The Darfur Conflict and Civilian Protection

Transcription

1 The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies The Darfur Conflict and Civilian Protection Conference Report January 2007 Cairo, Egypt

2 Table of Contents: 1. List of Abbreviations Executive Summary.2 3. Introduction.5 4. Summary of Presentations and Discussions: 4.1 Opening Session First Session: Humanitarian Situation in Darfur Second Session: Civilian Protection in Darfur Third Session: The Future of Humanitarian Intervention Fourth Session: Why the DPA (Abuja) Failed? Fifth Session: The Arab and African Role in Darfur Final Session: Conclusions Annex: 6.1 List of Participants Agenda List of Abbreviations: UN United Nations AU African Union SC United Nations Security Council DPA Darfur Peace Agreement (Abuja, 5 May 2006) NGO Non-governmental Organization INGO International Non-governmental Organization IGO Intergovernmental Organization (including the UN) IDP Internally Displaced People MENA Middle East and North Africa GoS Government of Sudan ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross WFP World Food Program IHL International Humanitarian Law AMIS African Mission in Sudan ICC International Criminal Court ICJ International Court of Justice JEM Justice and Equality Movement (Darfur) SLM Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (Darfur) 1

3 2. Executive Summary: The conference "The Darfur Conflict and Civilian Protection" was held in Cairo on January, and was initiated by The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS), with support from the Open Society Institute. A wide range of participants were involved including governmental, IGO, INGO, NGO, academic and media personnel. The conference represented the first time officials and representatives from the GoS and Darfur opposition movements met face-to-face since the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) process was concluded in May, The conference was organized around five thematic panel presentations, each followed by an open floor discussion. The five thematic panels were entitled: (1) Developments Concerning the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur, (2) Proposals for Civilian Protection- Including the Role of the African Union and United Nations, (3) Perspectives on the Future of Humanitarian Intervention, (4) Why the DPA (Abuja) Agreement Failed to Provide Peace and Security, and (5) Perspectives on the Arab and African Role Regarding the Situation in Darfur. The conference also included an "Opening" session and a "Concluding" session. The presentations and discussions canvassed a wide range of issues concerning Darfur, with a particular focus on the issues of civilian protection, the peace process, and humanitarian intervention. An overarching consensus was expressed that progress concerning all of these issues remains dependent on finding a political solution to the underlying causes of the Darfur conflict. While no formal list of conclusions was proffered during the concluding session, none-the-less, a convergence of opinion among a large majority of the participants developed around the three main issues: A. Civilian Protection in Darfur: The security of civilians in Darfur, including IDPs and humanitarian aid workers, is currently the worst it has ever been. There has been a dramatic increase in attacks on civilians. The unprecedented rise in pillage of humanitarian supplies and attacks on humanitarian workers over the last nine months has endangered the viability of all humanitarian operations within Darfur and eastern Chad. This situation is an extreme threat to the protection of civilians, as millions of IDPs within these areas depend on humanitarian aid for their basic subsistence. The GoS, government supported Janjaweed militias, and, to a lesser extent, rebel factions in Darfur are all guilty of attacks against civilians and hindering the delivery of humanitarian aid. However, the burden of responsibility for the humanitarian crisis primarily rests with the GoS, as the most powerful actor in Darfur and the sovereign authority in Sudan. Civilian protection has deteriorated in accordance with and as a result of the intensified violence and geographical expansion of the Darfur conflict. In the short term, there is a need for the leaders of the GoS and rebel 2

4 factions to commit themselves to abiding by the rules of International Humanitarian Law within Darfur, including allowing humanitarian agencies to carry out their work in a secure and unfettered manner. In the long term, civilian protection is dependent on two major elements: (1) The willingness of the GoS and Darfur movements to hold genuine transparent peace negotiations in which both sides compromise on their most extreme demands, and protection of civilians is included as an obligatory condition for all parties, (2) the legal system of Sudan must undergo a holistic reformation to ensure that the national laws and judicial process' provide sufficient and fair mechanisms of accountability which end the widespread practice and culture of impunity that officials and others enjoy within Sudan, especially for crimes committed within Darfur. B. The Darfur Conflict and the DPA 1 : The causes of the Darfur conflict are rooted in a collusion of resource competition (especially for fertile land) and ethnic identity. Moreover, unequal development caused by the central governments unwillingness to distribute resources to the periphery areas of the country in an equitable manner is largely responsible for the many internal conflicts within Sudan, including in Darfur. Since the DPA was signed, the conflict in Darfur has increased. The DPA failed largely because it neither adequately addressed nor engendered widespread agreement concerning the issue of resource management, distribution and control, including local natural resources. Furthermore, the constant fragmentation, disorganization and lack of political will for peace among the GoS and rebel factions has lead to an inability and/or unwillingness among these actors to consistently adhere to agreed upon obligations. There is a great need for transparent, inclusive and genuine negotiations between the GoS and rebel factions; and for non-combative stakeholders to peace in Darfur (ex: local Darfur communities and tribes) to be involved in this negotiation process. C. Humanitarian Intervention 2 : The use of a UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping force in Darfur must be considered in light of the deep, complex causes of the conflict. As such, the use of force for humanitarian intervention in Darfur remains a limited, short-term solution to the problem. Nonconsensual humanitarian intervention (i.e. carried out without the consent of the GoS) within Darfur has the danger of causing further destabilization in Sudan, and the region. Therefore, any humanitarian action that is taken in Darfur may cause 1 On Friday the 5th of May 2006, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (Minni Minawi) signed the Darfur Peace Agreement. This peace agreement, which covers security, wealth-sharing and power-sharing, was the result of two years of painstaking negotiations mediated by the African Union (AU). DPA text available in English, Arabic and French at 2 For the purposes of this report Humanitarian Intervention is referred to as an interference, usually involving the use of force, in a sovereign state by an outside entity for humanitarian purposes. The underlying idea being that state sovereignty can be by-passed in order to ease or halt certain forms of human suffering and/or governmental behavior that contradicts with basic tenements of international law. 3

