The Extent of Collaboration between Transnational Criminal Organizations. Carlos Novoa. Jessica Neham. Florida International University

Transcription

1 Novoa & Neham 1 Running head: The Extent of Collaboration between TCOs The Extent of Collaboration between Transnational Criminal Organizations Carlos Novoa Jessica Neham Florida International University

2 Novoa & Neham 2 Abstract With the evolution of globalization and the reduction of barriers, the movements of people, goods, and financial transactions, transnational organized crime groups have widened their global operations, while many smaller local crime groups have expanded beyond the borders, becoming a regional threat. This allows organizations the ability to network and cooperate with one another, enabling them to merge while broadening their expertise by sharing information, services, resources, and access to new marketpositioning them for growth. The purpose of this study is to understand the extent transnational organized crime groups collaborate with each other, the factors influencing inter-organizational collaboration, and the nature of these relationships. A search of cases, indictment, complaints, press releases, or news articles were located and analyzed. It results in 19 specific instances where at least two transnational criminal organizations collaborated in any capacity to commit at least one transnational crime. The information gathered revealed that at least one of all cases and articles found fell under six key factors which influence cross collaborations: the structure of groups, the size of networks, the complexity, routes and distance, the types of crimes and scale of operations. Keywords: transnational crime, organized crime, drug trafficking, human smuggling

3 Novoa & Neham 3 Introduction Important transformations of the 1990s gave way to changes in political and economic life, which along with the availability of revolutionary technologies, have broadened the reach of illicit activity and undermined the sealants that governments traditionally relied on to secure their national borders. Organizations involved in criminal activity enjoy the flexibility of working in a borderless world, where profits are higher, costs are lower and risks of being punished are easily avoided. Global criminal activities are transforming the international system, upending the rules, creating new players, and reconfiguring power in international politics and economics (Naim, 5, 2006). Due to the flexible character of TOC organizations, they enjoy an asymmetrical advantage over governments, whose resources and bureaucratic character limit them from effectively dealing with criminal activity. Transnational crime has become a national security threat for nations across the world due to the spread of violence and corruption that results from illicit activities conducted by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). This dynamic is clearly identifiable in fragile states where vulnerabilities such as high levels of violence, capacity deficits, weak government institutions, internal divisions, depleted infrastructures, high poverty rates, and subgroup hostility toward the state make them suitable for the execution of crimes (Locke, Rachel, 2012). Furthermore, the presence of traffickers also threatens the very process of state building by generating corruption, thus offering a safe haven for TOC organizations (Migragia and Ochoa, 2012). The entrenchment of these groups into the social fabric of nations is, therefore, common, and creates a dependency on these groups by other nations, as they become parallel power structures, often more capable than the state itself. Legal and illegal markets also become tightly entwined, allowing for transnational crime to become unidentifiable and highly profitable.

4 Novoa & Neham 4 In 2009, it was estimated that criminal proceeds amounted to $2.1 trillion or 3.6% of the global GDP of the year (UNODC, 2009). With the evolution of globalization and the reduction of barriers, the movements of people, goods, and financial transactions, TCOs have widened their global operations while many smaller local crime groups have expanded beyond the borders, becoming a regional threat. This allows organizations the ability to network and cooperate with one another, enabling them to merge while broadening their expertise by sharing information, services, resources, and access to new market positioning them for growth. Definitions Scholars and government officials have not recognized a standard definition of transnational organized crime group. However, the two main concepts transnational organized crime and organized criminal group have widely recognized definitions. For the purpose of this paper, the two definitions will be combined in reference to transnational organized crime group. The National Institute of Justice defines transnational organized crime as the planning and execution of illicit business by groups or networks of individuals working in more than one country. These criminal groups use systematic violence and corruption to achieve their goals and participate in crimes which include money laundering, human smuggling, corruption, extortion, cybercrime, and trafficking of humans, drugs, weapons, endangered species, body parts, or nuclear material. In carrying out illegal activities, they upset the peace and stability of nations worldwide, often using bribery, violence, or terror to achieve their goals (National Institute of Justice, 2007). One of the most cited definitions of organized criminal group is that of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Article 2), which states that an organized criminal group is a structured group of three or more persons, existing for period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in this Convention [ a

5 Novoa & Neham 5 crime punishable by more than four years imprisonment], in order to obtain directly or indirectly a financial or other material benefit (UNODC 2004, 5). For the purpose of this paper, the respective terms mentioned above are accepted and somewhat merged to define the term transnational organized crime groups to mean: a group made up of at least three people, existing for a period of time, with the aim of committing one or more serious crime, for financial or other material benefit, which crosses the border of at least one country. During the extent of this paper, the terms transnational organized crime groups and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are used interchangeably. Ideas Prior to further research of the cross collaboration among TCOs, it was expected that there would be large numbers of groups working with one another primarily for the need of business and type of crime. If an organization in country A needs connections in country B, the proper connections would be established in order for both sides to receive profit and run operations smoothly. It was also expected that the drug cartels would have less collaboration because of competition, rivalries, and violent nature of the crime, because drug activity has been associated with acts of violence. It was also predicted that the smaller the organizations, the more collaboration would be necessary, due to cartels lacking the necessary skills and proper levels of contacts in order to conduct a successful full-scale operation. After familiarizing with the routes and activities, it was also predicted, based on how far the product is from the source to destination, and the number of borders needed to be crossed, that increased cooperation between groups would be necessary.

