BELARUS AND EAP: IN THE LIGHT OF UKRAINIAN CRISIS

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1 Analysis No. 243, April 2014 BELARUS AND EAP: IN THE LIGHT OF UKRAINIAN CRISIS Andrei Yahorau The recent events in Ukraine clearly reveal the weaknesses of the EU s Eastern neighbourhood policy. Belarus remains a problematic partner for the EU and rejects the European way of transformation. Despite long lasting economic problems and external vulnerability Belarus doesn t use EaP opportunities for reforms. The price of democratization seems to be very high for Belarusian leadership to pay for deeper political and economic relations with the EU. This creates serious obstacles for applying the more for more principle as a real tool for change. EU policy towards Belarus needs new approaches and more effective instruments. Previous policy packages including the proposal of European Dialogue for Modernization failed to bring any tangible results. In addition, Russia s neo imperialistic policy undermines EU soft power and threatens overall stability in the EaP region. The establishment of Russia s political control over the Ukraine will lead to further Russian expansion. For Belarus this will mean challenges to its state sovereignty. Andrei Yahorau political analyst, director of the Center for European Transformation (Minsk, Belarus) 1 The opinions expressed herein are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of ISPI. The ISPI online papers are also published with the support of Cariplo

2 Belarus today: unstable authoritarianism After gaining independence in 1991, Belarus experienced a brief period of unstable democracy, but since 1996 the authoritarian regime of President Lukashenko has been in place. Belarus' authoritarian turn sharply worsened its relations with its main western neighbour the EU. Since then, EU-Belarus political relations have experienced some temporary periods of thaw, but generally have remained very cold. Among all the EU s eastern neighbours, Belarus has the lowest level of political cooperation. So far, Belarus has not signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU. Relations with its eastern neighbour - Russia - only appear to be trouble-free. Despite substantial indirect Russian subsidies to the Belarusian economy (which reached up to 15 % of Belarusian GDP, about USD 8 bln in ) and entry into the Customs Union, Belarus is experiencing constant tensions in relations with Russia. The latter is persistently trying to establish greater control over the political and economic life of Belarus, which leads to regular trade and energy wars and political conflicts between the allies. The long and stable existence of authoritarianism in Belarus is not a case of temporary collision in the transition period. Lukashenko s personal rule has deep social, economic and political roots. In social terms, the stability of the authoritarian regime is provided by the sort of social contract between the people and the state in which the population exchanges political loyalty for the economic benefits cum political stability provided by the government. This contract has emerged as a populist response to the request of the Belarusian society to eliminate the instability and transition crises of the early 1990s and continues to maintain its strength. The Belarusian regime managed to guarantee the relative economic well-being of Belarusians, especially in comparison to other countries of the Eastern Partnership. The share of GDP per capita of Belarus is ahead of the other countries of the Eastern Partnership: it is twice as big as Ukraine s (although this is only about a half of the level of the two EU neighboring countries - Poland and Lithuania). According to OECD classification, Belarus is the only higher average income country in the Eastern Partnership region (Moldova in this classification refers to the Least Developed Countries, the rest are included in the average category of countries with a lower average income) 2. The level of public support for the regime is quite high and reaches, according to independent sociologists, the level of 40-60% during electoral campaigns 3. After gaining independence in 1991, Belarus experienced a brief period of unstable democracy, but since 1996 the authoritarian regime of President Lukashenko has been in place. Belarus' authoritarian turn sharply worsened its relations with its main western neighbour the EU The stability of the authoritarian regime is provided by the sort of social contract between the people and the state in which the population exchanges political loyalty for the economic benefits cum political stability provided by the government 1 Belarus Reality Check 2012, 2 See A. YAHORAU - A. ZUIKOVA, Belarusian-European Relations: A History of Unseized Opportunities, Minsk, Lohvinau Publishing, See Lukashenko s electoral rating dynamics at IISEPS reports, 2