5 more harm than good, unless it is carried out in a widely accepted/supported manner that is in conformity with international law. Any intervening UN force may have to secure the acceptance of the Sudanese government to avoid a further escalation and intensification of the conflict. All efforts should be made to strengthen and support the existing AU peacekeeping force, AMIS, in Darfur. In this respect, INGOs, NGOs and others should lobby African governments to increase the size and strengthen the civilian protection mandate of this force, while at the same time pressuring the UN to provide generous financial support for its operation. Furthermore, heavy pressure should continue to be applied on the GoS to allow for an AU-UN hybrid force in Darfur that can provide effective civilian protection. Unless the GoS becomes more cooperative in this matter it is likely that civilian protection in Darfur will continue to decline. As such, the unconditional support the GoS receives from most Arab governments and within much of Arab mass media is extremely irresponsible and unethical. Arab governments have an international legal obligation and moral duty to do all they can to ensure that international crimes are not committed against civilians in Darfur, and that the GoS does all that it can to provide these civilians with protection and security. This lack of will among Arab governments to apply sufficient pressure on the GoS is symptomatic of a general lack of knowledge and/or understanding of the Darfur situation within the Arab world, which often leads to a rejection or mitigation of the seriousness of the humanitarian crisis that is occurring. In addition to the informative and constructive exchange of information and views that took place, several positive developments occurred during the conference. First, officials from the GoS and representatives from some Darfur opposition movements expressed a desire to renew the peace negotiation process, and to do so in a transparent, inclusive manner. Second, the GoS renewed its commitment to the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue process contained within the DPA. 3 Third, the GoS welcomed and pledged cooperation with a proposed Media Mission 4 to Darfur to be undertaken by CIHRS, in cooperation with other organizations. Forth, a series of cooperative working-groups were established among a variety of INGOs and NGOs dealing with the Darfur issue. 3 Chapter four in the DPA calls for a Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation in which representatives of all Darfurian stakeholders can meet to discuss the challenges of restoring peace to their land, overcoming the divisions between communities, and resolving existing problems to build a common future. The DDDC was envisioned as a way to build support for the DPA and address important outstanding issues of reconciliation, reconstruction, and political representation. However, there is a great deal of confusion about the Dialogue because the DPA does not clearly define its specific objectives, the process for achieving them, or the mechanism for implementing its outcomes. Read more at aa31f9e1e60d 4 The proposed media mission would allow for a delegation of reporters from Arab media outlets to visit Sudan and Darfur, and meet up with Sudanese media personnel. 4

6 3. Introduction: On the 29 th and 30 th of January 2007, the Conference "The Darfur Conflict and Civilian Protection" took place in Cairo, Egypt at the initiative of The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies ( with support from the Open Society Institute. The conference was attended by governmental authorities, parliamentarians, academics and representatives from opposition groups of Darfur, embassies, the UN, NGOs, INGOs and Arabic media outlets. The majority of participants were INGO and NGO representatives from throughout the North African and Middle East region, including from Sudan. The conference was scheduled to coincide with the proceedings of the AU summit in Adidas Ababa. The interventions and presentations of the conference focused on the causes of the Darfur conflict, with a special emphasis on the lack of civilian protection within this conflict. Key issues that emerged included the role of local, regional and international actors in providing and promoting civilian protection for IDPs, humanitarian aid workers and other civilians within Darfur and eastern Chad, the inability of humanitarian aid organizations to deliver aid to displaced peoples due to the deterioration of the security situation, and the causes of increased conflict within Darfur since the signing of the DPA. The aims of the conference included: To inform and raise awareness among the populations of North African and Arabic countries concerning the humanitarian crises, especially the lack of civilian protection within Darfur To provide a platform for dialogue between Sudanese governmental authorities, Darfur opposition group representatives, and the IGO, INGO, NGO community To pressure Arabic governments to play an active and constructive role in efforts to provide civilian protection within Darfur To strengthen and aid in the cooperation/coordination of INGO and NGO advocacy for and research on civilian protection in Darfur, especially within the Middle East and North African (MENA) region To provide a platform for information exchange among the IGO, INGO and NGO community dealing with Darfur, including Sudanese NGOs To suggest methods and approaches on how different actors can contribute to strengthening civilian protection in Darfur To contribute to efforts to revitalize peace negotiations between the GoS and opposition movements in Darfur This report contains a summary of the discussions and presentations that took place during the conference, and is not intended as a comprehensive review. While this document is believed to contain a correct representation of the views and opinions expressed by the conference participants, the organizers cannot assume any liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or subsequent use of any of the information herein. The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) 5

