Winners and Losers Among a Refugee-Hosting Population

Transcription

1 Winners and Losers Among a Refugee-Hosting Population *CORE and Université catholique de Louvain, *Fund for Scientific Research (FWO), University of Antwerp 17 January 2010, Royal Economic Society Fifth PhD Presentation Meeting

2 11.4 Mio refugees (UNHCR 2007) : a visible phenomenon but few economic analysis Beyond some popular misleading views on refugees Not temporary protracted refugee emergencies Not passive refugees bear economic functions Research questions Does the establishment of a refugee camp affect the local population? By which channels? Do people adopt coping strategies?

3 Research Question 1 Research Question 2 Research Question 3 Identifying assumptions Relaxing assumptions

4 Inflows from Burundi and Rwanda Kagera Quasi-natural experiment Unexpected in 1993 (Burundi) and 1994 (Rwanda) More than one half of Kagera population Movement restrictions to 4 km Good markets + demand : + food prices Labour markets Wage effects Business boom transport costs; Improved health and sanitation services Negative externalities: Environmental degradation; spread of disease; security issue

5 3 Research Questions Problem : No idea about the magnitude, the persistency and the distribution of these reported effects RQ1: Do economic benefits compensate for negative externalities? RQ2: Is the impact differentiated? RQ3: Non-monotonic relationship between proximity and welfare?

6 RQ1: Net economic benefits? Research Question 1 Research Question 2 Research Question 3 Identification Strategy KHDS dataset, selecting people interviewed before 21 October 1993 and re-interviewed in 2004 : Distance ( to refugee camp ) and refugee population RI v(h),t = log 13 c=1 pop c /d v,c log(v h,t ) = β 0 + β 1 (RI v(h),t ) + β 3 Z h,t + β 4 Q v(h),t + α t + α h + α v + ɛ h,t (1) V h,t : cons per adult equi., correcting for price differences Z household characteristics, Q village characteristics

7 Research Question 1 Research Question 2 Research Question 3 RQ1: Results (1) (2) (3) (4) POLS VFE HHFE HHFE(+) Log(V h,t ) Log(V h,t ) Log(V h,t ) Log(V h,t ) Log(RI) *** ** * ** (0.0264) (0.0328) (0.0320) (0.0338) Activity h,1991 incl. drop drop drop Z h,t incl. incl. incl. incl Q v,t incl. incl. incl. incl α t incl. incl. incl. incl. α v incl. incl. α h incl. incl. Obs R On average, positive impact from refugee inflows

8 RQ2: Impact differentiated? Research Question 1 Research Question 2 Research Question 3 Theoretical model predicts: Losers: Agricultural worker Winners: Self-employed in agricultural and non-agricultural activities log(v h,t ) = β 0 + β 1 (RI v(h),t ) + β 2 Activity h,1991 RI v(h),t + β 3 Z h,t + β 4 Q v(h),t + α t + α h + α v + ɛ h,t (2) Net gains unevenly distributed Losers: Agricultural worker Winners: Self-employed farmer Discrepancy with theoretical model: self-employed in non-agricultural activities

9 RQ2: Results Introduction Research Question 1 Research Question 2 Research Question 3 (1) (2) (3) (4) POLS VFE HHFE HHFE(+) Log(V h,t ) Log(V h,t ) Log(V h,t ) Log(V h,t ) Log(RI) *** * (0.0265) (0.0329) (0.0323) (0.0339) Agri. Self ** * ** *Log(RI) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) NonAgri. L * * *Log(RI) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Agri. L ** ** * *Log(RI) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) NonAgri Self *** *** *** *** *Log(RI) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Z h,t incl. incl. incl. incl Q v,t incl. incl. incl. incl α t incl. incl. incl. incl. α v incl. incl. α h incl. incl. Obs R