3 The economic basis of Belarusian authoritarianism is a huge share of state property and, accordingly, employment in the public sector (about 70% according to the EBRD) 4. The revenues of a significant part of the population depend to a varying degree on the state. For Lukashenko s regime, control over employment is an important instrument of political control. The political system is fully closed: there are no free elections, no division of powers; the independence of local authorities is abolished. Public administration is provided by a hyper-centralized executive branch with the Presidential Administration on the top (so called vertical power ) of it; Parliament and the Constitutional court do not have more than a decorative function. Most areas of public and social life (justice, education, culture, science, media, etc.) are also not free from the state s influence and are subordinated to the ideological apparatuses of the authorities. All independent activity is pushed to the periphery of the public sphere and actually doesn t affect national policies. At the same time, the political stability of the regime is provided not only by its internal consolidation, but is also rooted in the fragmentation and weakness of its opponents. Democratic opposition and independent civil society in Belarus are split and do not represent a united front of resistance to authoritarianism. Despite the apparent internal stability of such a model, it turns out to be very vulnerable to external shocks. The period of sustainable economic growth in (7-10 % per year) was associated with use of the accumulated industrial potential of the Soviet period and a favourable external environment. Economic growth in Russia and its huge market for Belarusian goods, as well as Russian discounts for gas and oil for Belarus created favourable conditions. The global economic crisis made the economic growth in Belarus less stable and in 2011 led to the structural crisis of the economy and to a chronic current account deficit (about 3 billion a year) 5. Maintaining economic prosperity requires a constant external injection that leads to the growth of public debt. Since 2009 the Belarusian economy has been suffering from persistent problems caused by the lack of full scale structural reforms, its volatility and exposure to external shocks; a low level of economic growth and low salaries provoke the drain of its high-profiled labour force. Foreign loans, which are constantly necessary in order to support economic stability and a minimal level of growth, are borrowed both from the East and from the West. For three years public debt has doubled and reached USD 34,028 bln in 2012 (62.3% of GDP). All this means that Belarus has an objective need of a large-scale modernisation; postponing the reforms just deepens the problems. In such a situation, by rejecting opportunities for reforms, Belarus at the For Lukashenko s regime, control over employment is an important instrument of political control The period of sustainable economic growth in (7 10 % per year) was associated with use of the accumulated industrial potential of the Soviet period and a favourable external environment 4 See EBRD Structural change indicators // 5 See Belarus: macroeconomic forecast, no. 1, vol. 6, 2013 г. // 3

4 least hampers its growth, and very probably, in the near future it will fall into a property trap. Belarus and the Eastern Partnership: a problematic partner In , the relations between Belarus and the EU experienced a temporary thaw, which coincided with the new EU Eastern Partnership initiative aimed at a rapprochement between the EU and its eastern neighbours. The Eastern Partnership (EaP) offered a comprehensive modernisation programme, including political reforms, transformation in the field of justice, a new level of energy security, economic convergence, prospects for free trade and visa liberalisation with the EU. Thus the basic principle of the Eastern Partnership initiative was borrowed from the experience of EU enlargement policy. The conditional approach of the enlargement policy, in which the depth of integration with the EU depends on the depth of democratic reforms and the implementation of European values by neighbouring countries, has been transformed into the European Neighborhood Policy "more for more" formula. In accordance with this, greater ambitions for reforms allow countries to rely on greater preferences from the European Union. The main accent of the EaP is on institutional changes and sector reforms provided by EaP governments with the EU s support. The formal progress in the reform agenda and rapprochement of EaP countries with the EU is connected to the implementation of EU norms and standards in EaP partners legislations and the signing of important pacts such as the Association Agreement. However, the conditional approach works well if neighbor countries governments and societies have a strong political will to move closer towards the EU, as was the case of the Central and Eastern European countries. Unlike the latter, the EaP countries were not ready to pay the price of democratic transformation for a new level of relations with the EU (at least, not all of them). The most striking cases here are the authoritarian Belarus and Azerbaijan, which have not accepted the offer of the EaP in its entirety. That Armenia and Ukraine stepped back before the last EaP Summit clearly reveals the limitations of this EU initiative. Due to the absence of any progress of political liberalisation in Belarus, cooperation between Belarus and the EU has been set to the minimal level. Belarus is included in the multilateral track of the EaP, but it still has no formal framework for full-fledged bilateral relations with Brussels. Attempts to reach a new level of cooperation and to create a legal basis for bilateral relations were made in late The EU and Belarus authorities discussed a Joint Interim Plan, which was intended to serve as a temporary replacement of the European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan. However, the December 2010 presidential elections in Belarus with their brutal crackdown of public protests and the subsequent wave of repressions against In , the relations between Belarus and the EU experienced a temporary thaw, which coincided with the new EU Eastern Partnership initiative aimed at a rapprochement between the EU and its eastern neighbours The formal progress in the reform agenda and rapprochement of EaP countries with the EU is connected to the implementation of EU norms and standards in EaP partners legislations and the signing of important pacts such as the Association Agreement Belarus is included in the multilateral track of the EaP, but it still has no formal framework for full fledged bilateral relations with Brussels 4

