reign Policy reign Policy ign Policy eign Policy Foreign Policy EU Watch

Transcription

1 ei n Policy ei rei ei rei orei ei orei i orei rei EU Watch NOVEMBER rei ei rei 2006 NO-1 i TESEV The Strategic Future of Turkey and the EU Sab ha Senyücel Seda Köknel PAGE 02 Foreword... This year TESEV's Program will start to publish a new bulletin on the European Union, which includes discussion of important subjects in Turkey's domestic and foreign policy agenda relating to the EU. The bulletin will include news from TESEV and reflections on EU-related matters. In addition, each issue will allocate space for analysis of issues related to Cyprus. Our first publication starts with an analysis of the contributions Turkey's full membership will make to the EU. Following this first article, you can find a brief assessment of the current situation of the Cyprus, which risks to lead to a train crash in the Turkey-EU relations. An article on the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia, an issue that often remains unaddressed among a number of other controversial issues between these two countries, follows. The last piece analyzes the New Anti-Terror Law and its significance within the security versus rights debate. You can also find news on TESEV's meetings and new publications. Please visit TESEV's web page at to get more detailed information on these meetings and the entire library of TESEV publications. Mensur Akgün TESEV Program Director The normal zat on of turk sharmen an relat ons Burcu Gültek n Utku KundakC PAGE 05 The cyprus problem on the path towards a train crash Mensur Akgün Sylvia T ryak PAGE 07 Turkey s new anti-terror law: a hassle on the way to eu or a far more complex story? Volkan Aytar PAGE 09

2 The Strategic Future of Turkey and the EU Sabiha Senyücel, TESEV Program Officer Seda Köknel, TESEV Program EU Watch Editor 02 The integration of Turkey will, paradoxically, force EU to devise comprehensive policies on regions like the Middle East and the Caucasus, which boast sensitive political balances and will bring new breath to the European Common Foreign and Security Policy. Sabiha Senyücel is a Program Officer for the TESEV Program. She coordinates research and advocacy activities on European Union. She is currently a PhD candidate at Bilgi University. Seda Köknel is working in TESEV Program as a program assistant. She is the editor of TESEV EU Watch. She also contributes to TESEV research and advocacy activities on European Union. Following its acceptance as a candidate country on 17th December 2004 and after the EU's decision to start accession negotiations on 3rd October 2005, Turkey overcame yet another hurdle in its 40 year 'EU marathon'. This strategic step towards accepting Turkey as a member will not only give new direction to Turkey-EU relations but also has the potential to significantly affect EU foreign policy. Given its geo-strategic location and military potential, Turkey is of critical importance to the EU, which show signs of wanting to become a world power. Despite divergence of opinion within the EU over the Iraq War revealing the obstacles to a strong Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), it is still on the EU's agenda of the European Constitution and the European Security Strategy. Goals pointed out in the two documents include the need for the Union to play a role in securing peace, sustainable development and human rights. Opponents of Turkey's membership argue that Turkish accession would harm the coherence of the CFSP and add 'Turkey's integration to the EU is quite difficult since it acts according to a strong national interest policy in internationally recognized conflicts'. Given its population and lengthy borders, it is not uncommon to expect that Turkey's integration process will be longer and more difficult than the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). Nevertheless, perceiving Turkey's membership in a negative light is narrow minded. Indeed, from a broader perspective, accepting Turkey to 'the European Club' can be seen as an opportunity. Turkey's Potential Contribution to the EU Turkey's accession will result in the EU's borders reaching as far as the South Caucasus (Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan), Syria, Iran and Iraq. While opponents of Turkey's membership underline the potential threats of becoming neighbors with the Middle East and South Caucasus, supporters emphasize the positive contribution it will have on the Union's future and security goals. Regardless of where its boarders are, the EU will be affected by the aforementioned regions and their component parts. As such, the EU could acquire a new geopolitical identity and assume a more important role in subjects currently defined as part of Turkey's bilateral relations if the candidate accedes. In other words, the integration of Turkey will, paradoxically, force Europe to devise comprehensive policies on regions like the Middle East and the Caucasus, which boast sensitive political balances and will bring new breath to CFSP. For example, it is often argued that the battle for water will become an increasingly important political issue in the Middle East. Turkey's accession, a country known for its abundant water resources, could assist the EU in securing economic interests by having control of the international management of the water resources and infrastructure projects and gaining an important political bargaining tool. Turkey's accession will also enable the EU to realize its goals in the Mediterranean basin. Turkey's membership will not only accelerate the regions economic and commercial