6 Novoa & Neham 6 Purpose The purpose of this study is to understand the extent transnational organized crime groups collaborate with each other, the factors influencing inter-organizational collaboration, and the nature of their relationships. Methodology Due to access limitations, only open-source information was used in this paper. In order to reach sound conclusions, case studies where groups were reported to have collaborated with one another (in any capacity) were used to identify the nature and extent of the relationships. Research was conducted through the news article engine, Lexis Nexis. Keywords such as transnational, organized crime, and collaboration were searched. Similarly, international crimes such as drug trafficking and human smuggling were also searched. The last set of searches on Lexis Nexis were on types of organizations associated with transnational crimes, such as cartels, gangs, mafia, and outlaw motorcycle clubs, as well as specific names of known groups, such as, Los Zetas, MS-13, Gambino Family, and Hells Angels. Research was also conducted through websites of U.S law enforcement agencies tasked with combating organized crime, such as the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Results were tracked in a spreadsheet listing the results of numerous news articles and press releases involving specific instances where a member, or a group of members of an organized crime group, were accused or reported to be involved in transnational criminal activities. The outcomes equated to 113 documented instances involving a transnational criminal organization. Of those, 53 U.S. federal cases, indictments, or formal complaints were unsealed and located via Google Scholar. Analysis of those documents yielded that a cross-collaboration between two

7 Novoa & Neham 7 more TCOs was present in eight instances. An additional 11 news articles or press releases of the original 113 instances were found to meet the criteria in which an unsealed public case could not be found. In the end a total of 19 cases, indictment, complaints, press releases, or news articles were located and analyzed, and used in the discussion of this analysis, all of which involved a specific instance where at least two transnational criminal organizations collaborated in any capacity to commit at least one transnational crime. Findings The information gathered revealed that at least one of all cases and articles found fell under six key factors that influence cross-collaborations: the structure of groups, the size of networks, the complexity, routes and distance, the types of crimes and scale of operations. These are not all the factors found in all cases of collaboration. But, by identifying them in at least one case, it can be said that they are a contributing factor in TCO cross collaboration. Structure of Organization The structure of groups has changed significantly through the decades. These organizations have consisted of various organizational structures, including a variety of strict hierarchies, cells, clans, and loosely knit networks. It is important to note that many transnational criminal organizations evolve and adapt over time, due to changing circumstances that stem from pressure, by law enforcement and or changes, in the market or surrounding environments, due to political, social, or economic issues. Some groups may be tied together by ethnicity, territory, ideology, or personal relationships (CRMP 2005). In the traditional sense, organized crime groups have been based on a hierarchical structure, with one boss, then lower lieutenants, and soldiers. Under this model, there are also individuals or associates who assist in promoting in illicit activities. These associates are usually on the payroll to conduct business-related issues, and are actually employed professionals such as lawyers, accountants,

8 Novoa & Neham 8 business owners, politicians and law enforcement officials (UNODC 2012). Soldiers and associates carry out the bulk of the work regionally under the boss. The structure of these groups transitioned from hierarchical to loosely-knit, less hierarchical structures that allow smaller groups within a network to make deals and carry out business transactions. Although hierarchy still exists, each cell oversees its own operations. However, they are ultimately run by the higher authority. This can be seen among some Mexican drug cartels such as the Sinaloa and Los Zetas Cartel. The Sinaloa cartel has a more decentralized structure of loosely linked smaller groups, thus making it easier to adapt in such a competitive region. (Beittel 2011) Los Zetas has adapted this model to expand their enterprise with minimal investment in supervision and control, by establishing violent cells in key cities, which allows them to become a quick, lucrative, efficient models as a destabilizing force (Dyer & Sachs, 2013). Los Zetas is estimated to have between 1,000 and 3,000 members and 10,000 loyalists across Mexico, Central America and the United States. The group has organized a sophisticated supply and distribution network through its established territories (Seper 2010) The Mexican drug cartels are the major wholesalers of drugs to the United States and continue to gain control within both countries through alliance with local U.S. gangs. Carrying out much of the cartel activities are more U.S. and global gangs, such as Mara Salvatrucha (commonly known as MS-13) and the Hells Angels. They are organized to facilitate crimes by its members, which follow a set of rules to avoid detection by all parties. A gang s involvement in drug trafficking has often resulted in expansion of non-traditional crimes, such as migrant smuggling, counterfeiting, and identity theft. In particular, U.S. gangs established relationships with Central American and Mexican drug cartels to perpetrate illicit cross- border activity and other organized crime groups. (NGIC 2011, 9).There is a rising number of U.S. -based gangs set on developing relationships with U.S. and other foreign drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs), as well other groups involved in different criminal activities. Cooperations exists to gain access to foreign markets of illicit drugs and other

