AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE TESTIMONY PREPARED FOR SUB-COMMITTEE ON REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

Transcription

1 AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE 160 North 15th Street Philadelphia, Pennsylvania TESTIMONY PREPARED FOR SUB-COMMITTEE ON REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REGARDING REFUGEE PROBLEM IN VIETNAM Presented by: Stephen G. Cary Associate Executive Secretary American Friends Service Committee September 21, 1965

2 AFSC Testimony- Refugee Problem in Vietnam page 1 Mr. Chairman: My name is Stephen G. Cary. I am Associate Executive Secretary of the American Friends Service Committee. I appear before your Committee today by reason of having just returned in mid-august from three months in South Vietnam, exploring possible avenues of service for the American Friends Service Committee and observing conditions throughout the country. In connection with this assignment my colleague and I visited most of the major coastal cities and travelled in three delta provinces, as well as in the highland provinces of Pleiku and Phuoc Long. I would like to focus my testimony on the refugee situation, but will also make some concluding comments on the conditions of the civilian population as a whole. My comments on refugees are based on conversations with American and Vietnamese government officials, with American private agency representatives, and on first hand observation of refugee concentrations in Pleiku, Qui Nhon, Song Be, Long Xuyen and Saigon. As I believe is generally known, the refugee situation in South Vietnam has deteriorated badly since May of this year, when I first arrived in Saigon. At that time, the number of persons who had been displaced by the war in South Vietnam was stabilized at around 300,000, and the efforts of the South Vietnamese Ministry of Social Welfare, the United States Operations Mission, and American private agencies appeared to have met the basic needs of the people rather well. The government's cash grant program of 7 piasters per day per person was reportedly getting into full operation and was adequate to meet minimal family food needs. Roofing materials and cement contributed by USOM supplemented other simple building materials locally available and resulted in the establispment of camps ~hat wer~ reasonably sanitary and comfortable. Although the camp~ were crowded as sµch places almost always are, I felt that the results of cooperative efforts, combined

3 AFSC Testimony -- Refugee Problem in Vietnam page 2 with the naturally warm climate, had created refugee conditions somewhat better than those I have observed in other refugee situations elsewhere in the world. Under these circumstances, I assigned refugee work a low priority in the list of possible undertakings for my organization. Unfortunately, this relatively favorable situation has been reversed during the past four months. The floodgates have opened again and the number of displaced persons has doubled to 600,000, with the end not in sight. No detailed information is available to explain all of the reasons for this unhappy development beyond the obvious one of intensification of the war, but it is clear that the principal reasons are Viet Cong harassment, heavy Viet Cong taxation and impressment of young men, and fear of American and Government of Vietnam bombing attacks. I made many inquiries as to the relative weighting of these iources for the refugee flow but could form no judgment on this because the explanation varies from place to place. This great increase in refugee population has placed too great a strain on the established mechanisms for handling the problem and the situation has gotten badly out of hand, with severe suffering the result. The construction of facilities has lagged far behind the flow of new arrivals, and even though schools and other public buildings have been made available, there is serious overcrowding and I below-standard accommodations. In remote areas, the schools are even worse, especially among the Montagnard refugees in the highlands where a combination of geographic inaccessibility and Vietnamese indifference has created conditions that are intolerable by any human standards. For example, a pocket of 5,000 Montagnard refugees in the valley around Kontum were reported in August, by sources that I regard as fully reliable, as being entirely without shelter of any kind at the height of the monsoon season.

4 AFSC Testimony -- Refugee Problem in Vietnam page 3 Further complicating the situation is the breakdown of the government grant program. The new influx made necessary the reduction of the daily per person grant from 7 piasters to 3 piasters, and either corruption or the bureaucratic paralysis resulting from the efforts to combat it has interfered with the distribution of even these meager funds in many provinces. At the same time, logistical problems flowing from the increased Viet Cong control of highways and rail lines, have reduced the availability of rice and driven up the price of food generally to levels double or triple what they were in May in some communities. The same problems of logistics hamper private relief agencies who often have substantial supplies backed up in U.S. ports or even in Saigon warehouses, but cannot get shipping facilities to move them to the critical refugee areas. I know of one agency in Saigon, for example, that cabled its home office to cancel all its next quarter relief shipment simply because it had no way to get supplies from its already bulging warehouse in Saigon to the coastal and highland areas where its distribution agents were located, and could not accept or warehouse additional supplies should they arrive. On the basis of this kind of evidence, which I believe to be factual, it is clear that a fresh and expanded effort must be mounted to meet this situation of tragic human need. I, therefore, welcome the decision of the United States Government to take more direct responsibility for such an effort, and hope that it will be possible for the American Friends Service Committee to play a modest role in alleviating the situation. Obviously, the basic problem of providing food and shelter is of a magnitude that can be coped with only at the government level, but private agencies can, I believe, play a vital role in supplemental relief and especially in providing the equally necessary services in the area of education, training, self-help and recreation that will contribute to the sustaining of mora+e, the fostering of hope and the maintenance of self-respect on the part of

