European terrorism forecast: Trends in Islamist militancy in 2018

Transcription

1 European terrorism forecast: Trends in Islamist militancy in 2018 [Content preview Subscribe to Jane s Terrorism & Insurgency Monitor for full article] Otso Iho examines key terrorism trends in Europe, providing a forecast of changing Islamist networks, tactical evolution, and counter-terrorism responses to deal with the security threat posed by returning foreign fighters Terrorism in Europe will continue to be dominated by Islamist militancy in The Islamic State s fall as a territory-holding organisation in Iraq and Syria will have reduced the group s resources in the region, but in this context continuing international operations remains of paramount importance to maintain the group s relevance among militant Islamists globally. The group is likely to widen its tactical arsenal, employ new technologies, and strengthen its roots in local Islamist networks, building resilience despite the losses in its heartlands in Iraq and Syria. Foreign fighters and the impact of returnees When the movement of people to join the Islamic State s ranks began in earnest in 2013, and sped up into 2014 with the declaration of the caliphate in June 2014, the future threat posed by foreign fighters to their home countries emerged into full view. The risks were realised in the Islamic Stateorganised and partly foreign-fighter-executed attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, with a second attack conducted by a foreign-fighter-dominated network in Brussels on 22 March 2016, when the international airport at Zaventem and the city s metro network were attacked. These two attacks killed 165 people and wounded 753 others. Page 1 of 12

2 Timeline of Islamic State-linked attacks in Europe, November 2015 October (IHS Markit) Foreign fighters have also featured in a number of other attacks in Europe; for example, the Thalys train attack in August 2015 and the attack on the Jewish Museum of Belgium in Brussels in May A further layer of the threat has emanated from inspired supporters of the Islamic State who lack combat experience, but have digested propaganda and chosen to stage low-capability attacks in the name of the group. In total, including the attack in Paris to January 2018, the Jane s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) has attributed 36 attacks by these different types of Islamic State actors, causing at least 327 fatalities and 1,376 wounded, making it the most destructive non-state actor in Europe. According to the European Commission s Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) report released in July 2017, more than 5,000 people have travelled to fight for Islamist groups in Syria and Iraq and become foreign fighters, with the majority joining the Islamic State. On average, 30% of the 5,000 have returned to their home countries to date, but the figure varies notably by country with Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom having received approximately 50%. Many foreign fighters will have died on the battlefield, and European authorities on the whole do not expect a mass exodus of foreign fighters to take place, but rather a more gradual flow. Many of these returnees will also not look to engage in violence; indeed, a February 2013 study by Thomas Hegghammer, senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, found that of known Western foreign fighters during , only one in nine returned to the West with the express intent of conducting attacks. However, this number is likely to be higher in the case of returnees from the Islamic State. Forecasts Transformation of networks Radical Islamist networks are not by default engaged in the propagation of acts of terrorism. Not all are illegal, and from a counter-terrorism perspective being an organisation engaged in radical political activism does not always provide sufficient grounds to warrant regular monitoring of a network as a security threat. In other words, Islamist networks across Europe are engaging in radical Islamist activities across a spectrum. This spectrum ranges from legal political activism, to charity support in conflict areas, supporting Islamist militant groups on a theoretical level, raising funding for the Islamic State, facilitating the transit of fighters to conflict areas, and to organisations encouraging and helping to plan and even execute attacks in their home countries. In terms of the relative size and number of such networks, legal activity is plentiful and often outside the remit of security agencies, whereas the size and number of networks towards the more radical end of the spectrum is minute by comparison. In addition to the immediate security threat posed by some foreign fighters that they may execute more complex attacks effectively on their own without organisational support the most significant risk they pose relates to their ability to transform and radicalise existing Islamist networks further, changing their nature and purpose. Foreign fighters are likely to hold substantial credibility in local Islamist networks that are already prone to support groups such as the Islamic State. Their input Page 2 of 12

3 and leadership could plausibly move groups that have possessed a supportive role financing, facilitating travel, widening the support base, spreading propaganda to adopt an operational one: setting up cells, acquiring weapons, providing facilities and safe houses for explosives building, and recruiting militants for attacks in Europe. Indeed, the Paris attacks were an example of just such a transformation. How can foreign fighters transform existing radical Islamist networks? (IHS Markit) Tactical evolution The tactics employed by Islamist militants in Europe are likely to evolve during the coming year, with foreign fighters at the centre of this evolution. The low-capability attacks recorded since the Paris attacks in 2015 are likely to continue, employed primarily by individuals or small cells that opt to act out of inspiration rather than as part of a wellorganised and funded cell. This will include crude improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, vehicle-impact attacks using rented or stolen trucks and vans, knife attacks, and in a limited number of cases, small-arms attacks, or a combination thereof. So far, such attacks have killed 162 people, representing 49.5% of all fatalities and 45.3% of victims wounded in Islamist extremist attacks, highlighting their significant impact and role in European terrorism. Page 3 of 12