7 4. Summary of Presentations and Discussions 4.1. Opening Session Session Panelists: Mr. Bahey el Dien Hassan (Moderator) Director of CIHRS Mr. Ahmed Haroun Sudanese State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs Mr. Kamal el Jozooli Sudanese Lawyer and Secretary-General of the Sudanese Union of Writers Opening Session Summary: Mr. Jozooli began the session by drawing attention to the fact that the humanitarian situation in Darfur has deteriorated since the signing of the DPA on 5 May 2006, with the conflict becoming more intensified and wide-spread. Several factors have contributed to this deteriorating situation including: 1. The DPA lacked the support and commitment of most rebel groups within Darfur, 2. The response of the Sudanese government to the situation is more dependent on external factors (ex: threat of sanctions) then on dealing with the internal dynamics of the conflict (ex: rebel grievances), 3. The DPA was a product of outside pressure more than internal agreement and compromise. Thus, the crisis will only improve when the GoS begins a genuine dialogue and bargaining process with Sudanese actors and stakeholders in the conflict. Minister Haroun acknowledged that the GoS may need to reevaluate their current relationship with civil society groups. He then asserted that the response of the international civil society and media to the situation in Darfur has become entrenched against the GoS, and lacked sufficient coverage and attention on crimes committed by rebel groups within Darfur. Security measures and terrorist actions are not distinguished from one another. The GoS seeks peace, and is ready to negotiate with any party. Mr. Hassan concluded the session by pointing out the "multiple layers of tragedy" that have contributed to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. The failure of Arab, African, and international efforts to stop the killing in Darfur has resulted in four years of increased violence and daily atrocities. Rebel groups may share responsibility; however, the GoS bears the greatest responsibility, and lacks the political will to solve the crisis. A sever lack of responsibility for civilian protection exists within Sudan and the region at large. In particular, mainstream public opinion in Arab regions seem unconcerned about the victims of crimes when committed by Arabs/Muslims against Arabs/Muslims, as in Darfur. Such victims seem of no value unless they can be used as tools to denounce foreign involvement; and any attempt to raise awareness of the situation is met with accusations of imperialist or Zionist plots to replace the Sudanese regime. The Arab media can only talk about Darfur in terms of conspiracy theories. Over 200,000 dead, mass rapes and 2.5 million refugees yet none of this has stirred the Arab conscience. A double-standard exists among the Arab public and governments: What happed to the regional outrage against the killings and mass rapes of Muslims in Bosnia? Why, when it comes to Darfur, have the Arabic intellectuals, governments, media and public fallen silent? It is extremely important for the Arab world to put moral pressure on the GoS to conform to 6

8 their legal and moral obligations to protect civilians in Darfur, perhaps even more important than the political pressure they can exert First Session: Developments Concerning the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur Session Panelists: Hany Megally (Moderator) Director- Middle East Department, International Institute for Transitional Justice Tamara Refaii Media Official at ICRC (Red Cross) regional office Mosaad Mohamed Ali Amal Center for Relief of Torture Victims (Sudan) Bashir Ahmed Amnesty International Jamie Balfour Humanitarian Advisor, Oxfam Khaled Mansoor World Food Program (WFP-UN) First Session Summary: Ms. Rafaii began the session by outlining ICRC operations in Darfur and the challenges it faces. The ICRC has a mandate to deliver food, medicine, perform medical procedures, monitor IHL and document the situation. The ICRC project in Sudan is its largest in the world, comprising 1500 staff and a budget of 73 million dollars. Within Darfur, security and medical care are the largest concerns of most Sudanese IDPs and civilians. Over the last year the humanitarian situation in Darfur and the ability of the ICRC, and other humanitarian organizations, to operate effectively have both dramatically worsened. 37 security incidents (ex: attack on workers) disturbed ICRC's ability to operate in The humanitarian situation in Darfur and the security of aid workers has never been worse. There are daily violations of IHL, international customary law and basic ethics of warfare in Darfur. Within this context, ICRC and other humanitarian organizations have no freedom of movement and limited access to IDPs. Without the ability to operate effectively humanitarian organizations can not alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. As such, the solution to the humanitarian crisis lies in a political process that creates the necessary political will to stop attacks on humanitarian organizations and civilians. Mr. Ali then gave a historical overview of the conflict in Darfur. The conflict in Darfur is historically rooted in competition for power and resources between different tribal and ethnic groups. In Darfur there are 107 tribes, most of these, Arab and African alike, are Muslim. In the 1980's, conflict in the area began to escalate due in large part to the desertification of northern Darfur. Desertification of this area lead the nomadic Arab tribes of the north to begin encroaching and seizing pastoral land of African tribes in central Darfur, initially around the Jabal Marra area. Open conflict between these two blocks began and escalated between During this period 27 Arab tribes united to move against non- Arabs and drive them off the land. Throughout the late 1990's Arab tribes attacked and burned the homes of the indigenous populations of central and southern Darfur. This was carried out with the increasing support of the GoS. Many indigenous people began to flee. In the early 2000's, these attacks increased and the government refused to intervene to prevent them from occurring. Thus, to stop these attacks indigenous groups began forming militias; forming the basis of the Darfur rebel groups. In response to this armed 7

