Who gains from oshoring in a dynamic product cycle model?
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1 Who gains from oshoring in a dynamic product cycle model? August 9, 2012 Preliminary Version Please do not cite Abstract In this paper I analyze income inequality in a dynamic North-South model with endogenous oshoring, innovation and imitation. I nd that oshoring aects the skill premium via more channels than in static models. More precisely, I identify a prot discounting eect as well as long-run composition eect and a spillover eect which depend on the endogenous share of Northern and Southern varieties. They can possibly reverse well-known static wage eects from oshoring. Sebastian Benz ifo Institute Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich Poschingerstr München, Germany Phone: +49 (0) Benz@ifo.de JEL Classication: F12, F16, F43, J31, O34 Keywords: Skill premium, Oshoring, Product cycles, Intellectual property rights
2 1 Introduction Explaining the patterns of wages across countries and time is one of the important challenges for modern economics, so that troublesome trends in income distribution may be analyzed and mitigated. The crucial role of a country's endowments for its factor prices is reduced when countries open up to trade. Indeed, the factor price equalization theorem tells us that under certain conditions all countries' factor prices are determined by the world endowment. According to this logic, trade does away with scarcity premia earned by owners of a country's scarce resources, and the factor content of trade should tell us what openness does to a country's factor prices. 1 This logic turns inaccurate when accounting for other aspects of international integration. A recent trend is the advent of international fragmentation of production chains, also called oshoring. 2 Models of oshoring usually require that production may be sliced into tiny components or tasks, that dier with respect to their skill intensity or oshoring costs. Theoretical studies on the eects of oshoring on factor prices give mixed results. Most prominent example are probably Feenstra & Hanson (1997) who use a one-sector model to show that oshoring may increase skill premia in both countries that start to engage in bilateral oshoring. Arndt (1997) uses a two-sector framework to demonstrate that workers may gain, even if labourintensive activities are being oshored. More recently, Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008) decompose wage eects from oshoring into three components: a productivity eect, a relative price eect, and a labor supply eect. They show that the productivity eect works in favor of low-skilled labor and is big for an advanced degree of oshoring. The relative price eect and the labor supply eect usually work in favor of the high-skilled, when low-skilled labor is subject to oshoring. Other contributions include Venables (1999), Egger & Falkinger (2003), Kohler (2003), and Egger & Kreickemeier (2005). Focusing on developing countries, Treer & Zhu (2005) point to a systematic eect towards increasing their skill premium from developed countries' catching-up in terms of income. Benz & Kohler (2011) show that even oshoring between countries with identical relative endowments may drive up the skill premium. The 1 See the discussion in Deardor (2000), Krugman (2000), Leamer (2000), and Panagariya (2000). 2 Empirical evidence on the magnitude and growth of oshoring can be found in Hummels et al. (2001), Yeats (2001), and Yi (2003). 1
3 empirical literature is even less clear cut. Lawrence & Slaughter (1993) and Berman et al. (1994) nd that oshoring does not contribute much to changes in US wages. Feenstra & Hanson (1999) estimate that oshoring explains about 15% of the increasing relative wage of nonproduction workers. Other explanations, such as biased technological change were usually considered to be more important. A model that combines oshoring, innovation, and imitation has been proposed by Benz (2012) who analyzes the eect of task trade with increasing costs on the relationship of intellectual property rights and the innovation rate. 3 In this model, innovation and imitation are endogenous processes, rewarded with monopoly prots in future periods. Northern rms can oshore their production to the South to save on short-run production costs and increase incentives for innovation. At the same time however, oshoring increases the leakage of knowledge to the South and thus the risk of imitation. An important shortcoming of this model is that it cannot give predictions on wage inequality within a country, since there only exists one homogenous type of labor. To overcome this decit, I introduce the notion of high-skilled researchers and low-skilled production workers. I can show that more channels are opened up by which oshoring aects wages than in the existing literature In addition to the productivity eect and labor supply eect of oshoring, well-known from Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008), there exists a short-run intertemporal prot eect and long-run composition and spillover eects. 