: Thailand Research Institute. Keely, C.B The International Refugee Regime(s): The End of the Cold War Matters. UNHCR at 50: Past, Present and Future of Refugee Assistance [online] [31 May 2011] Kengkunchorn, A An Assessment of The Needs for Higher Education of Karen Refugees along the Thai-Myanmar border; A case of Nu Po camp. Master s Thesis. Faculty of Political Science Chulalongkorn University. R E F E R E N C E S KRC Karen Refugee Committee: Newsletter and Monthly Report as of March 2011, [online] [01 July 2011]

105 Kritz, M.M US immigration and refugee policy. Massachusetts: Lexington books 91 Kunz, E.F Exile and Resettlement: Refugee Theory. International Migration Review. 15, 1/2: [online] [4 Apr 2011] Loescher, G. and Monahan, L Refugees and International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Loescher, G Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis, New York: Oxford press. Loescher, G The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path. New York: Oxford Press. Loescher, G Protracted refugee situations: the search for practical solutions in The State of the World s Refugees. [online] [15 May 2011] Loescher, G., Betts, A., and Milner, J UNHCR the Politics and Practices of Refugee Protection into the Twenty-first century. New York: Routledge. Loescher, G. and Milner J Protracted Refugee Situation in Thailand: Towards solutions, Bangkok: Presentation to the Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand on 1 February R E F E R E N C E S

106 92 Lom, C IOM Resettles 80,000 Refugees from Thai Camps. [online] [21 May 2011] Mae La Camp Committee List of resettlement from Mae La camp from January 2006 to June Tak province: Mae La camp committee office. Mayell, H World Refugees Number 35 Million. National Geographic News (June 16, 2003). [online] [4 May 4, 2011] MOI. 2011, Ministry of Interior. Summary Document: Mae La Temporary Shelter. Tak: Mae La temporary shelter. (Unpublished manuscript) Muntarbhorn, V The Status of Refugees in Asia, Oxford: Claredon Press. Mydans, S "Thailand Evicts 4,000 Hmong to Laos". New York Times online, (28 December 2009) [online] ml [04 September 2011] R E F E R E N C E S Newman, E. and Van Self, J Refugees and forced displacement. Tokyo: United Nations university press.

107 NSC National Security Council: National Security Policy , Bangkok: Ministerial press. 93 OPE Overseas Processing Entity (OPE) Overall Process. Bangkok: OPE Bangkok office (Unpublished manuscript). Pongsawat, P Border Partial Citizenship, Border Towns, and Thai-Myanmar Cross-Border Development: Case Studies at the Thai Border Towns. Doctoral dissertation, City and Regional Planning University of California Berkeley. Risser, G.J Thai policy towards the Burmese displaced persons Master s thesis, Thai studies program Chulalongkorn University. Salehyan, I US Refugee and Asylum Policy: Has Anything Changed After 9/11?, Conference Papers, International Studies Association. pp1-26. San Francisco. Saw Yan Naing, 2011b. Thais Plan to Send Burmese Refugees Home. Irrawaddy Tuesday (April 12, 2011), [online] [28 April 2011] Sivilai, N Thailand and Displaced Persons from Fighting in Myanmar: A case study of Tak province. Master s thesis, Faculty of Political Science Ramkamhaeng University. R E F E R E N C E S

108 94 Songprasert, P Thailand: the first asylum country for Indochinese refugees, Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies Chulalongkorn University. Stein, B.N Durable Solutions for Developing Country Refugees. International Migration Review. Special Issue: Refugees Issues and Directions (Summer, 1986) 2, 2 : [online] [12 Dec 2010] Taft, D.R. and Robbing, R International Migrations: the Immigration in the Modern World. New York: Ronald Press Company. TBBC, n.d Thailand Burma Border Consortium Maesot area, [online] [04 May 2011] TBBC, 2010a. TBBC program report Jan-Jun [online] [11 Oct 2010] TBBC, 2010b. TBBC program report July-December [online] [15 June 2011] R E F E R E N C E S UNHCR REFUGEE PROTECTION: A Guide to International Refugee Law. [online] [17 Jun 2011]