9 Novoa & Neham 9 services or products, such as money laundering and obtaining firearms (Johnson 2011). The importance of structure is clearly shown within the Mexican Gulf Cartel, who has long-controlled drug trafficking within Latin America and the United States. When the Gulf Cartel wanted to enter the European market, they formed an alliance with the Italian mafia group Ndrangheta to increase Cocaine distribution to meet demands. The Italian soldiers (capos) of Ndrangheta were the one who brought in cocaine to be further distributed once it entered Italy. The capos were backed by Colombian traffickers, who are considered a cell of the Colombian cartel and an alliance to the Gulf Cartel, and operate within Europe to ensure the ease of operation. Size of Organization As previously mentioned, smaller TCOs substantially outnumber large TCOs. Logistically speaking, one can conclude that there is a greater chance of one small group interacting with another small group. Although this can be true, there was no evidence in the cases reviewed in which this interaction came up. On the other hand, generally, the larger the organization the more money and manpower it has to expand the variety of activities or conduct its activities on a much larger scale. In both instances they have a higher chance of working with a broader number of groups. For example, the Knight Templar Mexican cartel (formerly La Familia Michoacan) began to gain a stronger hold of the Michoacan state. With it came money, manpower and expansion of its activities. The cartel has expanded to illegal mining and logging, and recently has been suspected to branch out to [human] organ trafficking (Associated Press 2014), each activity adding to the lists of clients (other TCOs). In another example, Los Zetas resilience stems not only from their brutal tactics but also from their wide range of activities which seeks profits outside the heavily-targeted drug trade, which include piracy, kidnapping for ransom, migrant smuggling, crude oil theft and even extortion from other criminal organizations. The group has also expanded supplying drugs, not only to U.S. street gangs, but the

10 Novoa & Neham 10 entire route originating in Central America (Dwight Dyer and Daniel Sachs, Los Zetas Spawn, Foreign Affairs, August 5, 2013). Each activity and market requires business relations with numerous different groups involved in illicit trade. Its large, decentralized structure allows for a spanning territory and its semi-autonomous cells allows for profit through any means necessary. The Berrelleza and Valenzuela cases illustrate the several links in the drug trade involving multiple organizations. The long, complex case involving the Beltran-Leyva Cartel and two U.S.-based groups, the Berrelleza organization the Juarez- Santos organization. The investigation, which was the result of a dual investigation conducted by the DEA and an ICE/ ATF collaboration, ended with the indictment of over forty individuals (Hamilton 2012). The Berrelleza DTO, led by Victor Berrelleza-Leal and Pascual Valenzuela, were accused of distributing large amounts of heroin and methamphetamine from Southern California and Arizona to Seattle. The Juarez-Santos and Berrelleza organizations were recorded brokering drug deals and discussing logistical matters over the phone (U.S. v Berrelleza-Leal. No. CR12-62RSL, 2013). Both groups had strong ties to the Beltran-Leyva Cartel in Sinaloa, Mexico. It is it not known if they are actually a subgroup of the cartel or whether they are simply aligned and enjoy full autonomy in everyday operations, but both Berrelleza and Juarez-Santos were referred to as kingpins in their respective organizations. The two organizations were alleged suppliers for dozens of local drug groups in the Seattle area. In the end authorities seized over 50 pounds of meth and heroin, $190,000 in cash, and thirty-one firearms including some assault rifles (Seattle Weekly, From Sinaloa to Seattle by Keegan Hamilton, Apr ). Both groups were also believed to have laundered hundreds of thousands (and probably millions) of dollars back to the Beltran-Leyva Cartel during the two year- long investigation. The money transferred either via Western Union or to the bank accounts of the cartel leaders. Additionally, Valenzuela (of the Berrelleza organization) was also indicted for the procurement of assault rifles, a

11 Novoa & Neham 11 sniper rifle, handguns, and body armor, which he attempted to smuggle into Mexico for the Beltran- Leyva cartel (U.S. v Valenzuela 2012). The two case examples show that the size of an organization can determine the extent to which TOCs collaborate with one another. The larger drug cartels can have smaller groups carrying out the essential parts of the operation while the cartel can be seen more as a distributor and can carry out more activities on a larger scale. Criminal connections evolve into complex chains involving connections between various groups and actors, who are recruited based on necessary skills, being local at all points, reassuring intimate knowledge of the territories. In order to have successful criminal entrepreneurship, smaller groups have formed, groups that have the knowledge and expertise in outside territories (RCMP 2003, pg. 12). Scale of Operation Law enforcement officials estimate the size of the organization involved in a particular activity by the scale of the operation or size of the bust (UNODC 2010, Pgs ). Logistically, when conducting large-scale operations, more people are needed in all stages of development. For example, if officials intercept an individual at the Juarez/ El Paso pedestrian border crossing with a kilo of cocaine concealed under his clothing and strapped to his body, it is more likely than not that the individual is part of a small network criminals. A small number of individuals are needed to purchase, transport, and distribute a kilo of cocaine. A small operation of this kind might involve only three people: a purchaser with a contact who deals in drugs, a person to transport the drugs across the border, and another to distribute the drugs to a retailer or the consumers. One person could take on more than one of the responsibilities. Now, if that same individual stopped at the commercial trucks lane of the same crossing was found to be transporting 50 kilos of cocaine in false compartments, one could assume that he was part of a larger organization.

