Real-Time Review: Haiti Earthquake Response

Transcription

1 Real-Time Review: Haiti Earthquake Response Final Report May 2010

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Background and Methodology 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 1. Context/Environment: Fragilities 7 2. Speed and Timeliness 9 3. Efficiency of Management Structures Coordination and Collaboration Standards and Codes of Conduct Targeting, Scope and Scale Involvement of beneficiaries and accountability Connecting Relief and Recovery 18 Appendix 1: List of Interviewees 20 Appendix 2: Documents consulted 21

3 Background and Methodology Report Background The HUMANITARIAN COALITION undertook its Haiti Real-Time Review from May 18-25, The Real-time Review (RTR) is a peer-led review intended to take place early on in any humanitarian response and is designed to identify collective strengths, weaknesses, gaps and quick win opportunities for making immediate improvements in performance. As such the RTR is the first major element of the HC Monitoring and Evaluation Framework. It is also an opportunity for individual agencies to take stock of progress and to identify adjustments which can feed directly into on-going programs. Methodology Following a desk review of relevant internal and external documents, a three-person field study team visited Haiti to review the humanitarian response so far. This team was composed of Pierre Beaudet (University of Ottawa), Mia Vukojevic (Oxfam Canada) and Nicolas Moyer (Humanitarian Coalition). Interviews and program visits were conducted to obtain a broad understanding of the progress that has been made and key lessons from the response to date. A local workshop was also organized prior to departure from Port-au-Prince to provide local stakeholders with an opportunity to reflect on findings and provide the RTR Team with feedback to further clarify key elements. A full list of interviewees and the generic questionnaires used during the RTR are provided in annex. Report Limitations The RTR approach used here relied on both a desk review and a short visit to Haiti. The RTR Team was present in Haiti for seven days, of which one day was set-aside for consolidating findings and another to present results to local member stakeholders. Because of the limited time available, the RTR Team spent only limited time directly visiting programs. In addition, staff turnover resulted in only limited access to member agency staff who were present in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. Acronyms: ACBAR Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (Afghanistan) CPIO Comité permanent inter-ongs CoC Code of Conduct CSO civil society organization HAP Humanitarian Accountability Partnership HCT Humanitarian Country Team IDP internally displaced persons INGO international non-governmental organization NGO non-governmental organization OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (United Nations) RTR Real-Time Review WASH Water, Sanitation and Health Notes on vocabulary: HUMANITARIAN COALITION members or members refers to the member agencies of the HUMANITARIAN COALITION NGOs refers to the non-governmental sector as a whole

4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Earthquake On Tuesday January 12, an earthquake measuring 7.3 on the Richter scale struck Haiti, with an epicentre 16 km from the capital Port-au-Prince. This was the most powerful earthquake to hit Haiti in more than 200 years. It is estimated to have killed 217,749 and injured 300, The Revised UN Flash Appeal 2 states that 3 million people have been affected, of whom approximately 1.9 million have lost their homes and over 511,000 have left the affected cities. The most affected cities are Port-au-Prince, Carrefour, Léogâne and Jacmel. Pre-existing vulnerabilities Haiti s recent political, economic and social history left it uniquely vulnerable to disasters. Before the January 12 earthquake, 50 per cent of the Haitian population lived with less than 1 dollar a day. Haiti already suffered from severe problems related to environmental degradation, dysfunctional education and health systems and as a fragile governance system. Despite high levels of aid 70 per cent of the national budget was composed of foreign aid even assistance from the international community was inadequate in meeting the country s needs. Haiti s systemic vulnerability prior to the earthquake is fundamental to understanding the real impact the earthquake has had on the country. A complex social, political and economic setting Major contextual factors have had a big impact on the humanitarian response to this crisis. These continue to raise important questions about Haiti s future and are likely to give food for thought in preparing responses for complex disasters elsewhere. Some of the most important contextual factors to consider are the unprecedented scale of this disaster, the focus of response operations in a dense urban environment, the indirect impacts on rural populations (livelihoods impacted with the capital and economic hub affected, the migration of urban populations to already strained rural communities), an important weakening of the Haitian middle-class, the weakness of state institutions, civil society and local social capital, a traumatised population and the absence of consensus on priorities. a) Summary of Findings Scale Faced with tremendous needs, the HUMANITARIAN COALITION member agencies have grown dramatically in Haiti, both in size and capacity. The first five months of the response have been characterised by a tremendous inflow of resources and the main emphasis of this period has been scaling-up. Programs have increased in size by factors of 2.5 to 6 times pre-earthquake levels. The RTR Team concluded that the scale of the HUMANITARIAN COALITION members responses was in line with the circumstances and that all agencies worked hard and beyond capacity to meet the needs of survivors. Speed and timeliness Despite being faced with low capacity in Port-au-Prince, damaged infrastructure, affected staff and many other challenges, the member agencies were responsive to needs and achieved a great deal in a short period time and in a very difficult situation. Management structures All HUMANITARIAN COALITION members showed evidence of major strain on management structures caused by the huge scale up of programs and inflow of resources. Though programs remain sound, all members suffered from the same management support issues in varying degrees, influenced in part by the quality and integration of international emergency support mechanisms ( alliances ). All members expressed concern regarding the initial sidelining of pre-existing programs (nearly all rural) and the importance of securing resources and support for pre-earthquake programs. High staff turnover and difficulties hiring were repeatedly identified as a challenge, as were the related difficulties of providing adequate training to large numbers of new personnel Haiti Revised Humanitarian Appeal, 18 February, 2010,