5 political opponents of President Lukashenko dashed these hopes. The EU scaled down the high level political dialogue with Belarus and conditioned its possible resumption on the release of all political prisoners. In the current situation the EU foreign policy package uses several instruments to influence Belarus. The first tool is represented by restrictive measures against the officials responsible for human rights violations, as well as a number of businessmen and companies allegedly supporting Lukashenko's regime. The second tool is a set of measures seeking to support the civil society and political opposition in Belarus. Mainly these measures provide financial support through special instruments such as a Non-State Actors and Local Authorities Programme, European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, European Endowment for Democracy, support from Member States. And the third one is technical cooperation between the EU and the Belarusian government, including the so-called sector dialogues, which are conducted by the European Commission with important ministries in the areas of energy, economy, regional development, customs etc. The EU and its Member States (mainly Poland, Sweden and Germany) are the biggest donors of technical assistance to Belarus 6. But the low level of political relations is reflected on the lower level of EU financial assistance to Belarus compared to the other EaP countries 7. The last four years since the dramatic events of December 2010 show that this EU external policy package towards Belarus has not helped to improve the situation. Attempts to find new tools to work with Belarus were made in the framework of the European Dialogue on Modernisation (DoM) launched by Commissioner Stefan Fule in March However, the two years of DoM implementation did not lead to new ideas or approaches to work with Belarus 9. Partly this happened due to the controversial position of the European Commission and the European External Action Service. On the one hand, they declared a commitment to the strategy of involvement in the Dialogue of a wide range of Belarusian social and political stakeholders ( structured dialogue, "dialogue of many stakeholders, dialogue of Belarusians, in Belarus and about Belarus"). On the other hand, the EC and EEAS strongly limited any attempts by active pro-european social actors In the current situation the EU foreign policy package uses several instruments to influence Belarus. The first tool is represented by restrictive measures against the officials responsible for human rights violations The last four years since the dramatic events of December 2010 show that this EU external policy package towards Belarus has not helped to improve the situation 6 K. SHYLA, A. YAHORAU. Civil society s role and place in the system of the EU s donor assistance for Belarus. Centre for European Transformation. Working paper // em-of-the-eu-s-donor-assistance-for-belarus-working-paper.html See European dialogue on modernisation with Belarusan society: europa.eu/delegations/belarus/press_corner/all_news/news/2012/european_dialogue_m odernisation_en.htm 9 See A. YAHORAU. How to increase the efficiency of the European Dialogue on Modernisation? //. DATE OF PUBLICATION, 5

6 and stakeholders in Belarus to affect the purpose and meaning of the concept of the DoM. However, the main reason for the weakness of the DoM was the inability of Belarus civil society and opposition political forces to express a consolidated position in the Dialogue. Today the European Dialogue on Modernisation is limited to expert talks and has a very limited influence on the situation as a whole. Thus, to date, the EU has no acceptable new package of tools to work with Belarus. The November 2013 EaP Summit in Vilnius also did not bring any changes to this situation. It was neither a failure nor a success; it has become quite an ordinary event in a series of official meetings of the EaP. The entire Summit was prepared according to the prospects of signing the Association Agreement with Ukraine and its sudden back-pedalling deprived the Summit of its essence. At the same time, the initiating of the Association Agreement with Georgia and Moldova, signing the agreement on visa facilitation with Azerbaijan, as well as the signing of a number of other less important documents marked some progress for the EaP. This is not so great, but, nevertheless, they are important milestones in the rapprochement of the EaP countries with the European Union. On the background of negative dynamics in relations with Ukraine and Armenia, the Belarusian authorities have used the Summit to restore their relations with Brussels. Since January 2014, negotiations on visa facilitation with Belarus have started and the frequency of diplomatic contacts has increased. According to the Head of the Department of Bilateral Relations of the EaP of the European External Action Service, Dirk Schuebel, the EU is ready for negotiations with Belarus about formation of a legal framework for cooperation (so called "interim phase"), but the main obstacle for the restoration of a meaningful dialogue are Belarusian political prisoners. Geopolitical games: the Russia factor It is obvious that the EaP has not fully achieved its objectives. This situation was clearly demonstrated by Armenia s rejection of a deeper association with the EU, by the complicated situation in Ukraine and the lack of any substantial progress in the situation with Belarus and Azerbaijan. The EaP or the EU has made two main mistakes: an overestimation of the transformative power of the process of formal treaties with the EU and an underestimation of geopolitics. It appeared that the many years of preparation for Association Agreement signing could be annulled in a single night. The Russia factor and its influence with strategically antagonistic interests have not been adequately considered. The political specificity of the EaP countries and their fundamental differences from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have not been taken into account. The institutional reforms in the EaP countries according to the European model The EU has no acceptable new package of tools to work with Belarus. The November 2013 EaP Summit in Vilnius also did not bring any changes to this situation. It was neither a failure nor a success; it has become quite an ordinary event in a series of official meetings of the EaP It is obvious that the EaP has not fully achieved its objectives. This situation was clearly demonstrated by Armenia s rejection of a deeper association with the EU, by the complicated situation in Ukraine and the lack of any substantial progress in the situation with Belarus and Azerbaijan 6