4 In the short-run this makes it more likely that the skill premium is reduced when the oshoring volume increases, whereas in the long-run it is less likely. Moreover, I analyze other comparative statics eects, such as from changes in factor endowments and intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation. Other closely related papers that have analyzed wage inequality in a dynamic setup are Sayek & Sener (2006) and Hsu (2011), albeit both assume an exogenous imitation rate and an exogenous oshoring volume. The further nds that an exogenous increase in oshoring raises the Northern skill premium, while the eect on the Southern skill premium depends 3 The product cycle literature started out as an idea by Vernon (1966) and being formalized later on by Grossman & Helpman (1991) in a variety expansion model and a quality ladder model by Segerstrom et al. (1990). Other important contributions, subsequently introducing FDI and endogeneizing the imitation decision are Helpman (1993), Lai (1998), Glass & Saggi (2002), Branstetter et al. (2007), and Branstetter & Saggi (2009). For a detailed discussion of this literature, see Benz (2012). 4 My model does not feature a relative price eect since I focus on a one-sector economy. 2
4 on the relative skill intensity of the oshored Northern good relative to the Southern good. Hsu (2011) uses a three-factor model to show that exogenous oshoring makes the type of production worker gain who is underproportionally used in production of the oshored good, whereas researchers always gain from more oshoring. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the main relationships of my model, while section 3 derives the main results and section 4 concludes. 2 The Model The model economy consists of two countries, North and South. Each country is inhabited by a xed amount of consumers L, of which a fraction h k k N, S is of a high-skilled type and a fraction 1 h k is of the low-skilled type. All consumers supply one unit of labor inelastically. 2.1 Consumer Optimization The intertemporal utility function of a representative consumer is given by W = 0 U(t)e ρt dt (1) where ρ is the discount factor and the utility in each period U(t) has the form U(t) = ( N(t) 0 ) σ x j (t) σ 1 σ 1 σ dj (2) where x j (t) is consumption of variety j at time t and σ is the constant elasticity of substitution between varieties. Intratemporal utility maximization yields a demand function x j (t) = E(t)p j(t) σ N(t) 0 p j (t) 1 σ dj (3) where p j (t) is the price of variety j at time t and the term in the denominator is the well-known Dixit-Stiglitz price index. Intertemporal utility W is maximized subject to an intertemporal 3
5 budget constraint 0 e rt E(t)dt 0 e rt w(t)dt + A(t) (4) with E(t) as consumer expenditure and A(t) is the value of assets in period t. This implies the usual Euler equation for consumption expenditure derived from intertemporal welfare maximization Ė E = r ρ. (5) Wages, prices, and thus expenditure are assumed to be constant over time so that utility per period rises linearly with the number of varieties available. 2.2 Manufacturing Sector Firms produce dierent varieties of an otherwise identical consumption good. Precondition for production of a variety is the existence of a blueprint which is not revealed to other rms in the economy. Blueprints for production in the North must previously be developed by high-skilled workers in an innovative research sector. Innovation in the South is prohibitively costly. However, in the South there exists an imitative research sector employing high-skilled labor and copying existing Northern varieties, which thereafter can be produced by a Southern rm. Subsection 2.3 below describes in more detail how blueprints in the two countries are developed. Production of each variety requires the performance of a unit interval of tasks that only dier in the costs that are caused if they are performed oshore. I refer to these costs as oshoring costs. These costs are generally assumed to represent such things as the content of tacit information of each task. However, the concept is suciently general to accommodate more features to the costs of unbundling the production process. These may include the more dicult transmission of knowledge from production to the research sector when production is performed abroad, such as in Naghavi & Ottaviano (2009). As is standard in the oshoring literature, I order tasks from 0 to 1 with a index i such that the oshoring cost schedule rises monotonously in i. Oshoring costs are thus represented by βτ(i), with τ(i) 1, τ (i) 0 and β 1 as technological oshoring costs. 4