109 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook: Division of International Protection. Revised in Geneva: UNHCR. [online] 96EB2CAB1C1256C61004B0961-hcr-resettlement-jul97.pdf [23 June 2011] UNHCR UNHCR Resettlement Handbook. Geneva: UNHCR. [online] [22 May 2011] UNHCR An Introduction to International Protection. Geneva: UNHCR UNHCR. 2007a. Camp Profile: Mae La camp. Document for external distribution. UNHCR Bangkok. (unpublished manuscript) UNHCR. 2007b. Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration: A 10-Point Plan of Action. [online] [22 May 2011] UNHCR. 2008a. UNHCR global report 2008,[online] [31 Apr 2011] UNHCR. 2008b. The High Commissioner's Dialogue on Protection Challenges: Protracted Refugee Situations [online] [20 May 2011] 95 R E F E R E N C E S

110 96 UNHCR. 2008c. Policy and Procedural Guidelines: Addressing Resettlement Fraud Perpetrated by Refugees, [online] [12 Jan 2011] UNHCR. 2009a. Thailand: Resettlement of Myanmar refugees hits 50,000 mark. Briefing Notes on 30 June [online] [16 April 2011] UNHCR. 2009b. Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime. [online] [13 April 2011] UNHCR. 2009c. US Resettlement Overview, Prepared by the Resettlement Section of UNHCR Washington, [online] view.pdf [24 January 2011] UNHCR UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs [online] [31 April 2011] R E F E R E N C E S UNHCR Finding durable solutions, UNHCR Global Report 2011 (Updated). [online] [03 May 2011]

111 Vatcharcup. S UNHCR's participation in solving the problem of Burmese displaced persons fleeing from fighting along the Thai-Burmese border. Master thesis, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University. Vungsiriphisal, P., Bennet, G., Jitpong, W., Poomkacha, C. and Reungsamran, K Sustainable Solutions to the Displaced Person Situation on the Thai-Myanmar Border: Analysis of Royal Thai Government Policy towards Displaced Persons from Myanmar, Bangkok: Asian Research Center for Migration, Chulalongkorn University. Weiner, M The global migration crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Right. New York: Harper Collins College publisher. Weng, L Junta Troops Take DKBA Border Gate. [online] < [29 April 2011] Zolberg, A.R., Suhrke, A., and Aguayo, S Escape from Violence. New York: Oxford University Press. 97 R E F E R E N C E S

112

113 APPENDICES APPENDIX A I: Protracted Refugee Situations: six focused areas of US government Source: (viewed 13 May 2011) A P P E N D I C E S

114 100 APPENDIX B II: Refugee Admissions to the USA fiscal year A P P E N D I C E S Source: Bruno, A 2006, Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy, Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy, Updated January 25, 2006, viewed 13 Sep 2011, XNc%3D&tabid=180&mid=605&language=ar-IQ

115 APPENDIX C III: Refugee Admissions to the USA from fiscal year Source: Gauger, K 2011, US refugee admissions outlook for FY 2011, Bureau of Population, Refugees & Migration (PRM), Presentation for California Refugee Summit April 13, 2011, viewed 13 SEP 2011, < andouts/plenary%20session%201/plenary1usrefugeeadmissio nsoutlook2011_kgauger.pdf> A P P E N D I C E S

116 102 APPENDIX D IV: Proposed refugee admissions for Fiscal Year 2011 Source: Department of State 2011, United States, Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2011: Report to Congress, viewed 13 June 2011, < A P P E N D I C E S

117 103 APPENDIX E V: UNHCR Resettlement Statistic by Resettlement Country 2009 Source: Department of State 2011, United States, Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2011: Report to Congress, viewed 13 June 2011, < A P P E N D I C E S

118 104 APPENDIX F VI: Statistics of Burmese Border Displaced Persons as of January 2011 A P P E N D I C E S Source: (view 11 May 2011)

119 APPENDIX G VII: Population report from Karen Refugee Committee (page 1) 105 A P P E N D I C E S

120 106 V: Population report from Karen Refugee Committee (page 2) A P P E N D I C E S Source: Karen Refugee Committee: Newsletter and Monthly Report as of March 2011, viewed on 01 July 2011,

121 APPENDIX H VIII: Refugee departure from nine temporary shelters 107 Source: TBBC program report July to December 2010 A P P E N D I C E S

122 108 APPENDIX I IX: Overall United States Refugee Admissions Program Overall Process: A P P E N D I C E S

