NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL THESIS

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1 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS STATE APPROACHES TOWARD REDUCING YOUTH VIOLENCE IN HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA by Luis E. Preciado September 2015 Thesis Advisor: Second Reader: Arturo C. Sotomayor Thomas C. Bruneau Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

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3 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA , and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project ( ) Washington, DC AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) September 2015 Master s thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS STATE APPROACHES TOWARD REDUCING YOUTH VIOLENCE IN HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA 6. AUTHOR(S) Preciado, Luis E. 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER 10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number N/A. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Nicaragua and Honduras are neighbor countries situated in one of the most violent regions of the world. As such, they share many similarities, including geopolitics, a history of political violence and insurgency, as well as a repressive authoritarian past. In spite of the two countries similarities, their divergent policing and public security policies have led to equally divergent outcomes in crime and homicide rates. What factors explain this divergence? How effective are their respective policing and security policies in confronting the proliferation of violence among the youth of their nations? Analysis of these questions helps U.S. policy-makers gain greater understanding of the critical factors that are contributing to Central America s escalating youth violence. By way of a most-similar systems approach, this thesis analyzes the aspects that either enable or degrade state efforts to address their youth gang crisis. In sum, building strong and accountable criminal justice institutions as well as addressing the socioeconomic challenges that confront youth populations are necessary preconditions for reducing youth violence. To assist our regional partners in restoring security to their nations, U.S. policymakers need to promote programs that help strengthen institutional capacities and expand social programs that assist atrisk youth. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Honduras, Nicaragua, youth violence, violent gangs, mano dura, community policing, institutional capacity, judicial system, police reform, CARSI, civil-military relations, social factors, institutional oversight 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified i 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified 15. NUMBER OF PAGES PRICE CODE 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT NSN Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2 89) Prescribed by ANSI Std UU

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5 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited STATE APPROACHES TOWARD REDUCING YOUTH VIOLENCE IN HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA Luis E. Preciado Major, United States Army B.S., United States Military Academy, 2003 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (WESTERN HEMISPHERE) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL September 2015 Approved by: Arturo C. Sotomayor Thesis Advisor Thomas C. Bruneau Second Reader Mohammed M. Hafez Chair, Department of National Security Affairs iii

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7 ABSTRACT Nicaragua and Honduras are neighbor countries situated in one of the most violent regions of the world. As such, they share many similarities, including geopolitics, a history of political violence and insurgency, as well as a repressive authoritarian past. In spite of the two countries similarities, their divergent policing and public security policies have led to equally divergent outcomes in crime and homicide rates. What factors explain this divergence? How effective are their respective policing and security policies in confronting the proliferation of violence among the youth of their nations? Analysis of these questions helps U.S. policy-makers gain greater understanding of the critical factors that are contributing to Central America s escalating youth violence. By way of a mostsimilar systems approach, this thesis analyzes the aspects that either enable or degrade state efforts to address their youth gang crisis. In sum, building strong and accountable criminal justice institutions as well as addressing the socioeconomic challenges that confront youth populations are necessary preconditions for reducing youth violence. To assist our regional partners in restoring security to their nations, U.S. policymakers need to promote programs that help strengthen institutional capacities and expand social programs that assist at-risk youth. v

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9 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION... 1 A. LITERATURE REVIEW The Heavy-Handed Approach Mano Dura Soft-Handed and Community-Oriented Approaches Democratic Transitions: Their Impact on Internal Security Institutional Arguments Structural Arguments... 8 B. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES C. RESEARCH DESIGN D. THESIS OVERVIEW II. HONDURAS A. THE EXTENT OF YOUTH VIOLENCE IN HONDURAS B. STATE RESPONSES TO YOUTH VIOLENCE Mano Dura and Honduran Anti-gang Policies The Downsides of the Mano Dura Strategy C. INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND MECHANISMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY The Honduran Public Ministry The Honduran Justice System Honduran Prisons Security and Police Institutions Militarized Policing D. HONDURAN NON-REPRESSIVE APPROACHES E. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS III. NICARAGUA A. POST CONFLICT CONSTRUCTION OF NICARAGUAN YOUTH GANGS B. ADDRESSING THE POSTWAR SURGE IN YOUTH VIOLENCE Improving Institutional Capacity Enduring Gang Prevention Efforts Community-Oriented Policing C. FURTHERING PROFESSIONALISM AND ACCOUNTABILITY vii

10 1. Strengthening the Juvenile Criminal Justice System Military Support of Internal Security Strengthening Relations with Civil Society Organizations and NGOs D. PANDILLAS VERSUS NORTHERN TRIANGLE MARAS E. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IV. CONCLUSION A. RECOMMENDATIONS B. IMPLICATIONS LIST OF REFERENCES INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST viii

11 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Regional Homicide Map, Figure 2. Homicide Rates in Honduras Figure 3. Homicide Rates in Nicaragua, Figure 4. Homicide Rates in Central America, ix

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13 LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Central American Gang Membership Table 2. Annual Flow of U.S Deportations to Central America, DHS Table 3. Statistics of Central American National Police Forces, Table 4. Central American Gang Membership xi

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15 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS CARSI EPS EREM FSLN GAO IIRIRA INE MIGOB MS-13 NGO PNPRRS RESDAL TIGRES UNICEF UNODC USAID Central America Regional Security Initiative Ejército Popular Sandinista (Sandinista Popular Army) Educación para Resistir y Evitar las Maras (Education to Resist and Avoid the Maras) Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front) Government Accountability Office Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act Instituto Nacional de Estadística (National Statistics Institute) Ministerio de Gobernación (Ministry of Interior) Mara Salvatrucha non-governmental organization Programa Nacional de Prevención y Reinserción Social (National Program of Prevention, Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration) Security and Defense Network of Latin America (Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina) Tropa de Investigación y Grupo de Respuesta Especial de Seguridad (Special Intelligence and Security Response Troops) United Nations Children s Fund United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime United States Agency for International Development xiii

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17 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First and foremost, I want to thank my beautiful wife, Jessica, and our three wonderful children: Sophia, Gracie, and Alex, for giving me the love and support I needed to be successful in graduate school. They are and will eternally by my inspiration to continue to push harder and strive to do my best. Jessica, thank you for your endless patience and encouragement. Because of you, I was able to write this thesis and accomplish my goal of earning a master s degree. I am truly blessed to have you as my wife and lifelong battle buddy. I want to give a special thanks to my advisors and mentors, Professors Arturo Sotomayor and Thomas Bruneau. Your combined knowledge and expertise inspired me to learn more about Latin America and helped me develop and strengthen my thesis. I could not have asked for a better team of advisors. I want to thank the entire staff of the Dudley Knox Library, the Graduate Writing Center, and especially, Noel Yucuis. Noel, thank you for your excellent coaching and guidance throughout the writing process. I also want to extend my thanks to the students, staff, and faculty of the Department of National Security Affairs and the Naval Postgraduate School. I feel honored to have worked with such a highcaliber group of academic and military professionals. Thank you all. I dedicate this thesis to my loving parents, Fernando and Emilia Preciado. xv

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19 I. INTRODUCTION According to a 2013 U.N. study, Nicaragua ranks among the safest countries in the world, with only 11 homicides per 100,000 people. 1 The Nicaraguan government has managed to maintain low levels of homicides through the application of domestic security policies that do not involve the military. 2 Conversely, Honduras recorded the highest homicide rate in the world the same year, 90 homicides per 100,000 people (see Figure 1). 3 To limit the violence, the Honduran government has militarized its domestic security efforts to gain greater control over gang-ridden regions. The extensive persecution and imprisonment of youth gang members, however, has failed to reduce the incidence of crime and violence. 4 A focused comparison between these two countries may allow us to identify causal variables that produce the high rate of homicides and gang violence in Honduras but not in Nicaragua. Furthermore, by comparing and contrasting judicial systems, law enforcement structures, domestic security policies, and existing social programs in Honduras and Nicaragua, we can extract valuable lessons for the development of effective public security reforms. Understanding the region s failing and successful policing strategies is significant to U.S. policymakers. Since 2008, the U.S. Congress has appropriated over $1.2 billion to fund the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and interagency programs that support its objectives to help restore security to the region. 5 An extensive analysis is necessary to ensure that U.S.-sponsored 1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global Study on Homicide 2013: Trends, Contexts, Data (Vienna: UNODC, 2013), José Miguel Cruz, Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America: The Survival of the Violent State, Latin American Politics and Society 53, no. 4 (2011): UNODC, Global Study on Homicide 2013, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire (Vienna: UNODC, 2007), 9. 5 Government Accountability Office (GAO), Central America: U.S. Agencies Considered Various Factors in Funding Security Activities, but Need to Assess Progress in Achieving Interagency Objectives (GAO ) (Washington, DC: GAO, September 2013), 9. 1

20 programs do not inadvertently fund failing policies that contribute to the escalating youth violence and human rights violations. As the United States continues to invest billions of dollars toward security-assistance programs in Central America, funded programs should reinforce only successful policies, those that reduce violence and improve the capabilities of vital institutions. By analyzing how Honduran security policies have failed to control the surge in violence and how Nicaragua has managed to achieve safer conditions, CARSI policy-makers could develop improved comprehensive security strategies and replicate successful policies throughout Central America. Furthermore, understanding the theoretical frameworks that explain how Honduras and Nicaragua developed their security policies can help predict whether the security institutions of the respective nations will embrace or reject policy recommendations. Figure 1. Regional Homicide Map, War on Drugs Central America, Global Security.org, last modified June 22, 2015, 2

