South China Sea 2011 Update. Prof. Pete Pedrozo

Transcription

1 South China Sea 2011 Update Prof. Pete Pedrozo

2 SLOC security Why is the SCS Important? 1/3 of world shipping moves through SCS 25% of world s crude oil passes through the SCS SLOCs life line of Asia-Pacific economies Most export-oriented/resource-deficient region Countries heavily dependent on seaborne trade Fundamental to regional economic development Control over SCS resources (oil and gas; fish stocks) Vietnam, RP and Malaysia economies dependent on SCS resources Excessive maritime claims inconsistent with UNCLOS Unilateral closure of water space subject to high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the seas FON is more than just transit rights Military activities, counter-piracy ops, SAR, counter-proliferation ops, etc.

3 South China Sea: Paracels and Spratlys PRC, Taiwan, RP, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei VN-23 RP-9 CH-7 MA-7

4 Largest feature in Spratlys Occupied by Taiwan 460 km (248 nm) from Taiwan Only feature with fresh water source UNCLOS Art 121 To qualify as an island feature must be capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life of its own Only islands may claim 200 nm EEZ/continental shelf Itu Aba

5 PRC Claim Cow s Tongue 1948/49 map (Cow s Tongue) 1958 TS declaration 1992 TS/CZ law 1996 UNCLOS ratification 1996 SBL law 2009 Island Protection law 2009 protests to CLCS Philippines claim Vietnam/Malaysia claims 2010 post-arf meeting 2011 response to RP protest 2011 SOA China Ocean Development Report

6 Changing Landscape 2010 PRC officials indicate on the margins that SCS is a core interest (Mar 2010) Category of non-negotiable territorial claim Other core interests Taiwan and Tibet US responds at Jul 2010 ARF meeting US has national interest in FON, open access to SCS and respect for international law US supports multilateral settlement of dispute Oppose coercion/threat of force by any claimant Maritime claims should be IAW UNCLOS Supports ASEAN Code of Conduct (2002)

7 PLA Expanded Naval Exercises 03/10 Fiery Cross Reef exercise 07/10 large scale military exercise 11/10 live-fire exercise 02/11 anti-piracy exercise 06/11 amphibious training exercise 06/11 naval exercise (14 ships + 2 aircraft)

8 PRC Increased Law Enforcement Capacity in 2011 China Maritime Surveillance (SOA) adding: 7K new personnel by 2020 (9K 2011) 90 new enforcement vessels ( ) 36 inspection ships and 54 high speed speedboats 6 new aircraft ( ) 4 other agencies BCD MSA FLEC GAC

9 PRC Annual Fishing Ban 16 May 1 Aug 2011 PRC announced annual fishing ban for northern SCS (Paracels) Traditional Vietnamese fishing grounds 130K fishing boats 600K fishermen Vietnamese fishermen arrested by PRC 5 Jul PLA soldiers boarded VN F/V, beat captain, threatened crew, and confiscated 1 ton fish

10 Fishing Boat Incidents Jackson Atoll 25 Feb 11 within RP EEZ PLA(N) frigate (560) threatened and fired warning shots at 3 RP F/V in the vicinity of Jackson Atoll Investigator Northeast Shoal Jun 11 PLAAF jet buzzed RP F/V feet from top of mast

11 Interference with Resource Rights Reed Bank Incidents 2 Mar 11 harassment of M/V Voyager by 2 PRC patrol boats 85 nm from Palawan Island Conducting seismic survey RP military response - deployed OV-10 & observation plane 2 CG vessels to escort Voyager 12 May 11 2 PAF OV-10s on routine patrol IVO Reed Bank Basin buzzed by 2 PLAAF fighters 135 km (85 nm)

12 RP Response Diplomatic Protests to CLCS and Reed Bank incidents Bilateral exercises with US off Palawan Mar MALPHI-LAUT Apr RP-US BALIKATAN 28 Jun-8 Jul RP-US CARAT Strengthen AFP presence Upgrades to military airfield Deploy PCG SAR vessel, high endurance cutter and destroyer escort (Rajah Humabon) Increase maritime patrols Increase surveillance capabilities Improve facilities on occupied islets Continue oil exploration - offer oil blocks to foreign companies Removed PRC markers and construction material from Boxhall Reef, Amy Douglas Bank and Reed Bank (May 11) Seeking US assurances on US-RP MDT