6 Production tasks are exclusively performed by low-skilled workers. By assumption, their wages in the South are lower than those for their Northern counterparts w/w > 1. This allows Northern rms to resort to oshore production of all tasks i I, where I is the marginal task implicitly dened by βτ(i) = w w, (6) so that oshoring costs for the marginal task equal the wage of Northern workers relative to Southern workers. As shown by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008), this implies per-unit production costs of wθ(i), where the oshoring saving factor is dened as Θ(I) := 1 I + I 0 τ(i)di τ(i) (7) with Θ (i) 0 i. The market for nal goods is characterized by monopolistic competition with an elasticity of substitution σ between varieties. This yields markup pricing with p = wθ(i)σ/(σ 1) in the North. Prots for each Northern rm are thus given by π = (p wθ(i))x = wθ(i)x σ 1 (8) where one should bear in mind that x is still endogenous in this relationship, depending on w and I. Southern rms produce varieties that have been successfully imitated. Due to the wage dierence they do not use oshore production. Thus, their per-unit production costs are simply given by w. With positive oshoring costs as described above, necessarily w wθ(i). I assume that the wage dierence in the two countries is suciently high so that Southern rms can set monopoly prices according to the elasticity of substitution, the so called wide-gap case from Grossman and Helpman (1991). This case is formally characterized by the condition w σ/(σ 1) wθ(i) or βτ(i)θ(i)σ/(σ 1) 1. 5 Thus, Southern rms earn prots π = (p w )x = w x σ 1. (9) 5 In the narrow-gap case Southern rms set prices slightly below Northern rms' production costs to capture the entire demand for that variety. This limit price-setting can also be interpreted as Bertrand price competition. 5
7 Given the preference structure, relative demand for varieties from the two countries only depends on relative prices such that x x = p σ = [Θ(I)βτ(I)] σ p (10) and the relative prots of the two types of rms are given by π π = [Θ(I)βτ(I)]1 σ (11) 2.3 Research Sector Research conducted by high-skilled workers during one time period yields a success with a certain probability 1/a. With lots of researchers, however, there is no aggregate uncertainty in the innovation process, despite of the presence of idiosyncratic uncertainty. Hence, a blueprint for a new variety can be developed in the North at a cost C = sa/n, where s is the salary of the high-skilled and N is as above the stock of all consumed varieties, which is identical to all blueprints ever developed in the North. The appearance of N in this cost equation is a spillover from present knowledge in line with Grossman & Helpman (1991), Aghion & Howitt (1992), or Romer (1990). 6 Successful research in the South means the disclosure of a Northern production blueprint and entails costs C = s a /γni, where γ (0; 1] is a parameter that characterizes protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) and n is the stock of Northern production blueprints not already disclosed to Southern rms. Intuitively, imitation is less costly when γ is close to 1, meaning little IPR protection and when the number of unrevealed varieties is high. Moreover, imitation is less costly if the share of oshore provided tasks is high, since it increases the Southern knowledge about Northern varieties. As already mentioned above, the growth rate of all Northern varieties is dened as g := Ṅ/N, which on the balanced growth path is also the growth rate of unrevealed Northern varieties ṅ/n and of Southern varieties ṅ /n. The imitation rate is m := ṅ /n. Entry into research is free in both countries. I abstain from analyzing the trivial case 6 Jones (1995) argues that spillovers have the form N φ with 0 < φ < 1. This semi-endogenous growth theory makes the growth rate exogenous, only depending on the population growth rate. 6
8 where research is not protable and, hence, the rate of variety development is equal to zero. Instead I assume that the no arbitrage condition holds with equality, giving a relationship of per-period prots and the value of a Northern rm as π + v = rv + mv (12) which implies that prots from successful innovation exactly compensate for interest payments forgone and the risk of loosing the entire rm value through imitation. The imitation risk term mv drops out for the Southern no arbitrage condition, yielding π + v = rv. With my assumption on constant expenditure over time I have r = ρ, as shown above. Furthermore I know that rm values decrease at a rate of g. Using the fact that the value of a rm must equal the cost of research in equilibrium I obtain sa N = π ρ + g + m and s a γni = π ρ + g (13) so that output in the two countries is given by nx = s w ρ + g + m g + m ag Θ(I) (σ 1) and n x = s g + ρ w g a m (σ 1). (14) γi Furthermore, from equation (13) I can solve for the relative prots of Northern and Southern rms as π π = s ρ + g + m g s ρ + g g + m aγiβτ(i) a. (15) 2.4 Labor Markets I assume that high-skilled workers are only active in the respective research sectors of the two economies, whereas low-skilled workers perform production tasks. For Southern workers this implies that they are free to move between local production and oshore production by Northern rms. Thus, the full employment condition for high-skilled workers are easily characterized. They 7