5 Coordination and collaboration Faced with weak UN coordination mechanisms and the absence of government leadership, all interviewees identified many problems in this area. In the initial period, UN cluster mechanisms were overwhelmed, offering little more than information sharing, while parallel mechanisms were developed with foreign military and donors. These problems were most pronounced in the capital. However, commendably members made major ongoing efforts to engage with coordination mechanisms and invested in improving these mechanisms where possible. There are also a number of good examples of inter-agency coordination. But more can still be done. Standards and Codes of Conduct (CoC) HUMANITARIAN COALITION members showed a varied performance in this area. Management levels all recognised the importance of meeting standards and observing Codes of Conduct. The main issues in this area are linked to scale-up, quantity sometimes coming at the expense of quality, and also many new staff with limited knowledge of humanitarian issues. Members appeared weakest on standards common to all sectors (participation, respect for culture, etc.) and there was much confusion in distinguishing between Sphere standards and indicators. Targeting, scope and scale The early response phase was characterised by improvisation of targeting, scope and scale of program delivery. This was influenced by existing locations, expressed needs, pressure to scale-up, attempts to coordinate and available information. At present, members seem to be focusing their programs more strategically and factoring in longer-term considerations. It was noted that there is continued emphasis on high density locations, like camps and urban communities. Connecting Relief and Recovery Despite the large influx of resources and the ongoing priority of humanitarian programs all HUMANITARIAN COALITION members are also working to develop their long-term strategies. This includes adapting existing country plans or merging humanitarian response plans with existing development programs. The pre-existing vulnerabilities and long-term risk of standalone ( silo ) humanitarian response programs require that all member agencies strategically emphasise the links between relief and recovery phases. Beyond direct program implications, this will require that agencies consider innovative approaches and use their advocacy strengths to influence the international agenda in Haiti towards addressing these issues. Involvement of and accountability to beneficiaries This area most evidently required improvement and all members must do much more to pick up their performance. All members do appear to be working on this and are urged to continue to pursue better performance and be more accountable to their beneficiaries. Huge staff training needs Members all expressed very important training needs for new staff and for existing staff that need a better understanding of humanitarian issues. This was true for local and expatriate personnel, who all have gaps to fill in their understanding. Successful staff training programs will be essential in managing risks associated to large program expansion.

6 b) Summary of Recommendations Create a full-time emergency coordinator position in Haiti (permanent). Stop expanding geographically in the short term, put emphasis on quality over quantity. Increase management oversight ensure the right people with the right skills are in place. Manage international expectations emphasise quality over quantity to help relieve pressure to scaleup. Further invest in UN coordination efforts a) Consider opportunity for joint analysis and advocacy efforts with largest INGOs to ensure the priority of donors and stakeholders is on long term recovery. b) Possibility of strengthening the Comité permanent inter-ongs (CPIO): small secretariat, collecting information for analysis, collective representation at UN, other forums. Engage more with local Haitian government offices ensure more systematic approach. Promote local civil society engagement find innovative ways to support their participation. Prioritize quality of the response and achieving standards. Emphasise areas of pre-earthquake interventions build on existing strengths, relationships, expertise. Outreach and awareness-raising in Haiti provide better information about services provided by NGOs. Develop required feedback mechanisms surveys and complaints mechanisms must be put in place. Promote culture of internal agency accountability a healthy culture of internal accountability is key to implementing quality accountability measures for beneficiaries. Provide comprehensive training for new staff (local and international) ensure that refresher trainings are also provided. Pool training resources where possible a joint investment may yield better results. Invest in Sphere Training of Trainers (ToT) create a pool of local trainers. Working with local and international universities on trainings to further support growth of local capacity.