12 Novoa & Neham 12 Logistically, it requires more criminals to purchase, transport, and distribute 50 kilos of cocaine than one kilo. It will take a few men to properly package the drugs for shipment and another couple to modify the truck for false compartments. Once transported, more men will be waiting to off-load the shipment and another set will be ready to distribute. More criminals working on the same operation requires that more people be paid, which cuts into profits. Similar to legitimate businesses, TCOs maximize profits by reducing costs, such as labor. For the most part, larger organizations will conduct activities on a larger scale, while smaller organizations will conduct activities on a smaller scale. It was observed that small networks will collaborate when an opportunity arises to increase the scale of the operation, thus generating more profits. These networks may not have the manpower in place to conduct a large-scale organization. For example, agencies in the Justice Department indicted 30 individuals charged with trafficking 92 pounds of methamphetamine and 50 kilograms of cocaine across the U.S./ Mexico border (DEA press release, 2011). One individual revealed that those indicted were members of two different drug trafficking organizations, the Zuniga Network and the Cervera Network. The two networks collaborated to transport, distribute, and deliver a large quantity of drugs throughout the Greater Los Angeles area (Winton 2013). The two networks worked together to traffic over 200 pounds of drugs into the United States, which neither of them could have done alone. Distance- Close Proximity of Groups Divided by a Border The Mexican Cartel/U.S. gang nexus is one of the largest in the Western Hemisphere, and is the backbone of the North American drug supply. It appears that a similarity in culture and language may allow for smoother, and therefore more, transactions between the two sides. Most importantly, it is the close proximately to each other which drives this collaboration. The United States and Mexico share the world s largest protected border, some 1,933 miles long. As porous as it may be, it is still one of the

13 Novoa & Neham 13 most heavily-fortified borders as well. The United States spends an estimated $18 billion a year on border security (Economist 2013). For this reason, the Mexican drug trafficking organizations need groups that will do their bidding on the U.S. side of the border, as the border is the tightest choke point in the narcotics supply chain (Burton and West 2008). In order to for their enterprise to flourish, the seven largest cartels have at least one U.S. gang, some have close to a dozen, with whom they collaborate. The majority of these relations are that of the buyer/seller agreement, while other cartels have closer ties employing U.S. gangs as distributors, debt collectors, and to carry out hits. Once the drug cartels smuggle the drugs across the Mexico/ U.S. border, they are purchased wholesale by other TCOs, most commonly U.S. gangs. Gangs have a strong presence in the four states which border Mexico. The gangs with the strongest ties to cartels reside in Texan border towns such as El Paso, Brownsville, and Laredo, as well as Nogales in Arizona (NGIC 2011). One example of this is found in U.S. v. Herreara (No ). The investigation revealed that La Linea cartel (the armed wing of the Juarez Cartel) hired the Barrio Azteca (BA) gang as facilitators and enforcers across the border in the city of El Paso, Texas. As facilitators, the BA engaged in the sales of narcotics and transported drugs for the cartel. In their role of enforcers, they collected delinquent payments and extortion payments from others conducting drug business not associated with the Juarez Cartel, as well as committing assaults and other violent crime on their behalf. Other gangs highly involved in the Mexican drug trade are MS-13, Mexican Mafia, and the Nortenos (Valdez Johnson Table 1 Mexican Cartel/ US Gang Nexus Mexican Cartel Gangs Aligned With Location of gang Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos Texas The Sinaloa Cartel (aka Guzman Loera New Mexico Syndicate New Mexico

14 Novoa & Neham 14 Organization aka Pacific Cartel) Los Carnales Latin Kings New Mexico Mexican Mafia California Knights Templar ( Formerly La Familia Michoacana Cartel) Los Zetas Surenos (aka Sur 13) MS-13 Arizona Mexican Mafia Wet Back Power (aka Doble Gang) West Texas Tangos Surenos MS-13 West Texas Tangos Barrio Aztec California Strongest presence in California, Texas, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador Arizona Arizona Texas California Strongest presence in California, Texas, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador Texas Texas (originated), New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts Gulf Cartel (aka Cardenas-Guillen Cartel) Juarez Cartel (aka Vicente Carrillo- Fuentes Cartel) Hermanos Pistoleros Latinos Mexikanemi (Texas Mexican Mafia) Texas Syndicate MS-13 Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos Raza Unida Texas Chicano Brotherhood Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos Barrio Azteca New Mexico Syndicate Los Carnales Texas Texas Texas Strongest presence in California, Texas, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador Texas Texas Texas Beltran Leyva Cartel Los Negros Texas Texas Texas, New Mexico New Mexico New Mexico Tijuana Cartel (aka Arellano-Felix Cartel) Mexican Mafia Surenos Arizona Mexican Mafia Border Brothers California California Arizona California Distance and Routes the Product Has to Travel from Source to Consumer