13 RP Response 20 Jul Filipino lawmakers visit Pagasa (Hope) Island (largest RPoccupied feature in SCS) Pledge funds to improve islet s infrastructure Water purifying system Cold storage facility Harbor works/pier improvements Runway improvements

14 Vietnam Survey Incidents 26 May 11 - Binh Minh 02 operated by PetroVietnam conducting seismic surveys 116 nm off Vietnamese coast Over 630 km from Hainan Island PRC maritime surveillance vessels cut exploration cable Endangering PRC fishermen Cable 30 m below waterline Planned operation 9 Jun 11 Viking II conducting surveys obstructed by PRC fishing vessel 60 nm off coast Over 1000 km from Hainan 116nm

15 Diplomatic Protest Vietnam Response Violation of Vietnamese sovereign rights Clearly within EEZ Inconsistent w/ UNLCOS Violation of resource jurisdiction Inconsistent w/ ASEAN DOC Continue exploration Escort survey vessels Protect investors Naval live-fire exercise (13 Jun) 20 nm off coast Bilateral exercise with US (Jul 11) Indian Navy port visit (Jul 11) Urge ASEAN navies to unite again PRC aggression (28 Jul 11) Open Cam Ranh Bay for use by foreign navies

16 PRC Response Waters under PRC jurisdiction Normal marine LEN and surveillance activities Normal for PRC companies to conduct economic activities in SCS Increased patrols by CG and FLEC Increased presence around Iroquois Reef-Amy Douglas Bank (125 nm from RP) Deployment of super-rig to SCS in July 2011 Singapore port visit by new 3000 ton MSA patrol ship (Haixun-31) New carrier will serve in SCS in 2012

17 Harsh Rhetoric People s Daily (CCP mouthpiece) If Vietnam wishes to create a war in the SCS, China will resolutely keep them company. China won t sit idly by while its territory is swallowed up by others. We re there to be a serious miscalculation on this matter [referring to RP], the due consequences would have to be paid. PRC Vice FM Cui Tiankai I believe the individual countries are actually playing with fire and I hope the fire will not be drawn to the US. PRC Amb. to RP Liu Jianchao We're calling on other parties to stop searching for the possibility of exploiting resources in these areas where China has its claims." Liberation Army Daily (PLA mouthpiece) Vietnam s live-fire military exercise will intensify tensions in the region.

18 Singapore Regional Reactions Mar 11 Singapore-India naval exercise SCS 20 Jun 11 - called on PRC to clarify its claims indicating current ambiguity has caused serious concerns in the international maritime community (Re-emphasize by SECSTATE Clinton at ARF in Jul 11) Indonesia Jul 10 Note Verbale to UN PRC claim clearly lacks international legal basis and is tantamount to upset UNCLOS Jun 11 SCS claimants should include other countries in the process Sep 11 agreement with Vietnam to conduct joint patrols in SCS Australia-Japan-US trilateral naval exercise off Brunei (9 Jul 11) Indian Navy port visit to Vietnam (Jul 11) PLA(N) query 45 nm off coast NZ SCS claimants must heed UNCLOS (12 Aug 11) Taiwan set up ocean research center on Dongsha Atoll (Sep 11)

19 Increased US Attention Sen. McCain (21 Jun 11) keynote address CSIS Dinner: US should assist ASEAN member states in developing and deploying an early warning system and coastal vessels in the SCS Emphasize importance of unified ASEAN effort in addresses disputes with PRC (multilateral approach) Develop binding Code of Conduct Best way to prevent conflict is build capabilities and undertake joint operations Re-iterated USG support for the RP

20 More Assertive USG Response US-RP joint press conference (23 Jun) SECSTATE gave assurances that US is committed to defend the RP and US would provide RP affordable and reliable military equipment US-RP talks (24 Jun) SECDEF pledged to enhance intelligence sharing to upgrade RP maritime situational awareness in SCS and strengthen RP defense capabilities