21 A. LITERATURE REVIEW Many social theorists have sought to identify and explain the factors that are causing youth crime rates to climb in Central America. These scholars have written books and articles to provide policy suggestions and to support the affected nations with effective policing and prevention strategies. A great portion of the literature focuses on two major themes: criticism and descriptions of policing methods to confront youth violence; and explanations for why nations implement certain policies. This literature review analyzes the major themes that pertain to state responses to the tragic escalation of youth violence in Central America. 1. The Heavy-Handed Approach Mano Dura Most of the available literature on Central America focuses on the policing strategies common among the Northern Triangle states of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Some regional leaders have embraced zero-tolerance policing, such as mano dura (heavy-handed) policing, under the assumption that such policies would be effective at improving security in locations overrun by criminal activity. 7 The underlying assumption of this policy is that, through the use of aggressive tactics, military and police can deter anti-social behaviors that often take root in dangerous neighborhoods. By criminalizing misdemeanors and perceived unlawful behaviors as well as implementing strong punishments for them, security forces hope to deter prospective criminals lawless and violent intentions. 8 Political Science Professor Mark Ungar argues that Latin American leaders often enact zero-tolerance policies without the necessary oversight mechanisms to ensure security agencies effectively reduce violent crimes as well 7 Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress (CRS Report for Congress No. R41731), Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014, Mark Ungar, Policing Youth in Latin America, in Youth Violence in Latin America, eds. Dennis Rodgers and Gareth A. Jones (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009),

22 as respect the civil rights of the communities they serve. 9 Youth populations tend to be the most obvious victims of zero-tolerance policing, for they often suffer police brutality and unwarranted persecution. According to Ungar, 90 percent of the victims of police abuse were men between the ages of 15 and 24 from poor neighborhoods. 10 Enrique Desmond Arias also claims that mano dura programs are counterproductive because they have increased the levels of violence in the streets of Central America. Disenfranchised youths have become more aggressive in response to increased incarcerations and hostility from security forces. Previously disorganized gangs are now more cohesive in coordinating attacks against security forces, rival gangs, and the public. 11 The contributions of both Ungar and Arias are useful in explaining the failures of mano dura policies. Furthermore, they give credibility to claims that ineffective policing and repression only instigate violent responses from oppressed youth. 2. Soft-Handed and Community-Oriented Approaches In an effort to avoid replicating the failures of mano dura policies, Mark Ungar and José Luis Rocha advocate for more lenient policing strategies. 12 They recommend state agencies implement soft-handed approaches that promote prevention, rehabilitation, and community-building to reduce gang-related youth violence. Ungar attests that community-oriented policing is far more effective than mano dura strategies because it aims to address and resolve the social ills that are impacting Central American youth. Community-oriented policing seeks to establish stronger ties between community members, police officers, and social service organizations. State agencies reduce criminal behavior and gang membership among the youth by establishing better coordination between 9 Ibid., Ibid., Enrique Desmond Arias, State Power and Central American Maras: A Cross-National Comparison, in Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America, eds. Thomas Bruneau, Lucia Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2011), José Luis Rocha, Street Gangs of Nicaragua, in Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America, eds. Thomas Bruneau, Lucia Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2011), 118 9; Ungar, Policing Youth in Latin America,

23 criminal justice agencies, local schools, and social services that support at-risk youth. 13 Through community policing, officers have greater opportunities to become involved within their communities and build relationships with local youths. Furthermore, police officers gain invaluable insight into the immediate hardships and concerns inflicting the lives of disenfranchised local residents. 14 According to José Luis Rocha, policing strategies that integrate support from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are highly proactive in reducing gang violence. NGOs reinforce police-sponsored community-building projects because they help establish job programs for unskilled youths and encourage civic participation. 15 In recent years, the Nicaraguan National Police s Juvenile Affairs Division has achieved substantial reductions in gang membership by conducting anti-gang activities that target at-risk youth within the impoverished municipalities of Nicaragua Democratic Transitions: Their Impact on Internal Security According to a recent report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), repressive and heavy-handed approaches remain commonplace in Central America. 17 Following the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, many Central American security elites who were members of the former authoritarian governments still hold positions of power within the new democratic regimes. 18 For this reason, scholars examine authoritarian transitions toward democracy in an effort to explain their impact on internal security. A preponderance of the literature claims that the manner in which states transition 13 Ungar, Policing Youth in Latin America, Ibid. 15 Rocha, Street Gangs of Nicaragua, Clare Ribando Seelke, Gangs in Central America (CRS Report for Congress No. RL34112), Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014, UNODC, Crime and Development in Central America, Ibid. 5

24 from their former authoritarian regimes determines the type of democratic regime that eventually emerges. Charles T. Call explores the influence of government transitions on security reforms in new democracies. According to Call, the modes of transition matter because they determine whether an emerging democratic state will be successful in establishing meaningful security reforms. He argues that war transitions or the collapse of authoritarian regimes offer the best opportunities for post-authoritarian governments to enact significant security reforms. 19 Meaningful civilian-led security reforms can only transpire when the armed forces of the pre-existing regime have been significantly weakened or demilitarized. Complete collapses of existing authoritarian regimes also give way to new security, intelligence, and legal institutions, which are more responsive to and representative of the public s security needs. Because a weakened security force is a prerequisite, a state that does not undergo a war transition is bound to struggle in achieving meaningful reforms. 20 At the time of his article s publication, Call considered Honduras an exceptional case because it was able to advance significant security reforms without undergoing a war transition. Contrary to the regional norm, the country was able to undergo a nonviolent democratic transition and establish comprehensive security reforms by significantly weakening and subordinating its armed forces. 21 Call s observations also validate Nicaragua s ability to improve security reforms in the aftermath of the Somoza government s collapse. However, his argument falls short of explaining why Honduras has resorted to highly repressive and militarized security policies after achieving significant improvements in the 1990s. José Miguel Cruz has also contributed to the democratic transition literature. He argues that nations are better able to implement effective security 19 Charles T. Call, War Transitions and the New Civilian Security in Latin America, Comparative Politics 35, no.1 (2002): Ibid., Call, War Transitions, 13. 6

25 reforms only when violent entrepreneurs from the prior regime are excluded from the political transition process. Cruz points to a critical juncture at which point a state has the opportunity to prevent former security elites from maintaining positions of power within the security apparatus of the post-transition government. When violent entrepreneurs continue to exercise power, states are destined to endure high levels of violence. 22 In the case of Nicaragua, Cruz claims that it was able to achieve significant security reforms through the complete removal of the Somoza regime and demobilization of Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) security forces in the 1990s. As a result, the Nicaraguan state has been effective in maintaining a lower incidence of violence and capable of addressing its domestic gang problems. In contrast, Honduran violent entrepreneurs who formed part of the military dictatorship continue to hold prominent positions within police, military, and intelligence institutions. Because Honduras transition was incomplete, violent entrepreneurs persist in promoting a culture of violence in which security institutions continue to employ repressive tactics against civilians Institutional Arguments In his article Violence, Democracy and Human Rights in Latin America, Todd Landman claims that many Latin American nations lack state institutions with the capacity to safeguard the rights of their citizens. 24 When states have weak institutions, they are unable to provide citizens basic legal protections or shield them from unjust persecution from rogue state-actors. Landman asserts that the state itself becomes the biggest perpetrator of violence when its government fails to establish the necessary legal conditions and oversight mechanisms to employ state violence lawfully. When security institutions are 22 Cruz, Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America, Ibid., Todd Landman, Violence, Democracy, and Human Rights in Latin America, in Violent Democracies in Latin America, eds. Enrique Desmond Arias and Daniel M. Goldstein (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010),

26 weak and lack systems of accountability, security actors are prone to exploit their positions of authority and ignore the legal protections and rights of citizens. To resolve such abuses of power, states need to build strong legal institutions and employ systems of horizontal and vertical accountability to ensure state agencies neither abuse their privileges nor violate the rights of citizens. 25 A state is less likely to behave in a repressive manner or carry out extralegal forms of violence when it builds strong legal institutions and systems of oversight to reinforce its security strategies. 26 Todd Landman s institutional arguments are highly effective in identifying the major flaws that exist within failing Latin American security policies. Furthermore, his arguments provide an explanatory framework for defining why Honduras and Nicaragua continue to experience divergent results in providing security and maintaining low levels of youth violence. An analysis of these two countries may demonstrate that their abilities to implement effective security policies are closely linked to their institutional capacities to apply the rule of law and respect the legal rights of individuals. 5. Structural Arguments The Central American states that have felt the greatest impact from the U.S. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act are more inclined to employ aggressive anti-gang strategies. Since the implementation of this 1996 U.S. policy to deport criminals back to their nations of origin, many Central American nations have become saturated with youth gang members, called mareros or maras. According to Dennis Rodgers, Robert Muggah, and Chris Stevenson, this policy created devastating security challenges when it led to the U.S. deportation of more than 200,000 criminal and illegal immigrants back to Central America from 1998 to However, the long-term social and 25 Ibid., Ibid. 27 Dennis Rodgers et al., Gangs of Central America: Causes, Costs, and Interventions (Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 2009), 7. 8

27 security impacts of the criminal deportees vary by country. The Northern Triangle has endured significant increases in gang violence because it received over 90 percent of the deportees. A large portion of the criminal deportees were members of two of the most ruthless street gangs in Los Angeles, the 18th Street Gang and the Mara-Salvatrucha. Upon return, former U.S. gang members quickly replicated the same criminal behavior and violent tendencies of the East Los Angeles streets in the neighborhoods of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. In contrast, Nicaragua did not experience the surge in gang violence since only three percent of deportees were of Nicaraguan descent. Furthermore, the Nicaraguan diaspora in the United States has tended to settle in Miami, where its immigrants have not assimilated into the ethno-centric gangs dominated by African- and Cuban-Americans. 28 Advocates of the deportation literature explain how U.S. immigration policies have created a security crisis in the Northern Triangle region. However, they fall short of explaining why the inflicted states have failed to integrate deportees into society before they assimilate into criminal organizations. Structuralists also attribute the rise in Central American violence to the youth gangs increasing involvement in drug-trafficking. 29 According to a 2012 UNODC report on transnational organized crime, Central America began to experience an increased incidence of violence once greater quantities of cocaine shipments began traversing the region in Traffickers began to utilize Central American drug routes with greater regularity when the Mexican government became more adept at intercepting drug shipments arriving directly from South America. As a result of Mexico s 2006 anti-narcotic strategy, drug traffickers found it less risky to transport cocaine into Mexico through the overland routes of Central America. With greater quantities of cocaine moving through the region, Central American gangs began to fight each other for control 28 Ibid., José Miguel Cruz et al., Political Transition, Social Violence, and Gangs: Cases in Central America and Mexico, in In the Wake of War: Democratization and Internal Armed Conflict in Latin America, ed. Cynthia J. Arnson (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012),

