ending the waiting game

Transcription

1 A POWERFUL VOICE FOR LIFESAVING ACTION ending the waiting game Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma Kavita Shukla

2 Acknowledgments Refugees International was able to collect much of the information in this report on the very sensitive subject of internal displacement with the help of a number of Burmese people, based in Burma and Thailand, who generously gave their time and energy to our efforts. For security reasons we are unable to thank them by name but we are greatly indebted to them. Refugees International would also like to express its gratitude to Ashley South, Jana Mason and Mark Bartolini for their invaluable guidance and assistance with this report. Cover photo: This couple in Karen State has spent six years waiting in a temporary settlement near the Thailand border until it is safe enough to return home. They had been displaced from their home five times by the Burmese army before arriving here. Refugees International june 2006 Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

3 Table of Contents Executive Summary i Introduction Types of Displacement and Conditions of the Displaced Population Displacement Resulting from Counter-insurgency Displacement in Ceasefire Areas Development-induced Displacement Urban Displacement Summary of Displacement by Geographic Area Displacement as a Consequence of Economic Vulnerability Conditions of the Displaced Population Humanitarian Response Inside Burma The Government of Burma Burma-based Agencies Thailand-based Agencies The Debate Over Aid and Engagement The Aid Dilemma Concern about Aid Reaching People in Need Sanctions vs. Engagement The International Community s Response to Burma Rationale for International Assistance Inside Burma Towards a More Effective Response to Internal Displacement Burma-based Agencies Thailand-based Agencies The Government of Burma Refugees International s Recommendations Glossary Notes

4 executive summary Burma is experiencing one of the most neglected humanitarian and human rights crises in the world. No less than half a million people are internally displaced in the eastern part of the country and at least one million more have fled to neighboring nations. This report provides an in-depth look at the causes of displacement in Burma, the acute needs of the internally displaced population and the current response to those needs. Because the Government of Burma is not fulfilling its responsibility to protect and support its own people, the report recommends that the U.S. and the international aid community channel more funds into Burma. Because the Government of Burma is not fulfilling its responsibility to protect and support its own people, particularly ethnic minorities, the report recommends that the United States and the international aid community channel more funds into Burma. The Burmese people cannot wait for a civilian government before receiving humanitarian assistance from the outside world. International aid is already attempting to respond to a number of crises in Burma threatening millions of people. If these crises are not addressed immediately, their long-term impact will affect many generations to come, not only in Burma, but in the surrounding region. The international community should provide aid to Burma for four key reasons: 1. Aid is needed to respond to humanitarian crises and control their spread in the region. 2. aid is required to build the capacity of community-based organizations and other non-governmental organizations that can access areas that are off-limits to international organizations. 3. aid can lay the foundations of democracy and contribute to a bottom-up social and political transition. 4. aid can help create a national identity and be used for conflict-resolution and peace-building initiatives. More than five decades of conflict between the Burman controlled state and ethnic non-burman nationalities has forced millions from their homes. Although many ethnic groups originally fought for independence, today almost all accept the Union of Burma and merely seek increased local authority and equality within a new federal structure. The Burmese military government, the State Peace and Development Council, still suspects these groups of scheming to split the country and uses this as a justification for its brutal policies, including executions, torture, disappearances, forced conscription of children in the armed forces, rape, demolition of places of worship, and forced labor. To a lesser extent, human rights violations are also carried out by ethnic insurgent groups fighting the government. Hundreds of thousands of people continue to be displaced in areas where armed conflict has ended. Human rights abuses by the military, large-scale development and infrastructure projects, and schemes to resettle the urban poor have all driven people from their homes. The most widespread form of displacement in Burma is migration by people seeking a secure livelihood, but they are generally not considered internally displaced under UN guidelines. Displaced people in Burma live in ceasefire areas administered by ethnic nationalities, government-run relocation sites, and conflict and war-affected areas. Conditions are poor for most internally displaced people, but those in conflict and war-affected zones are especially vulnerable. In terms of health care delivery, the World Health Organization has ranked Burma 190th out of 191 countries. Basic medical supplies are difficult to obtain in the country and there is a lack of information about diseases such as HIV/AIDS, even though Burma has one i Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

5 of the most serious epidemics in Asia. Surveys show that some in the displaced population have never even heard of HIV/AIDS. It is further estimated that one in six children under the age of five is acutely malnourished among internally displaced and war-affected people. Access to education is similarly low in conflict and war-affected areas, there are often no resources for teacher salaries and educational materials. When fighting breaks out the schools may be destroyed and education disrupted. The Government of Burma does not recognize the existence of internally displaced people in its borders and has no programs to assist them. Most displacement in Burma is the result of government policy and military action and officials regularly prevent organizations from accessing and responding to the needs of the Burmese people. An international response to displacement is all the more necessary for humanitarian reasons and to help protect the people. The presence of international or local organization personnel helps reduce the government s human rights violations because the regime does not want witnesses to acts of violence. Humanitarian aid to internally displaced people is provided by Burma-based international agencies, community-based organizations, and Thailand-based agencies. Access to the neediest populations is extremely restricted and international organizations lack the capacity to identify most populations of internally displaced persons. People in the conflict and war-affected areas of eastern Burma are off limits to international agencies with the exception of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has limited access. Within the UN system, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the only agency to have received permission from the government to become involved with internally displaced people. A 2003 survey revealed that up to 214,000 community-based organizations and 270 local non-governmental organizations operate in Burma. Because local groups can access many more locations than international organizations, partnerships between international agencies and local networks offer a promising means to meet the needs of internally displaced people. Some Thailand-based groups also provide cross-border assistance including food provision; medical care for communicable diseases, obstetric emergencies and other problems; water and sanitation awareness programs; and teacher training. However, limited capacity and resources hinder their operations. Since 1988, humanitarian assistance has been reduced dramatically, while disease, poverty, malnutrition and human rights abuses have increased. After the Burmese military brutally suppressed the democracy movement in 1988, most countries cut off bilateral aid to Burma with the rationale that aid would have little positive impact and would reinforce the military regime. Humanitarian assistance has been reduced dramatically since that time, while disease, poverty, malnutrition and human rights abuses have increased. The Burmese government has consistently resisted international efforts, which have been fragmented and incoherent, to convince it to change its policies and end internal oppression. The debate over aid rages on and even those who support aid to Burma are concerned that the assistance will be misdirected by the regime for its own use. As in any other country, there is the possibility that aid will allow the government to divert resources to other purposes, but most assistance is provided in areas where the government is ignoring the needs of the people. Disagreement also prevails over sanctions against the regime. Some believe such policies cause the people to suffer while the junta survives through the support of Asian neighbors. Others argue that sanctions provide moral support to pro-democracy forces and will weaken the regime in the long run. ii

6 Recommendations (See full list of recommendations on pp ) Donor governments should fund humanitarian agencies based in Burma now. The US in particular should expand funding for humanitarian initiatives and allocate more resources for displaced people in Burma. Humanitarian needs in Burma have reached a stage where they must be addressed immediately. A number of additional steps must be taken by the Government of Burma, the international aid community, the United Nations, international agencies based in Burma and Thailand, the United States and other nations to assist internally displaced people in Burma. First and foremost, the Government of Burma must respect the human rights of its people and allow agencies to support and assist displaced people in its borders. This is unlikely to happen any time soon, and the overall goal of donor governments and international organizations therefore should be to convince the Burmese government to allow access to the entire population in all parts of the country. International organizations have been able to expand gradually their involvement in sensitive subjects such as HIV/AIDS, so there is reason to expect that dialogue can make a difference. The United Nations as a whole must develop a common strategy to respond to the humanitarian and human rights crises in Burma. The Security Council should put Burma on its agenda and explore possibilities for a lasting political solution in the country. Top UN officials must make Burma a priority and attempt to urge the Burmese regime to recognize internal displacement and follow its responsibilities under international human rights and humanitarian law. Collective action is needed by the UN Country Team, and UNHCR and the UN Children s Fund (UNICEF) especially need to play a greater role with internally displaced people. Both UNHCR and UNICEF have an opportunity to urge the government to grant them access to the displaced because of programs they have already been given permission to run. Until greater access is achieved, the United Nations and other international agencies should channel funds through community-based organizations and train local networks on collecting data on human rights violations and other vulnerabilities. This data should be shared with advocacy organizations and agencies within Burma that are able to investigate cases of abuse. The emergence of civil society networks and community-based organizations in Burma should be encouraged, especially among minority and under-represented groups. Donors should also develop strategies to protect displaced people in war-affected zones from further violence and abuse and help build the capacity of Thailand-based agencies, which are virtually the only groups providing aid to displaced people in these areas. While the situation in Burma presents major challenges for the world at large, it can no longer be ignored. Humanitarian needs in Burma have reached a stage where they must be addressed immediately and international organizations in the country with the expertise to respond to these crises must be given permission by the Government of Burma to carry out their activities. More international organizations should consider working in Burma and the international community must support their initiatives. The displaced people inside Burma deserve no less. iii Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