9 are given by h N L = ag and h S L = a m γi (16) and serve to pin down the growth rate in the steady state and the imitation rate, once the oshoring volume is determined. Northern low-skilled workers only perform a fraction 1 I of tasks domestically. Their full employment condition satises (1 h N )L = (1 I)nx (17) and inserting from above I obtain (1 h N )L = s 1 I w Θ(I) ag g + ρ + m (σ 1) g + m (1 I) s h N L/a + γih S L /a + ρ = h N L Θ(I) w h N L/a + γih N L /a (σ 1) (18) Analogously, full employment in the South is given by which can be written as I (1 h S )L = β τ(i)dinx + n x (19) 0 (1 h S )L = s a m ρ + g w (σ 1) + h NL s γi g Θ(I) w = h S L s h N L/a + ρ w (σ 1) h N L/a + h NL s Θ(I) w h N L/a + γih S L /a + ρ h N L/a + γih N L /a (σ 1)β g + ρ + m I (σ 1)β τ(i)di g + m 0 I 0 τ(i)di (20) where the rst term on the right-hand-side represents labor in Southern production while the second term is labor used for Northern oshore production. 8
10 3 Wage Inequality 3.1 North From equation (18) I can solve for the Northern skill premium and use ω to refer to it ω := s w = 1 h N h N Θ(I) 1 I h N L/a + γih S L /a h N L/a + γih S L /a + ρ 1 σ 1 (21) This term for the skill premium consists of three components: First, eciency units of low skilled workers in domestic production relative to high-skilled workers. Second, the inverted share of Northern production relative to the discount rate of rm prots. And third, rm prots relative to production costs. The third term only depends on the elasticity of substitution between varieties. Given the relationships derived above I can now proceed to analyze the reaction of the Northern skill premium on changes in the oshoring volume. The eect can be split up into three components. The rst and the second correspond to the well-known productivity eect and labor supply eect, respectively, from Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008). 7 Note that the productivity eect is negative since it works in favor of low-skilled labor, while the labor supply eect works in favor of researchers and, hence, is positive. Moreover, there exist two further eect that are innate to dynamic analysis and are both induced by an increase in the imitation rate. First, the intertemporal prot eect implies a reduction of the skill premium, due to a higher discount rate of future prot streams that harms highs-skilled researchers. However, it is dominated by the composition eect. The declining share of Northern varieties reduces demand for production labor and thus induces an increase of the skill premium. I use a hat on a variable to refer to relative changes and thus can write the above outlined relationship as ˆω = ˆΘ(I) di + µ 2 1 I + µ 3 ˆm(I) (22) 7 My analysis diers from Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008) by having high-skilled researchers as xed cost of production, a non-homothetic technology as coined by Horn (1983), whereas Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008) use a Leontie-type production technology. Hence, they do not focus on skill premia, but analyze changes in the wages of the high-skilled and low-skilled separately. 9
11 where µ 3 := ρm g + m ρm g + m + ρ > 0 (23) and the imitation rate m is evaluated at its initial level. The analysis by Grossman & Rossi- Hansberg (2008) concerning the relative strength of the productivity eect and labor supply eect applies here as well. The rst bit of oshoring does not feature a productivity increase and, hence, works unambiguously in favor of high-skilled researchers. However, the productivity eect may dominate the labor supply eect when the oshoring volume is large and the oshoring cost schedule τ(i) rises steeply. Considering the timing of events more explicitly, it is trivial to see that the productivity eect and labor supply eect set in instantaneously. The same is true for the intertemporal prot eect. In the short-run, this leads to an increase in the probability that the high-skilled are harmed from oshoring, relative to low-skilled workers. The negative intertemporal prot eect and productivity eect might dominate the positive labor supply eect. However, in the long-run, when the composition of produced varieties has adjusted, the dynamic composition eect kicks in, working in favor of high-skilled researchers. In the long-run, the set of constellations in which low-skilled workers gain from oshoring is reduced. An increase in the share of high-skilled researchers in the Northern economy can be decomposed into a direct labor supply eect and a indirect intertemporal prot eect, composition eect, and spillover eect. The intertemporal prot eect benets production workers in the short-run because the discount rate is driven up instantaneously, reducing returns from innovation. However, in the long run, the composition and spillover eects kick in. The composition eect works in favor of the low-skilled workers since a larger share of varieties is manufactured in the North. However, it is dominated by increasing research spillovers that benet high-skilled researchers. Jointly they more than compensate for the increase in the discount rate and thus contribute to a rising skill premium, but are dominated by the direct negative labor supply eect. In relative changes I can write ( 1 ˆω = + ρg ) (1 h N )h N g + m ρg ĥ N (24) g + m + ρ 10