9 retaliation the GoS began efforts to fragment the indigenous militias while at the same time providing logistical and financial support to the Arab tribes/militias, including aerial bombardments of villages. The 2003 attack of rebel groups on a government air base elevated the status of the conflict into what we are now witnessing. It is important to note that not all Arab tribes are aggressors within the conflict, however, many Arab tribes involved have oriented their attacks to target civilians in an attempt to drive them off the land. These attacks have been responsible for the destruction of over 2000 villages, and the creation of 4 million refugees. The DPA has had no positive impact on the situation, largely because many rebel groups never signed it. Some of those that did sign it have fragmented and are once again fighting. (Mr. Ali later added) The majority of responsibility for the continuing conflict in Darfur lays with the government, in particular their policies of arming Arab militias and the use of indiscriminate bombing campaigns on villages. Ms. Bashir Ahmed highlighted the expansion of the Darfur conflict into eastern Chad, and, with it, the exportation of atrocities committed against IDPs and other civilians. Attacks on civilians by Janjaweed militias crossing into Chad have increased in intensity and geographical range, at times penetrating 150km into Chad. Such attacks are not only an affront to ethics and international law, but also contribute to the destabilization of the region. Ms. Ahmed then drew attention to the widespread use of rape as a weapon within the conflict and the disturbing nature of the atrocities that are committed in Darfur and Chad by reading the testimony of a girl who was brutally raped by the Janjaweed and forced to watch as they executed 19 men. Mr. Balfour began by reiterating the unprecedented increase in the level of attacks on humanitarian workers within the last half-year and the deteriorating access of humanitarian organizations to effected populations, which is worse than at any time during Oxfam's 20 year involvement in Darfur. Large amounts of humanitarian workers have been evacuated from Darfur due to these attacks. Pillage of property and equipment is a huge problem for humanitarian organizations. During 2006, 170 vehicles used by humanitarian organizations were hijacked in Darfur and Chad; severely limiting their ability to deliver aid. Simultaneously, intensified violence has increased the number of displaced peoples by 25% since the signing of the DPA. 120,000 refugees have fled into eastern Chad. Amid the increasing violence, AMIS, the ill-equipped undermanned, and under financed AU peacekeeping force in Darfur, has switched into defensive mode, and now provides less protection for civilians than at any time in its operation. In an unprecedented statement issued on 17 January 2007, UN agencies operating in Darfur have warned that humanitarian operations in Darfur are on the verge of a complete breakdown. 5 Mr. Mansour continued to stress the dire humanitarian crises faced by civilians and humanitarian workers in Darfur. WFP's operation in Darfur is its largest in the world, and attempts to provide food for 3 million people. Many gains made in providing for the nutritional and sanitation needs of IDPs in Darfur have been under threat especially by the end of In July 2006 UN humanitarian organizations were unable to deliver aid to 470,000 people. The reduction of aid services to IDP camps has resulted in a severe deterioration of hygiene standards, leading to a recent Cholera outbreak that affected 2,700 people. 5 UN Joint Statement available in English and Arabic at 8

10 First Session Open Floor Discussion: Minister Haroun: The humanitarian crisis in Darfur is a product of the war, and the rebel groups in Darfur bear full responsibility for the continuation of this war. The GoS does not, and has not been accused of blocking humanitarian supplies within Darfur. Ambassador Mohammad Abdullah (Ambassador of Sudan in Egypt): The internal and border security of Sudan is of the utmost importance to the GoS. International organizations and media must be objective and focus on the crimes committed by rebels in Darfur. Other points: General agreement that the solution is political GoS can do and is legally obligated to do more to protect civilians and stop the violence. Coverage of Darfur may concentrate on the GoS because the GoS severely restricts the access of journalists into Darfur. Important to try to find immediate, practical solutions to alleviate the humanitarian situation while the political dialogue is in process Second Session: Proposals for Civilian Protection- Including the Role of the African Union and United Nations Session Panelists: Mr. Abdullah Khater (Moderator) Darfurian Writer Mr. Nadim Hasbany Arab Media Officer, The International Crisis Group (ICG) Mr. Saleh Mahmoud Sudanese MP and Human Rights Lawyer Ms. Diedra Clancy The Darfur Consortium, International Refugee Rights Initiative Ms. Leslie Lefkow Human Rights Watch Second Session Summary: Mr. Nadim Hasbany began by posing the question of where the conflict in Darfur is headed. Could the conflict become just as prolonged as the conflict between North and South Sudan? A new generation in Darfur is being raised in refugee camps, a fact that damages the chances of a successful peace process from occurring. The first priority concerning the conflict should be to provide protection for civilians; the second is to ensure that a genuine constructive political process begins. The international community has failed in its international legal obligation to provide protection for civilians in Darfur. The Security Council (SC) and the European Union (EU) have been unwilling to impose sanctions regimes, while Arab governments support the GoS against any type of intervention. The Sudanese government only reacts to strong, concerted pressure. The Crisis Group recommends targeted sanctions on Sudanese governmental officials. In particular, many individuals in the GoS have been 9