28 of critical drug routes. In Honduras, the regions that have experienced the greatest incidence of violence are located directly along mobility corridors used to transport cocaine. Along with the upsurge of drugs moving through Central America comes an increase in turf wars between rival gangs. 30 In response, Central American governments have begun implementing stricter measures to address the unprecedented levels of violence they are experiencing. 31 A gap that exists within the drug trafficking literature is the exclusion of Nicaragua. Similar to the Northern Triangle states, Nicaragua is a major transient state for U.S.-bound drugs. However, in contrast, it has not experienced the same upsurge in violent clashes of youth gangs. Structural arguments also claim that states implement security policies to address the societal perceptions of youth gangs. When communities, the media, and political elites all see youths as menaces to public security, they encourage security institutions to enact harsh and repressive policies. However, when the public discourse does not classify youths as threats, the public is less likely to support harsh anti-gang policies. In his article Youth Violence in Central America: Discourse and Polices, Peter Peetz argues, There is a strong relationship and mutual influence between the public s fear (or disregard) of youth violence and the state s policies to reduce that kind of violence. 32 Hence, public perceptions are a significant driving factor in determining state preferences over security and prevention strategies. In many Central American neighborhoods, the public considers youth gangs the primary threat to domestic security. Since youth gangs are the most visible groups to display anti-social behavior, they intensify public anxieties and concerns over domestic security. 33 Peetz s observations demonstrate how public opinion can shape the security 30 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment (Vienna: UNODC, 2012), Cruz et al., Political Transition, Social Violence, and Gangs, Peter Peetz, Youth Violence in Central America: Discourses and Policies, Youth & Society 43, no. 4 (2011): Ibid.,

29 policies that states implement. However, his argument falls short of explaining how states can appease the public s perception of violent youths. According to his argument, harsh and repressive policies will remain commonplace unless the public begins to sympathize with disenfranchised this demographic. B. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES Among the various explanations that scholars have provided to explain the dynamics of Central American security policies and the factors that propagate violence, none were more convincing than the institutional arguments provided by Todd Landman. 34 He makes the case that security policies can only be successful when they are reinforced by strong and accountable institutions. Furthermore, Ungar and Rocha provide a useful framework for addressing the social ills that are inflicting at-risk youth through the incorporation of prevention and rehabilitation programs. 35 Strong institutions and prevention programs appear to be the essential elements for building stronger and safer communities. For these reasons, this thesis hypothesizes that Honduras continues to exercise repressive, ineffective security policies because it possesses weak institutions and has failed to promote social programs that assist its vulnerable youth population. Conversely, Nicaragua has been able to maintain lower homicide rates and a lower incidence of youth violence because it has moderately better institutions and a robust program to provide social services to potential gang members and juvenile delinquents. In order for security strategies to succeed in reducing youth violence, Central American states need to strengthen their criminal justice institutions as well as promote programs that help improve the socioeconomic challenges of at-risk youth. 34 Landman, Violence, Democracy, and Human Rights in Latin America, Ungar, Policing Youth in Latin America, 206; Rocha, Street Gangs of Nicaragua,

30 C. RESEARCH DESIGN Given their proximate location, economic underdevelopment, and social similarities, this thesis will provide a comparative analysis of Honduras and Nicaragua using a most-similar systems approach. These two countries are ideal cases to study because, despite their similarities, these states have significant variations in their security policies and homicide rates. The aim of this thesis is to compare and contrast Honduran and Nicaraguan efforts to address their security dilemmas and constrain the escalation of youth gang violence. By comparing and contrasting the policies that these states have implemented, this thesis will attempt to identify the variables that are contributing to Honduras failure and Nicaragua s success to reduce the high incidence of homicides and gang violence. At the end of this process, this thesis aims to isolate the factors that are contributing to Honduras security difficulties in an effort to provide policy recommendations. This thesis relies on the data of various sources to include public policy documents, scholarly books, journals, and articles. For statistical data, this thesis makes us of informational reports published by organizations, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the Washington Office on Latin America, the World Health Organization, the Wilson Center, and other reputable institutions. D. THESIS OVERVIEW In the forthcoming chapters, this thesis will identify correlations between the outcomes of existing state security policies and the strength of their respective law enforcement, judicial, and penal institutions. This thesis will also identify linkages between the application of preventative and rehabilitative social programs for youths and their ability to reduce violence and improve security conditions. Chapters II and III will focus on Honduras and Nicaragua, respectively. The chapters will present how each country is addressing its juvenile delinquency issues, through the implantation of domestic policies, security reforms, and social programs. This thesis will make use of statistical 12

31 data to highlight the variation between the nations, to include: crime and violence trends, human rights records, prison demographics, gang populations, and immigration/deportation trends. Chapter IV will summarize the findings and offer recommendations for future U.S. policy considerations and CARSI initiatives. 13

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33 II. HONDURAS As a result of escalating youth gang violence, the Central American nation of Honduras is currently undergoing a devastating national security crisis. According to a U.N. study, Honduras was the most dangerous country in the world in 2013, with a documented 90 homicides per 100,000 people. 36 Figures from the World Bank reveal that young men in Central America, between the ages of 15 and 25, are the predominant offenders and victims of violence. 37 World Bank assessments also indicate that extreme poverty, lack of education, and the influx of cocaine trafficking into the Central American region are among the primary drivers impelling Honduran youth to adopt delinquent behavior and join major transnational criminal gangs. 38 In an effort to restore public security and reduce the incidence of youth violence, the Honduran government has embraced zero-tolerance policies such as mano dura, or heavy-handed policing. Governments undergoing significant security issues often prefer mano dura policies, for they believe that mass incarcerations can be effective in restoring order when properly implemented. 39 However, the Honduran government s efforts to apply mano dura policies against their criminal youth have been counterproductive because the levels of violence have continued to rise steeply since The Honduran government has been unsuccessful in addressing youth violence because it has weak criminal justice institutions to enforce mano dura policies and has failed to address the socioeconomic challenges confronting Honduran youth UNODC, Global Study on Homicide 2013, The World Bank, Crime and Violence in Central America: A Development Challenge, Washington, DC: The World Bank, Sustainable Development Department and Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, 2011, Ibid., Ungar, Policing Youth in Latin America, Arias, State Power and Central American Maras,

34 This chapter examines why the Honduran government continues to exercise repressive, ineffective mano dura policies even when it possesses weak criminal justice institutions and has failed to promote social programs that may assist its vulnerable youth population. The first section provides an overview of youth violence in Honduras. The next section explains how the Honduran government has relied on repressive zero-tolerance policies to confront rising youth violence and gang criminality. Section three highlights the institutional weaknesses that exist within the Honduran national security apparatus to effectively employ mano dura policies. Section four elaborates on the Honduran government s efforts to collaborate with NGOs to implement preventative and rehabilitative strategies for youth violence and gangs. The chapter concludes with findings and recommendations for improving the Honduran government s approach for reducing youth violence. A. THE EXTENT OF YOUTH VIOLENCE IN HONDURAS In the last 15 years, Honduran youth have experienced a drastic increase in violence (see Figure 2). Incidences of violence and homicides involving Honduran youth rank among the highest in the world. In Honduras, young men ranging from ages 12 to 24 are more likely to die by violence than by any other cause. 41 Although young males make up only 14 percent of the Honduran population, the national police reported in 2001 that youth homicides represented more than 70 percent of the violent deaths recorded for that year. 42 As homicide rates continue to climb in the Central American nation, young males continue to play a major role in carrying out violent acts and representing the demographic that endures the highest levels of homicide victimization. 41 Jon Wolseth, Safety and Sanctuary: Pentecostalism and Youth Gang Violence in Honduras Latin American Perspectives 35, Issue 161, no. 4 (2008): Ibid. 16

35 100 Figure 2. Homicide Rates in Honduras 43 Homicide Rates in Honduras, (per 100,000 inhabitants) Social, economic, and educational impediments are among the primary factors exposing Honduran youth to lives filled with crime and violence. According to a 2011 national survey of Honduran households conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), 8.2 million Honduran citizens, 44.5 percent of the population is comprised of adolescents below 18 years of age. 44 The INE survey also indicated that 62 percent of Honduran households live in poverty, of which 42 percent find themselves in extreme poverty conditions. Confronting severe economic conditions, Honduran youth are increasingly lacking the opportunities to improve their socioeconomic conditions and escape their impoverished situations. Currently, the Honduran economy is not producing sufficient well-paying jobs to employ young adults seeking to enter the job market. Youth academic underperformance is also decreasing their ability to compete for good jobs. According to the INE survey, only 58 percent of minors between the ages of 5 and 18 were attending any form of educational institution. As children get older, their opportunities to receive a high school diploma 43 UNODC, Global Study on Homicide 2013, Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), Cuadragésima Primera Encuesta Permanente de Hogares: Resumen Ejecutivo, Vol. 41 (Tegucigalpa: INE, 2011): 4. 17

