U.N. in Kosovo: An Assessment of international administration

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1 U.N. in Kosovo: An Assessment of international administration By Ioannis Natsis 1 PN Introduction The purpose of this study is to briefly examine the role that the international organizations, in particular that of the UN, have been playing in Kosovo since the end of the NATO-led campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY 2 ) in 1999 and the consequent establishment of the international administration of the province. The present paper seeks to present the questions that international organizations have to address in the context of establishing viable and sustainable peace following armed conflict. Kosovo has proven to be a considerably complex case-study of conflict resolution that appears to confirm the view that nowadays winning the peace is a much more demanding and multidimensional task than winning the war. Ten years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement and even though a comparative analysis between post-1999 Kosovo and Bosnia should be generally avoided due to different tasks assigned to the UN in each case, we may argue that the challenges that the various components of the international community have to deal with in both cases are pretty similar (institution-building, return of refugees and displaced persons, law and order, reconstruction, multi-cultural diversity, reconciliation etc). I will elaborate on the international administration of Kosovo over three distinct time periods: i) the NATO bombing campaign to the holding of the local municipal elections (October 2000), ii) the municipal elections of MA candidate in International Conflict Analysis, University of Kent, Canterbury. 2 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) came into being in April 1992 following the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and ceased to exist in 2002 with the creation of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SCG). The new SCG Constitutional Charter (ratified in 2003) includes a provision according to which either Republic would have the right to call a referendum on independence after the lapse of three years (i.e. not before February 2006). For more information on the role of the EU s engagement in brokering the deal between Serbia and Montenegro, please see, Judy Batt, The State Union and European Integration, Chaillot Paper, Issue 81, 2005, pp

2 until the March 2004 events in Mitrovica and finally iii) the appointment of the new SRSG leading to the current developments. 2. The birth of UNMIK On the final day of NATO s Operation Allied Force against Serbia, 10 June 1999, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution This resolution authorized the UN to form an interim civilian administration under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 3. The resolution confirmed the respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the FRY but the facilitation of the political process designed to determine Kosovo s future status 4 was included as one the main responsibilities of the international civil presence. Paragraph eleven of UNSCR 1244 is one of the most important parts of the resolution for the purposes of this essay, as it provides a description of the tasks that the international administration must realize. The organization and the development of provisional institutions for autonomous self-government including the holding of the elections (point c), the reconstruction of the warravaged province (point g), the maintenance of civil law and order (point i), the protection of human rights (point j) and the return of all refugees and displaced persons (point k) are pointed out among others. Furthermore, the resolution called for the foundation of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) under the leadership of a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) 5. The security component was placed under the auspices of NATO. Resolution 1244 is one of the most debated and contradictory of UN resolutions for many analysts. Many writers 6 claim that this resolution was 3 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 (1999), para , paragraph 11 (e) , paragraph 6. 6 Alexandros Yannis, UN as Government, Global Governance, 10 (2004), pp. 72-8, Franz- Lothar Altmann, The Status of Kosovo, Chaillot Paper, 50, pp. 21-2, Ylber Hysa, UNMIK and KFOR in Kosova, Chaillot Paper, 46, p. 47-8, Independent International Commission on Kosovo (IICK), The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p

3 drafted leaving great space for various and very diverse interpretations, especially as far as the sovereignty of Serbia is concerned, as well as the question of whether the resolution pre-determines the final status of the province or not 7. This ambiguity and to a certain extent conflicting nature of the resolution may be due to, as Ylber Hysa stresses, the fact that at that point resolution 1244 was the only point of agreement within the international community 8 and thus had to leave sufficient space for diplomatic manoeuvring. Nevertheless, this high degree of complexity and ambiguity has had a negative impact and a lasting damaging effect on the visibility and credibility of the international administration s activities in Kosovo ever since. The implementation of the resolution on the ground has proven significantly troublesome while the range of activities assigned to the international community and in particular to UNMIK were both far-reaching and complex 9. UNMIK s structure consisted of four main pillars presided by the SRSG: a) police and justice (as of 2001) 10, b) civil administration, c) democratization and institution-building (under the OSCE) and d) reconstruction and development (under the EU). The UN was thus, entrusted with the direct governance 11 of the war-torn region. Taking into consideration the structure of the four pillars, it can be concluded that UNMIK, as the supervising and monitoring body had to join forces by shaping working partnerships with other international organizations such as the OSCE, NATO and the EU. 7 Some have argued that the fact that the FRY ceased to exist has made resolution 1244 irrelevant and thus Kosovo independent by default. Nevertheless, Tim Judah states that international lawyers, even ones sympathetic to the cause of Kosovo s independence, believe that if the FRY no longer existed, then in relation to Kosovo, Serbia would be the legal successor state, Chaillot Paper, 50, p Hysa, UNMIK and KFOR, p Alexandros Yannis, Kosovo Under International Administration:An Unfinished Conflict (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy and Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies, 2001), p Until the end of the emergency phase (2000), Pillar I was mainly preoccupied with the provision of humanitarian assistance and was under the guidance of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 11 Richard Kaplan, International Governance of war-torn territories Rule and Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p

