248 Türk ve Afrikal Sivil Toplum Kurulufllar / Turkish and African Civil Society Organizations

Transcription

1 247 PEACE AND CONFLICT SITUATION IN SUDAN EL Hussein Abdelgalil Mohamed YASSIN FEPS-Sudan Introduction The history of Sudan is littered with dozens of proposals and agreements to end the fighting. These agreements all have one thing in common: none was implemented, and none brought Sudan closer to peace. After 18 years, with over two million dead and over 4.5 million refugees and internally displaced, as difficult as it has been to reach agreements on paper, it is essential to recognize that the end product of past efforts has been paper agreements and nothing more. The history of Sudan is replete with paper agreements that the parties have quickly ignored, so that many hoped the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 9 January 2005 would not only end the long-running southern civil war, but provide the momentum and serve as a model for resolving other conflicts in the country. While the jury is still out on whether the CPA will survive until the 2011 referendum on southern self-determination, it has not served as the stimulus to end the war and humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Nor to date has the CPA advanced any reconciliation between the people of north and south Sudan, provided hope that its commitment to make unity attractive is being fulfilled, or is ushering in a democratic transformation of the country. There is a widespread acceptance that the CPA and the broader peace process it fostered is at best stalling, or at worst is collapsing. The IGAD Council of Ministers concluded the implementation of the CPA was lagging behind schedule and urged an extraordinary meeting of the IGAD Heads of State be held to consider the problem. However, the Sudan peace process is in a state of crisis which is not simply due to failures in the implementation of the agreement, but is a result of its narrow approach and short-sighted vision. By assuming a limited definition of peace, focusing solely on the north-south dimension of the conflict, refusing to involve other political parties and civil society, treating the media as a

2 248 Türk ve Afrikal Sivil Toplum Kurulufllar / Turkish and African Civil Society Organizations threat to the process, and leaving the fate of the process to SPLM/A leader Dr. John Garang and First Vice President Ali Osman Taha, it was successful in reaching an agreement based on an acceptance of the lowest common denominators of the parties. But this approach largely precluded the realization of its own stated objectives, which included a sustainable peace, Sudan s democratic transformation, and making unity attractive. The SPLM is facing enormous challenges which are severely undermining its ability to function as an effective partner in government. The SPLM faces two simultaneous tasks: as the lead party in the new autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), and the minority partner in the new Government of National Unity The SPLM is faring better in the South, as the GoSS slowly inches forward in the face of enormous physical and structural challenges. The 8 January Juba Declaration to integrate the bulk of the government-aligned southern armed groups operating within the umbrella South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) into the SPLA will help consolidate peace in the South, though implementation of the agreement will be difficult. Yet the GoSS is also facing some acute threats, most noticeably from the lack of progress on reorganizing the SPLA into a professional army, and the extended delays in paying its troops and civil servants. However, there are early signs that the SPLM is beginning to overcome some of its internal challenges and refocus its efforts on implementation of the CPA. Without a functioning and effective SPLM, there is little chance that the CPA will hold. In the face of all of this, the international community has remained largely silent. Heavy on monitoring but weak on follow-through, the international community particularly the key countries involved in the negotiation of the CPA has not yet embraced its role as a guarantor of the CPA, and continues to lack a consistent, coordinated approach to dealing with the parties, let alone holding them to their respective commitments. More consistent, proactive and forceful engagement by the international community is another required ingredient to see this agreement peacefully through the pitfalls that lie ahead. The weaknesses of the CPA: Lack of inclusivity of interested parties in southern Sudan, notably civil society and other political parties, and at the national level for a peace process that claimed to be comprehensive. The result is an agreement that is effectively a bilateral arrangement between the SPLM and the NCP for which most people in Sudan feel no sense of ownership.