7 Ending the Waiting Game Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma INTRODUCTION We cannot lay low. We have a duty to the people of Burma. We have to get information on abuses out and be more vocal. International aid worker in Burma The situation in Burma * presents acute humanitarian challenges. While the country has been in the throes of a political and human rights crisis for decades, with terrible consequences for civilians, the Burmese government has prevented humanitarian organizations from assessing and responding to their needs. The lack of access not only blocks an effective response, but limits information on the plight of the Burmese people from reaching the outside world. This is especially the case for the large internally displaced population in the country belonging primarily to ethnic minority groups. Burma s most protracted armed conflict has been between the Burman controlled state and ethnic non-burman nationalities which constitute approximately 35 percent of the nation s population of 52 million. 1 Although many ethnic groups originally fought for independence, today almost all have accepted the Union of Burma as a fact and merely seek increased local authority and equality within a new federal structure. The regime, presently known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), 2 still suspects them of scheming to split the country and sees this as justification for its repressive, often brutal policies against minorities. 3 Violations carried out by the SPDC in the minority areas include persecution, torture, disappearances, extrajudicial executions, forcible conscription of children in the armed forces, widespread rape, demolition of places of worship, forced relocation, and forced labor. To a lesser extent, violations are also being carried out by ethnic insurgent groups fighting the government. At present, no less than half a million people are internally displaced in just the eastern part of the country. More than a million have fled to neighboring nations of Thailand, Malaysia, India, Bangladesh and China in search of asylum. The causes of displacement are not restricted to conflict alone. Hundreds of thousands of people, all over the country, have been displaced in areas where armed conflict has come to an end due to human rights abuses by the military, large-scale development and infrastructure projects, and schemes to resettle the urban poor. The most widespread form of displacement in Burma is migration to gain a secure livelihood, with its root causes linked to decades of poor governance and the underdevelopment of peripheral areas populated by ethnic minorities. Migration is often the only option available to poor and marginalized people and while they would not be considered internally displaced persons according to the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 4 such migrants are extremely vulnerable. As their movement is frequently non-voluntary, this type of population movement may also constitute forced migration. 5 The Guiding Principles confer upon national authorities the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs) within their jurisdiction. Additionally they grant internally displaced persons the right to request and to receive protection and humanitarian assistance from these authorities. The Principles state that international humanitarian organizations have the right to Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced in areas where armed conflict has come to an end. * In 1989 the English name of the country was changed from Burma to Myanmar by the Burmese military regime. Using either Burma or Myanmar has since become a highly politicized issue. Ethnic groups that are not ethnic Burman regard the name change as part of an effort to Burmanize national culture. Refugees International uses the name Burma.

8 The national authorities are largely responsible for the displacement of people. The government does not allow international agencies to access the displaced. offer their services in support of the internally displaced, and authorities shall not arbitrarily withhold consent, particularly when they are unable or unwilling to provide the required assistance. In the case of Burma, the national authorities are largely responsible for the displacement of people and the IDP issue has acquired political sensitivity. The government does not allow international agencies to access the displaced. The displaced don t identify themselves as there is no advantage to coming forward. Far from providing assistance and protection in areas of government jurisdiction, the authorities refuse to recognize the existence of internally displaced people. The IDP situation in Burma is very complex and dynamic. Due to a lack of international access and the constant internal movement of people as a result of government harassment and the overall failure of state institutions, it is difficult to be precise about exactly who should be considered internally displaced. What is clear, however, is that displacement is a widespread phenomenon and few displaced people have been able to achieve stability in their lives. Specific criteria for the achievement and sustainability of durable solutions to internal displacement include: legal integration indicated by freedom of movement, protection against forcible return, non-discrimination, the ability to exercise land, property and citizenship rights; social integration or the right to participate fully and equally in public at all levels and equal access to public service; and economic integration or access to employment, self-sufficiency, and the capacity for achieving viable livelihoods. 6 The Guiding Principles envision three possible solutions for the end of displacement: return of IDPs to their original homes; integration in the localities where they went following displacement; and resettlement in another part of the country. These solutions have been elusive for most of the displaced. Many people in Burma have been on the move for 40 years and displaced multiple times. Displacement is an ongoing process; a vast number of those displaced decades ago are still without a durable solution and may be mixed up with newly displaced people. The root causes of displacement have not been addressed or resolved and there has been no genuine national reconciliation. National protection is still very much broken down, or altogether absent, in parts of the country. The ceasefires between the government and the ethnic armies are not political settlements, and in states where ceasefire agreements have taken place, displacement is an ongoing phenomenon, often related to violation of land rights and other human rights abuses. Although it is possible that some of the internally displaced persons, especially in ceasefire areas, may have acquired a certain level of economic or social integration, integration from a human rights/legal perspective remains beyond the grasp of the displaced in Burma. Responding to the needs of Burma s internally displaced population is difficult because their requirements are diverse and the population is not living in camp-like settings. A number of the displaced may not want to return to their original homes, especially those who have moved many dozens of times over the years. In assessments, some Burmese IDPs have maintained that they would like to remain where they are if conditions improve. All these factors make the internal displacement situation in Burma an intractable one, and present a series of challenges to those wanting to improve the lives of the displaced. The majority of the data for this report was gathered during two assessment missions in the latter half of 2005: one to Burma and the other to Thailand. During the course of these missions, Refugees International interviewed internally displaced people living in a village in Karen State in Burma, groups providing cross-border 2 Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

9 Farmers tend their fields in the countryside. Many Burmese have lost their land and are forced to leave their homes in search of a secure livelihood. Refugees International assistance, ethnic organizations working to assist Burmese refugees in Thailand, and UN, Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) personnel and donors on both sides of the border. While the RI team was in Burma, the UN and NGO expatriate staff were facing the worst government-imposed restrictions in years, which greatly limited their ability to oversee their programs outside of the capital Rangoon. Some restrictions have been relaxed since then, particularly for organizations in the health sector, and more expatriate staff are now able to travel to the field to monitor projects. RI also acquired information on conditions of IDPs during refugee focused missions between , in Malaysia, Bangladesh, India and Thailand. On these missions, RI interviewed recent arrivals, many of whom were former IDPs from Burma s eastern borders belonging to the Karen, Karenni, Mon and Shan ethnic groups; others were from Burma s western borders, such as the Chin and Rohingya ethnic groups.

10 The best available data collected suggested that more than 2,500 villages had been destroyed, relocated or otherwise abandoned in eastern Burma since TYPES OF DISPLACEMENT AND CONDITIONS OF THE DISPLACED POPULATION When the Burmese army goes patrolling around the border areas of Chin State, we are called for portering work without pay. Whether we are children, women, or the elderly, we have to carry soldiers bags, aluminum boxes and rations. At night, women are called by turn to the rooms of the captains and the majors. Nobody dares to ask questions about what goes on in the rooms. A Chin refugee now living in India s Mizoram State There is a dearth of information on the numbers and conditions of IDPs in Burma. The IDP issue is political because in most cases people have become displaced as a result of government policy and military action, and the Government of Burma does not allow international agencies access to the IDPs. Despite restrictions, some agencies based in Burma are assisting IDPs. This issue is examined in greater detail in pages Most of the public information on internal displacement in Burma focuses on the eastern part of the country, where agencies based in Thailand have limited access. The research has primarily centered on people who have become displaced due to armed conflict or human rights violations. There is little information available on those who have been displaced due to economic vulnerability. In western Burma, displacement results less from open conflict between the military and ethnic groups than from religious and cultural persecution, and abuses associated with increased militarization. There are not as much data available on the scope of displacement in western Burma, because cross-border assessments are not possible by way of India and Bangladesh, Burma s neighbors to the west. For the same reason, there is little information available on displacement in northern Burma. The most comprehensive analysis of internal displacement in eastern Burma has been carried out by the Thailand-based Thailand Burmese Border Consortium (TBBC). Since 2002, the TBBC has been collaborating with community-based organizations (CBOs) to document the scale and distribution of internal displacement in eastern Burma. The documentation is done through qualitative and quantitative surveys with villagers and representatives of nonstate actors in eastern Burma and humanitarian agencies based in Rangoon. Ethnic CBOs, such as the Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People and the Shan Relief and Development Committee, facilitate questionnaires, focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews. 7 Based on this research, in 2002 the TBBC stated that the best available data collected from indigenous humanitarian and human rights groups suggested that more than 2,500 villages had been destroyed, relocated or otherwise abandoned in eastern Burma since When the population of these villages was combined with smaller groups of people who had also fled from war and human rights abuses, it is estimated that approximately one million people had been forcibly displaced during that period. About 633,000 remained internally displaced in eastern Burma, while others had fled to neighboring countries or attempted to resettle elsewhere in Burma. 8 The most recent TBBC survey shows that as of September 2005 the total number of internally displaced people in eastern Burma who have been forced or obliged to leave their homes over the past decade and have not been able to return or resettle and reintegrate into society is at least 540,000, a reduction from the number estimated in the initial survey of The population is comprised of 340,000 people in temporary settlements of ceasefire areas administered by ethnic nationalities, while 92,000 civilians are estimated to be in hiding from the Burmese armed forces, known as the Tatmadaw, in areas most affected by military skirmishes. Approximately 108,000 villag- Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