7 1. Context/Environment: Fragilities Before the January 12 earthquake, 50 per cent of the Haitian population lived with less than 1 dollar a day. Haiti already suffered from severe problems related to environmental degradation, dysfunctional education and health systems and as a fragile governance system. Despite high levels of aid 70 per cent of the national budget was composed of foreign aid even assistance from the international community was inadequate in meeting the country s needs. Haiti s systemic vulnerability prior to the earthquake is fundamental to understanding the real impact the earthquake has had on the country. The Members before the earthquake All HUMANITARIAN COALITION member agencies had been present in Haiti for decades prior to the January 12 earthquake more than 50 years in the case of CARE which began work there in Through their engagement in development programs, CARE, Oxfam and Save the Children have come to know the country well, understanding the issues and building strong, long-term relationships with local governments and civil society. All HUMANITARIAN COALITION members kept head offices in Port-au-Prince prior to January 12 th and Save the Children also maintained some programming in the capital. However, the majority of member programs were in other parts of the country. CARE operated principally in Grande Anse, Artibonite, Nippes and Northwest departments; Save the Children had sub-offices in Jacmel, Massaide and Gonaïves; and Oxfam-Québec worked through partners across the country. Though all members have responded to other humanitarian disasters in Haiti, the majority of the members existing programs at the time of the earthquake focused on long-term development, with issues ranging from food security and sustainable development to education and women s rights and much more. The Catastrophe The devastation of January has been amply described elsewhere. However, the RTR Team believes the following dimensions are worth recalling: - The earthquake was of an unprecedented scale in a dense urban environment, directly affecting 1.5 million people, and many more indirectly in rural areas. The total value of damage and losses is estimated by the government as more than the country s entire GDP in The government administration and all economic activities, centralized in the capital city, have been very badly affected, paralysing the State and society at large. - Living and working spaces in the downtown areas, in peripheral neighbourhoods and in shantytowns were hit alike, in an already very weak environment (lack of infrastructures, difficult access, etc.). Many of the affected areas are nearly irrecoverable or require repairs on a prohibitive scale. - Even though large parts of the country were not affected directly, the country and society as a whole are terribly handicapped in the aftermath of the earthquake. Additionally, hundreds of thousands of citydwellers have taken refuge in rural areas, stretching rural capacities beyond their limits. Humanitarian Response: formidable and contradictory in the initial stages Shortly after January 12, a formidable humanitarian response began at the community level, with people helping people. In the second week, large-scale external assistance came from multilateral and bilateral agencies as well as military contingents and NGOs from many countries. But the apparent solidarity of international good intentions was less evident between international and local actors in Haiti. Again, important qualifications should be made in the context of the humanitarian response: - The Haitian State was quasi absent in the initial period (it still is in some important areas), as were other Haitian institutions (business associations, NGOs, social movements, political parties, etc). Mostly, interventions were spontaneous and citizen-to-citizen. - Beyond the poor communities hit hard in shantytowns, the middle classes were also particularly hardhit. This further weakened institutions and added complexity to the range and scope of the response.

8 - MINUSTAH, was badly hit and was unable to coordinate the inflows of aid. Though it was helpful in clearing rubble, its military capabilities were sidelined by the US army, which took control of key locations such as the airport. - The aid flows from private, UN and governmental agencies have been impressive, but its effectiveness has been undermined by the absence of strong coordination and leadership. Basic needs have been met, but the future remains uncertain Despite its shortcomings, the humanitarian effort temporarily stabilized a disastrous situation, which in itself was an impressive achievement. Hundreds of thousands of people quickly gained access to food aid, water and temporary shelters. Health care is being provided, potential disease outbreaks have been averted and different programs are in place to help survivors. However, the amplitude of the catastrophe means that many people are still in dire need of support. Port-au-Prince has been renamed by its inhabitants as Port-aux-tentes with over 1000 camps dispersed throughout the city. Many people still live in the street or in front of their destroyed homes. The fundamental problem of rebuilding the city and (re)housing more than 1.2 million people is a challenge on many levels, including the absence of legal and institutional frameworks and the state of public infrastructure. With the 2010 hurricane season already well underway, and predicted to be particularly violent this year, there appears to be little clarity on how best to prepare for the future. People remain unsatisfied Despite a massive inflow of resources, financial and otherwise, average Haitians often do not know what these are serving to accomplish or who is benefiting from all of these contributions. According to many interviewees, there is a significant disconnect for Haitians between the multi-billion dollar aid promises and their own situation. Time has largely served to worsen this sense of unfairness. With limited access to information and limited communication with the public regarding humanitarian programs, a climate of uncertainty, distrust and even hostility risks setting in. Large challenges moving forward So far, four international meetings on the reconstruction of Haiti have been held to take stock and plan. The UN, the World Bank and the Haitian government have come up with a Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) with commitments to provide over $9.9 billion in aid over the next five years. Although international aid is promising, there are various uncertainties surrounding the reconstruction process: - The interim reconstruction Commission, co-chaired by Prime Minister Bellerive and Bill Clinton, is seen by many as a parallel government which will further undermine existing institutions, or perhaps even go as far as establishing a form of de facto protectorate. - The government has declared a state of emergency which immobilizes the elected Parliament and other institutions. Elections have been postponed until the fall, which could increase risks of political unrest. - Civil society organizations also widely complain that they are not consulted about important decisions and short/long term reconstruction plans. - With so many homeless and poor people in Port-au-Prince, there is fear that security will deteriorate. The role of MINUSTAH forces will be tested, although their track record suggests serious challenges can be expected in ensuring safety throughout the country. Opportunities Overall, the situation is sombre. Yet, as is sometimes the case, such a catastrophe also presents some opportunities. Key stakeholders accept the fact that Haiti cannot be simply repaired and that it should be built back better. Issues such as governance, economic policy and land ownership must be addressed along with infrastructure and basic public services. Knowing this history, and now equipped with important resources, the international community has an opportunity to support good governance through active engagement with local institutions at every level.