3 integration, but also contribute to the stabilization of the region by improving Turkey's bilateral relations with Greece. Turkey's threat perception is converging with Europe's; Turkey's definition of threats is similar to those in the European Security Strategy and it follows parallel policies with Europe against these. For instance, although sharing American and European concerns on Iran's attempts to develop nuclear weapons, Turkey has continually stressed the need for a diplomatic solution. Likewise Turkey whilst underlining its sensitivities, has followed a constructive policy aimed at ensuring a stable and democratic Iraq and accepted the federal constitution, which provided strong autonomy to the Kurdish region in the north. Threats defined by the European Security Strategy - Terrorism - Proliferation of weapons - Mass destruction - Regional conflicts - State failure - Organized crime As Turkey gets closer to the EU, it seems to be converging with a more 'European' view of foreign policy and its diplomatic outlook. In recent years, Turkey has, in contrast to its previous security policy based on military powerand balance of power, adopted a foreign policy that includes economic, diplomatic and humanitarian means. In turn, this shift has narrowed the security culture gap between Turkey and the EU. On the other hand, Turkey's potential contribution to CFSP should not be underestimated. With 720,000 military personnel, Turkey is the second largest military power in NATO. Any development of CFSP, in light of the EU's goals, will necessitate more efficient coordination between NATO and the EU. In turn, this will dictate the deepening of security cooperation between the EU and Turkey, which is located in the vicinity of 21 out of the 23 conflict zones as determined by Given Turkey's young population, powerful military and proximity to the problematic regions of the world which wait for stabilization, its membership is an opportunity for the EU, whose population is currently ageing. NATO. In addition, Turkey has already cooperated with NATO and the EU in international peace keeping tasks. It provided military support to SFOR II in Bosnia Herzegovina and KFOR in Kosovo, and commanded NATO' forces in Afghanistan (ISAF). In short, Turkey has the potential to contribute to any planned European armed forces due to its experience in military planning and proximity to the aforementioned conflict zones. If one considers relations with parts of the Islamic world, the advantages of Turkish membership become more persuasive. For example, much of the Middle East views the West in a less than positive manner. In the same vein, parts of Europe and the West have the inclination of accusing the Muslim world for rising terror. Accepting democratic Muslim Turkey into the EU will help disprove the concept that Islamic values are contrary to democratic values and the theory that the EU is a Christian Club. It can be argued that such a development will not only ease the tension between the Islamic and Christian world but also be an important step in the struggle against terror. A secure energy supply and border management issues are also in the EU's broad strategic interest. Turkey's proximity to regions rich in energy resources is of increasing importance for the EU whose demand for energy is ever increasing. With Turkey's membership, the EU's energy sources will diversify by including the Caspian basin in addition to Russia and the Middle East. Following the energy crisis with Russia and Ukraine in January, a number of projects on the transportation of Middle East and Central Asian gas to Europe through Turkey came to the agenda. This is a sign of Turkey's increasing importance as an energy corridor. 03