11 acquiring large amounts of private wealth through "secret" companies run by the government. Target these companies and the oil interests of the Sudanese government to apply immediate pressure on the GoS to stop feeding the conflict in Darfur, and begin protecting civilians. Mr. Mahmoud pointed out that the main issue should be the protection of the 4 million displaced peoples, 2 million of which live in refugee camps. In this matter, the GoS has the preponderant responsibility to protect these people under international law. If the GoS fails to do so, then this responsibility falls to the international community, and Chapter 7 of the UN Charter should be used by the S.C. to ensure the safety of IDPs in Darfur. Whether you call the situation "ethnic cleansing" or "genocide" does not matter, in both cases the international community is legally obligated to step in and ensure protection. Some argue it is only the responsibility of the AU but AMIS does not have the capability to provide protection. A Commission from the Parliament of Sudan on Darfur recently reported that AMIS itself has requested the GoS to provide them with protection. As such, the use of UN forces is the only means to provide real protection for civilians in Darfur. If the international community does not step in then ethnic cleansing will continue to escalate. The GoS's suggestion to "relocate" IDPs to "safety areas" is another way of furthering ethnic cleansing and should not be accepted. Depopulated areas in Darfur are already being occupied by non-indigenous migrants. Furthermore, the issue of justice and accountability is an important tool in efforts to stop the killing. When the ICC first announced its investigation and lists of names were being circulated, there were very little attacks for 3 months. But after the perpetrators witnessed that nothing concrete was occurring they became convinced that there would be no accountability and full impunity, so they began attacking the people of Darfur once more. Ms. Clancy presented several "reflections on the role of the AU" concerning the Darfur situation. When the AU peacekeeping mission, AMIS, was first sent to Darfur their mandate did not include protection of civilians. This mandate was expanded in October 2004 to include limited protection of civilians, an appropriate measure considering that the AU Constitution includes a "duty to protect" clause. However, several factors, including the failure to provide sustained civilian protection, allegations that AU soldiers were involved in rape and AMIS's close cooperation with the GoS, lead people in Darfur to view AMIS with distrust and resentment. AMIS found itself being rejected by the very people it was supposed to be protecting. SC Resolution 1706, which seemed to call for the gradual sidelining of AMIS by a UN force, was passed by the SC with minimal AU consultation. Officials at the AU felt marginalized by the Resolution. There is currently huge confusion concerning what has and has not been agreed to by the GoS concerning the implementation of Resolution The African Union Summit is currently in session in Adidas Ababa. It was agreed to at last years AU Summit that Sudan would be given the Chairmanship of the organization this year. While the AU and AMIS have been criticized, they still have important roles to play in Darfur. Many are calling on the AU to not allow Sudan to take the Chairmanship, fearing that this would severely damage the ability of the AU to perform the role of a third-party peace-broker and peacekeeper within the Darfur conflict. Ms. Lefkow's intervention concentrated on the role that accountability and justice can and should play in efforts to provide protection for civilians in Darfur. Intervention by an international organization or force has a limited ability to create lasting peace in Darfur. The solution to the humanitarian crisis is much more complex, and will have to include the development of a system of 10

12 accountability and justice within Sudan that will engender the trust and acceptance of citizens in Darfur. Furthermore, fair and transparent national mechanisms of accountability have an essential complementary role to play in efforts to ensure the protection of civilians within the ongoing conflict. A "crisis of confidence" exists among Darfurians toward the GoS. Legal reforms can help to rebuild this confidence. In particular, Sudanese law provides no legal framework for command responsibility. 6 Also, immunities exist within Sudanese laws that provide impunity for governmental officials. These types of laws are a signal to Darfurians that justice will not be delivered. Second Session Open-Floor Discussion: JEM: It is well-known that the problem is political and requires a political solution. All humanitarian problems in Darfur have a political solution. SLM: The GoS bears the responsibility for what is happening in Darfur. There is a need for officials in the GoS to be strongly punished. AU plays very little role in Darfur. AU's role in the Abuja agreements was of no help. International forces and sanctions are needed. Ms. Clancy: Recommendations- 1. Use accountability mechanisms 2. Need genuine, inclusive renegotiations 3. Need clear timetable and benchmark for hybrid operation in Darfur. 4. Call for deployment in Chad to provide security for civilians and regional stability 5. Need to strengthen AMIS forces Other Points: International organizations are the life-line of Darfur people. Darfur has received very little aid from Arab governments or Islamic charities The fact that the situation in Darfur is a regional problem with regional effects has not been wildly recognized within the region Chad's support for rebel movements must be taken into consideration 6 Command responsibility, sometimes referred to as the Yamashita standard or the Medina standard, is the doctrine of hierarchical accountability in cases of war crimes, and includes the obligation to refrain from ordering and/or to take action to stop ones subordinates from committing war crimes/ human rights abuses. The doctrine of command responsibility was established by the Hague Conventions IV (1907) and X (1907) and applied for the first time by the German Supreme Court in Leipzig after World War I, in the trial of Emil Muller. The Yamashita standard is based upon the precedent set by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Japanese General Yamashita. He was prosecuted, in a still controversial trial, for atrocities committed by troops under his command in the Philippines. Yamashita was charged with "unlawfully disregarding and failing to discharge his duty as a commander to control the acts of members of his command by permitting them to commit war crimes." The Medina standard is based upon the massacre at My Lai which US captain Ernest Medina failed to prevent. It holds that a commanding officer, being aware of a human rights violation or a war crime, will be held criminally liable when he does not take action. See for instance: 11