9 2. Speed and Timeliness The first days following the January 12 earthquake could be referred to as a disaster within a disaster the destruction, hundreds of thousands of deaths and injuries, and a near-paralysis in terms of what was or could be done. People mostly looked after themselves and each other while saving those they could reach under the rubble. It took a few days for humanitarian assistance to come in significant quantities and it was not until one or two weeks after the earthquake that supply lines were fully operational. Speed and timeliness of responses The RTR Team felt that HUMANITARIAN COALITION members responded with adequate speed and in a timely fashion given the circumstances. All HUMANITARIAN COALITION members responded with what they had available in the country within the first week, and managed to have large quantities of basic relief supplies in the country and distributions up and running within seven to 10 days of the earthquake. All agencies brought in additional staff within days and quickly expanded their programs to cover as many beneficiaries as possible. Though some services were established later than others, it was clear that all agencies were responding to needs and prioritizing life-saving services given the means available to them in the first weeks. Challenges were huge - There were a number of factors making a faster response difficult. To illustrate, some of these are mentioned here. Logistical challenges, were immense: the roads were blocked, Port-au-Prince airport was not accessible to NGOs for relief supplies in the first few weeks, the port was severely damaged, there were limited entry points into the country, military personnel and supplies had a priority over humanitarian agencies, border crossings were congested, communications were difficult, there was a lack of cash in the country, etc. The offices and assets of CARE Haiti, Oxfam-Québec and Save the Children all remained operational in the days after the quake. However, staff members (almost entirely national) were heavily affected. Many of them had lost family members and homes and had to deal with finding shelter and food for their own families. Supply lines All HUMANITARIAN COALITION members initially relied on limited existing stockpiles. Very quickly however, supply lines were set-up through the Dominican Republic. Because of disruptions and limitations imposed on air traffic by US army control of the Port-au-Prince airport, offices in the neighbouring country were quickly mobilised to support the humanitarian response in Haiti. Save the Children benefited from a strong presence near the northern region of the border, where convoys were mobilised. While external supplies were of great importance, there were also some valuable experiences using local supply lines. Oxfam- Québec in particular sought to utilise existing contacts in rural areas to engage rural communities in providing necessary supplies for distribution to affected areas. This worked best where relationships already existed and may provide some lessons for emergency preparedness in the future. Internal challenges to timely response In addition to staff being greatly affected, none of the HUMANITARIAN COALITION members had significant program capacity in Port-au-Prince at the time of the earthquake; though Save the Children and Oxfam-Québec did have some programs and partners in the capital. The initial stages of the response in the capital were significantly affected by both this limited presence in the city and the urban nature of this crisis (higher density, presence of rubble, less familiarity with communities, etc.). It was also noted that none of the HUMANITARIAN COALITION members had a permanent senior humanitarian coordinator position or equivalent in Port-au-Prince at the time and that these people had to be brought in from outside. Though the agencies cannot be faulted for the absence of such staff positions prior to the earthquake, interviewees suggested the existence of such a senior position would have improved the speed and quality of the response in the early stages. If permanently filled, the RTR Team believes such a position could have acted as a rallying point; ensuring local knowledge could play a larger role in the humanitarian response. Charged with reviewing Emergency Preparedness Plans and training staff on emergency procedures, standards and Codes of Conduct, their presence and guidance would have ensured a more rapid and effective response.