11 ers have followed SPDC eviction orders and moved into designated relocation sites. 9 A 2005 report by Human Rights Watch puts the estimates of IDPs even higher. According to this report, as of late 2004, as many as 650,000 people were internally displaced in eastern Burma. 10 This number was determined by adding data, supplied by NGOs and CBOs working inside Burma, to that from cross-border assessments. The Burma-based groups have greater access to displaced populations in government-controlled areas, particularly the relocation sites. Staff of some international agencies based in Burma dispute the figure of more than half a million IDPs, believing the number to be significantly lower. They maintain that the data are skewed because they are collected by ethnic groups themselves and claim that their local staff, who are able to access sensitive areas, have not found relocation sites identified by Thailand-based agencies. Some expatriate humanitarian staff in Burma argue that the Thailand-based agencies magnify the numbers of IDPs in order to secure funding from donors for cross-border activities. Almost all of the agencies and people disputing the IDP estimates by Thailandbased agencies have themselves not been able to access the conflict and sensitive areas in eastern Burma, where IDPs are living in exceptionally vulnerable conditions. They therefore lack a firm basis for disputing the figures. As for the accusation that the Thailand-based NGOs exaggerate the numbers with an agenda of increasing their funding, their studies suggest that the majority of the displaced live in government or ceasefire areas, and so are not accessible from across the border even if their programs were to expand. Any response to the needs of the majority of the displaced would have to be the responsibility of Burma-based organizations. Displacement Resulting from Counter-insurgency Burma is one of the world s most ethnically diverse countries and since independence from Britain in 1948 has been experiencing conflict between the central government and ethnic minority groups. The ethnic minorities accuse the government of implementing a deliberate policy of Burmanization. They feel economically marginalized and socially, culturally, and religiously suppressed. 11 Fighting has been ongoing between the ethnic insurgent armies operating along Burma s borders and the military for more than five decades. The government has targeted civilians in conflict areas using a counterinsurgency tactic known as the Four Cuts. This policy was introduced in the mid-1960s, with the purpose of cutting the supplies of food, funds, recruits and information to the resistance groups and undermining their strength by severing their links to the local people. A rebel group has been fully cut if it no longer has access to new recruits, intelligence, food, or finances. This approach aims to transform black or rebel-held areas into brown or contested/free-fire areas, and then into white or government-held areas. 12 Under the Four Cuts policy, Tatmadaw units issue orders to villages in brown and black zones to relocate to government-controlled areas, usually with little or no warning. The Burmese army has cleared large areas of villages, forcing people to move to government-controlled relocation sites. Following a scorched-earth strategy, the army attacks villagers, destroys houses and crops, plants landmines in fields and paths, and shoots on sight anyone found returning to their homes. 13 This is contrary to Guiding Principle 21 which states that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of property and possessions and the property and possessions of internally displaced persons shall in all circumstances be protected. There are two main types of relocation sites: large centers and villages. The military creates large relocation centers when several villages are forcibly moved to one large Following a scorched-earth strategy, the army attacks villagers, destroys houses and crops, plants landmines in fields and paths, and shoots on sight anyone found returning to their homes.

12 Ceasefire agreements have not led to an end to displacement and communities in ceasefire areas are continuing to lose land. site under close military control. The army often confiscates food supplies during this process. Even when residents are allowed to retain control of their food, the amount that they can carry to the relocation sites is limited. Relocation villages are formed in some areas with an existing village used as the base for a relocation site, and outlying houses and hamlets forced to move into the central village. The village is fenced in and under military control. 14 Human Rights Watch has noted that living conditions at relocation sites vary. Its report continues, Relocation Center residents would obviously rather not be displaced again, and therefore many opt to stay in the centers, even after departure becomes an option. Some stay because there are greater market and work opportunities than in their original isolated villages. Conditions at some sites typically those that have been established for longer periods of time are better than others. In some cases, there are schools, some paid work, and communities are able to reestablish their lives. In such cases, residence is often no longer, or not entirely, a product of coercion, and it is debatable whether such new villages should still be considered relocation sites. 15 In order to escape the Tatmadaw, some people go into temporary hiding in the jungle. Others may live in the jungle for a number of years. Displaced villagers in hiding fall under suspicion of being rebel supporters and are targeted and subjected to human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killing. 16 IDPs may continue to live in hiding until they have exhausted all their survival options and then be forced to seek refuge in neighboring countries. The Four Cuts has been official policy since the early 1970s, but the present military junta has made its implementation much more systematic than before. 17 In the mid- 1990s, the SPDC launched programs to forcibly move or eliminate all rural villages in areas outside its control; the numbers of displaced increased dramatically as a result. These programs are in violation of Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions. 18 Protocol II is reflective of customary international law, and its Article 17 related to the prohibition of forced movement of civilians states [t]he displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand. Should such displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected with the conflict. Although Burma is a signatory to the Geneva Conventions it has not signed on to Protocol II, nor has it adhered to its tenets. The Guiding Principles, in accordance with Protocol II, also discourage the forced relocation of populations. Displacement in Ceasefire Areas From 1989 onwards, the SPDC has made ceasefire arrangements with some twentyeight armed ethnic nationality groups. The nature of the ceasefire agreements are not uniform, but in all cases former insurgents have retained their arms and sometimes still control extensive blocks of territory. 19 The ceasefire agreements are all essentially military accords the government maintains that it is a transitional administration and therefore unable to discuss political issues. 20 Ceasefire agreements have not led to an end to displacement and communities in ceasefire areas are continuing to lose land. Much of this is due to post-ceasefire militarization and confiscation of civilian property by the army, as well as large-scale economic development and infrastructure projects, such as mining, logging, and constructing dams. 21 Forced evictions of the people in those areas and forced labor at construction sites often accompany these projects. In Mon State, where the political leadership entered into a ceasefire agreement with 6 Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

13 the SPDC in 1995, the military confiscated nearly 8,000 acres of farmland and orchards between 1998 and The Tatmadaw forced farmers and landowners to work on the confiscated lands. In some areas, the military forced farmers and villagers to build barracks on the confiscated lands, the landowners also had to provide the building materials needed for construction. Additionally, the military collected money from local civilians to help cover the expenses of building the barracks. Massive land confiscation by the army forced thousands of civilians to lose their means of livelihood. Consequently, prostitution and crime increased in these areas. Many left their homes and went to Thailand in search of employment opportunities, while others fled to the Thai-Burma border areas to escape human rights violations. Those not able to leave remained in towns and villages, facing poverty and starvation. None of the landowners received full compensation for the value of their lands or plantations. 22 Development-induced Displacement Development projects such as mine construction and gas and oil extraction facilities are forcibly displacing communities without compensation. In November 2004 it was reported that since 1992 the regime had used scorched-earth tactics in Papun district of Karen State to secure control over sites on the Salween River where Burma and Thailand planned to build large hydroelectric dams. The Tatmadaw campaigns had decimated the local population, destroying 210 villages and forcing villagers to move to 31 relocation sites. Tens of thousands of people had fled to Thailand, while others were living in hiding. In 1992, there were estimated to be about 107,000 people in Papun district. By 2004, this number had been halved to approximately 54,000, of whom about 35,000 were living as IDPs in the jungles. 23 Similar cases can be found across the country where the military is forcing people to move prior to initiating major infrastructure projects. Since the early 1990s, a series of displacements have related to partnerships between the junta and three Western oil companies (Total, Premier and Unocal) to build the Yadana and Yetagun pipelines. The regime created a highly militarized pipeline corridor and soldiers moved villages to establish complete control. Through early 1993, Karen communities east of the Ye-Tavoy road were targeted for relocation because of the pipelines. The military forced Karen villages miles north and south of the pipeline routes to move closer to SPDC outposts on the Ye-Tavoy road to create a labor pool and eliminate threats from armed resistance groups. Some villages were completely relocated; in others troops forced residents living on the outskirts of the village to move to the center to increase the military s control of the people. The relocations and evictions devastated communities. Villages were split at times with some people fleeing across the border to Thailand, others to jungles or relocation sites. 24 Urban Displacement According to a 1994 report of the US Department of State, the government forced an estimated half million residents in Rangoon to relocate from the city center to new satellite settlements on the outskirts of the city between 1988 and Prior to this, a 1990 UN Center for Human Settlements/ Habitat report indicated that between , some 1.5 million people or 4 percent of the nation s entire population and 16 percent of the urban population had been relocated or resettled. The government undertook these urban relocations or resettlements for land development. The most controversial of these urban displacements were those which involved the relocation of urban residents to new rural communities. Throughout the early 1990s, the government moved squatter communities and other populations to border areas where people were to inhabit low population density areas and provide labor for construction and other infrastructure or development activities. 25 Between , some 1.5 million people or 4 percent of the nation s entire population and 16 percent of the urban population had been relocated or resettled.