3 Peace and Conflict Situation in Sudan 249 The elitist approach of the mediation was also manifest in its distain for the media. Instead of viewing the media as a partner in the peace process, a valued critic, and a crucial instrument with which to engage the Sudanese public and provide a measure of accountability, it was treated as an enemy and a threat. The lack of inclusivity of the peace process means that the Sudanese people can only pass judgment on the CPA through national elections, but the elections have been delayed and the difficulties in demarcating the north-south border and ending the conflict in Darfur may result in a further postponement. In addition, the development of a democratic culture conducive for the holding of fair elections has not been permitted to emerge in either north or south Sudan where security regimes dominate. Lastly, the National Assembly has passed legislation that prohibits parties participating in the national election unless they endorse the CPA, thus precluding a negative assessment of the agreement. The narrow focus of the CPA and the emphasis on reaching an agreement meant its implications were not fully appreciated. Thus the agreement to dissolve OAGs threatened to unleash a war between the SPLA and the South Sudan Defense Force, while the power sharing arrangement which gave the SPLM and the NCP the lion s share of state power undermined efforts to reach a settlement in Darfur and have encouraged secessionist sentiments in the country. Although never stated, the CPA was carried out on the basis of a narrow model which focused on ending the violence (many respondents referred to it as an extended cease-fire), instead of laying the basis for a sustainable and comprehensive peace in the south and the country at large. The lessons to be learned and recommendations: 1. The need for a strong commitment to democratic change as the cement upon which any peace agreement should be built, and that in turn necessitates a comprehensive conception of peace. It requires a much wider involvement in the process, robust reconciliation, and respect for the media. 2. This approach also recognizes that endemic conflict, such as that suffered in Sudan, is the result of deep-seated problems that necessitate structural change. 3. The experience of the CPA peace process makes clear that peace processes do not end with the signing of a peace agreement, but must continue into the post-conflict period.

4 250 Türk ve Afrikal Sivil Toplum Kurulufllar / Turkish and African Civil Society Organizations 4. Immediately reconstitute the National Constitutional Review Commission with the proper mandate to retroactively review all new bodies and legal acts related to the implementation of the CPA and ensure that they comply with the CPA and the Interim National Constitution. 5. The UN, World Bank, U.S., UK, Norway, Italy, other Donor Countries and IGAD Member States must Work to improve international coordination and strategies around the implementation process by forming a Technical Secretariat attached to the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, to track implementation and act as a central information clearinghouse for the international community on information relating to the CPA. 6. Link donor funding, both bilateral and through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, to the implementation records of the parties and develop clear benchmarks tied to future funding for the parties. 7. Channel financial support and technical expertise in the short-term to combat the greatest immediate threats to the CPA, by funding and helping to operationalize key commissions such as the Ad Hoc North-South Boundary Commission, the National Petroleum Commission, and the National Civil Service Commission. 8. Cease blocking the establishment of an effective National Petroleum Commission with the mandate agreed upon in the CPA. 9. SPLAM Immediately cancel all oil agreements in the South signed in violation of the CPA. Conflict Situation (Darfur) Background The war in Darfur is a military conflict in the Darfur region of western Sudan. Unlike the Second Sudanese Civil War, the current lines of conflict are seen to be ethnic and tribal, rather than political. One side is GOS. The other side comprises a variety of rebel groups, notably the Sudan Liberation Movement; the conflict began in February of There are many casualty estimates most concurring on a range within the hundreds of thousands of people. The United Nations estimates that the conflict has left as many as 400,000 dead from violence and disease. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum estimates that 100,000 have died each year. Most Non Governmental Organization use 200,000 to more than 400,000.Sudan s government claims that over10,000 people have been killed, although this figure is seen as a gross underestimate. As many as 2.5 million are thought to have been displaced as