10 Emergency Preparedness Plans Though all HUMANITARIAN COALITION members had an Emergency Preparedness Plan (EPP) or equivalent, these were of very limited usefulness. None of the EPPs provided sufficiently detailed activities in response to an earthquake and certainly not on this scale. The impact of this disaster on the capital city and the staff living there further weakened the relevance of EPPs. Recommendation: Each member agency should create a full time permanent senior humanitarian staff position in Port-au- Prince. Haiti is exposed to emergencies on a recurrent basis and having a senior full-time designated humanitarian position would help manage the initial stages of emergency and ensure timely response without as much stress on the rest of the organization. In line with some of the challenges outlined in this report, this person would: o o o o o o Review and improve preparedness plans; Develop and improve supply-line partnerships and contingencies; Ensure development and review of financial frameworks and procedures for emergencies Conduct trainings for staff and partner organizations on HA standards, procedures and Codes of Conduct; Support the capacity of partner organizations; Coordinate preparedness efforts with other humanitarian agencies. 3. Efficiency of Management Structures Scale - As a result of the massive scale-up of programming, well over a million people have been helped directly by the members of the HUMANITARIAN COALITION. However, all agencies acknowledged that this expansion has been accompanied by significant hurdles in terms of staffing, organizational structures, training needs, costs of large distribution networks, preservation of quality in programs and high-risks in all areas (brand reputation, financial management, abuses of power, purchasing practices, etc.) International support structures These had a direct impact on the speed and quality of program implementation and scale-up. Where systems were in place for a quick and efficient integration of resources from international alliances this helped reduce the size and type of strains imposed on existing management structures. Example: from experiences in Indonesia, CARE International had learned the importance of appointing senior emergency management positions quickly and did so within a week. This removed much responsibility and burden that would otherwise have been placed on development program staff and helped ensure that good humanitarian practices were quickly and efficiently adopted. Strain on existing programs HUMANITARIAN COALITION members pulled from all existing resources to support the humanitarian response and had to manage the expectations of staff that were temporarily sidelined by program support services particularly in rural areas. All agencies were aware of this and had already begun moving towards a more balanced support for development and humanitarian programs. Risks to development programs will continue however, as large humanitarian program structures remain in place and under pressure to increase results. HUMANITARIAN COALITION members should be careful not to jeopardise their long-term development programs. This will be particularly challenging with the looming prospect of challenging hurricane and rainy seasons High staff turnover This has presented many difficulties for managing highly dynamic programs. Burnout has been one cause of turnover, but short contracts for foreigners in key positions have also contributed to the

11 problem (often 2-4 weeks in the early response period). All agencies identified this as an issue and are seeking longer term placements wherever possible. However, hiring presents a separate set of challenges. Hiring has been slowed by an apparent shortage of experienced humanitarian workers, already present in Haiti or willing to travel to there for a prolonged period. Some HUMANITARIAN COALITION members also reported that there is a limited pool of available and qualified French speakers for positions in Haiti, and that experienced international candidates often don t want to move to Haiti. The large number of non-french-speaking staff is impacting on the quality of internal and external communications. Dealing with a large number of new personnel The influx of new personnel presents significant risks in terms of program quality, standards, integration and could even spur potential conflicts of interest or abuses of power. It was acknowledged by all HUMANITARIAN COALITION members that many new staff had so far received only limited training support and that this needed to be remedied. Emergency systems & procedures The quality of the structures and procedures in place made for very different scale-up experiences for each HUMANITARIAN COALITION member. The pre-existence of emergency procedures relating to programs, HR, finance and performance management allowed for a much smoother and more efficient roll-out of humanitarian response activities. Pressure to scale-up Programs have been scaled in relation to needs, but all HUMANITARIAN COALITION members also cited important external pressures to scale-up programs. International pressure, either from HQs or from the donating public has partly been linked to a limited understanding of the requirements of quality versus quantity in program interventions. Staff in Haiti often identified that more effort was needed to manage expectations back home and to address this pressure to scale-up with communications that better convey to the donating public the full range of issues related to providing aid in Haiti. Same issues and risks may apply to local partner organizations Though not directly investigated by the RTR Team, all the management issues being faced by member agencies are expected to be equally relevant for local civil society partners. Statements by interviewees revealed that well connected and reputable local NGOs are also under massive pressure to ramp-up programs a situation that will be accompanied by the same risks to quality and management support as those faced by the member agencies. Recommendations: Consolidate while retaining their humanitarian imperative, in the short-term agencies should put emphasis on quality over quantity. Consolidate and seek out greater geographical concentration of post-earthquake program interventions in coordination with other organizations. A distinction should be made here, where the suggestion to consolidate is primarily a geographic one. Sectoral consolidation may also be an important strategic consideration, but was not adequately examined by the RTR Team. Manage international expectations emphasis must be on quality and not quantity when communicating with media/public in donor countries in order to help relieve the continuing pressure from the media and the donating public to scale-up programs. Issue is not how many people get one bottle of water, but rather how many people are well cared for. Increase management oversight ensure the right people are in place with the skills needed to support program expansions and manage the associated risks.