14 Summary of Displacement by Geographic Area 26 From , the SPDC forcibly relocated over 1,400 villages in 7,000 square miles in central Shan State. Over 300,000 people were ordered to move into relocation sites. STATE Shan State NUMBER OF DISPLACED IDPs in southern Shan State: 219,000 CAUSES AND DATES OF DISPLACEMENT The SPDC has entered into ceasefire agreements with various ethnic groups in the state, but fighting is ongoing between the Tatmadaw and the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) in central and southern Shan State. To counter the SSA-S, the Tatmadaw has been forcibly relocating Shan villagers. From , the SPDC forcibly relocated over 1,400 villages in 7,000 square miles in central Shan State. Over 300,000 people were ordered to move into relocation sites. Between , Wa people from northern Shan State were forcibly relocated to southern Shan State. The stated aim of the program was to eradicate opium production by allowing villagers to grow alternative crops in the fertile southern Shan State. The resettlement displaced or affected as many as 48,000 of the original inhabitants, mostly Shan and Lahu, from that area. No compensation is known to have been paid to them. Karen State 89,900 For decades there has been fighting between the Karen army or the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the Tatmadaw. Karen villagers have been subjected to repeated displacement by the Tatmadaw. Despite a 2004 informal ceasefire between the Karen political leadership or the Karen National Union (KNU) and the SPDC, skirmishes continue to take place between the Tatmadaw and the KNLA. Human rights violations by military and civil authorities continue in Karen State and Karen-populated areas. It is believed the Tatmadaw has used the increased freedom of movement, following the informal ceasefire, to extend control into remote areas. Karenni State Tenasserim Division Pegu Division 92,500 Fighting between the Karenni army and the Tatmadaw is ongoing. The Tatmadaw has been relocating Karenni civilians as a counterinsurgency strategy. In 1996, the Tatmadaw began a massive relocation program, and 20,000-30,000 Karenni were forced into designated sites. The SPDC continues to harass Karenni it suspects of being supporters of the Karenni political leadership, or the Karenni National Progressive Party, by burning crops and villages and torturing those believed to be sympathetic to the Karenni army. 68,600 Resistance groups such as the KNU and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) have traditionally dominated the interior of Tenasserim. In 1996, the Tatmadaw established a regional military command headquarters in Tenasserim to secure construction sites for development projects. Troop deployment was followed by a concerted offensive in areas controlled by the KNU, complemented with a forced relocation campaign starting in Tenasserim is estimated to have the largest population of IDPs in relocation sites. 21,300 As the conflict-induced area most accessible from Rangoon, villages in eastern Pegu Division have been targeted for displacement since the mid-1970s. Harassment of internally displaced people in certain townships is being carried out by a SPDC-sponsored paramilitary group. The SPDC patrols relocation sites and immediate environs in the plains, while the paramilitary forces patrol upland areas to search for IDPs hiding in free-fire zones and to destroy crops. Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

15 STATE NUMBER OF DISPLACED CAUSES AND DATES OF DISPLACEMENT Mon State 48,700 Military offensives were a major cause of displacement in the state in the 1980s, but by 1992, forced labor, forced relocations, arbitrary taxation and extrajudicial executions were the main causes of flight. The principal reason for flight over the next five years was the construction of the Ye-Tavoy railroad and accompanying forced labor demands by the SPDC. Kachin State Chin State Rakhine State The ceasefire has not resolved the issue of resettling previously displaced people, estimated to be more than 60,000. It is believed that there is no significant internally displaced population in Chin State. Those who are forced to migrate have crossed borders into other countries. It is estimated that at least 50,000 Chin have fled to India and at least 12,000 to Malaysia. The SPDC abuses continue to prompt Rohingya refugee flows to countries like Bangladesh, where the official number of Rohingya refugees is around 20,000, but the unofficial number is estimated to be around 100, ,000. The NMSP agreed to a ceasefire with the SPDC in Soon after, 10,000 Mon refugees from Thailand were forced back into Mon State, where many of them remain in camp-like conditions. Some Mon groups have split from the Mon leadership and continue to fight the Tatmadaw. New displacement is ongoing in locations where the SPDC harasses villagers it suspects of being sympathetic to the Mon splinter groups. Thirty years of conflict between Kachin independence movements and the SPDC caused widespread displacement in Kachin State. Conflict-induced displacement has decreased since the signing of a ceasefire in 1994 between the Kachin Independence Organization and the SPDC. The impoverishment of rural communities following three decades of strife has led to significant rural displacement. Since the ceasefire, the main cause of displacement in Kachin State has been violation of land rights. Communities continue to lose land due to post-ceasefire militarization and farmland confiscation by the Tatmadaw. Large-scale agricultural projects and construction have often involved unlawful land confiscation. The Chin are being forced to migrate due to religious, cultural and political persecution. The SPDC is carrying out anti-christian measures against the predominantly Christian Chin. In the past decade, there has been increased militarization in Chin State, and with the increased number of soldiers there has been a sharp rise in the abuse of civilians. The Chin ethnic army controls no territory in Chin State and due to being a small force cannot provide asylum to Chin fleeing abuses. Instead of looking to settle in another part of Burma, or going into temporary hiding, those displaced by the Tatmadaw usually move to other countries. The Rohingya, an ethnic minority in Rakhine State, are concentrated in the northern part of the state. SPDC policies force them to pay taxes to the military, especially for registration of births and marriages. Rohingya are also required to obtain permits to travel anywhere outside their villages. These travel restrictions systematically deny Rohingya access to advanced education and medical care. The predominantly Muslim Rohingya are not free to practice their religion in Burma. A SPDC policy of relocating non-rohingya to model villages in northern Rakhine State has resulted in confiscation of land from the Rohingya. The Rohingya are also forced to build houses and facilities of model villages without pay. All of this has contributed to increasing poverty and food insecurity for the Rohingya and left them with no choice but to migrate. The SPDC abuses prompt Rohingya refugee flows to Bangladesh where their number is estimated to be around 100, ,000.

16 Surveys of internally displaced people show that some in the interiors have never heard of HIV/AIDS. Displacement as a Consequence of Economic Vulnerability In many cases, villagers livelihoods have been affected so severely by abuses such as forced labor that they have had little choice but to migrate within Burma or to a neighboring country. Food insecurity, loss of livelihood, and lack of access to basic services are likely the most widespread and chronic causes of forced displacement in Burma. 27 Conditions of the Displaced Population The majority of internally displaced persons in Burma are living in government controlled or ceasefire areas and some can be reached by agencies working in the country. However, for security reasons, the very limited information on this group and its vulnerabilities is not widely distributed. The humanitarian needs of this population, living alongside non-displaced people in periurban and rural areas, are similar to those of settled residents and relate primarily to lack of employment and income. It is believed that conditions for those in ceasefire areas are significantly better than those in free-fire zones or armed conflict areas. The internally displaced population in ceasefire areas has increased by between percent during the past two years. 28 There is more information available on IDPs in conflict and war-affected areas, where priority needs tend to be related more to physical security, food, health and education. Other needs of the displaced include shelter, clothing, blankets, mosquito nets and farming tools. Those living along the border areas are often dependent on slash and burn techniques to grow rice. Military attacks force people into hiding and disrupt this means of survival. The villagers are not able to tend to their crops, and after returning to what is left of their village, they may find their houses burned, and cooking pots, tools and seeds destroyed. Sometimes the military sets fire to crops. In other locations there is not enough land to cultivate. Even if the military does not destroy crops, it may restrict villagers from going to their field at harvesting time, and people lose the chance to reap their crop. Food shortages are experienced by many and to survive, people resort to eating yams, roots and non-nutritious jungle food such as bamboo shoots. Some residents of relocation sites try to find daily wage labor as the main means of livelihood. In certain centers, residents are allowed access to their farms, but usually the distance involved and restrictions on time they can spend tending their fields mean that rice production is much less than it was prior to their displacement. Residents are sometimes allocated plots of land to farm, but this land is often undeveloped and of poor quality. Even if people are able to produce rice, the army imposes rice taxes. Many in relocation sites are faced with chronic malnutrition and have no means of securing even minimum subsistence needs. 29 There is a huge void in health services for IDPs. In terms of health care delivery, the World Health Organization (WHO) ranked Burma second to last worldwide: out of 191 countries, Burma was 190th. Basic supplies like pain killers and bandages are difficult to obtain in the country. 30 There is lack of information about diseases such as HIV/AIDS, even though Burma has one of the most serious epidemics in Asia, with an estimated national adult prevalence of 1 2 percent. Surveys of IDPs show that some in the interiors have never heard of HIV/AIDS. Others may be aware of the disease but don t know all the causes; for example, many are unaware that the AIDS virus can be acquired through blood transfusions. Even in non-conflict areas, the central government is not providing much health care. The government hospitals and health facilities have little or no medicines, and people, whether displaced or not, have no choice but to buy medicines in markets, where they may be expensive. Women in particular don t seek formal medical care and may opt for traditional or local cures. Some of the 10 Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