36 significantly decrease, since only 28 percent of Honduran youth between the ages of 16 and 18 were still enrolled in school. 45 Confronting severe economic conditions, families are increasingly relying on their children to work and contribute to the family income. As a result, many young students are dropping out of school to work informal, poor paying jobs. Honduran youth have the potential to improve their economic struggles and become productive citizens only when they gain the capacity to earn a high school diploma and acquire the skills to earn a well-paying job. Otherwise, extreme poverty and the lack of formal education will continue to induce youth to engage in criminal endeavors. Marginalized Honduran youth, who are uneducated, lack essential job skills, and do not have supportive family networks, are extremely vulnerable to joining the highly criminal and violent Honduran maras, such as the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the Barrio 18 (18th Street Gang). In the last 15 years, the maras have been able to exploit the ongoing social conditions that currently exist in Honduran. Increasingly, youth are finding themselves becoming isolated from their homes and in desperate need of financial support. For many youth, joining a violent transnational gang is the only viable solution to escape their economic struggles and sense of abandonment by their families and government. As a result, Honduras has been experiencing substantial growth in gang memberships since the 1990s. 46 In 2007, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime estimated that Honduras was the nation with the most gang members in Central America. Although difficult to measure, the UNODC estimated that Honduras had over 36,000 gang members. Based on this figure, one in every 20 young males between the ages of 15 to 24 was a member of a Honduran mara or street gang (See Table 1) INE, Cuadragésima Primera Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, 6, Sonja Wolf, Mara Salvatrucha: The Most Dangerous Street Gang in the Americas? Latin American Politics and Society 54, no. 1 (2012): UNODC, Crime and Development in Central America,

37 Table 1. Central American Gang Membership 48 Estimated Gang Country Members Honduras 36,000 Guatemala 14,000 El Salvador 10,500 Nicaragua 4,500 Due to the overwhelming lack of legitimate employment opportunities, youth gang members in Honduras raise revenues through illicit means. Making matter worst, the methods that gangs employ to make money are becoming increasingly violent as the Honduran economy continues to stagnate. Some of the criminal methods that gangs employ to make money include: robberies, illegal sales of weapons, drug-trafficking, extortions, and murder for hire. Within the major Honduran cities of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, extortion rackets are the primary method that gangs employ to extract money from the public. For instance, youth gang members extort the majority of legal and illegal businesses that operate within their gang s defined territories. Small store owners, bus and taxi drivers, prostitutes, and drug dealers all have to pay steep extortion taxes to local gang members to continue operating their businesses. When business owners or workers refuse to pay the extortion rates, gang members respond violently by destroying their businesses or by assassinating business owners and members of their families. Increasingly within the last ten years, hundreds of business owners and workers, primarily within the informal transportation sectors, have been murdered by gang members due to their inability to meet the overwhelming monetary demands of gangs. 49 Within the last 15 years, Honduran youth gangs have also expanded the types of victims that they are now inclined to murder. Gang members no longer hesitate to kill or critically injure rival gang members, police informants, kids who 48 Ibid. 49 Wolf, Mara Salvatrucha, 78 19

38 decline to join their gangs, and young women who resist their sexual advances. 50 Scholars also attribute the high levels of violence to emergent gang initiation rituals and territorial disputes. As a demonstration of gang loyalty, aspiring members are performing rites of passage that entail killing innocent bystanders or members of rival gangs. Additionally, many violent acts and homicides are a result of turf disputes between rival gang as they battle to retain control of drug trafficking routes and neighborhoods. 51 U.S. deportation policies are also contributing to the escalation of youth violence in Honduras. In accordance to the U.S. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), U.S. custom officials are deporting thousands of criminals and youth gang members to Honduras annually. Since many of the deportees have extensive criminal records or have tattoos portraying that they belong to notorious U.S. gangs, the Honduran government has been unable to integrate thousands of deportees into their society. Also complicating the reintegration of deportees are issues, such as: many of the deportees do not have families to return to and many do not speak Spanish, since they fled to the U.S. with their entire families as small children. As a result, many deportees that possess violent, criminal inclinations end up assimilating into the Honduran gangs, such as the MS-13 and Barrio 18. In contrast to the Honduran state, the violent transnational MS-13 and Barrio 18 gangs have been more effective in reintegrating deportees, thus further expanding their numbers and capacity to inflict violence. 52 As of 2003, Honduras has had to reconstitute over 330,000 deportees from the United States (See Table 2) Ibid., Thomas C. Bruneau, Pandillas and Security in Central America, Latin American Research Review 49, no. 2 (2014): Joanna Mateo, Street Gangs of Honduras, in Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America, eds. Thomas Bruneau, Lucia Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2011), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Aliens Apprehended by Region and Country of Nationality, 2012 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (Washington, DC: DHS, 2013), p

39 Table 2. Annual Flow of U.S Deportations to Central America, DHS 54 Country Guatemala 10,355 14,288 25,909 25,144 23,907 33,690 33,882 36,228 39,153 55,307 Honduras 16,632 26,555 55,756 33,394 28,265 33,771 31,818 29,939 29,120 48,984 El Salvador 11,757 19,180 42,885 46,314 19,699 27,151 26,776 27,539 25,592 37,197 Nicaragua 1,055 1,664 4,272 3,228 2,119 2,801 2,674 2,417 2,150 2, DHS, 2012 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics,

40 As a result of gang violence, Honduran crime and homicide rates are surging drastically and are hindering the social and economic recovery of the nation. The high numbers of gang members committing crimes in the streets of Honduras have far exceeded the capacity of the national police and judicial system to maintain control and keep citizens safe. Rather than dedicating needed resources toward national economic recovery projects and investing toward the struggling, impoverished education system, the state has committed extensive economic resources to confront rising internal security threats. Foreign investors are also discouraged from expanding and taking advantage of business opportunities within Honduras as the state appears incapable of curbing the violence and reestablishing order. As long as the streets of Honduras remain dangerous, economic and social progress remains elusive. 55 B. STATE RESPONSES TO YOUTH VIOLENCE Since 2002, the Honduran government has implemented many measures to reestablish order and security. Unfortunately, government institutions, to include the Honduran National Police, the judiciary, and the penal system, have all struggled to contain and prevent widespread criminal behavior associated with disenfranchised youth. Early on, politicians and policy-makers implemented aggressive, short-sighted policies that ultimately served to make security conditions worst. 56 As it stands, many policies have failed to reduce the increasing rates of violent crimes and homicides; ironically, many security efforts have had the unintended consequence of making youth gangs stronger, more organized, and more effective at carrying out their criminal activities Mateo, Street Gangs of Honduras, Mark Ungar, La Mano Dura: Current Dilemmas in Latin America Police Reform, in Criminality, Public Security, and the Challenge to Democracy in Latin America, eds. Marcelo Bergman and Laurence Whitehead (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), Wolf, Mara Salvatrucha,

41 1. Mano Dura and Honduran Anti-gang Policies Soon after winning the Honduran presidential election on a staunch security platform, Honduran President Ricardo Maduro initiated the first of many anti-gang policies in Since security conditions were quickly deteriorating within the nation and throughout the northern triangle of Central America, the Honduran electorate overwhelmingly supported Maduro s policies that aimed to bring about a decisive end to social violence and growing insecurity. In rapid succession, Maduro and his administration were successful in reforming security policies in Article 332 of the Honduran Penal Code to directly target youth gangs. Successively, Maduro put into effect the security policies of Cero Tolerancia (Zero Tolerance), Mano Dura, and the Ley Antimaras (Anti-Gang Law). 58 The accumulated effect of these policies bestowed overwhelming authority to the police and military to conduct aggressive raids and security patrols within communities suspected of having high gang populations. In efforts to disband youth gangs and dissuade juveniles from joining them, Maduro s anti-gang laws made it lawful for police authorities to incarcerate individuals who are active members of a gang and youth who have close associations with them. Even in situations where individuals did not commit any crimes, anti-gang legislation made it possible for police to charge them with offences that carried heavy jail sentences. 59 Regrettably, the aggressive approaches adopted by Honduran politicians and national security services failed to prevent youth from associating with gangs or taking part in criminal activities. With the prevalence of mano dura policies, the levels of violence have continued to escalate dramatically throughout the country. Although the ruthless anti-gang policies achieved limited success in reducing national homicide rates during their first few years in practice, homicide rates 58 Lirio Gutierrez Rivera, Security Policies from a Spatial Perspective: The Case of Honduras, Iberoamericana XI, no. 41 (2011): Ibid.,

42 began to surge in Recorded homicides are now 200 percent greater from what they were at their lowest point in The Downsides of the Mano Dura Strategy Among the primary issues that Honduran politicians and security institutions failed to anticipate was the massive overpopulation of incarcerated gang members that were a direct result of their strong-arm approach. Beginning in 2002, the government corralled thousands of youth gang members into severely understaffed and congested prisons. As a result, Honduran prisons and detention centers soon began to serve as command centers for the powerful Maras such as the MS-13 and the Barrio 18. Youth that were previously unaffiliated with any gangs had no choice but to join the Maras to ensure their survival within the prison system. Small disorganized gangs, also known as clicas, began to merge with the dominant Maras. Through the Honduran prison system, gangs were able to evolve into more violent organizations, expand their ranks, and better control their criminal enterprises from within the prison walls. The ineffectiveness of the Honduran Prison system also contributed to escalating the levels of violence. Massive prison riots became a common occurrence due to extreme overcrowded conditions. The poor administration and security of the Honduran prison system led to the deaths of many young detainees. By the time most Honduran youth complete their jail sentences they adapt violent behaviors and establish affiliations with maras, which they did not have prior to their incarcerations. 62 Most prominent scholars on Central American security matters agree that the Honduran strong-arm approach was an inappropriate response toward improving the security conditions of the nation. Furthermore, such policies failed to protect the civil rights of Honduran youth and children from undue police 60 Mateo, Street Gangs of Honduras, UNODC, Global Study on Homicide 2013, Mateo, Street Gangs of Honduras,

43 persecution. Mano dura policies that targeted youth gangs were flawed for many reasons. First, politicians and security institutions primarily targeted youth gangs, even when police and government institutions recognized that they were contributing only a third of national criminal offenses and homicides. 63 A strong stance against youth gangs also provided political gains to government officials, so their constituents would perceive them as being tough on crime. Rather than targeting hardened criminal organizations or attempting to solve the social ills that were compelling youth to a life of crime, youth gangs became the scape goats for many politicians and security institutions. 64 Second, unqualified and unprofessional police and military personnel, performing the duties prescribed under the mano dura policies, consistently overstepped their authority and carried out extensive abuses of power against youths. Through their expanded police powers, security personnel terrorized the youths of poor neighborhoods by conducting mass raids to incarcerate perceived gang members and force confessions out of them. For many years, police officers also incarcerated thousands of youths with very little criminal evidence. As a result of these abusive practices, thousands of youth and children have fallen victims to extrajudicial killings carried out by improperly trained security officers. 65 According to Mark Ungar, Honduran state officials estimated that there were over 2,300 extrajudicial killings of youth and children from 1998 to 2005, many of which were attributed to the police. 66 However, security officials suspected of being abusive or committing extrajudicial killings rarely face punishment because Honduran judicial and security institutions are notoriously corrupt Ungar, La Mano Dura, Oliver Jütersonke et al., Gangs, Urban Violence, and Security Interventions in Central America, Security Dialogue 40, no. 4 5 (2009): Ungar, La Mano Dura, Ibíd., Ungar, La Mano Dura,