12 4. Coordination and Collaboration Coordination and collaboration have over and again been cited as one of the biggest challenges of the earthquake response. Ineffectual government The State should be the central actor, acting as chef d orchestre of any humanitarian response, with the moral and technical authority to be able to bring out the best of all the key stakeholders in reconstruction efforts. Likely the largest obstacle to a successful response to the earthquake in Haiti was (and remains) that the State has been unable to play the lead role that is expected. The scope of the catastrophe partly explain the inability of the State to play a lead role, however the State was also unprepared, with inadequate contingency plans in place. Its dependence on privately owned communication systems and an over-centralized structure which disempowered ministers, local officials and everyone else in the face of this disaster can also be singled out as other causes. The contrast with other emergencies is striking (in countries affected by the 2004 tsunami for example), and has resulted in most of aid being channelled outside State structures. Weak coordination mechanisms In the initial period of the response, weak coordination mechanisms directly impacted the scope, scale, targeting and quality of humanitarian responses. The existing UN cluster mechanisms were unable to cope with demands. Though cluster meetings did provide forums for sharing information, they were also overwhelmed by the task at hand and hampered by overlarge attendance (meetings often had more than 100 people in attendance), language issues and distance from the center of the city. In addition, the foreign military presence in Haiti quickly created alternative coordination mechanisms, further adding to the confusion and undermining the role of the Haitian government in leading the response. Large presence of non-professional NGO actors This was viewed as a disruptive situation by many interviewees. Though estimations varied, thousands of non-professional NGOs are known to be operating in Haiti since the earthquake, creating confusion and exacerbating the problems of coordination and managing Haitian public expectations. Good examples of inter-ngo Coordination Despite the significant challenges noted above, all HUMANITARIAN COALITION members invested heavily in their participation in coordination efforts. These agencies dedicated significant resources to coordination and participation in cluster meetings. Save the Children operates as co-lead of the education cluster, federally and in the regions. CARE Haiti also set-aside people and funds to support numerous cluster activities. Together, the member agencies successfully pushed for greater coordination at key moments. For example, an important letter signed by INGOs was the catalyst for the longoverdue formation of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). This specific effort was launched by CARE and Oxfam GB. Much successful coordination has also happened outside the clusters through bilateral agreements and semiformal mechanisms (regular meetings, exchange of information, etc.). However, this friendly coordination has limitations because it is not systemic. Inconsistent coordination with Haitian government In part out of expediency and lack of jurisdictional clarity, HUMANITARIAN COALITION members have initially put an emphasis on consultation and coordination with national ministries above local governments. Inconsistent efforts to engage with various government bodies, particularly local governments, have in some cases created resentment or a sense of being sidelined. All agencies confirmed their intention to engage with all levels of government and acknowledged they can do better in this area.

13 Local actors left out Apart from a few exceptional cases, the international community (all actors combined), have had limited interaction with local actors, either local authorities or local CSOs and NGOs. Although relations are abundant and diverse, there is a lack of comprehensive, long-term engagement plans. This situation was mostly observed by the RTR mission in Port-au-Prince, where the HUMANITARIAN COALITION member agencies did not have a significant presence prior to January 12. Results might well be different in rural or peri-urban locations where they have worked for many years. Recommendations going forward: Continue to increase investment in UN coordination efforts. To further buttress the clusters, large NGOs should explore the possibility of strengthening the role of the Comité permanent inter-ong (CPIO*) as a way of improving the level and type of engagement: small secretariat, collecting info for analysis, collective representation at UN and in other forums. The collective strength of the CPIO members could be used to push important NGO and CSO interests within larger international coordination bodies. Systematic efforts at informing and engaging with all levels of Haitian government. Improve level of engagement with local civil society and NGOs. Examples: pooled civil society fund with joint decision-making body, support the creation of a civil society network organization similar to ACBAR in Afghanistan. 5. Standards and Codes of Conduct For this review, the team looked at the members compliance with the HUMANITARIAN COALITION s agreed codes and standards with an emphasis on the Red Cross and NGO Code of Conduct and Sphere Standards. The specific questions of the involvement of and accountability to beneficiaries and striving to reduce future vulnerabilities are addressed as separate lines of inquiry in this report. Red Cross Movement and NGO Code of Conduct (CoC) HUMANITARIAN COALITION members did adhere to the humanitarian imperative, impartiality and independence principles, and they treated beneficiaries with dignity and respect in their images used to depict the emergency. However, it is not clear that they made significant attempts to build response on local capacities. While local capacities were limited to start with and severely affected by the earthquake, the HUMANITARIAN COALITION members could have invested more in working with local governance structures and local organizations. During the mission, all agencies were aware of these issues and committed to doing better. Language issue The principle of respect to local culture and custom seems to be an area of concern, in particular as it relates to the use of language. With the presence of so many foreign actors unable to speak French, many meetings, interagency and sometimes internal, were conducted in English; sidelining French- and Creole-speaking participants. The HUMANITARIAN COALITION members appeared overall to be performing better than average. Most staff are French- and/or Creole-speaking and materials were mostly available in Creole (improvements still required). But all members nonetheless explained they continued to face important difficulties hiring qualified staff with the appropriate language profile. * The Comité permanent inter-ongs (CPIO) was formed by 9 large international NGOs following the 2008 hurricane response and has been a successful informal coordination mechanism since that time. Though sidelined by post-earthquake coordination efforts, the members of the CPIO (which include the HUMANITARIAN COALITION members) can be viewed as accounting for over 75% of foreign aid in terms of public donations. As such, these professional organizations can and should work more closely together to offer leadership in larger cluster-level coordination efforts.