12 where the rst term is the labor supply eect, the second term is the positive joint spillover and composition eect, and the third term is the intertemporal prot eect. The growth rate g is evaluated at the initial level of h N. Since 1 > (1 h N )h N, ρg < g + m, and ρg < g + m + ρ the rst term always dominates. Hence, high-skilled researchers lose from becoming more numerous relative to low-skilled workers. Note that this analysis holds I constant. Letting the oshoring volume adjust endogenously, it is likely to see I increase which could partially oset the negative eect on the skill premium. Increasing the number of high-skilled researchers and holding the number of low-skilled workers constant has a positive eect on the skill premium. This can be seen from the fact that ˆω = ( ) ρg g + m ρg ˆL (25) g + m + ρ which is strictly positive as I pointed out above when analyzing exogenous changes in h N. A direct labor supply eect is not present here. A tightening of intellectual property rights in the South, a reduction of γ, reduces the long-run skill premium in the North when I is hold constant ˆω = ( ) ρm g + m ρm ˆγ (26) g + m + ρ The mechanism works entirely through the change in prot discounting and the composition of varieties. In the short-run, the skill premium is raised by a reduction in the discount rate of Northern prots that works in favor of researchers. However, in the long-run, tighter IPR legislation reduces imitation possibilities and thus reduces the share of Southern varieties. Consequently, more of each Northern variety is produced and demand for Northern production labor increases. The second eect always dominates. Such a tightening of IPR legislation has exactly the same eect as a reduction in Southern endowment L. 11
13 3.2 South Inserting equation (21) into (20) yields the Southern skill premium ω := s w = (1 h S)L (1 h N )L β I 1 I 0 τ(i)di h S L h N L/a h N L/a + ρ 1 σ 1. (27) which again consists of three terms: production workers left for Southern production relative to Southern researchers; discount rate of prots relative to research productivity; and rm prots relative to production costs. It is easy to see that the skill premium in the South decreases with a higher oshoring volume, ω / I < 0. Here there only is a rst order labor demand eect. The composition and discounting eect is not present since its two components exactly cancel each other out. On the one hand, oshoring increases research productivity that contributes to rising salaries for researchers. But on the other hand, the higher share of Southern varieties increases demand for Southern production labor and drives up their wages by the same amount. By the same token, an increase in the share of Southern high-skilled researchers decreases the skill premium, ω / h S < 0. Again, there is only a rst order eect, since the two dynamic long-run eects exactly cancel each other out. As above, this analysis holds I constant. An endogenously reduced oshoring volume could partially oset the negative eect on the skill premium. Moreover, I nd that an increase in the share of Northern high-skilled researchers increases the skill premium in the South for a constant I, ω / h N > 0. Firstly, there is a negative labor supply eect, since output of each Northern variety is reduced and less Southern production workers are needed in oshore production sites. Furthermore, there is a positive indirect eect, since the research productivity in the South due to spillovers from the North increases more than the discount rate of research prots. Interestingly, varying the strength of intellectual property rights has no eect on the skill premium in the South when I is hold constant, since both types of labor are aected equally from such a policy change. 12
14 4 Conclusion In this paper I analyze dynamic long-run eects on the skill premium, the wage of high-skilled researchers relative to low-skilled production workers, in a model with endogenous choices of oshoring, innovation, and imitation. This model combines two strands of the literature, the classical product cycle models and the recent oshoring models. I nd that in such a dynamic model there exist additional channels by which exogenous variables may aect the skill premium that so far have not been analyzed in the literature. Considering the inuence of oshoring on skill premium in the Northern economy as analyzed by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008), I nd that, in addition to the well-known productivity eect and labor supply eect, there exists a short-run intertemporal prot eect, as well a long-run composition eect. The endogenous composition of Northern and Southern varieties in the new steady state contributes to drive up the Northern skill premium in the long-run when the oshoring volume is raised. In the short run, however, the probability of a decline in the skill premium from intensied oshoring is increased, due to a rising discount rate of future prot streams that harms high-skilled researchers. Moreover, I analyze the comparative statics of Northern endowment shares on the skill premia in the two countries, holding the oshoring volume I constant. In the short run, a rising discount rate of prots harms high-skilled researchers in addition to the well-known labor supply eect when they become more numerous. The long-run eect from changes in the composition of varieties further harms researchers, but increasing research spillovers can compensate for negative intertemporal prot and composition eect. Nevertheless, these joint indirect eects are clearly dominated by the direct labor-supply eect. On the other hand, Southern researchers gain in the short run and the long run from a rising researcher-share in the North, due to a reduction of low-skilled employment in oshore facilities and due to increasing research spillovers. Changing the share of Southern researchers only has a static labor supply eect on the Southern skill premium, the Northern skill premium is not aected. In the short-run, tighter intellectual property rights in the South benet Northern researchers relative to production 13