4 3. Phase I: Following the end of the war, Kosovo was left with a collapsed infrastructure, no viable nor reliable civil administration, as well as a deep division within the population. While the overwhelming majority of Kosovo Albanians returned to their homes in Kosovo, Kosovo ethnic Serbs where obliged to leave the province or to concentrate in areas where the Serb population was prevailing (namely the northern city of Mitrovica). On 25 July 1999, the first UNMIK regulation 12 was issued stating that all legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo, including the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the SRSG. We may argue that the regulation s substance allows us to agree with Michael Doyle s characterization of the international administration s authority in Kosovo as supervisory authority 13. During the first phase of the international administration, emphasis was put on restoring the provision of the basic civil administrative services and the gradual transfer of power to the local authorities. To this end, six months after the deployment of the international civil presence, UNMIK set up the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS). JIAS was established with the purpose of eliminating the parallel administrative mechanisms 14 that Serbs and Albanians had formed in light of the power vacuum caused by the withdrawal of the FRY forces. Moreover, during this first phase, the problems in the coordination, cooperation and interaction between and within the various parts of the international administration became apparent. As Alexandros Yannis, a former UNMIK official, stresses UNMIK s structure itself, 12 Regulation 1999/1, On the authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo, Article Quoting from: Simon Chesterman, You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building (Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online. Oxford University Press, October (accessed ), p We should also note that these parallel structures of administration (health services, education etc excluding the public order services) existed in the province even before the 1999 war, were run by Kosovo Albanians under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, within his two folded policy of peaceful passive resistance and the internationalization of the Kosovo conflict and were tolerated by Belgrade {Franklin de Vrieze, Kosovo: Civil Society Awaits Chance for Reconciliation, in Paul van Tongeren, Hans van de Veen and Juliette Verhoeven (eds), Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia An Overview of the Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (London: Lynne Riener Publishers, 2002), p. 290)}. 4

5 presented numerous problems of dualism, division as well as excessive diversity within each pillar s working methods and mentality 15. Significant problems were also present in the UNMIK-OSCE and the UNMIK-KFOR coordination of action. It is worth examining another negative aspect of UNMIK s approach pointed out by the Kosovo Ombudsperson with regard to the scope of powers that have been vested in the international civil authority. Mr. Marek Antoni Nowicki keeps emphasizing in his annual reports to the Special Representative that UNMIK itself is not structured according to democratic principles while adding that it (UNMIK) entirely ignored one of the basic principles of democracy, namely the division of powers and concludes that this disregard for democratic values continues to have negative ramifications for the functioning and above all the democratic legitimacy of the UN mission in Kosovo 16. Adding to the last point made by the Kosovo Ombudsperson concerning the credibility of the UN mission in Kosovo, we should note that one of the most serious mistakes during the first steps of UNMIK was the solution it proposed on the question of the applicable law in Kosovo. UNMIK s first regulation 17 stated that the legislative framework that would be implemented in Kosovo would be the one that had been implemented before the start of the NATO operation, causing the outrage of the Kosovo Albanians. This decision damaged, right from the onset, the relationship between UNMIK and the local Kosovo authorities 18. UNMIK corrected its mistake after four months with the endorsement of Regulation 1999/24 (12 December 1999) which cancelled the July Regulation and reinstituted the 1989 Kosovo autonomy provisions. 15 Yannis, Kosovo, pp Fourth Annual Report , addressed to the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, p.7. Please note that all Kosovo Ombudsperson s reports can be found online at: 17 UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1, Section For an interesting account of the thinking of UNMIK in regards to the question of the applicable law in Kosovo, please see Eric Chevallier s (close advisor to Bernard Kouchner), L ONU au Kosovo: Lecons de la premiere MINUK ( UN in Kosovo: Lessons from the first UNMIK ), Occasional Papers, 35 (2002), pp 7-9 (can be found online at 5

