Civil society responses to large-scale land acquisitions in Tanzania and Indonesia. E. Mwangi, H. Komarudin, E. Luoga, M. Toxede

Transcription

1 Civil society responses to large-scale land acquisitions in Tanzania and Indonesia E. Mwangi, H. Komarudin, E. Luoga, M. Toxede

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3 Partners Research Sokoine University of Ag Sciences, Faculty of Forestry Tropenbos International, Indonesia Program Universitas Papua, Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry Policy Ministry of Mines and Energy Directorate of Environment University of Dar-es-Salaam TaTEDO

4 Overview Introduction Study sites Indonesia Tanzania Findings Reflections

5 Introduction Scale, pace unprecedented and concentration in weak governance regimes Outcomes increasingly documented: loss of access; unfavourable compensation; unclear/absent contracts; information asymmetries; coordination problems, lack of accountability in the land sector etc Empirical results point towards aggrieved communities, but less understanding or documentation of actions to address grievances

6 Our research How can relatively powerless rural groups influence tenurerelated decision making in their favor where states are overwhelmingly in support of land acquisition by investors? What kinds of actions do such groups engage in to defend their claims and access to land and forest resources?

7 Why it matters Dynamic social, political, economic environment; property rights under continuous challenge Severe asymmetries in power, resources<--accountability Rural livelihoods overwhelmingly dependent on resource access

8 Expectation Groups negatively affected by investments will organize to defend their claims. Successful organization will depend on the extent to which they link with external actors capable of mobilizing resources to influence government actors

9 Study sites Indonesia: Papua and West Papua Provinces Communities living around large-scale oil palm plantations State and private company plantation and smallholder Tanzania: Kilwa and Kisarawe Districts (Eastern & Coastal) Communities around large scale jatropha plantations Companies that had completed the land acquisition process European (UK & Sweden) Focus group discussions: men and women, with migrant and indigenous (in Indonesia). Key informant interviews with government officials from relevant ministries, company officials and relevant NGOs at local and National level.

10 Land/forest management Indonesia Decentralized to District Customary rights recognized subject to proof Background on Indonesia and Tanzania Human development 13% below poverty line Papua: 40% 40% in agriculture Biofuels a path to poverty reduction biofuels law Policy and legal National Energy Policy (2006) Blending targets Blue for national development (2007) 5.5MHa for oil palm Land acquisition Investment Promotion Bureau Governor/District Head (Permit) Negotiation with land owners Government Land 35 years, extended 25 more EIA required before approval Land 6MHa by MHa by MHa targeted Tanzania Decentralized to District Customary rights recognized- Village Land Act, Land Act 60% < 1$per day 80% in agriculture Biofuels to increase incomes, employment, economic growth National Biofuels Task Force (2006) National Biofuels Guidelines (2009) Tanzania Investment Center District Authorities Village Government Conversion to General Land 99 years EIA required before approval 4MHa requested by ,000Ha allocated 100,000Ha THINKING beyond acquired the canopy

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12 Kisarawe District 2006: Requested 18000ha 2009: 99year lease for 8200 ha 2010: 2000 ha planted with jatropha Grievance: Compensation; Unfulfilled promises Kilwa District 2006: Requested 80000ha 2007: Acquired ha 2008: 400 ha planted jatropha 2009: stopped field operations 2010: Financially bankrupt 2011: Certificate of incentives withdrawn Scale, size of group under study: 2 villages, 570 hholds, 2719 people, Grievance: Employment; Lack of payment of salaries labor dispute Scale, size of group under study: 2 villages: 643 hholds, 3746 people THINKING beyond the canopy

13 Indonesia case study: two sites Why Papua: Vast areas seen as idle economically, and key potential area for agrodevelopment/investment (e.g. maximum area policies) Site A Largest intact block of tropical rainforest left in the Asia-Pacific region about 42 Mha (forest cover: 77%) Site B Target of biofuels plantation expansion (existing 180,000ha), but 70 companies covering a land of 3.5 Mha are waiting for approval

14 Manokwari, West Papua 1977: central government & local government allocated 40,000 ha for transmigration. 1982: transmigrants started to occupy the lands (each HH obtained 2 ha of lands) 1982: state-owned oil palm company obtained concession over 12,000 ha, Grievance: Inadequate compensation and local Papuan from 2004 claiming back the rights over lands allocated to transmigrants Scale, size of group under study: Transmigrants: 2 villages, 1000 KK, 5,000 people, 1,800 ha (700 ha re-claimed) Land owner: 5 family clans, 41 HH Boven Digoel, Papua 1995: private oil palm company obtained a concession over 34,000 ha. 1997: started to establish plantations in block A (14,700ha) 2005: started to establish plantations in block B (planned to be 19,600 ha) but by 2010 the company has been able to establish only 7,600 ha of plantations Grievance: Rejection of plantation expansion to their customary lands, around 12,000 ha Scale, size of group under study: Local people: 25 familiy clans, 12,000 ha