17 FLEEING THE BURMESE ARMY Every year, more civilians are fleeing violence and human rights violations in Karen State. While some cross the border into Thailand, many internally displaced people continue to live in temporary settlements, forced relocation sites or remain in hiding. Hundreds of Karen people have sought safety in one temporary settlement located near the border with Thailand. The residents of this eight-year-old settlement often have been forced to move multiple times because of abuse by the Burmese military prior to arriving here. A 60-year-old farmer told Refugees International that he and his family had been displaced five times before finding safety in this settlement. In their native village, they suffered numerous attacks and abuse from the Burmese army. Four or five times a month, the Burmese army would take him away from his fields and force him to carry arms and ammunition for long distances without pay. The army also attacked the entire village several times. Each time, the villagers would flee and hide in jungles prior to the attack and would return to find their crops and seeds destroyed. The farmer and his family were forced to leave their home in 2000 when soldiers tried to drown a relative. Fearing more such attacks, the family fled to the safety of this settlement. According to the farmer, many people in his village continue to suffer and he cannot imagine taking his family back to that life any time in the near future. Life for this farmer and his family is much better than what they fled. They live in relative safety and even have a bit of land to farm. They do not want to cross the border into Thailand and try to live in a refugee camp there because they don t want to leave their homeland. Once it is safe enough and their physical security can be guaranteed, they would like to go back to their native village. It is often the youngest children in families who suffer from malnutrition because the parents have very limited resources. displaced living in government and ceasefire areas receive health care, particularly vaccinations, malaria treatment, and HIV/AIDS awareness, from international NGOs. Public health of the internally displaced in eastern Burma is very poor. According to a TBBC analysis, Child mortality rates amongst the internally displaced is three times higher than Burma s baseline rate. These child mortality rates are comparable to indicators derived from only slightly larger sample sizes of roughly nine hundred children from internally displaced and waraffected areas in the Horn of Africa Results [of Mid Upper Arm Circumference surveys] indicate that one in six children under five in internally displaced and war-affected populations are acutely malnourished, which is almost double the baseline rate for Burma. This represents a public health emergency according to WHO indicators and points to acute malnutrition rates which are comparable to those recorded amongst internally displaced persons in Somalia, although not as disastrous as the situation around Darfur in Sudan or the Somali region of Ethiopia. 31 It is often the youngest children in the family who suffer from malnutrition because the parents have very limited resources. Some of the people living in conflict areas, especially close to the Thai-Burma border, are getting medical assistance from backpack health worker teams and a few clinics. Water and sanitation facilities in relocation camps are frequently inadequate or nonexistent; consequently, residents are prone to a number of diseases. In theory, people at relocation sites are allowed free medication, but many times the only health care facility storing medicines is far away, and to travel there the patient has to pay bribes at numerous checkpoints along the way. Even after traveling to towns and cities, people 11

18 may find a lack of medicines in government facilities and have no choice but to purchase them from the market. The UN Development Program (UNDP) ranked Burma 138 out of 176 countries for combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross educational enrollment ratios and 157 out of 175 countries for GDP per capita. 32 A third of children attending school do not complete five years of elementary education. The UN Children s Fund (UNICEF) estimates that 55 percent of children go on to middle school and 25 percent enroll in high school. Children are not able to finish school because their parents are unable to afford the increasing fees or because falling family incomes make it necessary for the children to work. 33 Moreover, government schools often lack adequate number of teachers and supplies. In areas under government control, the Burmese language is the only medium for instruction permissible in state primary and secondary schools. Ethnic groups claim the government is forcing their children to learn Burmese and the curriculum disregards topics about local cultural heritage in order to Burmanize the next generation. Some of the ethnic education departments either teach Burmese language as a secondary subject or do not include it in the curriculum. In ceasefire areas, one of the benefits since the end of armed conflict has been the ability of ceasefire groups to run schools in their own languages. In Mon State, the NMSP Education Department and Mon CBOs provided Mon language teaching to over 100,000 students in , approximately 70 percent of whom live in government-controlled areas. This initiative would have been impossible prior to the ceasefire. 34 A complication of using an ethnic language as the medium of education is that when students graduate to high schools and universities where courses are taught in Burmese, they may experience problems due to their limited language skills. In conflict and war-affected areas, there are community schools and ethnic government-run schools and religious schools, but not many high schools. Frequently teachers themselves have not studied beyond 8th or 9th grade and there are no resources for teacher salary and educational materials. Out of more than 30,000 school age children living in conflict and border areas in one of the ethnic states, not more than 1,000 are reaching high school. Many children have to leave school after primary level. Education is disrupted when fighting breaks out, as the schools may be destroyed and classes may have to be held in forests. While relocation centers do afford some access to state-funded schools and buildings, teachers and books are usually in short supply. Additionally, school fees are typically charged and, as in the rest of government-controlled Burma, ethnic nationality children may not study their own languages in school. 35 A displaced woman who lives in a temporary settlement located near the Thailand border catches fish in a nearby stream. Refugees International 12 Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

19 HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE INSIDE BURMA The government s plan for the ethnic minorities seems to be cultural assimilation. The regime would prefer to see ethnic people reduced to tourist attractions. Many ethnic people are fighting the regime for cultural and language survival. An international aid worker in Burma The Government of Burma The Government of Burma does not recognize the existence of internally displaced persons and therefore has no assistance programs that address their specific needs. In a surprise move in 2004, the SPDC asked the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to become involved with IDP integration in an area of expected refugee return in Karen State. This request came at a time when former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, considered by some to be a moderate, was still in power, and negotiations towards a formal ceasefire were ongoing with the KNU. In October 2004, Khin Nyunt was purged and since then an informal gentlemen s agreement between the KNU and the SPDC has not progressed to a formal ceasefire arrangement. With the ceasefire not being formalized, the return of refugees and IDPs in Karen State does not seem possible anytime soon. Over the next decade, some of the Karen refugees, instead of returning from Thailand to Burma, may be resettled to third countries. Agencies working in Burma report a gradual expansion of their ability to reach people and areas in need over the past decade. Organizations are now able to operate in more geographical areas than before, and many are working in ethnic states, often near the periphery of conflict and war-affected zones. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is the only Burma-based international organization that has been successful in gaining independent entry to the zones of on-going armed conflict and border areas. With access expanding, there has also been increased policy dialogue between the government and international agencies. Official recognition of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, acknowledgement that child soldiers exist in the Tatmadaw, the proclamation of a law prohibiting human trafficking, and edicts against forced labor are examples of protection gains made during this period. 36 Despite these gains, the SPDC remains suspicious of outside scrutiny or involvement in issues that it considers matters of security and regime survival. If an international organization becomes involved in monitoring or documenting one of these issues, the SPDC may threaten to revoke the agency s permission to work in the country. Even worse, the lives of local staff of the international NGO, or those seen as collaborators with the agency, may be in danger. For example, in March 2004, the SPDC admitted to sentencing three individuals to death in part for communicating with the International Labor Organization (ILO) and a Thailand-based labor rights group about forced labor practices. Burma-based Agencies International agencies There are ten UN agencies and around 40 international NGOs 37 working inside Burma, mostly in the health sector. While these organizations have gradually expanded their areas of operation by negotiating and building trust at various levels, access to the neediest sectors of the population remains limited. Whereas under Khin Nyunt there was an incremental increase in access, after his removal from power the hard-liner government began to interpret its Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with international organizations very strictly and placed limits on their activities. For international agencies wanting to start operations in Burma, the required MOU with the junta is difficult if not impossible to secure. In March 2005, the government stopped giving permits to expatriate staff to travel to the field to monitor The Government of Burma does not recognize the existence of internally displaced persons and therefore has no assistance programs that address their specific needs. 13

20 The role of international agencies in Burma in building capacity and empowering local communities remains largely unpublicized and unrecognized. projects. Additionally, the World Food Program (WFP) did not receive authorization to deliver rice to the Rohingya population in Rakhine State for three months, exacerbating a food crisis there. These restrictions have loosened, particularly in the health sector, but both the Global Fund and Doctors Without Borders-France have made a decision in recent months to withdraw from Burma, citing restrictions on program implementation and monitoring as the reason for their departure. The Government of Burma has at times, particularly in 2005, made access of expatriate staff to a geographical area conditional on SPDC officials accompanying them. The expatriate staff are wary of traveling with SPDC officials as they fear losing the trust of local people, thus bringing more harm than good, and violating humanitarian principles. 38 Many organizations have the policy of conducting missions independently. Given the choice between taking along Burmese authorities to an area or not going, the agencies are increasingly making the latter choice and no longer visiting projects. UN agencies and international NGOs operating in Burma may find themselves in the position of working in areas where they witness abuses by the SPDC and the Tatmadaw. Ethnic and human rights groups have criticized some of them of being silent witnesses and not publicizing human rights violations that could be used to mobilize international pressure on the SPDC to stop these abuses. International agencies are afraid to publicize the abuses for fear that the SPDC will expel them, thereby losing whatever access they have to a very needy population and leaving their local staff to face SPDC arrest or persecution. Many expatriate staff working in Burma feel under attack from Burmese democracy activists based overseas and must constantly defend themselves against being labeled apologists for the regime. In particular, they maintain that there is much miscommunication with the Thailand-based NGOs that are working with Burmese refugees and monitoring Burma s political and human rights affairs. There is also a significant lack of information sharing between agencies working in Burma and those based in Thailand. In recent months, agencies on both sides have taken steps to bridge this gap, but much more remains to be done. A source of frustration to the agencies working in Burma is that they are being judged by outsiders who are not aware of their achievements with the local populations. For example, international NGOs have successfully assisted ethnic minorities in obtaining property rights in some areas, but for security reasons this accomplishment cannot be widely announced. The lack of information leads agencies and individuals outside Burma to conclude that Burmabased organizations are doing very limited work, focused on the provision of basic aid. The role of international agencies in Burma in building capacity and empowering local communities remains largely unpublicized and unrecognized. Several expatriate staff working for international agencies in Burma stress that because Burma is seen as being unimportant on a global level, they don t even get institutional support from their own headquarters. Within this environment, international organizations in Burma are responding to assistance and protection concerns of the internally displaced in different ways. Agencies are not working specifically with IDPs, but may be serving displaced people, principally in the government and ceasefire areas, under a sectoral approach. Within this approach, agencies seek permission to assist all vulnerable people in a targeted area in sectors such as health or education regardless of whether or not they are displaced. Agency staff stress that the needs among both displaced persons and settled communities are enormous, and in instances where both groups intermingle, their require- 14 Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