4 The question is whether the EU should leave Turkey as an intermediary region and distance itself from those problematic regions or move towards having more control in these areas by accepting Turkish accession. This decision is in fact linked to the role that the EU envisages for itself in the global order. Full membership will enable closer cooperation on areas such as human trafficking, drugs smuggling, and illegal migration, which are central issues in the EU's border management policy. Since Turkey's borders will become the EU's borders, the EU's capacity to control organized crime, which uses Turkey as a transit route, will strengthen. Under these circumstances, the question is whether the EU should leave Turkey as an intermediary region and distance itself from those problematic regions or move towards having more control in these areas by accepting Turkish accession. This decision is in fact linked to the role that the EU envisages for itself in the global order. If the EU wishes to move towards becoming a global power in addition to being an economic power, it should have the capacity to address global threats and solve regional problems. In this light the EU should seriously consider improving its financial and military capacity. Given Turkey's young population, powerful military and proximity to the problematic regions of the world which wait for stabilization, its membership is an opportunity for the EU, whose population is currently ageing. Unfortunately Turkey's membership to the EU is often considered in a negative light hence the European public misconceives Turkey. The worst outcome of this situation for both for Turkey and the EU will be a veto to Turkey's membership by the public of a particular member after an agreement is reached at the level of institutions and leaders. Therefore, both Turkey and the EU are obliged to inform their publics about the advantages of Turkey's membership. 04

5 The Normalization of Turkish-Armenian Relations Dr. Burcu Gültekin, Research Fellow, Centre for European Studies, METU, Ankara Utku Kundakc, TESEV Program Assistant Turkey's relations with Armenia - two countries that have been unable to establish good neighbourly relations - have often been evaluated through the axis of the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict and claims of 'genocide'. However, in order to sustain stability in the Caucasus, a region whose global importance increases day by day, and to increase Turkey's influence in it, relations with Armenia should be considered in a broader perspective and normalized. Following the end of Cold War, Turkey recognized all of its new neighbours in the Caucasus without discrimination. However, disagreement with Armenia started during the process of establishing diplomatic relations. Turkey had a prerequisite for the establishment of diplomatic relations; it wanted an official statement stressing that Armenia recognizes the 1921 Treaty of Kars, and thus the territorial integrity of Turkey. The Armenian side in turn declined this demand on the grounds that neither of the two countries had ever denounced the Treaty of Kars and Armenia accepts the principle of the immutability of borders within the context of its OSCE membership. The intensification of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, in addition to the disagreement on the recognition of the Treaty of Kars, increased tensions between Turkey and Armenia during the early 1990s. Although Turkey had accepted to open its borders for the transit of humanitarian aid to Armenia in November 1992, it closed the border in April 1993 following Armenian aggression towards Azerbaijan. The Armenian government has constantly expressed its readiness to normalize relations with Turkey unconditionally. However, negotiations over the normalization of relations remain deadlocked. One of the major factors that contributed to the failure of normalizing relations is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It appears that the normalization of relations becomes harder as long as Turkey does not consider its relations with Armenia separate of the Karabakh conflict. The Importance of the Normalization of Relations between Turkey and Armenia Since it is impractical to build a common future in a region where countries are isolated from their neighbours, the normalization of bilateral relations will contribute to regional stability and the integration of regional countries. The normalization of relations will also provide significant opportunities to both countries. The normalization of relations, first of all, will help Armenia to utilize its economic and political capacity; Armenia wishes to improve its relations with NATO and it has thoughts of EU membership in the future. By normalizing its relations with NATO member and EU candidate Turkey, Armenia could make a significant move towards these goals. Similarly, during the EU accession process, Turkey should normalize its relations with its neighbours and establish diplomatic relations with Armenia, which is a member of the EU's neighbourhood policy (ENP). In this regard, the normalization of relations will positively affect both Turkey's EU accession process and the international community's perception of Turkey. It should also be noted that the opening of border will contribute to the Armenian economy in general and benefit Turkey's north-eastern region in particular. The closed border has never forced Armenia into backing down from its position vis-à-vis Azerbaijan and the aforementioned problems with Turkey. By contrast, the closure of the Dr. Burcu Gültekin is a research fellow at the Centre for European Studies of Middle East Technical University and coordinator of the Integration, Neighborhood and Cross- Border Issues research program. Utku Kundakc is working in TESEV Program as a program assistant. He contributes to TESEV research and advocacy activities on European Union. He is currently preparing his MA thesis at the Modern Turkish History Institute of Bo aziçi University. 05