123 109 How long does it take? Refugees should expect that the entire process will take at least 10 months from the time they verify with UNHCR until departure. Process in Detail 1. MOI Refugee Registration Only persons registered with the Thai Ministry of the Interior (MOI) are legal residents of the temporary refugee camps and only registered persons can enter the resettlement process. The Royal Thai Government established PAB (Provincial Admissions Board) as a screening mechanism to register refugees in the camps along Thailand-Burma border. Upon screening by the PAB, UNHCR /MOI issues a document called the UNHCR/MOI Household Registration Form which lists all the members of a given family along with photographs. Refugees need this document and identity card for the first step of the US Resettlement process, the UNHCR verification exercise. About the PAB registration: There are currently many unregistered people living in camps but only the Royal Thai Government (MOI) has the authority to decide when the next PAB registration will begin. All agencies are working with the Royal Thai Government to regularize PAB registration and hopefully the Thai Government will decide to begin registering people again, but it is not certain when this will happen. Negotiations are still underway within the Thai Ministries and UNHCR about how best to overhaul the system to improve effectiveness of s creening legitimate refugees instead of economic migrants. A P P E N D I C E S

124 UNHCR Verification for Resettlement For those who are registered, have their names and photographs on an UNHCR/MOI Household Registration Form, identity card, and want to resettle, the next step is to apply or express interest in resettlement with UNHCR. This usually starts off with a large scale verification exercise. After the initial verification period refugees can still go to UNHCR office in the camp. You, your spouse, and any members of your family aged 18 and over must apply in person unless they are physically disabled and unable to do so. Your children under age 17 do not need to come with you for UNHCR verification for resettlement. Anyone aged 18 and over can apply by themselves if they choose to. You must bring your UNHCR/MOI Household Registration Form, and your individual ID cards if you have it, with you to the verification exercise. You cannot verify yourself without presenting these documents. A P P E N D I C E S Important things to remember about UNHCR verification for resettlement: 1. If you are interested in being resettled to the United States, go to UNHCR with your UNHCR/MOI Household Registration Form and individual ID card. 2. Unregistered persons cannot apply for the US Resettlement Program. 3. Everyone over 18 who wants to apply for resettlement must be present. 4. Anyone 18 and older can decide to resettle alone if they wish. They must have their Household Registration Form and ID card with them to verify with UNHCR. 5. Refugees do not have to resettle with everyone on their Household Registration Form if they do not want to. Family members not all on the same Household Registration Form should go to UNHCR with all the household registration forms if they want to resettle together.

125 OPE Interview After verification with UNHCR, UNHCR will refer refugee names and bio data to OPE for the next step. There are two interviews in the process: The first interview is with OPE and the second is with US Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The OPE interview is to prepare information of each case for DHS by verifying and collecting further information about refugee family composition and background. OPE does not make the decision as to who is accepted; DHS makes those decisions. The interview is conducted in English. Interpreters are provided but refugees are able to communicate directly with the caseworker in English if they feel more comfortable. A P P E N D I C E S

126 112 A P P E N D I C E S Important things to remember about OPE interview: a. At OPE Interview, refugees must bring: 1. UNHCR/MOI Household Registration Form. 2. Themselves and their family Everyone on their Household Registration Form who wants to resettle must be present at the scheduled OPE interview. If a refugee wants to resettle with a person who is on a different Household Registration Form, they should give that person s UN number to the OPE interviewer. 3. Documents about refugee s family (such as birth certificate, marriage certificates, etc.) 4. Refugees with a relative or friend who is already in America, they should give that person s name, address and phone number to the OPE interviewer. b. After OPE interview, if there are changes in your family composition such as marriage, deaths, birth, etc., please bring new documents and household registration to OPE to update information before they have DHS interview. c. Please be patient about the process. Everyone who registered for the US resettlement with UNHCR will be called for OPE interview and DHS interview. d. Every case is different so the length of processing time differs case by case. You should continue your daily activities until your departure is confirmed. e. Refugees must provide truthful information during your interview. If there is something they do not understand, they can ask to have the question clarified. If they do not know the answer to a question, simply say I do not know. Refugees can check OPE announcement board for their interview schedule. The lists will be posted at least 2 weeks in advance. If they miss their interview or someone in the family cannot come on that day, they should come to OPE for consultation.