44 C. INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND MECHANISMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY Honduran government efforts to effectively employ mano dura policies and reduce youth gang violence are a result of the inability of institutions, such as the criminal justice system, the penitentiary sector, and the national police, to perform their duties adequately. For the most part, these state institutions are consistently understaffed and underfunded to effectively train and prepare personnel to perform their necessary functions and address the security crisis. 68 For mano dura policies to succeed, it is necessary for a state to invest heavily in developing and training its personnel to aptly restore order without violating the human rights of its citizens. Strong-arm and zero-tolerance policies require extensive training of personnel, institutional mechanisms of accountability, and improved capacities for courts and prisons to process prisoners. Without these measures in place, a state could exacerbate the situation by permitting unfit institutions to violate the rights of individuals through repressive tactics and ineffective judicial procedures. 69 According to Todd Landman, The obligation to respect human rights requires the state and all its organs and agents to abstain from carrying out, sponsoring, tolerating any practice, policy, or legal measure that violates the integrity of individuals or impinges on their freedom to access resources to satisfy their needs. 70 Unfortunately for the citizens of Honduras, the national security, penal, and judicial institutions have failed to make the safeguarding of their civil and human rights their primary responsibility. 1. The Honduran Public Ministry The Honduran Public Ministry, which role is similar to the U.S. Office of the Attorney General, has struggled to ensure that the nation s security policies preserve the constitutional rights of the Honduran citizens. For many years, the 68 Lainie Reisman, Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Responding to Central American Youth Gang Violence, SAIS Review 26, no. 2 (2006): Ungar, La Mano Dura, Landman, Violence, Democracy, and Human Rights in Latin America,

45 public ministry has been extremely weak in carrying out its duties as the national ombudsman. Consistently, the public ministry has lacked the fiscal resources necessary to hire and develop a trustworthy staff of professional prosecutors to fill critical positions throughout the nation. Honduras has among the lowest levels of prosecutor-to-inhabitant ratios in Latin America, which currently stands at 6.4 prosecutors for every 100,000 citizens. 71 With so few prosecutors within its ranks, the public ministry lacks the necessary manpower to investigate and prosecute criminal cases. Most notably, it is unable to act as a watchdog to ensure state actors neither behave illegally nor violate the civil and legal rights of imprisoned youths. As recent as June 2013, the head of the Honduran Public Ministry, Attorney General Luis Alberto Rubi, resigned under pressure from civil society groups and members of congress, who accused the ministry of incompetence and corruption. 72 The public ministry s continued support of ineffective zero-tolerance policies highlights its greatest weakness. Rather than being an advocate for the rule of law and the ethical prosecution of criminal actors, the public ministry has supported policies that are discriminatory and overly repressive, especially toward Honduran youth. With the support of the public ministry, government officials were able to sanction laws that permitted security personal to actively target youth gangs and enter private homes without requiring search warrants (Presidential Decree ), expand the role of the military in support of police anti-gang functions (Honduras Segura), and authorize the sentencing of youths with prison sentenced of 6 12 years for being members of a gang (Ley Anti-Maras). Through the provisions of these laws, the national police gained full authorization to incarcerate young men and women without judicial orders. As a result, police officers gained the authority to detain thousands of young adults without needing to provide any proof of them committing a single criminal act. 71 Aaron Korthuis, CARSI in Honduras: Isolated Successes and Limited Impact, in Crime and Violence in Central America s Northern Triangle: How U.S. Policy Responses are Helping, Hurting, and Can be Improved, ed. Eric L. Olson (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2015), Ibid.,

46 The mere perception that a youth may potentially commit a crime or have an association with a gang was sufficient grounds for police officers to make an arrest. The public ministry s inability to act as a mechanism of horizontal accountability permitted state officials to implement policies that completely disregarded the civil rights of individuals The Honduran Justice System As a result of the massive enforcement efforts against youth gangs, the Honduran Justice System has been overwhelmed with hundreds of youths held in pre-trial detention centers waiting to have their cases heard before a judge. In most instances, detainees wait several months for their court dates to arrive due to the enormous backlog of cases. According to 2004 figures, 90 percent of the Honduran prison population has remained incarcerated without being sentenced. 74 Prior to having passed public security policies that were reliant on high incarceration rates, the Honduran government should had taken preliminary measures to ensure that it possessed sufficient trial judges to prevent bottlenecks within the judicial process. The Honduran justice system also suffers from an extreme lack of credibility. The Honduran public is wary of their justice system for they perceive that judges are ineffective at processing cases, make judicial rulings that are politically biased, and are prone to be highly corrupt. Since all Honduran judges gain their positions through political appointments, their rulings tend to align with the party leaders who appoint them. 75 In an effort to promote judicial independence of the courts, the Honduran government needs to reform the 73 Ungar, Policing Youth in Latin America, Mark Ungar and Ana Laura Magaloni, Latin America s Prisons: A Crisis of Criminal Policy and Democratic Rule, in Criminality, Public Security, and the Challenge to Democracy in Latin America, eds. Marcelo Bergman and Laurence Whitehead (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), Marcelo Bergman and Laurence Whitehead, Criminality and Citizen Security in Latin America, in Criminality, Public Security, and the Challenge to Democracy in Latin America, eds. Marcelo Bergman and Laurence Whitehead (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009),

47 justice system so that judges assume office by way of an electoral process rather than through political appointments. 76 A stark example of the lack of judicial independence within the Honduran Judicial System occurred in late In this case, the Honduran National Congress fired four Supreme Court Judges for not ruling in their favor in a decision involving the national police. 77 It is essential that judges regain the confidence of the public. Youth have no incentives to be less violent or reduce their levels of criminality when they know judges will sentence them to long prison sentences regardless of the severity of their crimes. 3. Honduran Prisons The Honduran penitentiary system is in a dire state of disrepair. As a result of mano dura policies, Honduran prisons have become overpopulated with youth prisoners yet dangerously understaffed to effectively secure the growing number of detainees. Undermanned prisons have become death traps and gang controlled zones rather than serving as facilities to promote the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. Once in prison, youths become vulnerable to being killed by fellow prisoners, contracting diseases, suffering hunger, and likely of having their civil and lawful rights violated by state officials. 78 In 2004, the Honduran prison system employed fewer than 1,300 prison guards to supervise all 24 national detention centers. With an extremely large prison population, each prison guard was responsible for supervising more than 130 inmates. 79 Within the last ten years, prison overpopulation has ballooned even further. As recently as January 2013, the Honduran federal prisons held over 12,000 prisoners. Since Honduras 76 Ibid., Korthuis, CARSI in Honduras, Ungar and Magaloni, Latin America s Prisons, Lirio Gutiérrez Rivera, Discipline and Punish? Youth Gangs Response to Zero- Tolerance Policies in Honduras, Bulletin of Latin American Research 29, no. 4 (2010):

48 only has the space to house 8,120 prisoners, this prison population exceeded the national prison capacity by over 50 percent. 80 Since prison authorities lack the capacity to establish order and provide basic services to inmates, MS-13 and Barrio 18 gang leaders fill the state s void. These gangs have become so powerful and dominant of the Honduran prison system that they determine which areas prison guards have access to and which prisons inmates get assigned to. Due to the state s lack of control, members of the violent transnational gangs are the ones that end up filling the roles as administrators of the Honduran prisons. Within the prison walls, gang leaders are the only ones capable of imposing their authority and determining which inmates have access to essential services. For this reason, new inmates have no other choice but to become affiliated with the major prison gangs to gain access to food, protection, and suitable shelter. In essence, the prisons have become an extension of the territory gangs control within Honduras. 81 To regain control of the gang-dominated prisons, the Honduran government passed the Penitentiary System Law in With the new law, state officials are reforming the national penitentiary system and working toward improving prison conditions. As part of the penitentiary law, the government transferred control of the prison system from the national police to the newly created National Penitentiary Institute. The new law no longer permits the mixture of unsentenced detainees, which had predominantly consisted of youths, to live alongside hardened criminals. The law establishes that prisoners be secured in facilities that correspond to their length of sentences. For instance, the state will now hold persons in pre-trial confinement in establishment centers, prisoners facing short sentences in local prisons, prisoners sentenced to less than three years in departmental prisons, and felons with sentences greater than three years in the national penitentiary centers. The Penitentiary System Law will 80 Security and Defense Network of Latin America (RESDAL), Public Security Index Central America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama, (Buenos Aires: RESDAL, 2013), Gutiérrez Rivera, Discipline and Punish,

49 also require that the state provide one prison guard for every 11 inmates. 82 The improved law and segregation of prisoners should improve efforts to rehabilitate juveniles convicted of minor offenses. 4. Security and Police Institutions For mano dura policies to succeed, the state needs to ensure that police forces are adequately trained and professionalized. Furthermore, oversight mechanisms must be in place to make certain that police officers operate within the national legal framework and are promptly punished for all instances of abuse. Without the establishment of a well-trained police force and systems of accountability, police officers are prone to perform in an overly repressive manner and remain unconcerned about respecting citizens civil rights. 83 Regrettably for the Honduran youth population, politicians and judicial institutions enacted mano dura and zero-tolerance policies without properly professionalizing and developing the national police force. Under pressure from politicians, police units have the immense task of restoring security and ending youth gang violence without receiving adequate training, budgets, and equipment to meet their mission requirements. As a result, Honduran police officers have been inept at restoring security since the implementation of mano dura. 84 The lack of state investment in professionalizing and improving the patrolling capacities of the national police has contributed to an increase in repressive police tactics. In their efforts to implement mano dura objectives, mass raids, forced confessions, and indiscriminate arrests of youths have become standard practices. Increased training and oversight mechanisms are necessary to reduce the high incidences of police abuse directed toward juveniles. Nevertheless, neither state nor senior police officials have taken the 82 RESDAL, Public Security Index Central America, Ungar, La Mano Dura, Ibíd., 98 31