13 4.4 Third Session: Perspectives on the Future of Humanitarian Intervention Session Panelists: Khaled Mansoor (Moderator) World Food Program (WFP-UN) Mr. Aryeh Neier Open Society Institute, President Dr. Mohamed el Sayed Said Ahram Center for Political Studies, Vice-President Third Session Summary: Mr. Neier asserted that humanitarian intervention, as a policy choice within the international sphere, still is and will remain an effective and necessary tool to prevent and/or stop the most egregious international crimes (ex: ethnic cleansing, genocide) from occurring. However, before humanitarian intervention can or should be used a certain set of criteria must be met: 1. The crimes committed/humanitarian crises should be of extreme gravity with massive negative consequences; 2. All other means of solving the situation (ex: economic and diplomatic pressure) must have been exhausted; 3. The intervention should have a high-probability of success, and low-probability of making the situation worse; 4. The act should possess legitimacy. While the first condition above is certainly true of the situation in Darfur, the answers to the other three criteria need to be studied and discussed to see if they have been met. In particular, the criteria of legitimacy needs to be examined. What constitutes a legitimate intervention? Certainly one carried out by the S.C. under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter would enjoy legitimacy under international law. Yet, political considerations have and will always make it extremely unlikely that the S.C. would authorize humanitarian intervention. Thus, what about unilateral intervention by another state? Another set of criteria would have to be met for unilateral intervention to be legitimate: 1. The intervention should be based on extraterritorial human rights obligations, and/or convention based prerogatives (ex: The Convention on the Elimination of Genocide); 2. The intervention must demonstrate a purity of intention that excludes motives based on securing the strategic interests of the intervening country (ex: resource procurement); 3. The intervention must be carried out in a manner that conforms to international humanitarian law standards and principles. As such, the purpose of the intervention should never be to overthrow the government of the territory, and the use of force should not exceed what is required to protect civilians. At the moment, the backlash against interventionist policies that has been created by the Iraq debacle has stifled debate on and support for the use of humanitarian intervention in general, including when it comes to Darfur. As a result, the U.S., European countries and others are unwilling to send troops or lead in efforts to intervene in Darfur. However, if we agree that genocide and ethnic cleansing are not acceptable, than humanitarian intervention, when in conformity with the criteria listed above, must be considered as an acceptable policy choice of international organizations, as well as individual states. Dr. Said provided a counter argument to Mr. Neier s point-of-view. According to Dr. Said, the principle of humanitarian intervention may be logically coherent. However, the history of Western intervention in the MENA region raises huge questions concerning its legitimacy as a policy choice. First, humanitarian 12

14 intervention is reminiscent of the neo-colonial experience, and is often viewed as an extension of this experience. Second, the case of Palestine evinces a prejudiced selectivity and double-standard concerning where and when intervention takes place in the region. For instance, why do Western countries advocate for intervention in Darfur and not in the West-Bank and Gaza? Third, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to ensure that humanitarian intervention is carried out with a purity of intention, and not as a means of furthering the intervening states own interests. Iraq is a prime example of this difficulty. Fourth, the manner in which humanitarian intervention was carried out against Iraq during and after the first Gulf War demonstrated a complete lack of respect for the well-fare of Iraqi citizens. The bombing campaigns and later the sanctions regime were responsible for extreme human suffering, and contrary to the standards and principles of IHL. There is a clear lack of mechanisms within the international realm to ensure the same type of abuses do not occur once more. What matters then is not the principled logic of humanitarian intervention but the particularities: Who? How? Where? And for what purposes? In this regard, considering that decisions of the S.C. are highly politicized, using the ICJ may offer a more fair and transparent method to decide the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention on a case-by-case basis. Third Session Open-Floor Discussion: Ms. Amal Basha: In Arab regions one of the main problems concerning the issue of Darfur is the lack of acknowledgment that a humanitarian and political crisis exists. Instead people focus on conspiracy theories concerning Western intentions to overthrow the regime. Mr. Neier: Regarding legitimacy, both the AU and UN General Assembly have accepted the principle of humanitarian intervention. The issue of humanitarian intervention needs to be debated and not ignored. Using the ICJ as a decision body concerning humanitarian intervention would be ineffective. Bosnia filed a case of genocide against Serbia more than a decade ago and it still has not been decided on. Dr. Said: I support intervention in Darfur in some form. But many of those who call for it have brutal, illegitimate records of intervention. Why should they be trusted? Abbas Abdallah Suleiman (SLM): What is happening in Darfur is not acceptable. I call it ethnic cleansing. Immediate pressure needs to be put on the GoS by local and international organizations. Other Points: No Arab country wants to accuse another Arab country of committing grave crimes for fear that its own crimes will come to light. Talking about theories of intervention is not useful. What we need is concrete solutions and recommendations. The case of Darfur is unique, and urgently needs a solution. 13