4 Share of fatalities attributed to low-capability and complex attacks in Europe since (IHS Markit) Foreign fighters coming into this equation will provide critical skills that will help an increasing number of operational Islamist networks conduct more complex attacks, likely increasing the share of the red half of the pie, which includes just two attacks but has led to more than 50% of fatalities. These skills include the construction of viable IEDs learned in Iraq and Syria where the Islamic State has produced IEDs on an industrial scale the effective and professional handling of assault weapons; training for acting in high-pressure combat situations; the use of new weapon types or technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles; and maintaining better operational security. Although this process will involve primarily the types of attacks already recorded, such as the use of explosive suicide vests or explosives carried in bags but detonated on-site by the attacker (eg Zaventem airport and the Brussels metro network in March 2016, Brussels Central train station in June 2017, New York s main bus station in December 2017, Ansbach music festival in July 2016 in Germany), there is also the potential for escalating such attacks to include methods used routinely in Iraq and Syria, such as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) and suicide VBIEDs. The successful use of VBIEDs or SVBIEDs by Islamist militants on European soil would mark a notable increase in the threat level, and there are indicators that some cells have already attempted to adopt this method. The cell that conducted the 17 August 2017 vehicle-impact and knife attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils, Spain, had been using a safe house in Alcanar to prepare a substantial amount of explosives, before an accidental detonation destroyed the building and likely sped up the execution of the subsequent attacks. According to Catalan police after the incident, the materials discovered at the bomb-making site included the explosive triacetone triperoxide (TATP), used in attacks in Paris and Brussels, as well as more than 120 butane gas tanks and an explosive suicide belt. Page 4 of 12

5 The destroyed building in Alcanar, Spain, that police suspect was used as a bomb-making facility by the cell responsible for conducting the Barcelona and Cambrils attacks in August (Jose Jordan/Getty Images) According to a study published in the US-based Combating Terrorism Center s CTC Sentinel in January 2018, investigators said the explosives were produced in very large quantities, with precursor materials found at the site sufficient for the production of up to kg of TATP. Moreover, investigators believed that these were intended for use in two rented vans, one of which was ultimately used in the vehicle-impact attack, with the butane gas tanks likely intended to magnify the explosive yield of the TATP. The damage caused at the building in Alcanar was substantial and indicative of the large destructive power of the already-produced explosives. Page 5 of 12

6 Dozens of gas canisters pictured at the destroyed house in Alcanar, Spain, that police suspect was used as a bomb-making facility by Islamist militants responsible for the Barcelona and Cambrils attacks in August (AFP contributor/getty Images) Notably, however, the accidental explosion of the TATP in Alcanar also highlighted the fact that creating large quantities of TATP is highly challenging and dangerous. For example, the TATP suitcase explosives used by militants in the Brussels attacks weighed approximately 16 kg based on an unexploded bomb discovered at the airport; encasing and transporting 100-kg payloads of TATP pose much more substantial challenges for successfully conducting an attack, with a considerably higher risk of premature detonation. VBIED use in mass-casualty attacks in the West. (IHS Markit/Shutterstock) Despite these challenges, Islamist militants and particularly the Islamic State regularly use SVBIEDs in Iraq and Syria (see Jane's Terrorism Case Study - Islamic State SVBIED development and innovation in the battle for Mosul, published 30 June 2017), and it is likely that militants will aim to employ their destructive potential in a European context as well. Examples of two ammonium nitrate fuel oil (ANFO)-based VBIEDs the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building bombing in 1995 and the bombing of Oslo s administrative district in 2011 illustrate the destructive potential of such attacks. The Oklahoma City attack killed 166 people after causing a large part of the office building to collapse, and the Oslo VBIED although less targeted in its placement and its blast impact weakened by poor placement of the detonator resulted in eight fatalities as a result of the detonation and notable property damage. Both of these attacks were conducted by right-wing extremists, Timothy McVeigh and Anders Breivik, respectively. Additionally, ANFO-based explosives are difficult to produce in the UK and other Western European countries due to restrictions imposed on the sourcing of required substances in large quantities. However, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has published guides on the construction of alternative VBIEDs in Page 6 of 12