6 The lack of relations between the two societies has exaggerated the mistrust between Turkey and Armenia. Establishing dialogue between the two societies, which share the same geography, will contribute to mutual understanding and the careful handling of sensitive issues. border has led Armenia to assume a more irreconcilable position, based on security concerns. In addition, Turkey could not use diplomatic channels in an attempt to settle the problem outright, and was not able to act as a mediator in the conflict. Crucially, the normalization of relations with Armenia does not mean that Turkey would withdraw its support for Azerbaijan on international platforms. The lack of relations between the two societies has exaggerated the mistrust between Turkey and Armenia. Establishing dialogue between the two societies, which share the same geography, will contribute to mutual understanding and the careful handling of sensitive issues. Recent Developments Both Prime Minister Erdo an and President Kocharian have made public proposals that have created a degree of momentum in this regard. Erdo an proposed that a joint commission be established to study the developments and events of 1915, whilst President Kocharian suggested that an intergovernmental commission should meet and discuss all outstanding issues between the two countries with the aim of resolving them. These proposals and confidence building measures have to be sustained by practical steps, aimed at the full normalization of bilateral relations and the two societies would be informed about the advantages of the normalization of relations. In achieving these goals, a constructive approach to future developments should be adopted and any step that may damage relations should be avoided. In this regard, the bill approved by the French National Assembly on October 12th 2006, not only undermined freedom of thought and expression but also affected the likelihood of the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations. In addition, Armenian foreign minister Vartan Oskanyan's article in the International Herald Tribune on October 19th, 2006 did not ease the current tensions. Indeed, Oskanyan's upbeat attitude towards developments in France and his thoughts on Turkish-Armenian relations did little to raise hopes. Such approaches will overshadow positive steps towards the normalization of relations and are likely to disrupt constructive dialogue by generating negative reaction. Destabilizing steps towards normalizing future relations of the two countries that carry mutual political, cultural and economic importance should be avoided. In short, steps towards the normalization of relations should be accelerated by taking into consideration the common benefits of opening the border and establishing full diplomatic relations. 06

7 The Cyprus Problem on the Path towards a Train Crash Asst. Prof. Sylvia Tiryaki, TESEV Cyprus Projects Coordinator Assoc. Prof. Mensur Akgün, TESEV Program Director When this article was written, the 2006 Progress Report had not been published and the suggestions of the Strategy Document concerning the Cyprus issue were not known. However, what was known was that the Cyprus problem will be a, if not the, major barrier to Turkey's EU accession - just as it has been in the past. The initiative which tried to bring Turkish and Greek Cypriots together in order to discuss Finland's proposal also failed. The major problem was the inability to implement the Protocol signed on July 29th, 2006 that aimed to widen the scope of the customs union between Turkey and the EU to cover the Greek Cypriot Administration, which acts in the name of the Cyprus Republic. Tensions that have arisen as a result of linking the promise of opening Turkish ports and airports to Greek Cypriot vessels to the lifting of isolations imposed on Turkish Cypriots have not yet been alleviated. Although, through the Finnish presidency's proposal, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) became a part of the isolationprotocol equation, the possibility of suspending Turkey's accession process in mid- December because of the Cyprus problem has been readily touted. Indeed, the Greek Cypriot Administration joined with parties who opposed Turkish membership in a seemingly successful holy alliance. Turkey, or rather Prime Minister Erdo an, who brought this equation into the agenda, responded by declaring that Turkey could, in fact, risk EU membership. Essentially, a different solution should be found; the two issues could be managed in their own spheres without political linkage. Turkey could turn the ports issue into a technical problem, claiming that the customs union protocol did not include provision for the opening of ports and extend the problem on legal grounds. Similarly Turkey could remind the EU about its promises regarding the lifting of isolations and about the 3rd article of the 10th protocol, signed by the Greeks in the name of the Republic of Cyprus during the accession process, which disallows the blocking of economic development on the Turkish part of the island. However, under the influence of Turkish Cypriots and domestic politics, Prime Minister Erdo an chose to link the two issues. Now he, Turkey and, of course, the EU are confronted with a hard choice. If Turkey retreats, it will face Greek Cypriot blackmail, as well as demands and requests throughout its accession process. Thus, Turkey, with a population of 70 million, will seemingly surrender to the Greek Cypriot Administration, which represents , weakening the AKP and its domestic and international credibility on the eve of both presidential and parliamentary elections. Therefore, this solution is neither an alternative for Turkey nor for the AKP. Both Turkey and its government will have to resist. Finland's proposals, which are not yet official but have been leaked to the press, are also not acceptable. Accepting to leave Varosha first to the UN and then to the Greeks in return for putting Famagusta under EU control is impossible. Presenting this to the Turkish public as the lifting of isolations is not possible either. If the TRNC will open the port of Famagusta for practically insignificant tax cuts, the benefits to Turkey are seemingly irrelevant. For the EU, the problem is how to solve the stumbling block and simultaneously ensure the solidarity of the community. The easiest way to do this is to grant Turkey some nonfunctional Asst. Prof. Sylvia Tiryaki is the TESEV Cyprus Projects Coordinator. She is also a faculty member of Kültür University. She has many published works on Cyprus issues. Assoc. Prof. Mensur Akgün is the director of TESEV Program. He is also working in Kültür University and contributing to many Turkish dailies as columnist. He has written extensively on the issues concerning Turkish foreign policy. 07