50 necessary measures to improve the effectiveness and quality of the Honduran police. 85 Besides being overly repressive, Honduran civil society groups and human rights organizations consistently denounce the national police for being corrupt. Highly attributed to the low wages, police officers, at all institutional levels, have become involved with drug trafficking organizations and other criminal enterprises. Honduran police officers have also been implicated with various crimes to include non-judicial homicides, briberies, and robberies. To reduce corruption, the Ministry of Security needs to implement improved vetting mechanisms to verify that they are admitting high quality professionals into the ranks of the national police. 86 In 2013, the average monthly salary for 83 percent of the police officers in the Honduran National Police was $ Even for Honduran standards, $472 a month is not a sufficient salary to properly provide for a family. To improve the quality of police officers, the state needs to provide greater monetary incentives and improved work conditions to decrease police officers vulnerabilities toward becoming corrupt and developing unethical behaviors. In May 2012, the Honduran legislature passed the Police Purging Law to grant the Ministry of Security the authority to dismiss police officers suspected of being corrupt and having close ties to criminal organizations. 88 However, most efforts by the state to rid the national police of corrupt police officers have been poorly executed and overly politicized. Among the greatest criticisms of the purging law is that high level officials within the police and the justice sector instructions have used the law as a tool to remove unwanted low level police officers and give the perception that the Ministry of Security is being proactive in regulating and strengthening its police force. In December 2013, the purging law 85 Ungar, La Mano Dura, 94,98 86 Korthuis, CARSI in Honduras, RESDAL, Public Security Index Central America, Ibid.,

51 came under attack when the media reported that countless police officers, known for their diligent dedication and professionalism toward their police work, had fallen victims to the purges. 89 The public perceived the government s dubious purges of uncorrupt officials as a major step backwards toward professionalizing and cleaning the national police. Corrupt senior officials fired respectable police officers that had received extensive U.S. police training and had demonstrated the ability to pass all the U.S. Embassy administered background checks and vetting procedures. Conversely, the Purging Law has failed to effectively scrutinize the practices of senior police officials, whom Honduran civil society groups suspect of being the biggest perpetrators of police corruption. The distorted application of the Police Purging Law has only served to further weaken the national police and dilute the public s confidence toward their security institutions Militarized Policing Since the Honduran public lives in a constant state of fear of falling victim to youth gang violence, the nation has become accepting of the increasing encroachment of the military s role in internal security matters. Apart from fearing youth gangs, the public also distrusts the Honduran National Police. In contrast, the public has greater confidence in the Honduran Armed Forces abilities to restore order due to their superior professionalism, legitimacy, and training. Growing concerns of the police ability to restore public order and reduce internal corruption has prompted the Honduran government to expand the role of the military in internal security matters. The view of citizens and political leaders is that authorizing the military to assume internal security functions is necessary to overcome the high levels of youth gang violence and delinquency. Given the 89 Korthuis, CARSI in Honduras, Ibid.,

52 national police s current ineffectual status, the public and the government perceive the military s involvement as a public necessity. 91 Using the military to support the police is not a new concept in Honduras. Since 2002, the Honduran government has regularly authorized the military to reinforce police anti-gang operations and neighborhood patrols. However, the military in support of police operations are only effective at providing immediate, short-term relief. Since military forces are neither designed nor trained to conduct police functions, governments should not become overly reliant on them to serve as an additional arm of the police. Furthermore, past use of the military to support mano dura policies have led to abuse and overuse of aggressive military tactics against juvenile gangs and petty criminals. 92 Nevertheless, the current administration of President Juan Orlando Hernández has continued to advocate for sustained militarization of the national police. Upon assuming office, President Hernandez expanded heavily militarized police units known as the Tropa de Investigación y Grupo de Respuesta Especial de Seguridad, TIGRES (Special Intelligence and Security Response Troops). Although they are a civilian police force, TIGRES units are different in that they possess advanced weapon systems, receive military training, and conduct highrisk counternarcotic and anti-gang operations. Through their tactical superiority, TIGRES enhances the capacity of the national police to establish control of gang ridden Honduran neighborhoods. However, the numbers of trained TIGRES remain minimal so are unlikely to make a major contribution toward reestablishing public security in the near future. 93 With the passing of the Military Cooperation in Pubic Security Law in 2013, the Honduran legislature authorized the armed forces to grow by 5, Liza Zúñiga Collado, Desafíos Institucionales De La Colaboración Policial-Militar: El Triángulo Norte, URVIO, Revista Latinoamericana De Seguridad Ciudadana 12, (2012): Ungar, La Mano Dura, RESDAL, Public Security Index Central America,

53 troops to establish the Policía Militar de Orden Público. 94 Military Police units, which the Ministry of Security does not control, are trained and equipped to conduct internal security operations alongside the national police. Military Police troops accompany policemen on joint patrols but defer all arresting procedures to the police officer on the scene. 95 President Hernandez s 2015 appointment of Army General Julian Pacheco to Minister of Security further highlights the militarization of the Honduran public security institutions. Unlike his predecessors, President Hernandez chose to appoint an active duty military officer rather than a civilian. The president s decision was based on his aspiration to instill military ethos, professionalism, and expertise within the national police. Although General Pacheco resigned his military commission prior to assuming office, he was the first active duty military officer selected to lead the institution responsible for overseeing the internal security of the nation. 96 Apart from undermining the democratic advancement of civilian leadership, the selection of a military officer to lead the Ministry of Security conflicts with Constitutional Decree The 1998 decree established the Ministry of Security with the sole purpose of separating the national police from the influence and control of the Honduran Armed Forces. 97 The long-term reliance on military personnel to support policing functions has undermined the development of an already weak police force. In an effort to equip and train military soldiers to perform police functions, the Honduran legislature has diverted funds from the national police to militarized policing. Rather, the state could have used desperately needed resources to hire more police officers or train and equip more police units. Nevertheless, the Honduran 94 Ibid., Ibid., 96, Honduras: General Julián Pacheco Será Nuevo Ministro de Seguridad, El Heraldo, December 15, 2014, accessed May 14, 2015, 97 RESDAL, Public Security Index Central America,

54 government continues to expand the military s policing capacities during a period when police officers find themselves scrounging and stealing to acquire essential equipment. State endeavors to professionalize and improve the crime-prevention capacities of the national police will remain unsuccessful as long as the Honduran government continues to expand the internal security roles and functions of the military. 98 D. HONDURAN NON-REPRESSIVE APPROACHES Within the last 15 years, the Honduran government has also sought less suppressive methods to address its youth violence crisis. The administration of President Carlos Roberto Flores ( ) first sought to reduce the proliferation of violence by promoting gang prevention programs for the Honduran youth. Prior to leaving office, President Flores was successful in passing Law that established a prevention-based strategy. The passage of this law gave way to Programa Nacional de Prevención y Reinserción Social de Personas Vinculadas a Pandillas (PNPRRS) (National Program of Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Social Reintegration). PNPRRS served as the governmental body with the capacity to coordinate national and international efforts to educate at-risk youth and their families. Its collaboration with international organizations like the United Nations Children s Fund (UNICEF) addresses the social and economic ills confronting disenfranchised Honduran youth. By promoting the efforts of PNPRRS, the Honduran government expanded its capacity to work with youth vulnerable to gangs and to help those seeking to leave the gang lifestyle. PNPRRS also reinforced state and NGO efforts to provide young adults access to programs that promote education, gang prevention, poverty alleviation, and jobs training Korthuis, CARSI in Honduras, Programa Nacional de Prevención, Rehabilitación y Reinserción Social (PNPRRS), Situación de Maras y Pandillas en Honduras, UNICEF/PNPRRS, 2012, 83, 36

55 During the administration of President Manuel Zelaya ( ), the Honduran government also implemented more comprehensive approaches to reduce the sources of national violence. Zelaya promoted government-sponsored social programs to target the root causes compelling young children and juveniles to join the crime-centric maras and youth gangs. While in office, Zelaya increased the incorporation of prevention and rehabilitation programs within the national police anti-gang strategy. He also made efforts to reduce reliance on repressive policing advocated through the mano dura policies. To support his anti-gang prevention strategy, Zelaya expanded the incorporation of community police units under the newly established Gang Prevention Division of the national police. 100 Since its implementation, the Honduran Community Police force has sought to improve their partnerships with the communities they serve. To reduce youth violence and gang memberships, the community police have created various anti-gang prevention programs, especially designed to influence and inspire elementary-age children and their parents. Police officers trained as instructors and prevention counselors aim to dissuade school-age children from joining gangs by registering them in anti-gang programs such as Educación para Resistir y Evitar las Maras (EREM) (Education to Resist and Avoid the Maras). These programs have tremendous potential to enlighten young children about the life-long implications from choosing to join a gang and engage in a life of crime. However, the success of the community police anti-gang programs is heavily dependent on a limited government budget. Since community police programs are less of a priority, only a small number of Honduran children have been able to participate in programs such as EREM. 101 Various NGOs and religious organizations are also playing a vital role in implementing gang prevention programs for at-risk Honduran youth. These organizations are highly critical of the state s inclination to apply repression 100 Mateo, Street Gangs of Honduras, Mateo, Street Gangs of Honduras,