15 Novoa & Neham 15 The Mexican drug cartels are connected to numerous US-based groups to distribute drugs from the southwestern US states to the rest of the country. For example, the Sinaloa Cartel wholesales to smaller drug trafficking organizations, and on occasion hires them for distribution. In reference to the Bustamante DTO case, they either purchased drugs directly from the Sinaloa Cartel once it arrived in the United States, or were hired by the cartel to distribute it. From July 2008 to 2011, over 1000 kilograms of cocaine and marijuana were transported from Arizona to Michigan. The Bustamante DTO would store shipments of drugs arriving from Mexico in a warehouse in Wyandotte, Arizona, later to be driven by several individuals to a destination in Michigan (US v. Sharp et al, ). This case involved at least four different organizations, each providing a different link in the drug trade. The defendant was a close associate of the Sinaloa Cartel and acted as wholesalers to Pedro Delgado-Sanchez, which acted as the middleman between Lucero-Bustamante and Dias-Lucero in Mexico, and a Theodore Czach, who was the purchaser of and receiver of drugs in Michigan. Delgado- Sanchez s associate, Octavio Humberto Gamez, would find couriers to transport the drugs from the Southwest border up to Michigan. A third network, led by Leo Earl Sharp, was the hired couriers. The fourth set of conspirators resided in Michigan and was hired as distributors in the Greater Detroit area. The four sets of networks collaborated with each other to bring hundreds of kilograms of cocaine from Mexico to the Northern United States, covering a large distance. In another case with connections to the Sinaloa Cartel, a network involving residents of Arizona and New York were indicted for conspiring to traffic over 100 kilograms of marijuana and cocaine, as well as for laundering money. Members of the network would transport the drugs from Arizona, primarily via shipping crates and United States Postal Service parcels. The drugs would then be received by other members of the network in Buffalo, New York (US v. Grafman, 12-CR-45S). It can be inferred from UNODC s Globalization of Crime report, that trading routes play a significant role in shaping the TOC environment, and which groups are involved in the transportation of

16 Novoa & Neham 16 illicit goods. Trading routes can determine which groups play a primary role and which play a support or facilitator role. Additionally, law enforcement activities (whether strong, weak, or corrupt) can result in a group gaining or losing power, can dismantle the group, or can even create new ones. Law enforcement efforts can shift these routes, changing the transit countries which the illicit good must pass through, and therefore potentially changing one group for another. The route will depend on the commodity in demand, the geographic location of the source, the geographic location of the market for the commodity in demand, and the cheapest or easiest way to transport the commodity from source to destination. This takes several factors into effect: time, transportation cost, labor costs, likelihood of interception, other overhead costs such as paying bribes or paying taxes to other groups. Transnational organized crime is defined more by the route of certain activities rather than the criminal group themselves. Operational routes have transformed over the years to reflect the points of origins (sources), transit points, and destination (consumer). Places of origins, or source countries, differ by commodity, whether its cocaine or heroin, forced labor or sex exploitation, counterfeit merchandise or pharmaceuticals. Transit points will vary, not just on geography, but will transform based on access to labor, regulations and law enforcement efforts by all countries involved, economic and diplomatic relations between countries, and corruption susceptibility of government officials. Any measurable increase or decrease of these variables could have an impact on the route taken from source country through destination country. If one or several transit countries become more prevalent in intercepting illicit trade, the criminals would be forced to find another transit country to pass their commodities through. This was the situation for the cocaine trade from Colombia to the United States. During the 1970s, cocaine was primarily transported directly from Colombia to the United States by Cessna planes piloted largely by American veterans. U.S. law enforcement, with the help of improved radars, began intercepting these cargos and the Colombians began to incorporate the Caribbean as a transit point.

17 Novoa & Neham 17 Colombian Cartels turned to the Cuban and Dominican criminals to transport their product from the Caribbean to South Florida, and to the Northeastern United States, respectively. As law enforcement increased in the Caribbean under the authority of the U.S. Coast Guard (which works in unison with various agencies) during the 1980s and 1990s, the cocaine trade route moved westward through Central America and in through Mexico. Mexico shares a 1,933 mile border with dozens of legal border crossings to mask their illicit goods within. Additionally, Mexican public officials are grossly underpaid, leaving a high susceptibility for corruption. Initially the Mexican groups were hired strictly as smugglers for the border crossing and would hand over the product back to the Colombians once they set foot safely on U.S. soil. However, due to increased law enforcement cooperation and extradition agreements between United States and Colombian law enforcement, the dismantled Colombian drug cartels began to lose its monopoly on drug trafficking. By the late 1990s, Mexican groups began to gain foothold in the cocaine trade, while Mexican law made extradition of criminals to the United States more difficult. Today, the cocaine drug trade route is primarily by sea, from Colombia to Central America and Mexico, then into the United States by land. The Colombian groups take the role of the supplier while Mexican groups make the most profit as wholesalers (UNODC 2010). In theory, a change on the transit countries en route could then change the roles of the organizations involved, or the organizations altogether. Additionally, the longer the distance covered to get a product from the source to destination, the more likelihood cooperation between TCOs will occur during the trade route. This can be seen in both the cocaine route from the Andean Region to North America as well as the Heroin routes from the Golden Crescent to Western and Central Europe. The UNODC (2010, 88.) dissects data from a study in which they conclude there are at least seven steps involved, from the cultivation of coca leaves in the Andean Region, to the final consumer in the United States, all involving different organizations (See Appendix, Table 4).