8 concessions and to convince the Turkish Cypriots to accept. Otherwise, the EU will face a significant political defeat or have to take measures which they do not want to in December. If these measures were to be harsh, the EU's global interests may be harmed, Turkey will be alienated in its accession process, and identity debates as well as the reactions of the Muslim world could be disturbing. However, if the Finnish proposal can produce some success, the election period in Turkey could pass and thus allow all sides more time to develop a sustainable solution. However, the problem will by no means be solved. Cyprus will continue to be a headache for both Turkey and the EU if they console themselves with temporary solutions. Thus, the parties should acknowledge the truth before it is too late. Using the Commission's terminology, it would be better to have a train crash on December 15th, At least then, EU member states could see that Turkey will not and cannot accept a Greek imposed solution for the sake of EU membership and they could then sincerelysupport a comprehensive settlement on a UN platform that bares resemblance to the Annan Plan. 08

9 Turkey's New Anti-Terror Law: A Hassle on the Way to EU or a Far More Complex Story? 1 Volkan Aytar, TESEV Democratization Program Officer The early 2000s brought about hopeful signs of improvements in the protection of human rights in the face of the hitherto authoritarian security policies of the Turkish state. Following the constitutional amendment of October 2001, eight European Union Harmonization Packages were adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly between February 2002 and May All eight packages included impressive changes in legislation, which enlarged the domain of citizens' rights vis-à-vis previously security-oriented state structures. The changes also incorporated amendments to the draconian Anti-Terror Law (TMK) of April 12, The TMK was formulated and legislated during the height of the conflict between the Turkish security forces and the rebels of the outlawed PKK in eastern and southeastern Anatolia, and was among the strongest legislative tools for the 'securitization' of state and society. A substantive reform was introduced by the sixth package, dated June-July 2003, whereby the notorious Article 8 - which had penalized written and oral propaganda and mass demonstrations and marches aiming to disrupt the unity of the Republic of Turkey with its land and nation, and thus was among the strongest legal sources of the abridgment of freedom of expression in Turkey - was removed in order to extend the space for freedom of thought and expression and provided further clarification of the definition of terror. However, since 2004, with the end of the PKK's self-declared cease-fire, the security situation has deteriorated with renewed fighting in the region, as well as increasing urban terrorism. Additionally, since mid-2005, strange bombings in the region, such as in the notorious case in fiemdinli, increased concern that shadowy formations, reportedly operating within some factions of the state's security establishment, had re-introduced dirty methods to combat the PKK and to halt, or at least slow down, the general shift towards democratization. Also, in this context, various security sector bureaucrats made statements directly or indirectly criticizing and challenging legislative changes incorporated in the harmonization packages. Some claimed that reforms in the direction of democratization had hindered their capacity and ability to fight terrorism and crime. Such a line was voiced, most chiefly, by the Chief of the General Staff, Hilmi Özkök, in August 2005 when he argued that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) decidedly continue fighting separatist terrorism although our authorities to do so had been curtailed. In the meantime, a gulf had, reportedly, emerged between the Prime Minister and more hard-line sections from within the state and the security establishment, especially with regard to the Kurdish problem. Erdo an's public statements in August 2005 implied that the state may have made mistakes in the past, and that Turkish citizenship constitutes a common umbrella under which different ethnic self-identifications may continue to exist. Unsurprisingly, such comments were received rather coldly by certain parts of the state and security establishment, as well as by the PKK who continued its attacks. The government also found itself at a difficult situation when the TSK reacted toughly to a local prosecutor who indirectly implicated General Yaflar Büyükan t with the fiemdinli incident and shadowy formations surrounding counter-terrorism measures of the last decade or so. Volkan Aytar is a Program Officer for the TESEV Democratization Program. He coordinates research and advocacy activities on democratization issues. He is currently a PhD candidate in Sociology at the State University of New York at Binghamton. 1 This article is based on a report prepared by TESEV in collaboration with the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels. For more information, please consult the TESEV website. 2 The ninth harmonization package prepared in 2006 will not be tackled in this article. 09