6 One of the first successes of the international administration (under Pillar I and in cooperation with the OSCE) during the first phase was the holding of local municipal elections on 28 October The remaining Kosovo Serbs (about ) did not take part in these much anticipated elections following Belgrade s propaganda of non-cooperation with the international administration mechanisms. In fact, the Kosovo Serbs refusal to participate in the elections demonstrates clearly how difficult it was for the international civil authority to implement its mandate on the ground in connection with the local authorities. The reason for this was that from the very beginning the two major Kosovo communities (Kosovo Serbs and Albanians) tended to interpret every policy outlined by UNMIK as favouring the other and thus focused their efforts on boycotting it. Therefore, in the case of the elections, the Kosovo Serbs accused UNMIK of allowing Kosovo Albanians to seize political control of Kosovo and thus, preferred not to legitimize that prospect by abstaining from the ballot. Nevertheless, what was important from the October 2000 elections was the victory of the moderate Albanian political forces led by Ibrahim Rugova Phase II: May 2001 is the next important date for the course of action of the international administration. The Constitutional Framework for the Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo 21 was signed by the SRSG Hans Haekkerup 22. This Constitutional Framework is the basis for the creation of the Provisional 19 Some claim that the elections were part of an exit strategy for UNMIK and KFOR (please see Hysa, UNMIK and KFOR, p. 54). 20 Steven J. Woehrel, Julie Kim, Kosovo and U.S. Policy (The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, June 2005), p The full text of the Constitutional Framework can be found online at: 22 Hans Haekkerup (Denmark) was the second head of the UN Mission who served from February 2001 to December Dr. Bernard Kouchner (France) served as head of UNMIK from July 1999 to January Mr. Michael Steiner (Germany) served from January 2002 to July Mr. Harri Holkeri (Finland) served from August 2003 to June It is worth noting that the late Sergio Vieira de Mello (Brazil) also served as Acting Special Representative for Kosovo on an interim basis (11 June 2 July). The current SRSG is Søren Jessen-Petersen (please see 6

7 Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) 23. It called for the establishment of a 120-seat legislature which elects a President and a Prime Minister. Twenty seats were reserved for ethnic minorities, including ten for Serbs, but Serbs would not have a veto power on laws passed by the ethnic Albanian majority in the body 24. The goal of the PISG was to gradually transfer competencies to the local authorities especially in light of the general elections that were to take place in November The transfer of competencies included the legislative, executive and judiciary fields while at the same time reserved a determinant role for UNMIK and the SRSG. In fact, UNMIK would retain oversight or control of policy in many areas, including law enforcement, the judiciary, protecting the rights of communities, monetary and budget policy, customs, state property and enterprises, and external relations. UNMIK would even have had the right to invalidate legislation passed by the parliament, had it been in conflict with U.N. Security Council Resolution Following the establishment of the Assembly, general elections took place, as scheduled, in November In the meantime, the October Revolution had taken place in Belgrade, in the aftermath of Milosevic s defeat in the October 2000 presidential elections - Milosevic got arrested in April 2001 and was transferred to the Hague to stand trial in June of the same year - and Vojislav Kostunica became the new President. Kostunica encouraged the Kosovo Serbs to take part in the November 2001 Kosovo elections. Return, a coalition of Serbian parties, won 22 seats while turnout in Serb-majority areas was about 47%, according to the OSCE. Once again Rugova s moderates won most of the seats and Rugova himself was elected President (March 2002) following extensive talks on the formation of a coalition government. 23 An interesting observation made by Franz-Lothar Altmann about the text of the Framework is that there is no mention of Kosovo belonging to the FRY. Altmann also states that this Constitutional Framework characterises the transition from a pure protectorate to a selfadministered political unit (Franz-Lothar Altmann, The Status of Kosovo, p. 24). 24 Chapter 9, Sections Chapter 12. 7