127 DHS INTERVIEW A US DHS officer interviews all refugee applicants to determine if they meet the US criteria for refugee status and eligibility to enter the US as a refugee. Interviews are conducted in English. Interpreters are provided but refugees are able to communicate directly with the caseworker in English if they feel more comfortable. A decision letter from DHS will be sent out some time after DHS interview. It will be stated in the letter if the individual is eligible or ineligible to resettle in the US. If DHS finds refugees ineligible (not accepted for US resettlement), they have 90 days to submit a written statement to DHS explaining why their case should be reviewed. Applicants requesting for DHS review need to show that a) a significant error occurred in the adjudication of their case or b) that new information is available. The statement can be written in the native language or English and should be submitted directly to DHS. If DHS is not present in the camp, then the letters can be given to OPE and they will deliver the request for review to DHS. Refugees who missed the 90 day period to submit a statement for reconsideration should see UNHCR or OPE.. 5. IOM IOM (The International Organization for Migration) takes care of the last step before refugees departure. After approval for US resettlement, IOM provides medical screening to check for conditions that prevent the refugee from A P P E N D I C E S

128 114 being able to enter the US immediately. There are some conditions that require further processing and/or treatment before the refugee can enter the US. IOM also offers a cultural orientation course, which prepares refugees for a new culture that they will be adjusting to in the US. IOM arranges all transportation and accompanies refugees from camp to the Bangkok international airport. Refugees usually transit in Japan or other countries, IOM staff will also meet and accompany refugees at the airport should there be airplane changes. Each refugee will receive and need to carry with them an IOM bag containing all documents needed for their trip. In short, IOM provides three things: 1. Medical check-up and treatment 2. Cultural Orientation training (C.O. training) 3. Travel arrangement to the United States* *The only thing refugees need to pay back is the airfare to the US. They will be expected to start paying off their loan 4-6 months after arriving in America and they will be given approximately 36 months to pay off the interest-free loan. During IOM s predeparture process, refugees will need to sign a promissory note acknowledging that they are informed and committed to paying back the airfare in the US. A P P E N D I C E S

129 RESETTLEMENT AGENCIES Every refugee who resettles to the US is assisted by a nongovernmental resettlement agency, or VOLAG (voluntary agency). Resettlement agencies in the US are there to help refugees with their transition into a new life in the US and make sure that every refugee who is resettled in the US is doing fine. Resettlement agencies also provide the guidance necessary for refugees to become self-sufficient. This includes assistance in enrolling children in school, teaching about public transportation and safety and other necessary life skills, and working with adult refugees to find a job as soon as possible. During the first 30 days after arrival in the United States, the resettlement agency will pay all basic living costs such as rent, electricity and provide basic housing supplies like bed sheets and dishes. They will also explain and help apply the types of programs and services that are available to refugees in the area where they are resettled. This will include things like English classes and health services and the types of ongoing financial support programs that refugees and their family may be able to receive to be able to meet their basic living expenses. After the first 30 days, the resettlement agency is not responsible for any financial support, but they will continue to provide other kinds of support as mentioned above. The resettlement agency will still help answer any questions and provide consultation if refugee face any problems or difficulties. Even if they cannot A P P E N D I C E S

130 116 solve the problem, they will be able to provide information and help to refer refugees to someone who can assist. Important things to remember about financial support: Refugees should keep in mind that there are many types of financial assistance programs available. They may not be enrolled in the same programs as their friends and neighbors, and may even have different people within the family enrolled in different programs. In general, their eligibility for different financial programs is based on the following: The number of people in the family and their ages. The number of children in the family and the ages of the children. Where they are living. (different states--different types of programs and funding levels.) The cooperation of employable adults in looking for work. Almost all of the financial assistance available in America is based on the idea that it is temporary assistance, meant to help people for a short period of time until they are able to support themselves. Source: OPE 2009 Overseas Processing Entity Overall Process A P P E N D I C E S

131 APPENDIX J X: Cut off dates of eligibility for nine temporary shelters in Thailand (Only for Priority-2 Group Submission of US resettlement) 117 Source: OPE, 2009, Overseas Processing Entity electronic archive A P P E N D I C E S