14 Varied Performance re: Sphere Technical Standards 3 Applying Sphere Standards in a situation like Haiti is not easy. From what the RTR Team saw during program visits, HUMANITARIAN COALITION members were making efforts to achieve the technical standards and performed relatively well when standards were understood in their context and adjusted accordingly. However, the RTR Team visited only a limited number of locations and when asked, interviewees stressed that they are still not achieving the technical indicators agreed in cluster meetings at all locations (for example: numbers of latrines per person in camps). Though constrained by the scale of needs and response, the objective of achieving/maintaining standards appears to be a priority of HUMANITARIAN COALITION members. Less progress on standards common to all sectors 4 Performance in terms of compliance with standards common to all sectors was identified as an area of weakness. These include standards relating to the participation of beneficiaries, staff competencies and supervision and management in service delivery. Performances in these areas were identified as particularly weak and are covered in more detail in other parts of this report. In addition, they were usually not thought of as standards and/or are often seen as soft issues. Knowledge of codes and standards There seems to have been general awareness of the Code of Conduct (CoC) for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief and its provisions among most agency staff met by the RTR Team during the mission. However, interviewees raised concerns about the awareness of and respect of the CoC provisions by recently hired staff members without previous humanitarian experience or training. All the staff interviewed by the RTR Team were aware of the Sphere Standards and understood their importance. However, the mission also revealed that some notable confusion existed regarding the difference between the standards and the indicators 5, as well as how these standards are to be determined and applied. Consistent monitoring of indicators HUMANITARIAN COALITION members were consistently monitoring hard indicators such as water per person, numbers of latrines, and the like. However, standards common to all sectors were not subject to the same level of monitoring. More training is needed For expatriate and local staff alike, more training is needed. Basic training immediately following the hiring process is essential, to cover the basics of humanitarian response, codes and standards. But ongoing training is also needed to ensure new personnel remain informed of all of the issues at hand. One good example of continuous training was found with Save the Children s education program. Within this program unit, Saturday afternoons are set aside for staff to take part in trainings and review performance. As it is almost impossible to pull staff out of their daily responsibilities to undergo intense training, similar ongoing training programs may well hold the most promise. 3 Technical Sphere standards apply to quantifiable inputs, such as WASH, health, shelter, etc. Technical standards identify how much and what kind of input is needed to save lives and/or relieve suffering in humanitarian crises. These are about the minimum needed to keep people alive and preserve from illness. 4 Standards common to all sectors refer to soft elements of humanitarian assistance, including participation, consultation, assessments, management systems, etc. 5 Sphere standards are often thought of as 15 litre of water per person per day, but this is an indicator and not a standard. The Sphere standard for water quantity is All people have safe and equitable access to a sufficient quantity of water for drinking, cooking, and personal and domestic hygiene. An indicator (as a measure of standard) has to be set understanding that quantities of water needed for domestic use may vary according to the climate, the sanitation facilities available, people's normal habits, their religious and cultural practices, the food they cook, the clothes they wear, etc.