21 ments may be similar. International organizations lack the capacity to identify most IDPs, and even if they were able to identify the displaced, agencies may be unable to develop specific programs responding to the needs of the displaced due to the political sensitivity attached to them. Many international agencies are adopting an approach of working on sector programs to reach the most vulnerable populations in government and ceasefire-areas. On a very informal and small-scale basis, some international NGOs are supporting community-based religious organizations with constituents in areas with internally displaced populations. Displaced people living in the relocation sites are assisted by the affected communities themselves, or through CBOs and local NGOs that provide small levels of assistance. In the last few years, assistance provided by local networks to internally displaced people has increased. Some analysts believe that such activities enable the government to sustain its forced relocation programs. Others maintain that by providing relief in partnership with relocated populations, local NGOs assist with building community networks and capacity development. Humanitarian efforts like these strengthen local civil society and human capital in ways which could contribute towards peace-making and conflict-transformation capacities, thereby indirectly supporting the process of political transition. 39 Some international NGOs may also be working at relocation sites without knowing it, and a few others may persuade local authorities to allow them to channel some assistance through local NGOs. Internally displaced persons in conflict and war-affected areas of eastern Burma are off limits to the international agencies working inside the country. With the exception of the ICRC, the authorities have not allowed any organization independent entry to these zones. Since Khin Nyunt s purge and greater restrictions on international NGOs, the access of ICRC has also been reduced. Burma has not been a priority for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Internal Displacement Division. The UN Resident Coordinator in Burma has overall responsibility for the UN s IDP response. The present Coordinator has started to focus more on internal displacement and consequently commissioned an action-oriented analysis on forced migration. Following the UN s stated policy and guidelines regarding internal displacement, since May 2005 the Resident Coordinator s office has led a Population Movement Working group with the UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as participants. The working group started among the UN agencies and will later expand to other organizations. The purpose of the group is to develop a common analysis and approach on assistance and protection to the internally displaced. The collaborative approach 40 is supposed to guide the response of UN agencies to internal displacement. In Burma UN agencies are exploring ways of collaboration, although the approach would not involve having a fullscale outlined public plan of action on IDPs, as in other countries. Nor is a cluster lead 41 type of response foreseen by the UN. Most of the focus at present is on information sharing, which has always been weak. The UN Country Team hopes that the outcome of a strategic forum, to be set up in the near future, will be to introduce protection elements to all programs reaching vulnerable populations. Aside from protection, the forum will also look at ways to improve provision of aid. UNHCR is the only UN agency to have gotten a foothold in the IDP arena, in the context of the SPDC-KNU ceasefire negotiations. In March 2004, during ceasefire talks between the SPDC and the KNU, the possibility of return of refugees and IDPs was one of the topics discussed. The SPDC asked UNHCR, which so far had only been working in western Burma with the Rohingya population, to develop programs in eastern Burma in preparation for the possible return of refugees In the last few years, assistance provided by local networks to internally displaced people has increased. 15

22 Some observers outside of Burma assume there is no civil society in the country, but extensive civil society networks exist. and internally displaced persons, and IDP reintegration in areas of return. Through its agreement with the SPDC, UNHCR attained access to most areas in 12 of the 13 townships of potential return in Burma s Karen State, Mon State and Tenasserim Division. UNHCR developed plans to implement health and education programs in refugee and IDP return areas. Two of its partner organizations, the Myanmar Red Cross Society and the Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association, however, were widely considered to be proxies for the military government. UNHCR later dropped plans to work with the Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association. In the latter half of 2004, UNHCR began to implement micro-projects (construction of wells, primary schools, clinics) to upgrade local infrastructure in areas of possible refugee return and in places where displaced persons may want to go. Human Rights Watch noted that, Despite some optimism within UN- HCR about these developments, grave concerns remain over the extent of UN access in these border areas. As of October 2004, international staff had only been allowed to visit areas under government control. 42 All of UNHCR projects in the townships are in areas that the government claims is territory under its control. UNHCR s international staff had access to project sites until the end of June 2005, but national staff have been able to continue traveling there. UNHCR is currently negotiating a MOU with its newly designated government counterpart, the Ministry for Border Development Affairs, and hopes that once the agreement is concluded, its international staff will be able to resume travel to the areas of operation. International agencies based in Burma claim that their presence contributes to reducing the SPDC s human rights violations as the regime doesn t want international or local organization personnel to witness acts of violence. The presence of representatives of international organizations has prevented the populations of certain villages from being displaced and also contributed to reductions in forced labor. Agencies working with the Rohingya population in Rakhine State, in particular, have noted that some moderation of SPDC persecution has occurred because of NGO and UN organizations being in that area. The problem is that there is usually nothing systematic about international organizations presence and protection in Burma. For the most part, the ability of organizations to protect through presence is a matter of happenstance rather than the result of a coherent strategy. Civil society and community-based organizations In light of the constraints on international organizations, partnerships between international agencies and civil society networks offer a promising means to meet the needs of internally displaced persons. 43 Whereas international NGOs are limited to specific sectors and geographical areas, local organizations can work across sectors and access many more sites within government and ceasefire areas as well as in armed conflict and border zones. Some observers outside of Burma assume there is no civil society in the country, but extensive civil society networks exist. 44 These include religious organizations, traditional village associations and formally established CBOs and local NGOs. A survey by Save the Children UK in discovered that new NGOs and CBOs have been forming in every decade and a large number of new CBOs and local NGOs have been established during and since the 1990s. The survey calculated that in 2003 there were up to 214,000 CBOs and 270 local NGOs operating in the country. Just over half of the surveyed NGOs were legally registered, usually under the Organization of Association law. The survey excluded government organized NGOs (GONGOs) and agencies closely linked to the government. Religion has been the single driving force for civil society initiatives around the country. 16 Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

23 Many NGOs have formed out of Burma s four major religions: Buddhism, Christianity, Islam and Hinduism, and they sometimes have not clearly separated their religious and social/developmental goals. However, the survey also noted that there was inter-faith dialogue and some religious communities were actively promoting joint efforts to reduce barriers and mistrust in conflict areas and increase better cooperation and understanding. Starting in the 1990s, participatory forms of community organization appeared to be more tolerated by the regime, and NGOs were also allowed increased access in sensitive border areas and parts of the country where they could not previously work. The survey showed that the most common sectors for local NGO involvement were education, health and social welfare. The least common were conflict resolution, nutrition and emergency response. Most NGO activities involved provision of welfare, charity or relief. Some NGOs working in water/sanitation, community development and agriculture sectors had moved to activities such as community or group mobilization, skills development and self-reliance. Very few NGOs were engaged in advocacy, rights-based programming, campaigning, and empowerment. Over half of the CBOs surveyed worked primarily on issues related to religion, but many others worked on social welfare and education. The CBOs and local NGOs are generally homogenous, formed by members of particular religious or ethnic groups to serve that particular group. Two NGOs, Shalom and Metta, run by Kachin groups, have developed the capacity to implement activities across ethnic groups. Metta, with a budget of more than half a million US dollars, is working in five ethnic areas and two divisions, and undertaking microcredit programs, vocational training, water and sanitation projects and rural development schemes. The operational capacity of these NGOs, however, remains weak. Thailand-based Agencies As discussed above, eastern Burma s zones of on-going armed conflict are off limits to international agencies based in Burma, with the exception of the ICRC. Burma-based local NGOs and CBOs, especially church and Buddhist networks, have very limited entry to these areas. In order to fill the humanitarian gap, since the early 1990s Thailandbased teams from the Karen and, later, other Burmese ethnic groups have provided humanitarian relief and undertaken some community development and educational work among displaced communities in conflict and war-affected areas in eastern Burma. 45 The beneficiaries of cross-border aid are usually a self-selecting sub-group of IDPs in hiding, having put their trust in the ethnic groups. 46 A report in 2004 documented that over the previous year 30 percent of IDP households surveyed were accessing aid to survive disruptions to livelihood (35 percent in hiding sites, 17 percent in relocation sites, 49 percent in ceasefire areas and 21 percent in mixed administration areas). 47 As noted by the Burma Ethnic Research Group, Thai authorities do not officially allow any of the registered NGOs based in Thailand to develop programs of assistance across the border, but there is an endorsement of temporary cross-border assistance in certain instances. 48 The Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), describing the situation in Karen State, writes that NGOs are forced into covert humanitarian intervention if they want to assist villagers in the state. This requires [w]orking in heavily mined areas and avoiding hostile Burmese patrols with no outside military assistance, unless they accept a KNLA escort The rugged terrain, lack of roads and fear of detection allows only small quantities of rice, basic foods, medical and school materials to be taken from Thailand on foot by small groups. Assistance to IDPs far from the Burma-Thai border can only be delivered in cash form, making monitoring a significant problem. Moreover, many Thailand-based teams have provided humanitarian relief and undertaken some community development and educational work among displaced communities in conflict and waraffected areas in eastern Burma. 17