15 Findings

16 Indonesia case study Grievance Actions Outcomes Comments Site A land reclaiming, conflict over lands between transmigrants and local Papuan Get back their rights over lands or get a proper compensation Negotiate with the owners of lands (Local Papuan) Negotiation/appeals to local government, company Appeals to high-ranking officials (central govt) visiting the village Link to parliament members who then bring the case to the House of Representatives and the Min. of Transmigration in Jakarta (central govt) No agreement or clarity over the land boundary or compensation, conflict remains No response from local govt (in dilemma) and from company (not its responsibiity). But, this action brings the conflict to surface, and reveal hidden issues (e.g. transparency in the distribution of benefits) (a) The central govt official promised to report the case to the Ministry ; (b) the second visit was sabotaged by local government, the group was not able to send its aspiration The members establish a special committee (though not functioning well), bring the issue in the parliament sessions and ask the Min. of Transmigration to resolve the conflict Need a facilitator or neutral agent Political & Administrative channels Administrative channel Political institutions

17 Grievance Actions Outcomes Comments Site B community groups reject the oil palm expansion, conflict over lands between local Papuan and a private company The community rejects the expansion of the company s plantation into their customary lands Reasons: (a) no improvement in the living standards among two other villages whose villagers transferred already their lands to the company; (b) the way how the company appraoch the community didn t put respect to their customary laws, didn t ask permission to conduct a survey Demonstration and block company s operation, prevent the company s machinery/truck/bulldozer from entering their c customary lands Appeals to the head of the district, several times visiting his office and raise the group s aspirations The company stop its operation, land opening and expanding their plantation, despite the company s intense effort to persuade the community to transfer the lands. The company even built a bridge that connect s the village and its surrounding. Effective In March the district head finally agreed that the company s expansion will not occupy the community s customary lands Effective Political Administrative

18 TANZANIA Grievance Action Effectiveness Comment Compensation, employment and unfulfilled development promises Appeals to District Executive via village and ward representatives Company summoned for meeting; Company CEO and top level officials attend meeting and agree to review compensation, compensate bare land, privilege locals in employment (Effective but only after new DED took office) Formal administrative channels used to address grievances. Biased recruitment; some villages excluded from employment Complaints to Districts Executive via village and ward representatives Ineffective Administrative Unpaid salaries Direct appeals to District Executive Ineffective Admin channels Holding company officials captive Report to Regional Trade Union Protest March to District Commissioner alleging that company was disposing of assets Case filed in Labor Court but Company did not show up Company and district officials ready to negotiate. Somewhat effective. Negotiations between TUICO and Company management failed; workers rejected 35USD offer for termination (Somewhat effective) DC and District Police Commander held assets under policy custody (Effective) Court appointed broker to auction company assets to pay salaries Political Political Political Legal THINKING beyond the canopy

19 Tanzania NGO actions: WWF international network mobilization: Withdrawal of 50% financing by Swedish local governments. Company cannot conduct operations. HakiArdhi community mobilization: Communities in above company areas reject company proposals but political involvement creates much pressure WWF national network mobilization: Parallel biofuels guidelines incorporated into formal guidelines approved in December WWF/HakiArdhi National Biofuels Forum: Input into Biofuels policy development

20 Reflections

21 Three levels of action by different actors: Community/local: Protest, sabotage, held officials in captivity Links to political leadership at local and national Links to district administration Political tools, largely informal Ex-post defensive actions by communities e.g salaries not paid, compensation inadequate. Not proactive. Not for inclusion in decision processes.

22 NGO actions: National coalition building among relevant NGOs Transnational networks Formal institutional channels. Mostly proactive. Entering formal arenas of decision making BUT --Little coordination among NGOs and communities AND --Different actions (Education, finances, information; transnational links?)

23 What now? Shifting community responses from reactive/ex-post to pro-active Better information (rights, content & implications of deals) Disinterested broker Negotiate more favorable terms (CSR a separate matter) Cross-community links Minding the gap Increased NGO involvement in the above (currently overwhelmingly govt dominated) Increased direct community representation in the NGO forums (farmers federations; women s orgs) Strengthening NGOs effectiveness Resources Synergistic interactions with govt/policy processes (without ruling out contention)

24 Thank you!