7 have not been possible without understanding the internal political situations in these partner countries as well as weighing Russia s geopolitical game in the region. Further ignoring these facts could put the EaP on the verge of a serious crisis. From the viewpoint of the post-soviet region, Russia s intervention in Ukraine was a constantly expected event, terrible in its essence, but understandable. For the nearest neighbours of Russia, this threat has never disappeared as Russians have never retreated from dreams of restoring the empire and from their nostalgia for the Soviet Union. These sentiments have been always present in the foreign policy and in the official discourse of the Russian authorities. In the Yeltsin era this was masked and rarely pronounced, but under Putin's rule they voiced this openly. Putin's Munich speech, his famous phrases about the Soviet Union s collapse as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20 th century and proclaiming the new Russia's greatness were pronounced deliberately and provocatively. Ignorance of this rhetoric could also only be deliberate. The European Union for a long time did ignore it, continuing to treat Russia as a strategic partner and ally. The illusion was that Russia would simply compensate for its weakness with its aggressive rhetoric, but would never be able to carry it out with concrete actions. Indeed, today's Russia is a big but politically weak, economically and technologically backward, poor country with inflated geopolitical ambitions. To understand this it is enough to analyse Russia s position in leading world rankings, where it loses not only to developed countries but often to many developing ones 10. Russia's GDP per capita is less than half of the EU s and, given the uneven distribution of national wealth, this gap is even more obvious. According to various ratings regarding the scientific and technological sector, Russia is not in the first ranks, while its share in the world market of high-tech products is less than one percent (0.25% in 2011) 11. This tragic imbalance between desirable and actual status leads to the need to constantly demonstrate the symbolic successes of Russia: expanding its area of influence (the Eurasian Union), demonstrating its military power (the 2008 war with Georgia) and sports victories (the Olympic Games). From the viewpoint of the post Soviet region, Russia s intervention in Ukraine was a constantly expected event, terrible in its essence, but understandable Putin's Munich speech, his famous phrases about the Soviet Union s collapse as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20 th century and proclaiming the new Russia's greatness were pronounced deliberately and provocatively The paradox of Russia s current strength lies in the comparative weakness of its geopolitical environment. The post-soviet region, except for the Baltic countries, is a collection of cases of failed transformations and unstable regimes. This gives Russia a vast space to play with energy leverage, to directly and indirectly subsidize neighbouring countries and to maintain frozen conflicts. The EU and its Member States, as the other geopolitical 10 V. MIRONOV, D. AVDEEVA, Konkurentosposobnost Rossij v mezhdunarodnyh reitingah: 10 let spustia, 11 Y. MEDVEDEV, Ychenyi v sobstennom soku. Srednij vozrast issledovatelia v Rossij priblizhaetsia k 50 godam, Rossijskaia Gazeta, August 10, 2011, 7