10 10 Opposition to the Law on Amending the TMK remained weak and disparate. During parliamentary discussions, few AKP and CHP legislators raised concern with the draft in terms of the abridgment of the individual rights and liberties. However, with few exceptions, the opposition CHP were mainly centered on the claim that the government lacked the political will to fight Islamic terrorism ; had no effective plan to fight PKK related separatist terrorism; and that the proposed Article 6 paved the way for an amnesty for the leaders of terrorist organizations, including Abdullah Öcalan. The government was also criticized by secularist circles, most chiefly represented by the main parliamentary opposition, the Republican People's Party (CHP). CHP continued to claim that the AKP's policy of handling the Kurdish problem and the increasing violence in the region was ineffective as well as dangerous, while its stance towards Islamic terrorism was half-hearted at best. Numerous CHP legislators argued that the government was unwilling to crack down on insidious reactionary forces (irtica), especially when Turkey was speedily becoming a target for global terrorism, particularly Al Qaeda and its local offshoots and operatives. Hence the government became motivated to convince the state and security establishment that it was not soft on terrorism and crime. Also, counter-terrorism measures in many European countries, especially in the United Kingdom, seem to have constituted an added pretext for an authoritarian revision of the TMK. Indeed, amid reports of intensive lobbying by the security establishment who, according to the Justice Minister's statement, requested powers not more and not less then those in England, a draft law on amending the TMK was prepared by the government under the coordination of the Ministry of Justice. While the reasoning behind the Law amending the TMK argues that the balance between security provision and human rights protection will be kept and that no civil rights and liberties would be abridged, numerous articles of the Law signal a move in the opposite direction. For example, Article 3 of the Law identifies 50 offenses referred to in the Turkish Penal Code (TCK) as terror offenses, if those were to be committed in the framework of the activities of a terrorist organization. Article 5 increases penalties for the press and allows judges and prosecutors to stop the publication of periodicals for up to a month. Article 6 also increases penalties for the press for helping conduct propaganda of terrorist organizations and makes the proprietors of the periodicals additionally responsible for those crimes. The article also penalizes masking faces, carrying symbols and uniforms of the terrorist organizations and additionally increases those penalties if offenses take place at the premises of associations, foundations, political parties, trade unions and professional organizations, educational institutions and dormitories. Article 9 limits the number of lawyers that the suspects can hire to one, and allows judges not to allow the suspects communicate with their lawyers for 24 hours. Article 9 also allows judges to allow the presence of a civil servant at the meetings between the suspects and their lawyers. Other articles of the Law on amending the TMK prove to be equally problematic in terms of human rights and liberties and the authority granted to security officers. Article 11 allows security officers to hire up to three lawyers to defend them when they become suspects. The cost of hiring all three lawyers is then made accountable to the state and not the suspect. Article 14 also increases the state's protection coverage for those security officers, prosecutors and judges, and allows public servants to also be involved in counter-terrorism measures. In addition, article 16 allows the security forces to aim and shoot terrorists after demanding them to surrender. Opposition to the Law on Amending the TMK remained weak and disparate. During parliamentary discussions, few AKP and CHP legislators raised concern with the draft in terms of the abridgment of the individual rights and liberties. However, with few exceptions, the opposition CHP were mainly centered on the claim that the government lacked the political will to fight Islamic terrorism ; had no effective plan to fight PKK related separatist terrorism; and that the proposed Article 6 paved the way for an amnesty for the leaders of terrorist

11 organizations, including Abdullah Öcalan (note that controversial sections of Article 6 were later removed from the draft by the sub-committee). In general, one could claim that the CHP remained close to the sensibilities of the security establishment and did not raise concerns in terms of citizens' rights and liberties. NGOs, however, raised opposition with the Law and its individual articles. Although the Justice Minister continually claimed that they sought the opinions of all interested parties, it was unclear how many of the reservations voiced by civil society had been incorporated into the draft. As the EU continues to debate on how to keep that fine balance and as there exist increasing concerns in Europe that the conditions of fighting terrorism start have a negative impact on citizens' rights, Turkey's highly promising development in the similar domain may significantly slow down, if not totally halt as exemplified in the amendment to the TMK. However, the TMK signifies how global anti-terror fears and some administrative/legal measures, such as those in the UK, provide additional pretexts or alibisfor authoritarian revisions. The TMK signifies how global anti-terror fears and some administrative/legal measures, such as those in the UK, provide additional pretexts or alibis for authoritarian revisions. Unless civil society dialogue between the EU and Turkey develops effectively enough to help represent the ongoing debates respectively, and if EU institutions continue to place the sole critical emphasis on problematic Turkish Civil- Military Relations at the expense of the equally important problems in the balance between security and rights, insist on seeing Turkey primarily as a gateway country that would keep unwanted immigrants, arms, narcotics and terrorists out of Europe, and fail to establish society-to-society, institution-to-institution, legislator-to-legislator relations that would help increase civilian and citizen capacity building efforts and provide a repertoire of policies to choose from among and to protect the fragile process of democratization in Turkey, the future of that vital and fragile balance between security and human rights looks bleak both in Turkey and in Europe. 11

12 TESEV's 2006 Events Istanbul Symposium II: Gender Equality and Political Participation in the Middle East and North Africa February 6-7, Istanbul World Movement For Democracy Fourth Assembly: Advancing Democracy: Justice, Pluralism and Participation April 2-5, Istanbul 3rd Bosphorus Conference EU-Turkey relations: One year on Turkey's progress towards the EU September 15-16, Istanbul EuroMeSCo Annual Conference: Paths to Democracy and Inclusion within Diversity October 6-7, Istanbul TESEV Publications TESEV Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakf Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation We would like to express our appreciation to TESEV High Advisory Board and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung for their support to this bulletin. TESEV EU WATCH Owner: Can Paker (Executive Board) Responsible coordinator: Mensur Akgün Editor: Seda Köknel Translation: Utku Kundakc, Jonathan Levack Head office: TESEV Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation Bankalar cad. Minerva Han No: 2 Kat: Tel: Fax: Karaköy / stanbul Graphic design and aplication: Myra Printing office: Çetin Ofset Type of publication: Periodical Diacan Grafik Matbaac l k Tic. Ltd. fiti. Yerebatan cad. Salk m Sö üt sk. No: 2 Kat: Tel: Ca alo lu / stanbul