7 the West, which are structured around a standard IED and a vehicle packed with gas tanks, not dissimilar to those sought by the Barcelona attackers. Al-Qaeda s 12th issue of Inspire magazine detailing instructions for building VBIEDs to conduct attacks in the West. (Jane s) The use of a VBIEDs or SVBIEDs in Europe by militant Islamists would significantly increase the potential fatality of attacks, and give militants more control over the level of destruction by studying the most efficient placement of the explosives. According to the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Explosive Standards guide, a compact car with 227 kg of explosives capacity has a lethal air blast range of 30 metres, with this increasing to 38 metres for a full-size sedan (455 kg explosives capacity) and 61 metres for a passenger van of the type used in Barcelona (1,818 kg explosives capacity). The range for lethal or serious injury from shrapnel damage extends much further than the air blast radius. Page 7 of 12

8 Scenario: Potential blast radius of a VBIED in Barcelona s Las Ramblas. (IHS Markit/Shutterstock) In the context of Barcelona s Las Ramblas thoroughfare, as shown in the diagram above, the detonation of a passenger van VBIED with an explosive capacity of 1,818 kg of TNT equivalent would have created a deadly air blast zone with a radius of at least 60 m in both directions on Las Ramblas and at least some way on the adjoining streets, while causing massive property damage to the nearby buildings which would be approximately 20 m away from the blast site. Threat from above Militants may also employ new technologies, such as UAVs, in attacks to reach new targets or increase the publicity and impact of an attack. The Islamic State and other Islamist militant groups have used UAVs rigged with explosives in Iraq and Syria, and their use in conflict zones is becoming more sophisticated and varied, increasing the likelihood of their adoption in Europe. For instance, on 5 January, unidentified militants used 13 GPS-guided fixed-wing UAVs rigged with IEDs to target Russia s Humaymim Air Base and its naval base in Latakia, Syria, reportedly operating the devices from as far away as 100 km. Potential UAV target sets. (IHS Markit/Shutterstock) Page 8 of 12

9 Although Russian air defences brought down the UAVs and the attack was unsuccessful, the incident illustrated the risk posed by such technology to less hardened targets in Europe. Airports, power stations, symbolic targets, sports stadiums, amusement parks, or other places with large gatherings of people in Europe are likely to lack the types of defences that could prevent a swarm of 13 UAVs rigged with dozens of explosives from causing significant damage. These devices are available commercially and can provide an effective weapon at reasonable cost, particularly for militants with prior experience of adapting them in Syria. Recruitment Foreign fighters who transform the networks they join are also likely to improve the recruitment of new operatives. This means that networks that have already become more radical in nature as a result of the injection of foreign fighters will likely be more effective at attracting candidates, and radicalising existing members within those networks. This in turn means more individuals willing and motivated to conduct attacks. At least some of the foreign fighters are likely to be charismatic leaders who have held key roles in combat units, and will enjoy substantial credibility within radical Islamist networks as both leaders and operatives. The attacks in Paris, for example, were driven by influential foreign fighter Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who himself was the recruit of Brussels-based radical Islamist leader Khalid Zerkani. Zerkani, and many individuals like him, have been linked to other individual attackers and larger cells in Europe during the past two years. These charismatic individuals have typically helped to facilitate radicalisation, travel to conflict zones, or conduct attacks in Europe. In the Barcelona attack in August 2017, an imam identified as Abdelbaki Es Satty who died in the Alcanar explosion was suspected by police of radicalising the suspected attackers in his home town of Ripoll. Counter-terrorism considerations The question of foreign fighters has also thrust European countries preparedness for their return into the spotlight. Legislation and resources dedicated to dealing effectively with returning foreign fighters, and the ability to imprison those who pose an immediate threat to security and to monitor those who pose a potential longer term threat vary significantly across Europe. Since the attacks in Paris, counter-terrorism legislation has been somewhat harmonised across the continent, and on a legislative level most countries are equipped to deal with returnees in a hard manner through the imprisonment of those who have committed terrorism offences or pose a clear security risk. In practice, however, enforcement of these laws varies from country to country based on their experience of terrorism. Additionally, for militants coming from countries with small Muslim and Islamist communities, returning to a third country with larger communities to infiltrate may be easier and may better serve militant Islamist objectives despite stronger judicial disincentives. This is particularly true within the Schengen countries. This raises three important factors that affect the terrorism forecast: Page 9 of 12