15 4.5 Fourth Session: Why the DPA (Abuja) Agreement Failed to Provide Peace and Security Session Panelists: Mr. Kamal el Jozooli (Moderator) Lawyer and Secretary-General of the Sudanese Union of Writers Heidar Al Nour The Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM), Darfur Mohammed Adam Elhassan Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Darfur Hany Raslan Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies Dr. Alex De Waal Expert on Sudan, Global Equity Initiative Dr. Pricilla Joseph Sudanese Parliament Member Fourth Session Summary: Mr. Nour warned that the lack of a transparent, genuine peace process in Darfur could lead to the break-up of the country. The reason why the DPA/Abuja Agreement failed is simple there was no actual agreement. There were peace talks, but these failed. A majority of rebel groups never signed the DPA. Minnawi, the leader of the faction that did sign the DPA, was never a part of the process or legally entitled to sign the agreement. Furthermore, the vast majority of Darfurians were opposed to the terms of the DPA on key issues such as the distribution of resources. The GoS only signed the agreement due to international pressure and never intended to adhere to it; a fact which has been attested to by the unaltered behavior of the government in Darfur over the last 9 months. Mr. Hassan pointed out that the Darfur crisis is a part of a national historical problem related to mismanagement and unequal distribution of resources. The DPA process was faulty for several reasons: 1. Mediation by the AU was biased toward the GoS. The Darfur factions were separated and not allowed to communicate with each other; 2. The international community applied too much pressure and did not allow enough space for negotiations. The text of the agreement was also flawed: 1. The DPA failed to observe the Declaration of Principles 7 ; 2. The text was written by foreign experts not the parties to the conflict; 3. The percentage of national revenue granted to the Darfur region was less than the percentage of Sudan s population that Darfurians comprise. These reasons explain why only one of the three main movements in Darfur signed. The one that did sign is perhaps the weakest of all three. The DPA not only failed, it made matters worse. The JEM is ready for a ceasefire and serious, genuine negotiations. Mr. Raslan held that all parties involved in the DPA negotiations contributed to its failure. The fragmented and divided nature of the rebel factions and the lack 7 Representatives of Sudan s government, the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement all signed a three-page "declaration of principles" aimed at helping calm the Darfur crisis, on Wednesday July 5, This Declaration is available in English and Arabic at 14

16 of consistency in governmental policy make it almost impossible to create a common political outlook or unified vision concerning a solution to the conflict. Due to this internal fragmentation and lack of central coordination, no party to the DPA was capable of meeting the obligations of the agreement. Most representatives of the rebel factions are chosen from within tribal groups. As a result, many of the rebel representatives lacked experience and the necessary skills to effectively contribute to the negotiation process. The representatives of the JEM were experienced in this process but their Islamist politics made them unpopular among the other groups. Furthermore, conflicting regional and international stances contributed to the confusion and inconsistencies. The IDPs and people of Darfur have largely been left out the peace process, and are being held hostage by the inefficiencies and lack of political will for peace among the government and rebel factions. Mr. Alex de Waal was an expert consultant in the DPA process on negotiations concerning Security Arrangements. He began by drawing attention to the fact that the conference represented the first time that representatives of the GoS and rebel groups have met face-to-face since the Abuja negotiations, which could be a positive indication that mediation between the groups may be a possibility once more. He then went on to describe the context of the negotiations. The DPA process was extremely hindered by the fact that neither the GoS nor the rebel movements demonstrated a willingness or readiness to compromise on any of their demands. A long and painstaking process was required, yet the international community applied great pressure for an unrealistic quick fix that would immediately stop the bloodshed. This pressure ultimately resulted in a premature end to the negotiation process. The core concept that guided the drafting of the Security Arrangements was the principle of consent. Any security arrangement had to be obtained by consent, and could not be forced onto the parties. One of the problems encountered during the process was the lack of active involvement within the process by the JEM. Though they were repeatedly sought out for consultation they were rarely forthcoming in their participation. None-the-less, the Security Arrangements arrived at were a relative success and neither the GoS nor any of the rebel factions objected to any clause within the security section of the text when presented to them on the 4 th and 5 th of May The political power-sharing arrangements of the text were more problematic and divisive. The Security Arrangements were organized around a ceasefire leading to disengagement and withdraw of forces to designated positions. Also included were a partial arms-control regime and a ceasefire commission that would monitor hostile actions. In the end the GoS did not live up to its ceasefire obligations and the commission failed. One major mistake of the AU was to expel two non-signatory groups from the ceasefire commission. It is impossible to have a ceasefire without the agreement and participation of all parties. Key issues and difficulties concerning the Security Arrangements: 1. Demilitarization of IDP camps is a necessity. Yet, who should provide security within the camps? ; 2. Disarmament of the Janjaweed is also essential. However, it is impossible to do this through force, and must be done through an agreement. ; 3. No matter how many peacekeeping troops are deployed they must have the correct mandate and operational concept, otherwise they will fail. Working with the communities in Darfur to gain their consent and acceptance must be a key aspect of any future peacekeeping mandate. The fundamental responsibility for the DPA s failure lies with the belligerent parties to the conflict, and not with regional or international actors, despite their many mistakes. The way ahead lies in taking immediate measures to protect civilians and revitalized efforts to get a workable security agreement between the parties to the conflict. Dr. Priscilla Joseph argued that the failure of the DPA was due in large part to what the agreement neglected to include. In particular, the DPA failed to 15