5 AFSC Testimony -- Refugee Problem in Vietnam page 4 the refugees. While coordination of such agency work is, of course, necessary I would point out that there is already an efficient coordinating committee of voluntary agencies that meets regularly in Saigon, to say nothing of the similar role played in the United States by the American Council of Voluntary Agencies. It would be my feeling, therefore -- and here I feel confident that I speak for the agencies already at work in Vietnam -- that the principal assistance which this government can now render to the voluntary agencies in the refugee area is to provide for greatly increased inland transport facilities. This, more then elaborate coordinating machinery, seems to me to be the priority need at the present time. I am pleased to report that the American Friends Service Committee is now making plans for a program of services to refugees such as I have indicated. I would like to close these formal remarks with a few comments on the general conditions existing in rural Vietnam, where more than three-fourths of all its people live. These conditions have, of course, vital impact on the future of the country because they are shaping attitudes that wi.11 make or break the possibility of emerging democratic loyalties. As many thoughtful persons both in and out of government have pointed out, there is great danger that disaffection and des~air will vitiate whatever military victory is achieved or favorable political settlement reached. Such gains will prove transient and illusory if the surviving population on the day of settlement is in such a mood of despair and resentment that they will fall easy victims to the blandishments and overtures of the first tyrant who appears, whether he be from right or left. I found very widespread disaffection with respect to both sides on the part of the Vietnamese people, and I would estimate that 80 to 90% of the people of Vietnam feel no real stake in the war. I would emphasize here that I am speaking

6 AFSC Testimony -- Refugee Problem in Vietnam page 5 of rural, unsophisticated Vietnam and not of educated, urban Vietnam. The great issues enunciated by the leadership are wholly beyond either their understanding or their interest. Their outlook is focused on the need for a safe night's sleep and the opportunity to keep a reasonable proportion of what their labor produces, but neither side affords them either of these luxuries. Feelings are masked both by reason of Asian mores and of harshly enforced regulations against dissent, but it is safe to say that the American presence is widely misunderstood, widely mistrusted, and probably widely resented. Obviously, this problem will find its real solution only as peace is restored which is a goal we all seek. There are, however, two military policies now being followed that have a bearing on the problem and that are appropriate to mention in the context of the attitudes among rural Vietnamese. The first of these is the ino-sanctuary" policy of the Governm.ent of Vietnam and the United States forces, and its companion "open target areas" policy. I can understand the military basis for the first of these policies which permits a commander in the field to call up air attack support when his men are being fired upon or when he believes Viet Cong are taking refuge in a village, but more than military considerations are in order. I deeply believe the policy is wrong morally, shortsighted pragmatically, and disastrous in terms of the bitterness it is creating among civilian Vietnamese, both those whom it drives to become refugees and those who stay behind. I can see even less justification for the "open target areas" policy, under which any aircraft, unable to dispose of their explosives qn the designated target, apd prohibited from landing with explosives aboard, is irystructed to drop them within certaiq lar~e Viet Cong areas-~ on village, rice paddy, man, or beast, wherever chance dictates. I believe both of these policies should be changed. The second policy area relevant to Vietnamese rural attitudes that might

7 AFSC Testimony -- Refugee Problem in Vietnam Page 6 usefully be reviewed relates to the United States AID program in Vietnam. Let me say at the outset that I returned a warm supporter of this program and can attest to the devotion and calibre of many of its workers. There are two principal com- ments that I would like to make with respect to it, however. First, I believe it a mistake for this program to be geared as sharply to the r.ather narrowly defined "win-the-war" point of view as it now is, More emphasis on laying the foundation for agricultural improvement, Mekong river development, educat:i.on and civil.service reform is needed now, because these things are so crucial in terms of the long pull in Vietnam. Once the fighting stops and an exhausted people await evidence of better times, disillusionment will set in fast if results are not prompt in coming, and the results may well not come at all unless the ground is now laid, even while the war still goes on. I realize, of course, that the South Vietnamese Government itself carries primary responsibility in some of these matters, but the United States can, and I think should, exert pressure on the government to act on them now. We are not without leverage in the situation and we should use it for the constructive reforms that are essential. Another emphasis in USOM that needs strengthening is work at the hamlet level. Our aid situation is a pyramid with its base in Saigon and its apex in the hamlets, which means that it is upside down in terms of what is most needed. Unfortunately it cannot now be turned right side up because of outright Viet Cong control of much of the countryside and uncertain security conditions in other parts of the country. I do think, however, that determination to build a stronger base in the hamlets could produce results in relatively secure areas, even though it may be very difficult to overcome some of the central and provincial bureaucratic resistance. It seems to me that this is essential because it is the people at the hamlet level who most desperately need help and need to feel that someone is concerned for them. Thank you.