15 Recommendations: Prioritize the quality of the response and achieving standards. Provide comprehensive training for new staff (local and international) training should be modular, starting from basics (history, basic international human rights principles, etc.) and expanding to cover more specific issues. Ensure that refresher trainings are continuously provided. Ensure that training on codes and standards is provided to all the relevant staff as a priority! Some of the ideas to explore: o Pooling resources available for training. The training needs seem to be similar in all off the agencies (within and outside the HUMANITARIAN COALITION members) and a joint investment o may yield better results. Investing in Sphere Training of Trainers (ToT) program to create a pool of local trainers that could be of service to government departments and local organizations should be explored. This would also contribute to building local disaster management capacities and reducing vulnerabilities in the case of future disasters. As possible, work with local and international universities on trainings, support growth of local capacity. Member agencies must institutionalise Sphere/HAP trainings across all staff. 6. Targeting, Scope and Scale Scale of the response was appropriate to the scale of need The unprecedented scale of the crisis and needs pushed HUMANITARIAN COALITION members to scale-up their responses dramatically. The HUMANITARIAN COALITION members budgets have increased from times annually and accordingly all members have scaled up the number of staff they employ and the number of locations in which they operate. Improvisation in terms of targeting and scope in initial months of the response All HUMANITARIAN COALITION member agencies initially targeted beneficiaries in geographic proximity to their offices. Targeting, scope and scale was further influenced by requests for assistance, coordination with other agencies and pressure to scale-up in the first couple of months. All agencies responded in multiple sectors (WASH, shelter, food, health, etc). Not unexpectedly, there was little or no strategic approach to targeting and scope in the first few months of the response. However, all agencies are currently engaged in long-term strategic planning and are reviewing targeting and scope more strategically. Strong urban focus As the areas most directly affected by the earthquake were around Port-au-Prince, the main thrust of the humanitarian response has been in urban areas. Yet the HUMANITARIAN COALITION members had little or no program capacity in the capital prior to January 12. Initially, this urban focus came as a trade-off in terms of support for existing rural programs. It was often noted by interviewees that rural citizens were also directly affected by the earthquake, because of the arrival of large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs), ruptured economic flows, disrupted government services and more. It was noted by the RTR Team that rural programs have progressively regained proportional importance for the HUMANITARIAN COALITION members. All were clear in their determination to retain programs in the areas where they have traditionally been serving the Haitian polupation. Community mobilisation, social and political dynamics all differ significantly in an urban setting and this may have an important impact on how programs should be managed. Some interviewees raised interesting questions about how mostly rural expertise was being applied in an urban setting. Important lessons can be drawn from this response that could help improve strategies for responding to future urban disasters. With the world s population increasingly concentrated in urban centres, these lessons should be carefully considered. At

16 present, HUMANITARIAN COALITION members are best equipped to deal with humanitarian responses in rural settings and may need to further develop capacities for urban responses. Emphasis on camps HUMANITARIAN COALITION members have focused their response in camps, especially those with high densities of people. While this may have been a good strategy early on, when agencies were attempting to reach as many people as possible, it is now essential to think and plan beyond the targeting of camps. Even at their best, conditions in camps are not ideal and the camps in Haiti are definitely not model camps. Staying in camps for too long encourages dependency and provision of services in these locations creates a pull-effect on nearby communities. With the growing quality of services in camps, people living nearby will increasingly be drawn to camps in order to access services. It appeared to the RTR Team that almost all interviewees wrestled with the question of moving services from camps to communities. Though members all acknowledged the need to facilitate the return of people to their homes or alternate settlement areas, the challenge remains to balance the humanitarian imperative of service provision while helping people move away from camps; where living conditions will remain inadequate. The Scale of the response is stretching agencies too thin While expansion of programs was justified by the extent of the crisis, the RTR Team felt that HUMANITARIAN COALITION agencies were already stretched to the limit and that they should stop expanding geographically to focus on improving the quality of their programs. Most of the staff interviewed was very aware of the risks associated with scaling up and the need to work on improving the quality of services provided. However, all interviewees also stressed that pressures are still strong to scaleup. In particular, pressure from agencies headquarters to further expand should be reduced. Many comments were made that external pressure to increase the number of beneficiaries was overwhelming and unhelpful. Rather than focusing on the number of people assisted, Communications Teams should focus more on how we are providing full packages of services. It is through this type of comprehensive support that people will, and should be, be cared for. Risks of negative dynamic between humanitarian and development programs and staff Such an unprecedented expansion of programs carries the potential to create difficulties between the programs that existed before the earthquake and the current emergency response. The earthquake response has absorbed most of each agency s resources, energy and time and has made it difficult to maintain equivalent support for pre-existing programs. The potentially negative effects of such an extraordinary growth and large presence of expatriates on the mostly local staff who were present before the earthquake need to be taken into consideration and managed appropriately. Conversely, HUMANITARIAN COALITION members should recognise the opportunity they have to capitalise on the local knowledge of their own local personnel. Wherever possible, local staff should be integrated into program decision-making and their knowledge put to greater use. Recommendations: Member agencies should be more strategic in terms of targeting moving forward both for the earthquake reconstruction phase and in case of new emergencies during the hurricane season. Member agencies should not neglect areas of pre-earthquake intervention, and should even consider using these areas where relations are strongest to build up longer-term programming. Member agencies should shift their focus from camps to communities, as one of the interviewees put it. Expanding their activities to serve communities rather than camp population is important and should be part of the strategy for the rest of the relief phase as well as for the reconstruction phase. Member agencies should stop expanding to new sites (geographically) and should work on improving the quality of the response with more systematic quality control and repair works.