18 Novoa & Neham 18 Type of Crime The type of crime is another factor contributing to the collaboration of TCOs. Although drug trafficking is the leading business among groups, there are multiple types of crimes that can determine the partnership between TCOs, ranging from money laundering, counterfeiting of merchandise, arms dealing, human trafficking, and racketeering. The type of crime that can be associated with a particular organization can be based on economic and political standards. For instance, groups in impoverished regions in Asia and Africa allow TCOs the connection needed to gain power and profits to carry out successful counterfeit merchandising operations. Ungoverned or remote places offer an indispensable service for global criminals. The counterfeit market is among the most profitable trades within TOCs, worth an estimated $600 billion a year. With the latest wave of globalization, it has become easier for lesser goods to be passed off as high-quality items. Illicit goods are easily produced in fragile states where labor is cheap and regulations are deficient. The absence of labor standards and increased poverty attracts TOCs to establish proper connections within the region. Factors such as customs fraud, cheap labor, deregulation, and easy access to smuggling routes allow profits to be fully maximized. (UNODC 2010, ). The trafficking of firearms is unlike other forms of trafficking, because they are considered durable goods, meaning that unlike drugs or counterfeit pharmaceuticals, firearms will last indefinitely. The flow of weapons tends to be directly based on necessity, especially among criminal groups. For instance, trafficking firearms from the United States into Mexico originates from obtaining weapons legally. The volume is not concentrated enough to be considered an organized trafficking flow in this instance, but more of a trans-border movement. Mexican Cartels regularly use individuals and groups residing in the United States to purchase firearms for them. Using case example of John Hernandez, who was charged with purchasing $24,800 worth of military-style firearms on behalf of a trafficker who

19 Novoa & Neham 19 would sell them in Mexico (US v. John Phillip Hernandez, 633F.3d370,2011).Therefore, partnerships among groups are essential in order to continue the ease of trafficking, for both criminal and political purposes. There seem to be vendors who buy a large number of weapons, who communicate directly with the cartels, and who are more of a disposal tool, considered to be the smaller networks mentioned previously. There are large and small operations being carried out by these loosely connected players (UNODC, The Globalization of Crime,pg ). One example of a terrorist organization that used an arms dealer to obtain weapons for the purpose of killing Americans is provided in the case involving dealer Monzer al-kassar, who provided weapons for the FARC. He agreed to provide 15 air missiles, 4,000 grenades, 9,000 assault rifles, and thousands of pounds of C-4 explosives for the price of $1million (US v.monzer Al Kassar, CR354,2008). Although drug trafficking is one of the illicit activities attached to increased violence, it appears to lead to the most cooperation between cross-border organizations, or groups that are not in direct competition with each other. These groups fight or the same territory, but have the same objective of distributing a product to a particular area. For example, Mexican drug cartels, which are competing over the Juarez/ El Paso border as a means to transport cocaine from Mexico into the United States, will not cooperate with each other, but will reach out to a group in the U.S. side for sell or distribution. This holds true, due to the fact that drugs are among the highest valued illicit product by volume. A kilo of cocaine can be purchased in ungoverned parts of Colombia for $2,200; $5,500 to $7,000 at a Colombian port ready to ship; $10,000 in Central America; $12,000 in Southern Mexico; and $15,000 in a Mexican city just south of the U.S. border (Stewart 2013). Once in the United States, a kilo of cocaine will jump up significantly at an estimated wholesale value of up to $53,000. It is then marked up 318% for retail at value of $169 a gram ($169,000/kg), adjusted for purity (UNODC 2010, PDF). So, not only do cocaine prices inflate with each border crossing (most significantly at the U.S. border), but price hikes illustrate that there is a lot of profit to be gained at all stages.

20 Novoa & Neham 20 Drug trafficking also has some of the highest punishments by law 20 years to life in the United States for large quantities and is most targeted by law enforcement. The amount of profit to be made in a large market, combined with the lucrative nature of the business, allows drug trafficking to be one of the most collaborated activities among TCOs. Complexity Incorporating all the factors mentioned above, an operation may be very large, and may cover vast distances involving several activities, all of which prove too complex for any one organization to handle alone. A combination of these factors will require the collaboration of several groups. One example of a highly complex case involving the collaboration of multiple TCOs is U.S. v, Cournoyer (U.S. v Cournoyer, E.D. New York, No.12-CR-65 (2012). This case, which involved at least six different organizations, each playing a role, witnessed the transportation of multiple tons of marijuana exported out of Canada and distributed in the United States. Its proceeds were used to purchase cocaine in Mexico, which was then also smuggled and distributed in the United States. Money was laundered out of the United States in both directions. In mid-2013, Canadian Kingpin, Jimmy Cournoyer pled guilty to drug trafficking and money laundering. Cournoyer s billion dollar enterprise spanned all of mainland North America. The TCO transported outdoor-grown, high quality marijuana from British Colombia to warehouses in Montreal, which were also used to manufacture ecstasy and hydroponic marijuana (DEA press release). With the assistance of the Montreal Mafia and Hells Angels, the marijuana was transported and smuggled using the passage of co-conspirators in the Akweasasne Mohawk Native American tribe. The sovereign Akweasasne reservation spans across portions of the Quebec Province and spills over into upstate New York, conveniently straddling both countries. Most of the drugs were then sold to and distributed by the Bonanno crime family in New York City. The profits from New York were then flown, via private jet, to