8 In December 2003, UNMIK and the PISG agreed on the Standards for Kosovo 26 procedure which has been largely interpreted as the endorsement by UNMIK of a standards before status policy, as well as exposes the international community s procrastination in addressing the issue of the final status of Kosovo 27. Adding to this, we may claim that the idea of a standardsrelated process was first introduced by Michael Steiner (SRSG, January July 2003) in his speech addressing the Security Council when he made references to benchmarks and priorities 28. The raison d etre of the standards for Kosovo procedure was to set a number of targets and priorities that had to be met for the status talks to get underway. To this end, the establishment of a review mechanism was also foreseen by the Security Council 29. The first review took place as expected in mid-2005 and its findings will be presented later on in this study. March 2004 was a milestone with regard to the prestige and credibility of UNMIK and KFOR. The grave inter-ethnic violence of March 2004 that erupted in the divided city of Mitrovica following accusations that two Albanian boys were drowned in the Ibar river by local Serbs, spread throughout the province and proved that the international community s goal of a harmonious mutliethnic society in Kosovo had not been achieved. Kofi Annan stated the following: The onslaught led by Kosovo Albanians extremist against the Serb, Roma and Ashkali communities of Kosovo was an organized, widespread and targeted campaign...the violence in March completely reversed the returns process. In less than 48hours, 4,100 minority community members were 26 For the complete text of the Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan visit The Standards were endorsed by the UN Security Council (4880 th Meeting (PM), Press Release SC/795, 12 December 2003) and the Contact Group. The Contact Group was formed in April 1994 and is composed of USA, UK, Italy, Russia, France and Germany {James Gow, Triumph of the lack of will International diplomacy and the Yugoslav War, (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), p.263}. 27 International Crisis Group, Kosovo: Toward Final Status, ICG Europe Report, 161 (2005), pp Attaining these benchmarks is an objective in itself. Kosovo can only advance towards a fair and just society when these minimum preconditions are met (UNMIK s Press Release 719, Wednesday, 24 April 2002, can be found at 29 Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Europa South East Monitor, ), pp

9 newly displaced, more than the total of 3,664 that had returned throughout This is why following the developments in Mitrovica, there has been a review of the Standards for Kosovo and priority has been given to those standards (eg equal representation of all Kosovo communities at all PISG levels, respect for the freedom of movement and the free use of language, promotion of tolerance in education etc) reinforcing multi-ethnicity. UNMIK was quick to reaffirm that this prioritization of specific standards does not however mean that other Standards are less important. The 2-day events constituted a major setback for the international civil and security presence on the ground while UNMIK and KFOR personnel also came under attack by the rioters. The exposed failure of the international authority was so significant, many believed that the August SRSG change of guard was a direct effect of the March events 31. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG) the March events showed clearly that UNMIK had been loosing instead of gaining control in Kosovo while stressing the immense significance of the city of Mitrovica 32 in the talks for the final settlement of the province s status Phase III: present In August 2004, Mr Søren Jessen-Petersen (Denmark) became the fifth SRSG. Improving security, prioritizing and accelerating the Standards, empowering local authorities and reinforcing the economy were among the priorities he set forth 34. Following the November general elections and the indictment of the prime minister-elect Mr Ramush Haradinaj to the International Criminal 30 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo, UNSC S/2004/348, 30 April 2004, paragraphs 2 and 3, pp More information on the March 2004 events and their implications can be found on the International Crisis Group website: (accessed ). 32 For a full Mitrovica Municipal Profile provided by the OSCE, please visit: (accessed ). 33 International Crisis Group, Bridging Kosovo s Mitrovica divide ICG Europe Report, 165, 13 September 2005, pp Mr. Søren Jessen-Petersen s speech, Kosovo: The last piece in the puzzle given at the Chatham House on Wednesday, 8 December 2004 ( 9

10 Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 35 appointed Kai Eide as his Special Envoy to carry out a comprehensive review of the standards to be fulfilled to enable the start of the talks for the status of the region 36. In October 2005, Kai Eide submitted his muchanticipated report 37 recommending the start of the talks on the final status of Kosovo, noting however that progress on the ground has not been sufficient and that numerous serious problems still existed. More specifically, Eide emphasized that the major areas which required further attention and effort included: a) the privatization process, b) the economic situation that remains bleak while poverty is widespread and unemployment is high, c) the judiciary that remains the weakest Kosovo institution, d) the police services which is a fragile institution and e) the security situation that remains stable and fragile. In addition to the above, he stressed the need for the Serbs living in Kosovo to take part in the local administrative institutions. In relation to the standards implementation, Eide concluded that it has been uneven. He characterised organised crime and corruption as the biggest threats while he underlined that these constitute widespread phenomena. Finally, Eide urged the international community to act upon the need for a multi-ethnic society to be rooted in Kosovo where the situation for the time being, is grim. He described the Kosovo society as deeply-divided, one which is still recovering from post-conflict trauma. However, more optimistically, Kai Eide listed the areas where progress had been made including the institutional frameworks that had been put in place, the shaping of a sustainable legal framework as well as the formation of a civil service. 35 United Nations Security Council Report S/2005/335 (dated: 23 May 2005), p. 6 where Kofi Annan initiated the comprehensive review. 36 United Nations Secretary General Press Release SG/A/ United Nations Security Council Report S/2005/635 (dated: 7 October 2005), see also the statement (document S/PRST/2005/51, dated: 24 October 2005) made by the President of the Security Council Mihnea Ioan Motoc of Romania, welcoming Eide s assessment and agreeing with Kofi Annan s intention to start a political process to determine Kosovo s Future Status (p.1). The statement also reads that the Council welcomes the Secretary-General s readiness to appoint a Special Envoy to lead the Future Status process (p.2). 10