10 The distribution of the foreign-fighter threat will vary across countries, based on the number of those who have originally departed but also on factors such as the host country s value as a symbolic target, as returnees can also travel to third countries. Sentencing practices are broadly in line across the chosen sample countries in Western Europe, but countries with less experience of terrorism such as the Nordics tend to have more lenient sentencing practices. Increased radicalisation risks in prisons remain a serious issue and mean many convicts are likely to remain a security threat on their release, potentially translating to a continued flow of recruits into radical Islamist networks in the five-to-10 year outlook. Forecasts Third-country returnees Although it is too early to make definitive conclusions based on available data of returned foreign fighters, harsh sentencing practices in host countries do not necessarily appear to be a significant disincentive for foreign fighters returning from Iraq and Syria. The United Kingdom is an example of this trend, where despite ample precedent and prison sentences for returnees, it has the highest number of returned militants with about half having come back. For those returnees planning on engaging in violence, the symbolic target value of Western European countries perhaps outweighs the higher likelihood of being apprehended and imprisoned. Page 10 of 12

11 Sentence length in the UK for terrorism offences. (IHS Markit/Shutterstock) Indeed, according to a report by Richard Barrett, former MI6 director of global counter-terrorism, in October 2016, an estimated 425 of 850 UK citizens who had left to fight with the Islamic State had returned. This means that to date more foreign fighters have returned to the United Kingdom than any other Western country, with approximately 300 estimated to have returned to Germany and 271 in France. According to the UK Home Office, 54 of the returned fighters had been convicted. The high number of returnees in the UK is particularly notable because compared to mainland Europe, the UK has stronger border controls and detection of returnees by security services on entry is more likely than elsewhere in Western Europe, once a foreign fighter with European citizenship has been able to enter the European Union s Schengen area. The UK has strong terrorism legislation and an active history of prosecuting terrorism cases, in theory providing a concrete disincentive for returning militants who face potential prosecution. According to a comprehensive study of sentencing practices related to Islamist terrorism in the UK by the Henry Jackson Society, between 2011 and convictions were recorded, with the largest category of sentences (43.4%) being those of one to under four years, followed by sentences between four years and under 10 years (25.7%), 10 years and under 20 years (13.3%), and life (7.1%). For 2016 and 2017, JTIC has recorded an additional 46 Islamist-terrorism-related convictions, with 45.7% falling into the four years to under 10 years category, 30.4% for one to under four years, 13.0% for life sentences, and 10.9% for 10 to under 20 years. Prisons and sentencing A wider assessment of sentencing lengths in Europe also shows similar results in Western Europe, whereas the Nordic countries, which have experienced less terrorism, tend to give shorter sentences. Additionally, it suggests that those who have entered the prison system during are likely to be released from 2019 onwards, increasing the potential pool of recruits for Islamist networks and underlining the importance of deradicalisation efforts during incarceration. Although ex-convicts are likely to be subject to various restrictions upon their release, the resources to adequately monitor all those who are released are likely to be stretched as the number of people released after serving sentences for terrorism offences increases. Based on JTIC data for prison sentences for Islamist terrorism offences during in Belgium, France, Germany, and the UK, the average prison sentence, excluding life sentences, was six years. The UK had an average prison sentence of 5.3 years, Germany had an average of 5.0 years, Belgium had an average of 7.7 years, and France had an average of 5.9 years. The longer sentences of 10 years or more were primarily given for the execution or preparation of terrorist acts in-country, whereby the defendants were found to have posed a clear and immediate threat to public security. Lesser offences, such as the possession, distribution, and production of terrorist propaganda, preparing and attempting to travel to Iraq or Syria, or facilitating the transit of others to conflict areas typically carried lower sentences, from two years up to 10 years. This trend appears to be consistent throughout the four countries in question. Page 11 of 12

12 Timeline of expected release of prisoners convicted on terrorism charges during (IHS Markit/Shutterstock) Conclusion Terrorism risks in Europe are likely to increase in 2018, despite the Islamic State s decline in Iraq and Syria. The pool of potential recruits will continue to increase and be supported by individuals who have radicalised or become more extremist during their time in prison, while the radical Islamist networks in Europe are likely to become more dangerous as a result of the injection of foreign fighters. Although low-capability methods are likely to remain prominent, it is likely that new and more destructive methods, such as the use of VBIEDs or SVBIEDs in Europe or the adoption of new technologies such as UAVs, will emerge in the two-year outlook due to the capability boost provided by returnees. In the longer-term five-to-10-year outlook, European countries will continue to face an elevated terrorism threat posed by radicalised convicts, returned foreign fighters, and other returnees who have direct ties to the legacy of the Islamic State. For the full version and more content: Jane's Military & Security Assessments Intelligence Centre This analysis is taken from Jane s Military & Security Assessments Intelligence Centre, which delivers comprehensive and reliable country risk and military capabilities information, analysis and daily insight. IHS country risk and military capabilities news and analysis is also available within Jane s Intelligence Review. To learn more and to subscribe to Jane s Intelligence Review online, offline or print visit: For advertising solutions visit Jane s Advertising Page 12 of 12