17 address the allocation of land/water resources within Darfur, referring instead to the national allocation of resources. Local resource competition is one of the main causes of the conflict. Unless such regional resource arrangements are worked out disarmament of the Janjaweed, and other militia groups will remain impossible. Also, the DPA was focused on arrangements between the fighting groups, but did not properly consider the role or interests of other, noncombatant, stake holders, in particular the IDPs and other civilians within Darfur. The agreement between South and North Sudan was partially successful because southern leaders were allocated positions within the central government; no similar allocation has yet occurred with Darfur leaders. Furthermore, the assumption that those who signed the agreement were the most influential leaders in Darfur has been proven very wrong. It now appears the GoS is ready to bring on-board other factions that have not signed the agreement. If so, this is a positive development. If a solution to the Darfur crisis is not found there is a risk of it escalating into a regional conflict. Fourth Session Open-Floor Discussion: Minister Haroun: The GoS is ready to negotiate if and when other parties are. We intend to accelerate the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue to reach compromises among different groups. Ambassador Mohammad Abdullah: The DPA has not failed as an agreement. The implementation of the agreement has failed. The text of the DPA is a valid foundation to base peace on but was abandoned. The GoS and other parties need to make efforts to adjust and negotiate this document. We welcome a reactivation of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue process. Mr. Hassan (JEM): The agreements on security and civilian protection are too vague in the DPA. Mr. Al Nour (SLM): The Darfur movements don t lack a vision. They presented their demands very clearly, but were ignored by the GoS. The GoS is mainly to blame for not paying attention to the demands and needs of the Darfur tribes. Mr. Raslan: The national state in Sudan is not crystallized. Equitable distribution of wealth within the country may be impossible without central organization in the state. The economic and political development of Darfur may be the only way out of the situation. Mr. de Waal: The government is without stable polices and keeps changing its positions. The greatest danger is the loss of confidence in the negotiation process on both sides. Need confidence building measures. Any future peacekeeping will have to be 90% outreach and 10% force. Negotiations in the future need to be as transparent and open as possible. 16

18 4.6 Fifth Session: Perspectives on the Arab and African Role Regarding the Situation in Darfur Session Panelists: Ms. Amal Al Basha (Moderator) The Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Regional Coordinator; The Arab Sisters Forum for Human Rights, Director Mr. Ahmed Haroun Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, Sudan Mr. Osman Kalibo Bella Ambassador of Chad in Egypt Dr. Iglal Raafat Professor in Political Science, Cairo University Fifth Session Summary: Ambassador Bella began the session by high-lighting the serious threat to regional stability and security that is caused by the extension of the Darfur conflict into Chad. Dr. Raafat concentrated on the regional, especially the Egyptian role in the ongoing conflict. The conflict in Darfur is part of the overall crisis in Sudan in which the central government neglects and marginalizes the economic development and distribution of resources to other regions of the country. While the solution is largely political, the problem also has a significant cultural element that shouldn t be ignored. All post-independence governments, including the current GoS, have failed to address and/or respect the diverse cultures and pluralistic nature of Sudanese society. This is a historical factor inherited by the current government and not only of its own making. However, one problem with the current GoS is that it has intensified and solidified the aggressive armed confrontation in Darfur, and has deepened cultural divides within the society. Egyptian policy makers also fail to acknowledge the pluralistic nature of Sudanese society. This has led the Egyptian government to ignore different parties and interests within Sudan. Egypt prefers to deal with Khartoum as if it is the only political player in Sudan. In other words, Egypt sees Sudan in its own likeness. It strongly favors dealing with a centralized, undemocratic stable government rather than a fragmented, decentralized democratic state. Thus, Egypt supports the central government almost unconditionally and refuses to participate in any action that may contribute to fragmentation or pluralization within Sudan's political sphere. There may be indications that this relationship is changing. Egypt has allowed South Sudan to open an office in Cairo. Also, Egypt tacitly supported S.C. Resolution 1706, and voted against Sudan's chairmanship of the AU. Minister Haroun asserted that the situation in Darfur is a local conflict, based on resource competition. None-the-less, Arab and African states have a role to play in the solution of the Darfur situation. Events in Darfur effect countries in East Africa and the MENA region, and have consequences for the national security of states throughout the Arab world. Furthermore, the structural features of the conflict questions of identity, development, center-periphery relations, etc are present in all Arab and African countries. The interest of all Arab and African states is to secure peace and security in Sudan. The motives and strategy of the big powers, in particular the U.S. and E.U., are not justified. These powers do 17