56 policies, especially when they hold state officials responsible for promoting policies that have resulted in the widespread poverty and academic underperformance of Honduran youth. As such, they have sought to resolve the economic, academic, and vocational tribulations compelling Honduran youth to join maras. By working directly with gang members and imprisoned juveniles, NGOs and church organizations strive to address the root causes that are impeding marginalized youth from sustaining normal livelihoods. Apart from gang prevention programs, these organizations are providing drug addiction counseling, job training, and adult education classes to youth gang members. 102 The Honduran penal system has also established programs to promote the rehabilitation and social reintegration of youth serving long prison sentences. With the resources and assistance of PNPRRS and UNICEF, the Honduran penitentiary system is in a better position to provide training and educational opportunities to imprisoned youth. While in prison, youth have access to job training workshops and primary education classes to improve their opportunities to become productive members to society when they complete their prison sentences. By engaging incarcerated youth, PNPRRS recognizes that young adults are less likely to continue their past criminal and violent behaviors if they gain valuable job skills in prison. Penal education programs also aim to offset the lack of schooling that Honduran youth lacked prior to becoming gang members and entering prison. Education and rehabilitation programs are essential tools to end the vicious cycle of criminality that Honduran youth are experiencing. By learning vital life and works skills, youths are able to become members of the national workforce and gain honest means of earning money. More importantly, they are an effective approach to preventing youth from returning to a life dependent of gangs and violence. 103 Job training and education programs are essential to providing youth an alternative to leading lives as gang members. Many gang members find it difficult 102 Ibid., PNPRRS, Situación de Maras y Pandillas en Honduras,

57 to leave a gang when they reach their adult years. Since youth tend to join gangs in their early teens, they lack marketable job skills by the time they reach their 20 years of age. Through the jobs and education programs that NGOs provide, young adults can break their dependence on gangs and criminality to make money. 104 However, the success of these programs, to reduce gang membership, has remained minimal in Honduras. Very little coordination, collaboration, and planning exists between NGOs and church organization in implementing their programs. Furthermore, collaboration with state and police organization has also been marginal. In effort for these programs to have lasting effects, extensive coordination and planning must exist between the NGOs, religious organizations, and government agencies. The NGO sponsored antigang programs have the opportunity to achieve long term success, only if they can improve their ability to work in partnership and reinforce their efforts with the state. 105 Nevertheless, the Honduran government has struggled to garner the political and societal support to make prevention and rehabilitation programs a priority. The Honduran government has continued to have a preference toward repression based mano dura policies since they provide a possibility of bringing a quick and easy end to the youth gang problem. Unfortunately, youth rehabilitation and reintegration programs remain severely underfunded in Honduras even though they are an effective approach to drawing kids away from gangs. Ultimately, prevention and rehabilitation programs such as PNPRRS, community policing, penal vocational training, and NGO education programs have had limited success in reducing youth violence in Honduras Wolf, Mara Salvatrucha, Mateo, Street Gangs of Honduras, José Miguel Cruz, Government Responses and the Dark Side of Gang Suppression in Central America, in Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America, eds. Thomas Bruneau, Lucia Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press),

58 E. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Honduras mano dura polices have failed to restore the public security of the nation and address the core issues leading to the proliferation of youth violence. Thirteen years after its implementation, Honduras maintains its position as the most violent country in the world. 107 Mano dura has failed to deter Honduran youth from joining gangs and participating in a criminal lifestyle. Marginalized youth continue to join the large transnational gangs due to the state s inability to address the mounting socioeconomic difficulties confronting the poorest sectors of the Honduran society. Rather than restoring security, Honduras repressive approach has intensified the problem because subjugated gang members have become more violent and resilient to government suppression. Repression alone will not solve Honduras problems. 108 Mano dura has not succeeded because institutional weakness continues to persist within the Honduran National Police, penitentiary services, and the criminal justice system. Partly due to corruption and the overwhelming lack of professionalism, Honduran institutions continue to be inadequately administered and staffed with untrained and poorly educated personnel. If the Honduran government wants to restore public security and reduce youth violence, it needs to develop its policing and criminal justice institutions to respect and protect the human rights of its citizens. The national police and the criminal justice sector must have improved systems of oversight to ensure corrupt and brutal officials are held accountable for their illegal and brutal acts against youths that may be associated with gangs. If state agencies continue to violate the civil liberties of its youth and fail to implement mechanisms of accountability to control corrupt state officials, the Honduran government will not be able to control the expansion of youth violence. 109 Honduran security policymakers can enhance their ability to 107 UNODC, Global Study on Homicide 2013, Jütersonke et al., Gangs, Urban Violence, and Security Interventions, Landman, Violence, Democracy, and Human Rights in Latin America,

59 confront youth violence by seeking to understand the sources contributing to youth violence rather insisting on the continued suppression of youth gangs. 110 The government can advance its anti-gang efforts by committing the national police ability to build better community relations, rather than further militarize Honduran anti-gang efforts. The national police require added state investment to professionalize and improve the training of existing police forces. Rather than investing funds to integrate more military soldiers and TIGRES elements to confront youth gangs, political leaders should seek to improve the investigative capacity and effectiveness of existing police units. Although the militarization of the police can provide immediate short-term results, a long term solution necessitates regular police officers solve crimes and build better relations with the communities they serve. Continued militarization of the national anti-gang strategy will only serve to delay badly needed reforms for the national police and create more hostile relations between the state and already marginalized youth. 111 Government anti-gang efforts need to expand their prevention and intervention programs to engage at-risk youth before they join gangs or commit crimes. Since many NGOs and church organization are already delivering prevention and rehabilitation programs, the Honduran government can help improve coordination among organizations to enlarge the numbers of youth that can benefit. NGOs have done tremendous work in helping rehabilitate gang members in and out of jails. By working closely with NGOs, the government can help provide education, training, and incentives for youths to leave their gangs and end their cycle of incarcerations. 112 Enacting the right policy to address youth violence in Honduras will require the government s commitment to develop a long term comprehensive strategy. 110 Mark Ungar, Policing Democracy: Overcoming Obstacles to Citizen Security in Latin America (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), Korthuis, CARSI in Honduras, Mateo, Street Gangs of Honduras,

60 As policymakers have observed within the last 15 years, zero-tolerance repression policies have failed to bring an end to youth violence and improve public security. Policymakers need to expand police capabilities to solve and prevent crimes, while also helping improve the socio-economic factors inhibiting Honduran youth from becoming productive, law-abiding citizens. Honduran youth can attain a chance at a better future, if the government can provide programs that help reduce extreme poverty and ensure they are able to achieve a high school education. The youth of Honduras will have less of a need to rely on criminality and violence to survive if they view their government as a vested partner willing to help them learn the skills and education for a better future Mark Ungar and Enrique Desmond Arias, Reassessing Community-Oriented Policing in Latin America, Policing & Society 22, no. 1 (2012):

61 III. NICARAGUA Similar to Honduras, Nicaragua is a Central American nation that has extensive poverty, poor education systems, youth gang problems, and a long history of violent internal conflicts. Strikingly, the incidence of youth violence and homicides in Nicaragua are substantially less than in Honduras. In the early 90s, incidents of youth violence soared throughout the country soon after the Nicaraguan civil war ended. However, extensive police reforms and proactive government efforts to reduce youth violence decreased national homicide rates by half within a ten year period. 114 A 2013 U.N. study demonstrated that Nicaragua now ranks among the safest countries in the world, with only 11 homicides per 100,000 people. 115 The fact that the Nicaraguan government has been able to reduce gang violence and maintain low levels is a major accomplishment. Unlike Honduras, the Nicaraguan government reduced its national homicide rates by implementing domestic security policies that required neither military participation nor large-scale repressive approaches against youth gangs. Through state collaboration with programs sponsored by NGOs, Nicaraguan youth gang members have greater opportunities to leave their gangs and become productive citizens. 116 The Nicaraguan government has been successful in addressing youth violence because it has built stronger criminal justice institutions and has implemented a community-oriented security strategy that addresses the socioeconomic challenges confronting Nicaraguan youth. 117 This chapter examines the Nicaraguan government s efforts to promote community policing, strengthen its criminal justice institutions, and integrate NGO programs to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the youth population. The 114 Rocha, Street Gangs of Nicaragua, UNODC, Global Study on Homicide 2013, Cruz, Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America, Cruz, Government Responses and the Dark Side of Gang, 156 7; Rocha, Street Gangs of Nicaragua,

62 first section provides an overview of how youth violence surged toward the end of the Nicaraguan civil war. The next section explains how the Nicaraguan government has relied on non-repressive anti-gang policies to reduce youth violence and gang criminality. Section three highlights the public security reforms the Nicaraguan government undertook to strengthen its criminal justice institutions and augment their mechanisms of accountability. Section four elaborates on the significant roles international organizations and NGOs have played in supporting Nicaraguan preventative and rehabilitative strategies. The chapter concludes with findings and recommendations for improving the Nicaraguan approach for reducing youth violence. A. POST CONFLICT CONSTRUCTION OF NICARAGUAN YOUTH GANGS For the greater part of the 20th century, social violence prevailed in Nicaragua. In a dictatorship spanning 43 years, the brutal Somoza family dominated Nicaraguan society and government. Ultimately in 1979, revolutionaries of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, also known as Sandinistas or FSLN, succeeded in toppling the Somoza regime and establishing a socialist government after more than 20 years of guerilla warfare. However, the defeat of the Somoza regime gave way to 20 more years of violence as a devastating civil war ensued between the Sandinistas forces and the U.S.- supported Contras militias. Through the extensive support of the international community in helping negotiate a peace and the FSLN defeat in the presidential election to Violeta Chamorro, the Nicaraguan civil war ended in Although the war was finally over, Nicaraguan society continued to live in a state of perpetual fear due to the violence and criminality that ensued in the post war. 118 As noted by Nicaraguan citizen, Luis Fanor Hernandez, the nation descended into a state of paralysis due to the proliferation of youth violence, especially within the nation s capital of Managua: 118 Dennis Rodgers, Youth Gangs in Colombia and Nicaragua: New Forms of Violence, New Theoretical Directions? in Breeding Inequality - Reaping Violence: Exploring Linkages and Causality in Colombia and Beyond, ed. Anders Rudqvist (Uppsala, Sweden: Collegium for Development Studies, 2003),