15 workers due to a lower discount rate. However, the long run composition eect reverses this pattern. The skill premium in the South remains unaected, since both types of labor are aected identically. References Arndt, Sven W Globalization and the Open Economy. North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 8, Benz, Sebastian Boon or bane: The impact of intellectual property rights on innovation. Unpublished Manuscript. Benz, Sebastian, & Kohler, Wilhelm Managerial Versus Production Wages: Oshoring, Country Size and Endowment. University of Tuebingen, Working Papers in Economics and Finance No. 13. Berman, Eli, Bound, John, & Griliches, Zvi Changes in the Demand for Skilled Labor within U.S. Manufacturing: Evidence from the Annual Survey of Manufactures. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, Branstetter, Lee, & Saggi, Kamal Intellectual Property Rights, Foreign Direct Investment, and Industrial Development. NBER Working Paper, no Branstetter, Lee, Fisman, Raymond, Foley, Fritz, & Saggi, Kamal Intellectual Property Rights, Imitation, and Foreign Direct Investment: Theory and Evidence. NBER Working Paper, no Deardorff, Alan V Factor Prices and the Factor Content of Trade Revisited: What is the Use? Journal of International Economics, 50(1), Egger, Hartmut, & Falkinger, Josef The Distributional Eects of International Outsourcing in a 2x2 Models. North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 14(2), Egger, Hartmut, & Kreickemeier, Udo International Fragmentation: Boon or Bane for Domestic Employment. European Economic Review, 52, Feenstra, Robert C., & Hanson, Gordon H Foreign direct investment and relative wages: evidence from Mexico's Maquiladoras. Journal of International Economics, 42, Feenstra, Robert C., & Hanson, Gordon H The Impact of Outsourcing and High-Technology Capital on Wages: Estimates for the United States, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), Glass, Amy Jocelyn, & Saggi, Kamal Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment. Journal of International Economics, 56(2), Grossman, Gene M., & Helpman, Elhanan Endogenous Product Cycles. Economic Journal, 101(408),
16 Grossman, Gene M., & Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban Trading Tasks: A Simple Theory of Oshoring. American Economic Review, 98(5), Helpman, Elhanan Innovation, Imitation and Intellectual Property Rights. Econometrica, 61(6), Horn, Henrik Some Implications of Non-Homotheticity in Production in a Two- Sector General Equilibrium Model with Monopolistic Competition. Journal of International Economics, 14, Hsu, Kuang-Chung Does Outsourcing Always Benet Skilled Labor. Review of International Economics, 19(3), Hummels, David, Ishii, Jun, & Yi, Kei-Mu The Nature and Growth of Vertical Specialization in World Trade. Journal of International Economics, 54(1), Kohler, Wilhelm The Distributional Eects of International Outsourcing. German Economic Review, 40, Krugman, Paul R Technology, trade and factor prices. Journal of International Economics, 50(1), Lai, Edwin International intellectual property rights protection and the rate of product innovation. Journal of Development Economics, 55, Lawrence, Robert Z., & Slaughter, Matthew International Trade and American Wages in the 1980s: Giant Sucking Sound or Small Hiccup? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, Leamer, Edward E What's the use of factor-contents? Economics, 50(1), Journal of International Panagariya, Arvind Evaluating the factor-content approach to measuring the eect of trade on wage inequality. Journal of International Economics, 50(1), Sayek, Selin, & Sener, Fuat Outsourcing and Wage Inequality in a Dynamic Product Cycle Model. Review of Development Economics, 10(1), 119. Segerstrom, Paul S., Anant, T.C.A., & Dinopoulos, Elias A Schumpeterian Model of the Product Life Cycle. American Economic Review, 80(5), Trefler, Daniel, & Zhu, Susan Chun Trade and Inequality in Developing Countries: A General Equilibrium Analysis. Journal of International Economics, 65, Venables, Anthony J Fragmentation and multinational production. European Economic Review, 43, Vernon, Raymond International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle. Quarterly Journal of Economic, 80, Yeats, Alexander J Just How Big Is Global Production Sharing. In: Arndt, S.W., & Kierzkowski, H. (eds), Fragmentation: New Production Patterns in the World Economy. Oxford University Press. Yi, Kei-Mu Can Vertical Specialization Explain the Growth of World Trade. Journal of Political Economy, 111(1),
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