8 center, is also not able to convert its presence to a dominant power. The European Union is weakened by internal economic complications and bound to a complex decision-making system by 28 Member States. This makes its foreign policy in the region far from consistent and effective. Furthermore, the EU is dependent on the stability of Russian energy supplies and some of the EU Member States have very profitable economic relationships with the Russian Federation. The interest in Russian economic benefits makes them passive and sometimes loyal to dubious Russian policies. For another global player - United States the EaP region is not a case of significant interest. The U.S. concedes leadership to the European Union, preferring to avoid serious interference. The lack of initiative of the West has allowed Russia to believe in the revival of its strength and world-power status. The strengthening of the faith was followed by action. First, Russia began to strengthen its own presence and influence in its "near abroad" by creating and funding pro-russian forces and simply buying the political elites. Secondly, using long-lasting frozen conflicts it undertook intervention in Georgia, occupied part of Georgian territory and established controlled regimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. These actions of Putin's Russia remained unpunished and after a short crisis its relations with the West were restored. This convinced Putin even more that there is no one who can impede the expansion of Russia and he began to take more decisive action. The EaP was a response of the European Union to Russia s expansionist actions. However, it was based on the principle of the use of "soft power", i.e. an attractiveness of the European model and the step-by-step involvement of neighbouring countries in the process of rapprochement with the EU. At the same time, the European Union tried to simply eliminate the geopolitical and political context from the Eastern Partnership, putting emphasis on the formal (legislative) side of cooperation with neighbouring countries and benchmarking the process by the formal adoption of the EU norms and standards in their legislation. Outside of the EaP s focus remained the questions of the regional influence of Russia and the internal political situation in the partner countries, namely the balance of pro-and anti-european forces on the internal political scene. Such a strategy brought some temporary benefits, but only because Russia did not consider the EaP as a serious offer. The EaP didn t propose either big money, or prospects of EU membership. Russia underestimated the attractiveness of the EU model and the strength of the EU s "soft power" in neighboring countries. This led to the fact that it missed the moment of symbolic exit for most of the partner countries from the Russian zone of influence. The initiation of the Association Agreements EU with Armenia, Moldova and Georgia and the signing of the Agreement with Ukraine were supposed to mark the triumph of the new integration strategy of the EU. Outside of the EaP s focus remained the questions of the regional influence of Russia and the internal political situation in the partner countries, namely the balance of pro and anti European forces on the internal political scene 8

9 Only when Russia realised that the region was slowly but inevitably turning to the West, and that the Eurasian Union could not compete with the attractiveness of the Association Agreements, did it undertake active steps to block this process. The most economically and politically dependent countries Armenia and Ukraine appeared to be under Russian pressure. The EU s "soft power" has been unable to resist the hard political and economic pressure from Russia. Ukraine and Armenia had to be the first to reject the European offer. The rest of the EaP countries should be next, but Ukraine remains a key point. Russia easily blocked Armenia, where its military presence and political control of the elites is particularly great. Ukraine has been much more intractable. It was not difficult to convince the corrupt pro-russian "Party of Regions" and the government of former President Yanukovych, but the population of Ukraine negatively perceived the geopolitical turn of the country towards its eastern neighbour. For the people of Ukraine the rejection of the European way amounted to a denial of dreams, ideals and hopes for the best. The sharp demarche by the Ukrainian President and the government and the suspension of the Association Agreement with the EU resulted in mass protests across Ukraine. "Euro Maidan" protests quickly passed from the demand to return to the path of integration with the EU to direct political demands of regime change and revolt against the corruption and authoritarian rule of Yanukovich. The Ukrainian government was not able to cope with the revolutionary protest in the country and there was a change of elites: the pro-russian "Party of Regions" ceded power to a new revolutionary government. To a great extent this government is a result of compromise between old Yanukovich s elite, opposition leaders and Euro Maidan protesters. New leadership, following Euro Maidan demands, is taking steps to restore the process of rapprochement with the EU. In March, 2014 the political part of the Association Agreement was signed. For Putin and the Russian leadership that meant the loss of political control over Ukraine and hence a failure of their own neo-imperialist ambitions. In this situation, Putin launched a backup plan to destabilise the situation in Ukraine, which was already tested in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia easily blocked Armenia, where its military presence and political control of the elites is particularly great. Ukraine has been much more intractable The focus is on the destabilisation of the south and eastern regions of Ukraine, which do not support the new revolutionary government of Ukraine. According to Putin s plan, chaos and instability should force the Ukrainians to ask for help from Russia in bringing order in the country, which would allow Russia to set an external control over Eastern Ukraine. But here the situation is not as straightforward and Ukrainians are much more consolidated, they fear the new government less than Russian rule. The full destabilization scenario, the change of power in the region and the search for "external help" became possible only in Crimea. Russia de facto annexed Crimea. However, Russia does not need Crimea as such. By threatening the integrity and stability of Ukraine, Putin is putting pressure on the new Kiev 9