63 The war is over in Nicaragua, we re at peace now that s what [government officials] say, but have you seen how we live? Look at what s happening in this country, all this delinquency, all this crime People are scared, everybody lives barricaded in their homes because it s so dangerous You can get killed for almost anything money, jewellery (sic), your watch, but also your clothes, your shoes, or even for just looking at somebody the wrong way It s like this everywhere, in all the poor neighborhoods I tell you, this isn t peace, its war; we re living in the middle of a war again The only difference with the past is that this war is no longer happening in the mountains, but right here, in the city. 119 When the civil war ended, thousands of demobilized Sandinistas and Contra soldiers merged to form armed criminal gangs that looted and terrorized the Nicaraguan cities. These gangs, known as pandillas, consisted primarily of youth since most combatants were young teenagers when they had been conscripted to fight. Criminal violence surged because the national economy was in ruins and the postwar government struggled to reintegrate former soldiers into society. Without jobs or homes to return to, gangs of demobilized troops began to raid and plunder as their primary means of survival. Making matters worse, the criminal gangs had the capacity for extreme violence since most members had extensive combat experience and were heavily armed with military weapons and ammunition. 120 A great portion of the demobilized troops were also unable to gain employment after the war because they lacked marketable job skills. Many of the former fighters developed into young adults knowing only how to conduct guerilla combat operations and how to obtain their necessities through violence. For the remainder of the decade, neighborhoods had to form their own vigilante protection gangs to protect residents from outsiders. Violence and homicide rates surged throughout the nation as vigilante neighborhood gangs killed and mutilated strangers whom they believed were rival gang members with intentions to steal inside their neighborhoods Dennis Rodgers, Slum Wars of the 21st Century: Gangs, Mano Dura and the New Urban Geography of Conflict in Central America, Development and Change 40, no. 5 (2009): Ibid., Rodgers, Youth Gangs in Colombia and Nicaragua,

64 Nicaraguan youth gangs emerged as the primary providers of neighborhood authority, security, and subsistence. Although most gangs were protective of the neighborhoods to which they belonged, it was common for them to enter other neighborhoods to steal, beat, and kill rivals. As the Nicaraguan government struggled to provide security and improve the economy, neighborhood gangs continued to grow in strength and numbers. Especially within the poorest neighborhoods, boys as young as seven years old would leave school to join neighborhood youth gangs. Just like their predecessors, young, uneducated kids were learning to become criminals to help provide for and violently protect their struggling neighborhoods. According to national police figures, Nicaragua had over 110 gangs and more than 8,500 youth gang members by the end of the decade. Although the national police was notorious for underreporting the severity of the gang crisis throughout the 90s, these measures still represented a 500 percent growth within a ten year period. 122 When drug consumption began to increase within the Nicaraguan youth population, the role of gangs as guardians of the neighborhoods began to deteriorate. As youth became addicted to crack-cocaine, crime and violence began to soar throughout Nicaragua. Neighborhood residents who were once thankful for the protection youth gangs provided soon began to fear them. Local residents became the easiest targets for youths to assault and rob in order to buy more drugs. As the incidence of crack-cocaine use increased, so did the incidents of assault, rape, and homicides. 123 Drug consumption also contributed to the escalation of violence and hostility between rival youth gangs. Within the most dangerous neighborhoods of Nicaragua, youth gangs were responsible for over 60 percent of crime-related killings. 124 Although public security had deteriorated to dangerous levels throughout the country, the postwar Nicaraguan government was committed to addressing 122 Rodgers, Slum Wars of the 21st Century, Rocha, Street Gangs of Nicaragua, Rodgers, Youth Gangs in Colombia and Nicaragua,

65 the socioeconomic problems compelling youth to resort to violence and criminality. Nicaraguan public security institutions and civil society became active partners with the state to reduce the national homicide rates and improve the conditions inflicted on the youth population. By the end of the decade, the Nicaraguan government and society were able to cut the national homicide rates in half (see Figure 3). Figure 3. Homicide Rates in Nicaragua, Homicide Rates in Nicaragua, (per 100,000 inhabitants) B. ADDRESSING THE POSTWAR SURGE IN YOUTH VIOLENCE After the Nicaraguan civil war ended, the government made it a priority to reduce the number of unregistered weapons that remained dispersed throughout the country. The availability of uncollected civil war weapons was contributing greatly to the surge in firearm-related homicides and armed robberies. Weapons were widely available everywhere in Nicaragua because the Sandinistas and the Contras forces had supplied large quantities of weapons to any willing, fighting citizen during the war. As a consequence, millions of unaccounted weapons 125 Dennis Rodgers, Disembedding the City: Crime, Insecurity, and Spatial Organization in Managua, Nicaragua, Environment & Urbanization 16, no. 2 (2004):

66 remained at the disposal for anyone to use, including youth gangs. To diminish the overabundance of guns, the national police relied on gun turn-in programs to collect and destroy firearms throughout the country. By reducing the number of available weapons, the Nicaraguan government sought to reduce the number of gun-related homicides and crimes. 126 The widespread availability of military weapons also created conditions in which youth gangs and other criminal organizations had the capacity to out-gun most police units. Without much effort, youth gangs could acquire weapons, such as handguns, assault rifles, and hand grenades that still remained scattered and easily accessible. Since weapon availability has been a common problem throughout Central America, Northern Triangle countries have used this as a pretext to militarize their anti-gang policing strategies. However, the Nicaraguan National Police has continued to work toward building trusting relations with its communities to make the gun turn-in programs a success. As a result, thousands of citizens have voluntarily relinquished their weapons to the various national turn-in programs. Within the last 25 years, these programs have made it possible for the national police to destroy hundreds of thousands of weapons that were once in the hands of youth gangs and criminal organizations. 127 The Nicaraguan gun turn-in programs greatly reduced the number of weapons available for citizens and youth gangs to commit homicides and armed robberies. The programs have been so successful that Nicaragua is now a global leader in weapons collection and destruction, helping the country become one of the safest in Central America. 128 To this day, the public continues to support national police efforts to reduce the number of illicit weapons on the streets. The public has been instrumental in providing police information that has led to the seizure of thousands of weapons. Public provided information has enabled police units to conduct raids and searches of criminal gangs suspected of possessing 126 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in Central America, Ibid., Rocha, Street Gangs of Nicaragua,

67 vast arsenals of illegal weapons. Between 2008 and 2013, the national police seized nearly 20,000 illegal weapons, such as handguns, machineguns, shotguns, rifles, and grenades Improving Institutional Capacity A major reason Nicaragua was successful in addressing the surge in youth violence in the postwar period was that it made it a priority to build stronger and more accountable criminal justice institutions. The fact that Nicaragua was emerging from a civil war and undergoing a complete government transition facilitated the process of implementing major reforms. The democratic electoral removal of the Sandinista National Liberation Front government paved the way for Nicaraguans to construct government institutions from the bottom up and implement public security reforms that were more responsive to the needs of civil society. The 1990 reforms produced security institutions that respected the rule of law, coordinated with community organizations, and confronted rising criminality with greater capacity. Following the post-transition reforms, Nicaraguan security institutions emerged with improved capacity to control the issues that had stimulated youth violence. 130 A positive shift toward improving the Nicaraguan security structure occurred when Violeta Chamorro defeated Daniel Ortega in the 1990 presidential election. Upon taking office, Chamorro was influential in bringing about positive changes within the public security institutions. 131 Her collaboration with international organizations, opposition civil society groups, and the Unidad Nicaragüense Opositora (National Opposition Union) political party, helped dissolve the FSLN-dominated security and military institutions of Nicaragua. Chamorro was able to establish new institutions in which security actors were 129 Malcolm Alvarez-James, Nicaraguan Police Seize Illegal Weapons and Reduce Crime, Dialogo Digital Military Magazine, August 20, 2014, accessed June 15, 2015, Cruz, Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America, Ibid.,19. 49

68 subordinated to their democratically elected leaders, professionalized, and depoliticized. With the introduction of effective public security reforms and the depoliticization of the national security apparatuses, the Ministry of Interior (MIGOB), the Nicaraguan National Police, and the army gained greater autonomy and capacity to meet the security needs of the nation. 132 The Nicaraguan government devoted the entire decade of the 90s to strengthening and reforming its security and criminal justice institutions. To support the extensive process of professionalizing the Nicaraguan national security forces, the United Nations oversaw the demobilization of the Sandinista Police and the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS). Following negotiations between the FSLN and the Chamorro administration, former members of the Sandinista Police and the EPS became integrated into the newly established National Police and National Army. To date, the Nicaraguan security and criminal justice institutions remain in a continuous state of modernization. In particular, state modernization efforts remain focused on expanding community policing strategies and gang prevention programs. 133 What emerged from the exhaustive efforts of the Nicaraguan government and the international community was a more legitimate and respected public security structure. 134 By the end of the 90s, the Nicaragua reforms were foundational in reducing the national homicide rates and transforming Nicaragua from a war-torn, crime-ridden nation to one of the safest countries in Central America (see Figure 4). 132 Cruz, Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America, RESDAL, Public Security Index Central America, 108, Rocha, Street Gangs of Nicaragua,

69 Figure 4. Homicide Rates in Central America, Enduring Gang Prevention Efforts To confront youth violence, the Nicaraguan government has preferred to implement anti-gang policies that are geared toward promoting gang prevention and improving community relations. In contrast to Northern Triangle countries, Nicaraguan policymakers are disinclined to promote policing programs that rely on domestic repression, police militarization, and mass incarcerations of gang members. Through the 1990s, Nicaraguan officials were proactive in working with disenfranchised youth and providing them the social support necessary to prevent gang involvement. Rather than treating youth gang members as social pariahs who threatened public security, Nicaraguan officials viewed gang members as rebellious youngsters who required guidance from the state and the community. As such, criminal justice institutions have integrated the support of 135 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Impact Evaluation of USAID s Community-Based Crimea and Violence Prevention Approach in Central America: Regional Report for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama (Washington, DC: USAID, 2014),