24 Although crossborder groups can provide limited assistance, they are unable to provide protection to the very vulnerable populations in the conflict and waraffected areas. donors are skeptical of aid to areas only accessible with a Karen military escort. These problems create difficulties in raising funds. This assistance has saved many lives and livelihoods, but logistical and resource limitations currently limit it to sporadic support for a small percentage of hundreds of thousands of Karen IDPs. 49 The medicines carried by cross-border relief groups run out after a few days of travel to the interior. A more sustained medical service is provided by mobile health teams. These teams respond to communicable diseases, malnutrition, especially in children under the age of five, obstetric emergencies, landmine injuries and mental health problems. The teams are made up of two to four workers who serve a population of 2,000 people. The teams integrate water and sanitation awareness with school health programs and undertake community health workshops and training of traditional birth care attendants. In addition, a very small number of clinics in the areas under control of ethnic groups or in armed conflict zones cater to larger populations. In order to upgrade the standard of teaching and skills of teachers, trainers cross into eastern Burma each summer to train teachers from at least one ethnic group. Some vocational training programs are also held in border areas. Despite these initiatives, the standard of education in the border and conflict and war-affected areas remains low. Consequently many parents send their children to live in refugee camps in Thailand where the standard of education is higher. KHRG further notes that the local assistance groups get resources from NGOs working in Thailand. Villagers are not required to be displaced to receive assistance, they need not come out of hiding, nor are their political connections or identities questioned. The relief teams, predominantly displaced Karen themselves, report back on vulnerabilities and needs expressed by villagers and responses are adapted to these as possible. This aid is admittedly political. It relies on KNLA forces for intelligence and escort, it transmits information on human rights abuses to the outside world, and it provides information and resources to villagers to help them resist forced relocation and assimilation. However, because it is seen as violating the principles of neutrality and state sovereignty, resources are hard to obtain and it must remain covert, not openly acknowledged by the NGOs involved. 50 The aid is easier to provide to those living closer to the borders as well as in ceasefire areas where there is a certain level of stability. Due to the cessation of hostilities in ceasefire areas, it is simpler to transport materials. In ceasefire areas where some territory is under control of an ethnic government, there is less reliance on the armed ethnic groups to escort those bringing in assistance. Although cross-border groups can provide limited assistance, they are unable to provide protection to the very vulnerable populations in the conflict and war-affected areas. They do, however, sometimes engage in advocacy campaigns. Many of the communities have developed their own protection strategies. Early warning systems have been shown to play a critical role in preparing civilians for potential attacks. IDP watch groups, the village headman, or the armed resistance often inform villagers of the Tatmadaw s presence in the area. The villagers prepare two or three locations in advance as hiding places. They also hide rice and a few other basic supplies beforehand. Upon hearing news of the army in the area, they go into hiding and wait and watch for the army to withdraw. Only after the army has retreated, do the villagers return to their villages. Some opt to move to towns where there is relatively more safety. 18 Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

25 THE DEBATE OVER AID AND ENGAGEMENT Humanitarian aid in Burma is key. Capacity must be built inside the country and along the border [by agencies based in Thailand] and meet along the middle. An aid worker in Thailand Almost 18 years have passed since the events of 1988 when the military brutally suppressed the democracy movement in Burma. Following these events, most countries cut off bilateral aid to Burma with the rationale that aid would have little positive impact under the current system and would reinforce the military regime, undercutting the struggle for democracy. In principle, bilateral sanctions have excluded humanitarian assistance, but in reality this area has been reduced dramatically as well. 51 Moreover, multilateral institutions like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank are not providing any direct financial assistance to Rangoon; lending and technical assistance from the banks stopped in Since 1988, the humanitarian situation in the country has continued to deteriorate with people experiencing increased levels of disease, poverty, malnutrition, low education attainment and human rights abuses. Although few deny that the country is in crisis, the issue of providing international aid inside Burma as long as the military regime is in power remains contentious. The Aid Dilemma Like Cambodia in the 1980s, Burma presents an acute dilemma to aid agencies: should aid be withheld to avoid propping up an unsavory regime and to force political change or do the acute needs of the population justify the provision of assistance regardless of the political context? Those opposed to or at least cautious about international aid being given to Burma maintain that the SPDC is responsible for the poor conditions in the country and no sustainable, long-term solution can be found without a change in the government. They argue that politics cannot be separated from the aid issue because the root cause of the current situation is prolonged military rule. Furthermore, they believe that under present circumstances, aid will only serve to legitimize a regime that should not be in power. Proponents of humanitarian aid to Burma argue that with more than a decade having passed since the events of 1988 and the 1990 elections 53 with no sign of political change, ordinary people cannot afford the luxury of aid being conditional on change, especially when the humanitarian situation is so dire. They stress that civilians already suffering due to the policies of the military government should not be dealt a second blow and deprived of humanitarian assistance. Moreover, they maintain that politics shouldn t blind people to the social costs of denying aid. Agencies working in Burma point out that the country receives less international humanitarian aid per capita than almost any nation in the world, including others with repressive governments. Neighboring Laos, for example, which is ruled by a communist regime that suppresses political liberties, receives more than 20 times as much humanitarian aid per capita as Burma according to 2003 figures compiled by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. These figures also show that Vietnam receives nine times as much aid per capita as Burma; even Cuba, which like Burma is subject to US trade sanctions, receives more than twice as much aid per person. 54 Supporters of aid to Burma argue that politics should be delinked from the issue of humanitarian assistance and aid should be delivered now, rather than after regime change. The Burmese government-in-exile or the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) has taken the position that without considering the root causes of The country receives less international humanitarian aid per capita than almost any nation in the world, including others with repressive governments. 19

26 Activists known as The Student Generations since 1988 have urged the international community to continue providing humanitarian assistance to Burma. the humanitarian conditions, aid is likely to make the humanitarian and political crisis worse. It believes that aid will fail to provide protection and assistance to the most vulnerable populations and further consolidate the regime s rule. While the NCGUB shares the concern of the UN and the international community regarding the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Burma and believes it needs immediate attention, the NCGUB considers existing aid channels to be inadequate. It wants the humanitarian issue to be one of the first items on the agenda of a substantive dialogue between the SPDC and the NLD, and favors development of joint consultative mechanisms. Their purpose would be to ensure transparency, accountability and independent monitoring of humanitarian aid. If these structures were agreed upon, the NCGUB would support increased humanitarian aid by the international community. With no genuine political dialogue presently taking place, reaching an agreement with the SPDC on aid structures has been impossible. The position of the National League for Democracy (NLD) on humanitarian aid has been described by some analysts as remaining ambiguous. 55 In 1995, NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi put forward two main principles. The first is that international aid agencies have an obligation to work in close cooperation or consultation with the elected NLD leadership. The second is that aid should be delivered to the right people in the right way: it should not be channeled through government structures; be properly monitored; and be distributed to all in need irrespective of their political views. 56 While Suu Kyi has called for assistance to Burma to be accountable and transparent, she has also advocated against aid inside Burma. In a 1998 interview, she said, We don t think the time is right for NGOs to come in. It is very difficult, if not impossible, for NGOs to work without permission of the authorities Why don t these NGOs go to the Karen refugees on the border? There s plenty of need there. We (inside) really have to help ourselves...[ngo assistance in Burma] would only be a drop in the ocean. Helping a few thousand here or there. We want to create a system which will help everyone. It is far more important to change the political system in Burma. 57 In another interview in 2002, on the issue of foreign assistance, Suu Kyi said, What we have been saying is that we can cooperate with the SPDC if the assistance is beneficial to the people and supports democratic changes. This is not different from what we said before. We have stated since the time of the SLORC that we are ready to cooperate [with the regime], if the assistance will be beneficial to the people and supports democratic development in the country. We have been consistent on this, and we will continue to hold this policy. 58 A very clear call for humanitarian aid to Burma has come recently from another respected Burmese political figure, Min Ko Naing, the famous student leader of the 1988 uprising who was released from prison in late 2005, after spending almost 16 years in confinement. Min Ko Naing and a group of activists known as The Student Generations since 1988 have urged the international community to continue providing humanitarian assistance to Burma and advocated for the removal of government restrictions on international aid agencies. This statement came soon after the pull out of the Global Fund from Burma, which had terminated its five-year, $98.4 million grant to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. It highlighted the country s failed health and education systems and appealed for the international aid community to remain involved to respond to these crises. The statement also encouraged the establishment of an appropriate mechanism between the military government and all democracy forces in order to cooperate with the international community. Soon after this statement was released, the NLD said that its position on humanitarian assistance is similar to that of the 88-gen- 20 Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