21 Novoa & Neham 21 California, smuggled to Mexico and used to purchase cocaine from the Sinaloa Cartel. After finding its way to Canada, the cocaine was distributed by individuals with ties to the Rizzuto crime family. Some of those proceeds were then used to purchase the high quality marijuana in British Columbia, and the cycle continued. In the end, the six-year investigation netted hundreds of pounds of marijuana, 83 kilograms of cocaine, 60,000 MDMA pills, multiple firearms and ammunition, more than 800 marijuana plants and nearly $11,000,000 in narcotics proceeds. For his role as the mastermind behind the complex operation, Jimmy Cournoyer was sentenced to 20 years in prison and forfeited $1 billion, all before his 34th birthday (DEA.gov). The Cournoyer case illustrates how well such a complex operation can be orchestrated with the collaboration of a half dozen criminal organizations spanning across a continent. Each organization maintained a specific role based on territory control and accessibility. Cournoyer s criminal empire would not have been possible without collaboration. He alone did not have access to the product (drugs), the demand (consumers in Canada and the U.S.), the various smuggling routes, or the personnel needed to conduct the large complex operation. Table 2 Factors Which Proliferate Cooperation Factors/Theme How it works Case example Proximity Routes & Distance Close proximity of groups divided by border (El Paso/ Juarez) The further the product(drug) has to travel, the more likely cooperation U.S. v Herrea, Neriquez, Cardoza, Perea, Mona, Alvarez; No ; El Paso Times April 15, 2012; Seper Washington Times; U.S. v Berrelleza-Leal, et al/ U.S. v Valenzuela; U.S. v Grafman; U.S. v Issa; U.S v Cournoyer; Seper 2013; U.S. v Chavez, No ; U.S v Sharp et al. Scope of Larger operations will require more Zuniga & Cervera Networks (Winton

22 Novoa & Neham 22 operation manpower and actors. 2013) Complexity More complex operations involving large transactions of various goods/services traveling a long distance will necessitate cooperation U.S. v Cournoyer; Type of Crime Certain crimes require more cooperation US v.john Phillip Hernandez, 633F.3d370,2011 Size of Organization Expansion Structure Large TCOs such as Los Zetas have contacts in various gangs to conduct business. Gang are sold drugs; used to purchase arms, cars; launder money; carry out hits TCOs forge new alliances with foreign groups to expand their enterprise to new markets. Loose Hierarchical Cell groups that carry out activities; overall authority head of organization Seper 2013; Parker 2006, Daily Star Gulf Cartel and Ndrangheta Characteristics of Relationship All of the cases analyzed showed that the natures of the relationships were characterized in different capacities, which include operational, logistical and strategic partnerships. The operational relationship between groups focuses on the overall administration and management of operations, which include trading of contraband, the buyer/seller, distributer and enforcers (hit men, debt collectors, security providers). The trading of contraband for another is exemplified in the case involving Homero Varela, who led a drug trafficking ring in Albuquerque as an associate of the Sinaloa Drug Cartel. He was responsible for the importation of large quantities of controlled substances into the United States. Calls were intercepted stating he would transfer weapons as payment of drug debts. It was also determined that

23 Novoa & Neham 23 he was involved in the trade of 20 kilograms of cocaine for 300 pounds of marijuana (U.S. Homero Varela, CR JB, 2012). The buyer/seller relationships was the most common relationship among the groups. One case that illustrates the buyer/seller relationship involves the Canadian branch of Hells Angels, who forged links with Mexican outlaws in order to secure a direct supply of cocaine in order to eliminate the middleman and go directly to the source. This is a prime example of a buyer /seller relationship (Prince George Citizen 2013). The role of the distributor is one in which the wholesaler hires a group to distribute a product to retailers, cutting one group out of the process, potentially maximizing their own profits. Generally, a wholesaler (like the cartels) will sell in large quantities to groups across the border. At times, distribution can be carried out by members of the organization of from smaller groups that act as retail distributors. This relationship is common in Mexican drug cartels, who hire gangs such as the Latin Kings in Texas, Hells Angels, MS-13, and countless others to act as distributors. It has been reported that these drug cartels used Indian reservations to recruit workers and use the land to transport drugs (Valdez 2009). This distributor relationship forms smaller networks, making it harder to be detected. The enforcer has an organizational role in the relationship in the form of an associate who ensures that activities can be carried out with minimal detection, thus minimizing any vulnerability. This relationship can be seen in the history of MS13 hiring deadly street gang members to carry out acts of violence against cartel members. These cartel members have defected to the United States, presumably due to escalating turf wars between Mexican drug cartels. The U.S. presence would also allow MS13 to gain intelligence on police operations within the U.S. (Seper, 2008). Logistics Another characteristic of the relationship between groups is the logistical relationship, which manages the flow of goods from source to destination. The goods provided could be anything from