5 Peace and Conflict Situation in Sudan 251 of October The United State Government has described it as genocide, although the UN has stated it is not genocide. In March 2007 the UN mission accused Sudan s government of orchestrating and taking part in gross violations in Darfur and called for urgent international action to protect civilians there. After fighting stopped in July and August, on August 31, 2006, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 1706 which called for a new 20,600-troop UN peacekeeping force called UNAMID to supplant or supplement a poorly funded and ill-equipped 7,000-troop African Union Mission in Sudan peacekeeping force. In March 2005, the Security Council formally referred the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, taking into account the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1564 of 2004, but without mentioning any specific crimes. the Prosecutor has found reasonable grounds to believe that the individuals identified [in the UN Security Council Resolution 1593] have committed crimes against humanity and war crimes, but did not find sufficient evidence to prosecute for genocide. In April 2007, the Judges of the ICC issued arrest warrants against the former Minister of State for the Interior, Ahmed Harun, and a Militia Janjaweed leader, Ali Kushayb, for crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Sudan Government says that the ICC had no jurisdiction to try Sudanese citizens and that it will not hand the two men over to its custody. On July 14, 2008, prosecutors at the International Criminal Court (ICC), filed ten charges of war crimes against Sudan s President Omar Al-Bashir, three counts of genocide, five of crimes against humanity and two of murder. The ICC s prosecutors have claimed that al-bashir masterminded and implemented a plan to destroy in substantial part three tribal groups in Darfur because of their ethnicity. The ICC s prosecutor for Darfur, Luis Moreno- Ocampo, is expected within months to ask a panel of ICC judges to issue an arrest warrant for Al-Bashir. The evidence was submitted to 3 judges who will decide whether to issue an arrest warrant in the coming months. If formally charged, Al-Bashir would become the first sitting head of state charged with genocide. Bashir has rejected the charges and said, Whoever has visited Darfur, met officials and discovered their ethnicities and tribes, will know that all of these things are lies. As Sudan has not ratified the Rome Statute the International Criminal Court can not investigate crimes that may have taken place in Darfur unless the United Nations Security council asks them to under Article 13.b of the

6 252 Türk ve Afrikal Sivil Toplum Kurulufllar / Turkish and African Civil Society Organizations Rome Statute ( A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations ). Current Situation The Darfur conflict has changed radically in the past year and not for the better. While there are many fewer deaths than during the high period of fighting in , it has mutated, the parties have splintered, and the confrontations have multiplied. Violence is again increasing, access for humanitarian agencies is decreasing, international peacekeeping is not yet effective and a political settlement remains far off. The strategy the African Union (AU)/UN mediation has been following cannot cope with this new reality and needs to be revised. The mediation should use this opportunity to reformulate the process, broadening participation and addressing all the conflict s root causes. UNAMID is unlikely to be fully operational until well into 2008, so it is important to complete the delivery of promised aid packages to AMIS quickly so that it can resume more active peacekeeping. When it is on the ground, UNAMID must build upon lessons learned from its predecessor, including to be more pro-active in protecting civilians and responding to ceasefire violations. Its leadership should also engage actively in the peace talks so as to ensure coherence between what is agreed and its capabilities. The international community must give it more support than it did AMIS, including strong responses, with sanctions as necessary, to further non-compliance by any party, as well as to actions that obstruct the peace process or violate international humanitarian law. RECOMMENDATIONS To the AU/UN Joint Mediation Support Team: 1. Return to Darfur for further consultations that bring in all constituencies on core issues such as land tenure, grazing rights, the Native Administration and cessation of hostilities, and seek to identify individuals to represent the interests of those constituencies at the peace talks, with specific attention to the representation of women. 2. Give the rebels participating in the SPLM-hosted Juba conference time to unify and create a common platform and joint negotiation strategy and to identify representatives before resuming peace talks, and encourage absent factions to take part in the Juba conference.

7 Peace and Conflict Situation in Sudan Prioritize a new ceasefire agreement when negotiations resume, including a commission inclusive of all its signatories, DPA signatories and adherents and AMIS/UNAMID, and supported as necessary by international guarantors of the peace process. 4. Ensure that UNAMID military and political leadership participate in the negotiations so as to ensure coherence between what is agreed upon and UNAMID s mandate, capabilities, planning and concept of operations. 5. Prevent DPA signatories and adherents from becoming spoilers by including them in the negotiations and ensuring that they are appropriately represented in any future power-sharing arrangements. 6. Mobilize regional and other international partners to press the negotiating parties to make goodwill gestures to prove commitment to the talks and improve the environment for agreement. On the Peacekeeping Operation: 7. GOS must create a coordination structure between state security committees and UNAMID to prevent the escalation of local conflicts and promote their speedy resolution. To AMIS/UNAMID: 8. Resume patrolling and priorities protection of IDP camps, humanitarian assistance and key transportation routes, including by working with all parties to set up up demilitarize zones around camps and humanitarian supply routes, as called for in the DPA. 9. Recommend to all Sudan (UNMIS, UNAMID) and Central African Republic/Chad (MINURCAT, EUFOR) peacekeeping missions a joint coordination and information exchange mechanism to maximize their protection of civilians and improve their capacities to deal with cross-border threats.