10 authorities, aiming at coercing the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to appoint a pro-russian government. The future destiny of Belarus and the whole EaP region is highly dependent on resolving the Ukrainian crisis. Establishing control over Ukraine unties the hands of Russia for new attempts to put pressure on small EaP countries. Putin s regime strategically focuses on creating neo-soviet imperia and will not be satisfied with Ukraine. The absorption of Armenia is quickly developing with pro-russian officials joining the government and thus the country is turning to the Eurasian Union. Some steps have already been taken for the possible prevention of a rapprochement of Moldova with the EU, where Russia took advantage of its control over Transnistria and its strong influence in Gagauzia.. In Russia s imperialistic logic of bipolar world restoration a scenario of subjugating Belarus is highly probable in a mid-term perspective. Any attempt of Belarus to change its geopolitical vector or any move to democratic transformation could provoke Russia s reaction. Many perceive Belarus as a problem solved by Russia, a country that has long been firmly under Russian control. But it is in many ways an illusion. Belarus is definitely under strong Russian influence, but retains its own independence. This independence is based on the Lukashenko administration s tight control of state apparatus ("vertical power"), as well as its control of key productive assets, which in turn enables it to control the population s employment. Any attempt of Belarus to change its geopolitical vector or any move to democratic transformation could provoke Russia s reaction Unlike Ukraine, Belarus has no independent elite oligarchic clans or broad protest activity. There are no actors capable of creating internal destabilisation. A scenario of subjugating Belarus will be different. First, Russia will seek to take over certain sectors of the economy under the control of Belarusian authorities by transferring regulatory functions to supranational bodies of the Eurasian Union. Second, Russia will seek to destroy the unity and integrity of the system of public administration, using different approaches: from establishment of joint Belarus-Russia control over the army (such as the general grouping of troops) prior to infiltration by Russian security services agents, to creation of common customs controls, to the direct corruption of elites, etc. Third, the privatization of significant Belarusian enterprises in favor of the Russian capital will be undertaken. Fourth is deepening Belarus credit and energy dependency on Russia. The Belarusian authorities see and understand these threats. At the same time the limits of Belarus resistance to Russian expansion are based on room for maneuver between the EU and Russia and so far on the successful strategy of exchanging symbolic loyalty to Putin s initiatives for economic advantages. However, if Russia asserts its control over Ukraine, Belarus will lose its status as Russia s only Western geopolitical ally. The maneuver room will be critically reduced and the potential threats of complete loss of sovereignty will be more than real. Unlike Ukraine, Belarus has no independent elite oligarchic clans or broad protest activity. There are no actors capable of creating internal destabilisation. A scenario of subjugating Belarus will be different 10

11 Possible perspectives The development prospects of the EaP policy lay in its instrumentalization. The policy should be seen more as a set of instruments of the European Union making it possible to engage countries of the Eastern Partnership in the European transformation. This means including a partial step away from the "more-for-more" principle, understood solely as a dependence on the depth of interaction with the EU or the will of national governments to follow such a rapprochement. The Ukrainian situation clearly shows the opposite aspirations of society and the government. A proportionate EU response to the unwillingness of EaP governments to integrate with the EU can be greater support for the European aspirations of society. This approach will mean a greater politicization of the EaP and thus will require a greater immersion in the partner s political situation, including direct support of various pro-european forces within the EaP countries. Is has to be accepted that the EU became embroiled in geopolitical confrontation with Russia in their common neighbourhood. The strategic partnership, which has long been built by the EU in its relations with the Russian Federation, showed itself to be weak. The question today is not in the synchronization of EU and Russian actions, but in the total revision of the strategy of EU-Russia relations. Since implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy, the Eastern Neighborhood has become less stable and safe. It cannot be said that the EU Neighborhood policy is the reason for that. However, it is obvious that its political weakness and geopolitical indifference contributed to the general destabilization of the situation. 11