24 Novoa & Neham 24 drugs and arms, to people and organs, or to counterfeit watches and documents. Logistical support is often needed when a network does not have the physical means to transport a good, such as a large truck with a hidden compartment or a Cessna airplane, and does not have access to a favorable route, territory, shipping dock, or runway, or simply does not have the manpower to move the good. The transporter is a type of logistical personnel and can also include the courier, smuggler, or trafficker. Although the term trafficker is a broad term to describe any person or group which moves an illicit product from point A to B, it is often used to describe drug cartels involved many stages of the drug market process. For the purpose of this discussion, transporter, smuggler, or trafficker means a person or group of people which are not members of the TCO but which will get compensated in some form of monetary or material value, for the sole purpose of getting a product from one point to another. This logistical relationship can be seen in the West Africa, South American, and European threeway cocaine-trafficking transit point. Cocaine shipments were seen being flown from South America into Africa or transported in commercial fishing vessels and in cargo ships where it was then emptied and distributed throughout Europe. They were then transferred via mules or truck shipments along several routes that change spontaneously. Nigerian gangs have begun to gain control of the transit routes and profit from deliveries to Europe. Weaker states are ideal for transit routes, but the stronger African states in this instance have an advantage, due to logistics and money laundering tactic (Traub,2010). Money launderers can also be grouped together with logistical support. Although most prefer to launder money using their own members or trusted associates, some hire professional money laundering groups to ensure that transactions are less likely to be intercepted by law enforcement. The illicit trade market produces cash profits, which are considered illegal funds and are more susceptible to seizure from law enforcement in that form. Therefore, organizations turn to money laundering, whether it be through charitable organizations or businesses. Money laundering was present in virtually all the

25 Novoa & Neham 25 cases studied, especially in cases involving drug trafficking. Drug trafficking is a cash business and profits must appear to be legitimate in order to avoid detection or be smuggled across borders to repay wholesalers. Strategic for Mutual Benefit The cases studied also showed characteristics of a strategic relationship among groups, which provides benefit for both parties, including swapping tactical information, sharing intelligence, and exchanging techniques to avoid detection. An example here is the partnership of Los Zetas Cartel and MS-13 gang. They appear to have an unparalleled bond among criminal organization, something short of a merger. The initial collaboration of buyer/seller along with hired enforcers has morphed into something greater. Both groups are responsible for thousands of killings and the carrying out of illicit activities. This merge brings together two highly mobile, dangerous, and brutal gangs. It has been reported that Los Zetas are providing MS-13 with military training and indoctrination in their camps in Mexico. They are teaching them how to carry out Swat-style kidnappings and assassinations (El Paso Times Zeta cartel-mara Salvatruchas alliance April 15, 2012). In return, Los Zetas has enjoyed a larger control of the Central American/Mexico corridor to help facilitate the trafficking of drugs from Central America and through Mexico with the assistance of MS-13 (Seper 2013). Table 3 Characteristics of Relationships between Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO) TCO (A) TCO (B) Characteristics of Relationship Crime(s) involved Cases/ News Articles Barrio Azteca La Linea (Juarez Cartel) Facilitator, Enforcer Homicide, Drug Trafficking, Extortion, Money Laundering U.S. v. Herrea, Enriquez, Cardoza, Perea, Mona, Alvarez; No (2012)

26 Novoa & Neham 26 Al Qaeda Oumar Issa DTO Enforcer/ Security Drug trafficking U.S. v Issa, Toure, Aberrahman Sinaloa Cartel Varela DTO Buyer/Seller/ Trade Drug trafficking, money laundering, arms exportation U.S. v. Varela; No. CR JB Berrelleza DTO Beltran- Leyva Cartel Buyer/seller Distributor Drug trafficking, money laundering U.S. v. Berrelleza-Leal, et al. No. CR12-62RSL; U.S. v Valenzuela Los Zetas MS-13 Military training and indoctrination El Paso Times Zeta cartel-mara Salvatruchas alliance April 15, 2012 Texas Mexican Mafia (prison gang) Los Zetas Recruitment Enforcers; Debt Collectors, hit men, traffickers; firearms suppliers homicide, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, money laundering, Seper 2013, Washington Times; Seper 2008, Washington Times. Los Zetas Central American Gangs Distributor, Alliance to take control of cocaine shipments from Guatemala to Mexico drug trafficking Seper 2013, Implications Transnational criminal organizations have been heavily targeted and prosecuted by a collaboration of local, state, and federal agencies, both domestic and foreign. Law enforcement and policy makers could use this information to note that their efforts to disrupt organized crime groups appeared to have initially worked. TCOs have been limited in their operational reach and are forced to collaborate with others. However on a darker side of the argument, it can most certainly be implied that TCOs are as dangerous as ever. Their evolving structures, resiliency and collaboration have allowed