21 US Senate Resolution S. Res. 217 (27 Jun 11) - Resolved, That the Senate-- 1) reaffirms the strong support of the United States for the peaceful resolution of maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and pledges continued efforts to facilitate a multilateral, peaceful process to resolve these disputes; 2) deplores the use of force by naval and maritime security vessels from China in the South China Sea; 3) calls on all parties to the territorial dispute to refrain from threatening force or using force to assert territorial claims; and 4) supports the continuation of operations by the United States Armed Forces in support of freedom of navigation rights in international waters and air space in the South China Sea.

22 US Military Activities CJCS Visit to PRC (Jul 11) ADM Mullen These *SRO+ flights, these operations, these exercises are all conducted IAW international norms, and essentially we will continue to comply with that in the future. We ve operated in the SCS for many decades, and we will continue to do that. Our enduring presence in this region has been important for our allies for decades and it will continue to be so. US-Vietnam Naval Exercise (Jul 11) RDML Carney We ve had a presence in the Western Pacific and the SCS for years. We will maintain a presence in the Western Pacific and SCS as we have for decades, and we have not intention of departing from that kind of activity.

23 Draft of Guidelines of the Declaration of the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) 1. The implementation of the DOC should be carried out in a step-by-step approach in line with the provisions of the DOC 2. The parties to the DOC will continue to promote dialogue and consultations in accordance with the spirit of the DOC 3. The implementation of activities or projects as provided for in the DOC should be clearly identified 4. The participation in the activities or projects should be carried out on a voluntary basis 5. Initial activities to be undertaken under the ambit of the DOC should be confidence-building measures 6. The decision to implement concrete measures or activities of the DOC should be based on consensus among parties concerned, and lead to the eventual realization of a Code of Conduct (COC) 7. In the implementation of the agreed projects under the DOC, the services of the experts and eminent persons, if necessary, will be sought to provide specific input on the projects concerned 8. Progress of the implementation of the agreed activities and projects under the DOC shall be reported annually to the ASEAN-China Ministerial Meeting.

24 Talk Doesn t Make Rice Guidelines kick the can down the road again Back to where they were in 2002 when DOC signed PRC stall tactic to solidify its claims Long-standing PRC non-compliance with DOC Interference with resource rights of other states Expanded military presence in the SCS Conducting increasingly sophisticated military exercises PRC long-standing pattern of aggression 1974 Paracels US withdrawal from Vietnam 1988 Johnson South Reef collapse of USSR 1995 Mischief Reef US withdrawal from RP 2001 BOWDITCH/EP-3 incidents testing new Bush Administration 2009 IMPECCABLE incident testing new Obama Administration

25 PRC position: Call for Joint Development What is mine is mine, what is yours is also mine but we are willing to share yours. Why would any nation agree to jointly develop resources within its EEZ or on it continental shelf? Japan-PRC Agreement on Cooperation for the Development of ECS Resources (2008) In limbo

26 Compulsory Dispute Settlement? RP proposal to submit dispute to ITLOS (Jul 11) Rejected by PRC citing UNCLOS Art. 298 PRC has opted out of compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms for sea boundary delimitation But we re not talking about boundary delimitations Interference with coastal state s sovereign rights and jurisdiction over resources in the EEZ (e.g., fisheries and hydro-carbon deposits) is subject to compulsory dispute settlement

27 Way Forward? ASEAN must present a united front Multilateral not bilateral discussions Develop binding Code of Conduct in the short term Other claimants must resolve their differences Will require Vietnam to compromise with Malaysia and RP RP and Vietnam to pursue compulsory dispute settlement at ITLOS PRC interference with legitimate resource rights and jurisdiction Cooperation between regional navies Bilateral and multilateral exercises Information sharing US must take a position and reject PRC claims Sen. Webb by not taking a position the US is taking a position Continued US naval presence as a counter-balance Visible and robust Bilateral and multilateral engagement

28 Questions?