27 eration student leaders. Both the student leaders and NLD have emphasized that international standards of transparency and accountability must be maintained in allocating any international assistance. As for the Thailand-based Burmese prodemocracy groups and NGOs, the attitude of some towards aid inside Burma has been evolving. In the early and mid-1990s, they were among the most ardent critics of humanitarian aid inside Burma. They recommended that aid should be channeled to refugees along the Thai-Burma border instead of to the population inside Burma, and further exploration of cross-border assistance should be made. Over the last few years there has been a shift in this attitude. More agencies in Thailand, working with Burmese refugees and migrants to provide assistance, protection and capacity building, while continuing to sympathize with the democracy movement, have become aware of the scope of the humanitarian crisis in Burma and the potential for it to have a regional impact. Increasingly, some have started to favor international humanitarian assistance to Burma. There is also greater awareness that cross-border assistance can only reach a fraction of the needy in Burma; the vast majority of the country s population is not accessible by agencies working along the Thai-Burma border. While some of the NGOs involved in refugee and cross-border activities have started to support the concept of humanitarian assistance to Burma, they have emphasized that aid to Burma should not be at the cost of programs targeting Burmese in Thailand. There remain strong voices against humanitarian aid to Burma. Some of the biggest critics of aid are members of the politically active Burmese community, democracy activists in exile, some of the human rights organizations based in Thailand that focus chiefly on Burma, and political organizations in Western countries that are championing the cause of democracy in Burma. Concern about Aid Reaching People in Need Even those who in principle support humanitarian aid to Burma before the achievement of political reform are skeptical that current assistance is reaching those most in need. They believe funds are being misdirected by the regime for its own use, which international organizations are unable to prevent. Charges leveled against international agencies in Burma include that organizations have to pay a 10 percent fee to the regime for operating in the country; out of every More agencies in Thailand have become aware of the scope of the humanitarian crisis in Burma and the potential for it to have a regional impact. WAITING TO RETURN HOME A 56 year-old woman interviewed by Refugees International said that she had been on the move for five years. She now lives in a settlement for internally displaced people in Karen State close to the border with Thailand. On two separate occasions, this woman thought she had found safety and could start to rebuild her life. Instead, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, a proxy force for the Burmese military, set fire to her home each time. She and her family had to live under trees for a few days until they could determine where to go. She eventually reached this settlement, but soon after she arrived, her husband was killed in a bus accident just across the border in Thailand. Today she survives by doing paddy farming. She sent her youngest child to a refugee camp in Thailand so he could receive an education, and has two other children who are now married and live in this same settlement. Right now, this woman believes that the only place in Karen State where she can stay safely is in this settlement she doesn t have any other place to go. While her life is better here than in her native village, she hopes one day in the near future she will be able to return home and live in peace. 21

28 It is not possible to undertake nationalscale initiatives in fields like HIV/AIDS prevention, restriction of human trafficking, and drug eradication while completely bypassing the government in power. dollar destined for UN agencies in Rangoon, between cents automatically benefits the regime as the UN accepts an exchange rate on the dollar lower than the market rate; MOUs signed between the SPDC and the UN and international NGOs stipulate using Burmese consultants who are closely linked to the regime; food and supply convoys have to pay money at SPDC checkpoints on the road; and medicines provided by UN agencies are being resold in markets. Humanitarian agencies in Burma deny most of the accusations about aid being misused at present, 59 but do admit that the regime levies a 10 percent tax on food purchased by the WFP to distribute internally. Additionally, as discussed previously, access remains a major problem with severe restrictions in 2005 on the delivery of aid and project monitoring. Critics remain unconvinced that international organizations have the freedom to implement programs and benefit people in the military-controlled environment in Burma. They caution agencies against working with the bureaucracy or GONGOs. Additionally they want the organizations to implement initiatives without having any connection with the SPDC. The critics express doubt that the UN and international NGOs can ensure that funds are helping the most vulnerable people and call for much more extensive monitoring. Another concern is that money from the international aid community permits the regime to spend even less on key sectors like heath and education and leaves it free to use the funds towards building up its military. The skepticism is warranted as there is little doubt that the military leadership would prefer international donors to simply hand over the money at the border and let the government implement its own programs as it sees fit. The SPDC is more in favor of UN programs which respond to government requests and are implemented through government departments or GONGOs. It is reluctant to work with international NGOs, whose grassroots approach, emphasizing local organization and empowerment to build social capital and ensure project sustainability, is at odds with a government bent on control. 60 The international organizations in Burma emphasize they can carry out their programs independently so as to reach the most vulnerable in the areas they operate. The strategy used by several organizations is to start out working on small projects and build trust and relationships with officials in government departments. Once the regime ceases to be suspicious of them, they have more room to expand to additional projects in different sectors. Expatriate staff stress that there are some dedicated officials in government ministries who are genuinely concerned about the welfare of the people and keen to assist the international agencies. This is especially the case at the local level where the officials are often from the same communities as the people. International agencies maintain that even when a civilian government comes to power, the bureaucracy will remain the same, so exposing this group to their work will be beneficial in the long term. In the early and mid-1990s, some international NGOs worked through the GONGOs, but since then have dealt more with church and women s groups and encouraged the formation of village and ward-level associations. 61 The agencies in Burma stress that they provide most aid directly to the beneficiaries. Regarding the issue of carrying out activities without connection to the SPDC, agencies make the point that it is not possible to undertake national-scale initiatives in fields like HIV/AIDS prevention, restriction of human trafficking, and drug eradication while completely bypassing the government in power. Staff of international organizations believe that the monitoring of their programs meets international standards. They maintain that donors would not be funding them if they were unable to demonstrate the effectiveness of the funds in ameliorating the conditions of the poor in areas of access and argue that 22 Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

29 if they were unable to monitor their programs, they themselves would suspend or cease activities in Burma. International organizations in Burma acknowledge that the SPDC is continuing to expand its military. Estimates of the military expenditure range from 29 to 50 percent of the total government budget; meanwhile the regime allocates only three percent of its budget to health and eight percent to education. 62 As in any other country, there is the possibility that aid will allow the government to divert resources to other purposes. International organizations in Burma contend that most of their activities are in sectors and geographical areas where the government was hardly involved before their arrival on the scene. If they were to withdraw, instead of diverting resources from the military to social services, the government would provide minimum services to selected communities seen to be sympathetic to the regime while ignoring the needs of the majority of the people, ethnic minorities in particular. For example, agencies working with the Rohingya communities in Rakhine State claim that if they were to leave, the SPDC, which does not even consider Rohingya to be citizens of Burma, would not step in to take over food delivery and social services, thus depriving the Rohingya of all assistance. Finally, while many of the international agencies would like to respect Suu Kyi s wishes and consult with the NLD, they believe that doing so is not practical because any consultation with The Lady could result in a backlash from the regime and their programs could be affected. Some of the agencies operating in Burma say that they are able to inform, but not consult, the NLD about their programs and run their programs according to the criteria of transparency, accountability and independent monitoring as prescribed by the NLD and NCGUB. Sanctions vs. Engagement Any debate over the appropriateness of providing aid inside Burma takes place within the broader context of the debate over how to achieve political change. Various governments and international agencies have tried different approaches to bring about an improvement in the political situation. Some have imposed comprehensive sanctions while others have opted for sanctions which allow humanitarian assistance. Many nations are engaging with the regime and a few have tried to initiate political change in Burma by providing aid that is linked to democratic reform. The Burmese government has consistently resisted international efforts, which have been fragmented and incoherent, to convince it to change its policies and end internal oppression. The humanitarian crisis and displacement in Burma will continue as long as the political situation remains unresolved. Those opposed to sanctions point out that the greatest weakness of the Burma sanctions is that they are far from universal. With neighbors providing economic and military aid to Burma, sanctions, such as those imposed by the United States and the European Union, will not bring about a change in the country s governance. While the NLD has endorsed the US embargo, some of its members acknowledge that it has not been very effective. According to a senior NLD member, Exports are continuing to increase... India and China will buy anything we sell. They demand a lot of our raw materials and agricultural materials. 63 Since the United States first introduced sanctions the Burmese government has made no moves in a democratic direction; instead moderates like Khin Nyunt have been purged. As for the effectiveness of sanctions in the South Africa case, to which the Burma sanctions are often compared, South Africa was deeply integrated in the international economy and its government came under pressure from domestic business and neighboring states. 64 Conversely, Burma has an internationally isolated agrarian economy, running decades behind the rest of the re- The humanitarian crisis and displacement in Burma will continue as long as the political situation remains unresolved. 23

30 Humanitarian interventions in Burma, or lack thereof, have political overtones. gion. The SPDC does not depend on external economic linkages for its survival. 65 It is the people of Burma who suffer from sanctions while the junta survives through the support of Asian neighbors. Advocates of sanctions have noted that the US and EU sanctions are relatively new and will take some years to have the desired effect. They maintain that sanctions have symbolic value and give moral support and leverage to the NLD and Burmese pro-democracy forces. Sanctions may also have encouraged the SPDC to adopt the terminology, if not the practice, of democracy and human rights, and to invite individuals and institutions like the UN Special Envoy, ICRC and Amnesty International into the country. 66 Those opposed to engagement point out that Burma has been a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since 1997, and while ASEAN countries have tried various forms of engagement to bring about reform, they have failed in their endeavors. They argue that even China, with all its interests and involvement in Burma, cannot influence the regime beyond a certain limit. The removal of Khin Nyunt supports this claim, as he was widely regarded as having very close relations with Beijing. In this context, humanitarian interventions, or lack thereof, have political overtones. A recent example is the withdrawal of the Global Fund which had been providing funding for health projects. According to the Fund the pull-out was due to travel restrictions imposed by the SPDC, making it impossible for the agency to oversee the implementation of grants outside Rangoon and ensure that money would reach those who need it most. