XXII Forum Ekonomiczne Krynica-Zdrój, 4-6 września 2012 SZEF SZTABU GENERALNEGO WOJSKA POLSKIEGO GENERAŁ MIECZYSŁAW CIENIUCH

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1 XXII Forum Ekonomiczne Krynica-Zdrój, 4-6 września 2012 Panel:,,Zwrot USA w stronę Azji: Jakie konsekwencje dla Europy?" SZEF SZTABU GENERALNEGO WOJSKA POLSKIEGO GENERAŁ MIECZYSŁAW CIENIUCH Ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to be with you here today to address such a distinguished audience an audience that truly understands the value of international cooperation which galvanizes our efforts to successfully cope with the contemporary security challenges and confront the economical crisis. We realise this crisis, in the worst case scenario, can cause Europe largely powerless to shape the international politics of the first half of the 21 st century, with long term negative impacts on global security environment. Over the course of the next few minutes, I intend to deliver - as a starter to further discussion - a few thoughts on proposed topic The meaning of America s pivot to Asia for the Europeans. The Pivot coincides, in time and space, with the financial crisis in Europe, and additionally coincides with significant changes in the geopolitical environment. The most significant developments here are the rise of China and other powers in Asia, but also a larger sense of instability in the Arab world and Middle East. Naturally, given my portfolio I am focusing a bit more on the security aspects of it, acknowledging that it is only a part of a wider context. Nevertheless, both areas, I mean security and economic conditions, are strictly interrelated. We can find many examples to support this statement in human history. Most probably, the potential security consequences of economic stress were well understood also by the original drafters of the North Atlantic Treaty which was established in 1949, four years after the close of World War Two. Let me remind us that Article 2 of the Treaty committed the parties to work together to preserve the economic conditions necessary for peace. In order 1

2 to preserve and sustain peace you should guarantee a credible security environment, which nowadays is even more complex, multidimensional and, what can cause some concern, is also uncertain. Consider how the Arab Spring swept across North Africa and the Middle East so quickly and unexpectedly and how the depth of the global economic crisis in which we now find ourselves was, until a few years ago, unforeseen. The currently evolving situation there does not look very positive right now either... But, focusing on the US s pivot. Intentionally, I am not to argue about the reasons of that decision, and will neither justify nor criticize the United States decision to shift its foreign policy towards Asia. It was an independent, sovereign US national decision and we simply face it and try to adapt to it as well as we can. Here, I focus rather on possible consequences of this decision, mainly within the security frame. Besides some U.S. officials post-decision announcements, which emphasise that Asia commitment does not come at the expense of Europe, we are witnessing a situation that for the first time in over seventy years, Europe is ceasing to be at the centre of the U.S. world view. As a by-product, the United States is looking for a larger European strategic autonomy, at least regionally. As a matter of fact, looking from the opposite direction, the pivot is partially dependent on Europe s ability to take care of its own business. If Europeans prove unable to contain a crisis that poses a serious threat to the continent, the U.S. will have no choice but to intervene. Such intervention may turn out to be more costly than to retain some U.S. military presence in Europe. In that sense some may argue that the Asia pivot is nothing to be afraid of from the European perspective. The United States will probably remain a European power, though its involvement in future conflicts or crisis in and around Europe may be more cautious, limited and restrained. One of the challenges resulting from the pivot are for NATO to refine its identity. NATO for a long time relied on U.S. military power and got used it. The European allies have a million more troops under arms than the United States, 2

3 but the U.S. provides a larger share of forces that are capable of deploying and fighting abroad. That is a fact. Unfortunately, the military capability gap between Europe and the U.S. does not seem to shrink in the years to come. While most allies are reducing their military budgets to cope with the economic crisis and while frequently competing with the ministries of interior (who are responsibile for illegal immigrants, frequently seen as a more imminent national threat among allies), they are cutting deeper than the Americans do, and they are starting from a lower base. The deterioration of defence spending will constrain Europe s capacity to intervene in future crisis. It s not a matter of one or two years, but in the long term if the need to use force suddenly arises, you can t deliver that military capability if you have not spent the money for it over the course of a decade. So what should be done about that? First, Europe needs to invest in military capabilities which are required to maintain its status in the world. We have to acquire our own strategic enablers (e.g. air-to-air refuelling, targeting, strategic transport, satellite surveillance, reconnaissance systems and so forth) for crisis management operations, so as to reduce the disproportionate dependence on U.S. means. In the recent 2011 Libya campaign roughly 90% of the above mentioned as we call it in military jargon enablers were American. No single European country is capable of generating such capabilities on its own. So, the visible solution is a collective European with a shared use of expensive military equipment which individual smaller nations cannot afford. But any attempts at multilateral procurement are not easy. Governments frequently look at such aspects like safeguarding employment at home or losing their autonomy by sharing their military assets. This is a process which needs time and a period of trust building. Second, such collective decisions on future capabilities requires the effective decision-making procedures and structure, which should base on a common agreement (or compromise) concerning functional and geographic priorities for the most likely deployments. Every action and national comment after that should be in line with common European foreign directives. But how effective can Europe s common foreign policy be today? It is also a process, which slowly develops. Again, 3

4 the Libyan crisis has shown, that Europeans have different views on which types of crisis and in which parts of the world they feel responsible for. There is a long road ahead of us create an effective common security and defence policy as part of a common foreign policy in Europe. Next, the American pivot implies a less pronounced American role in NATO and this may change the meaning of the NATO-EU relations in the long run. In the past, about 20 years ago when the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) concept was crafted, it was assumed that the concept would transform into a technical European pillar firmly anchored in and subservient to NATO, mostly due to American presence. But gradually, the situation has changed. The way to keep NATO viable is to reinforce European ownership of it, which starts with reinforcing the EU. In a reconfigured transatlantic partnership, Europe would collectively define a strategy for crisis management. Finally, what does the pivot mean for Poland in particular? For most of the past two decades, Poland saw NATO as its primary insurance policy. It was largely because the transatlantic alliance includes the United States and its military presence in Europe. Warsaw considered Washington a particularly reliable ally within the Alliance and treats the bilateral military cooperation with the U.S. as a key feature of its national security. A few years ago we invited the U.S. to deploy some of its military personnel on our soil. As our foreign minister Mr. Radosław Sikorski said, Poland is determined to have alliances backed by realities, backed by capabilities. Our military indeed cooperates very closely with the U.S. Armed Forces in many areas and we feel this tie to be strong, solid, and enduring. In fact, our soldiers enjoy working with their American counterparts, there is frequently a special camaraderie developing among our soldiers serving in the field, on missions, in the staffs or in the air or at sea. Those bonds are not to be underestimated, as they provide a true military partnership among our nations and states, which historically dates back to the XVIII century. Now, while keeping our Polish U.S. bilateral military relations strong, given the circumstances, we also have to diversify our security guarantees and look at various 4

5 European defence cooperation options. Those do not exclude defence cooperation with the U.S. We saw our EU presidency as a way to establish our European credentials. Among other priorities, Poland proposed a variety of ways to reinvigorate the EU s defence efforts, from improving EU-NATO cooperation and making EU battlegroups easier to deploy. Unfortunately, as the Euro crisis rumbles on, the security and crisis management issues were losing their importance among several capitals. Closing my intervention, I am careful with joining those who argue that the Asia pivot is leaving European defence and security structures unaffected. It will be rather difficult to sustain European defence collaboration in this, financially challenging climate. The Euro crisis is a defining moment of challenge not only to the economic but also to the security institutions upon which the West relies. I would like to re-emphasise to many of you well known argument - that the time for debate on the future Europe is now. I go even further, it is time for action. Thank you for your attention. Naturally, I am open for further discussion and to take your questions and from the floor. 5

DECLARATION ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS *

Original: English NATO Parliamentary Assembly DECLARATION ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS * www.nato-pa.int May 2014 * Presented by the Standing Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly on Friday 30 May