11 On November 1 st, Kofi Annan named 38 former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari as his Special Envoy to lead the political process to determine the future status of Kosovo. Martti Ahtisaari s appointment signalled the beginning of the end of the international administration of Kosovo in its current state, and in particular as far as the UN presence is concerned. It is the UN point of view 39 that the time has come for other regional organizations (namely the European Union) to become heavily engaged in Kosovo. The status talks are expected to last until June Conclusion A vision for the future Coming to the end, or rather to the dawn of a new phase, it is important to examine what the UN involvement in Kosovo meant for the world organization itself as well as for the international community s activities in the field of peace-building. As it is generally acknowledged, the UN s mandate in Kosovo broke new grounds in the field of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. The tasks assigned to UNMIK were highly political and aimed at building peace rather than keeping it, while resolution 1244 did not outline a specific vision for the province, it added more obstacles in the unfolding of the international administration s activities. Apart from the absence of a specific reference point for the components of the international administration, one could argue that Kosovo faded from the top of the world s political agenda. This is why the March 2004 events, even five years after the implementation of 1244, constituted a violent wake up call for the policymakers. More importantly, as the international community faces the challenge of defining Kosovo s future, it is the author s point of view that it must consider the fact that the multi-cultural diversity of the province seems to have disappeared. Although this seems to be true for the time being, the 38 The respective UN press release can be found at (accessed ). 39 S/2005/635, p

12 international community, primarily the European Union, should focus its efforts on re-establishing the multi-ethnic character in order to discredit belief that the Balkans is a region inherent with ethnic and religious hatred. It is now imperative to emphasize the notion of a new identity for the peoples of Kosovo a Kosovo identity that will incorporate all minorities and that will stress the idea of the Kosovo citizenship. This new sense of identity could serve as a new definition for all the Kosovo inhabitants, which will be a harmonizing alternative from the dividing ethnic and religious background. Kosovo people need to be provided with an alternative vision. For example, economic development that will emphasize the beneficial aspects of harmonious inter-ethnic coexistence in order to convince people that they can and should work together towards the achievement of common and mutually beneficial goals. This new sense of identity can make the motto united in diversity a reality in Kosovo. The endorsement of this new vision becomes even more imperative, if we take into consideration that 2006 constitutes a crucial year for the whole of the Balkans. During the coming year, the international community will have to address the prospect of Montenegro s independence at the same time as it will try to resolve Kosovo s future. It is self-evident that the decisions on Kosovo will have a direct impact on the course that the Montenegrin politicians will follow regarding the independence issue. It is thus a unique opportunity to send the right messages from the Kosovo status talks and the international community s positions. Promoting a shared identity among Kosovars should not be the new vision of the international engagement in Kosovo alone, moreover it could also serve as a very positive precedent that could be used across the Balkan region. 12

13 Bibliography Chesterman, Simon, You, The People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004). Hans van de Veen and Juliette Verhoeven (eds), Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia An Overview of the Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (London, Lynne Riener Publishers, 2002). Independent International Commission on Kosovo (IICK), The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000). Kaplan, Richard, International Governance of war-torn territories Rule and Reconstruction (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005). Yannnis, Alexandros, Kosovo Under International Administration: An Unfinished Conflict (Athens, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy and Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies, 2001). European Union: Institute for Security Studies (ISS) reports and papers Altmann, Franz-Lothar, The Status of Kosovo, Chaillot Paper, Issue 50. Batt, Judy, The State Union and European Integration, Chaillot Paper, Issue 81, Chevallier, Eric, L ONU au Kosovo: Lecons de la premiere MINUK ( UN in Kosovo: Lessons from the first UNMIK ), ISS Occasional Papers, no 35, May Hysa, Ylber, UNMIK and KFOR in Kosova, Chaillot Paper, Issue 46. International Crisis Group (ICG) Reports International Crisis Group, Bridging Kosovo s Mitrovica divide, ICG Europe Report, No 165, 13 September International Crisis Group, Kosovo: Toward Final Status, ICG Europe Report, No 161, 24 January Other Yannis, Alexandros, UN as Government, Global Governance, Vol. 10, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 (1999). 13

14 Steven J. Woehrel, Julie Kim, Kosovo and U.S. Policy (The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, June 2005). Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Europa South East Monitor, Issue 50, November-December United Nations Security Council Report S/2005/635 (dated: 7 October 2005). Report of the UN Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo, UNSC S/2004/348, 30 April