10 Research Question 1 Research Question 2 Research Question 3 RQ3: Non-monotonic relationship? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Log(V h,t ) Log(V h,t ) Log(V h,t ) Log(V h,t ) Log(V h,t ) Log(V h,t ) Log(RI) *** *** (0.451) (0.475) Log(RI) *** 0.504*** (0.168) (0.176) Log(Prox) 0.193*** 0.236*** 2.156* 1.989* 0.612*** 0.639*** (0.0724) (0.0754) (1.171) (1.210) (0.198) (0.205) Log(Prox) * [0.151] (0.259) (0.268) Z h,t incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. Q v,t incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. α t incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. α v incl. incl. incl. α h incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. Obs R Controlling for the average refugee population, inverted-u shape relationship between distance and welfare Controlling for proximity, existence of a scale effect

11 Identifying assumptions Relaxing assumptions Exogeneity Quasi-natural experiment (Friedberg and Hunt 1995: 36): Episodes where the timing and location of immigration may be politically rather than economically motivated, [...] reduces the problem of immigrants choosing location based on their labor market conditions >< Attrition : (Traced) remaining households more able to adjust? >< Baez (2008: ): endogenous location? Poorer regions that are highly disadvantaged in some unobservable domains may be relatively more likely to [...] host more refugees (e.g. limited institutions and systems to control their arrival or assist them). Common trend assumption: similar trajectory in absence of refugees? (Lee and Kang 2006)

12 Attrition? Introduction Identifying assumptions Relaxing assumptions Figure: Own calculation based on KHDS P(Migration = 1 x) = Φ(β (RI v(h),t ) + β n.s. Activityh,1991 RI v(h),t + βzh, βq v(h), αt + ɛh,t) (3)

13 Exogeneity? Introduction Identifying assumptions Relaxing assumptions Baez >< Border out of control of local authorities Educated guess? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Log(RI) Log(RI) Log(RI) Log(RI) Log(RI) Log(RI) Log(V h,1991 ) *** *** *** *** (0.0197) (0.0191) (0.0232) (0.0215) Log(Cons) *** *** (0.0154) (0.0175) (0.0141) (0.0157) Z h,1991 incl. incl. incl. Q v,1991 incl. incl. incl. Obs R Robust to sample restricted to the two bordering districts

14 Identifying assumptions Relaxing assumptions Common trend assumption? Placebo test (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Log(V h,t ) Log(V h,t ) Log(V h,t ) Log(V h,t ) Log(V h,t ) Log(V h,t ) Log(V h,t ) Log(V h,t ) Log(RI v,1993) (0.0250) (0.0250) (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0401) (0.0401) (0.0243) (0.0244) True Log(RI) * * (0.0313) (0.0324) (0.0314) (0.0323) Agri. Self(91) *** *** *** *** *Log(RI v,1993) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) NonAgri. L(91) *Log(RI v,1993) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Agri. L(91) *Log(RI v,1993) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) NonAgri Self(91) *Log(RI v,1993) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Act h,1991 idem idem *Log(RI) idem idem α t incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. α v incl. incl. incl. incl. α h incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. incl. Obs R

15 Identifying assumptions Relaxing assumptions Identifying Assumptions Exogeneity of the camp location Qualitative argument: No endogeneity! Unlikely endogenous choice Lower-bound estimate Common trends assumption Placebo Test Relaxing theoretical assumptions Allowing for geographical mobility Refugee camp : not a dispersion force Including migrants: Lower-bound estimate and geographical adjustment of labour Allowing for occupational mobility: Lower-bound estimate

16 Introduction On average, positive effect... but unevenly distributed: Looser: Agricultural worker Winner: Self-employed farmer (conditional on common trend assumption) Self-employed in non-agricultural activities? possible reconciliation: Increased competition (selection) following entry of new businesses Migration as a coping strategy Minimum mass of refugees needed for positive externalities Further works: open the black box External validity? Provision of local public goods: impact on heath status? (with Ph Verwimp, Antwerp) Agglomeration economies may play a role, with G. Duranton (Toronto) and J. Thisse (UCL)? Impact on social cohesion or trust?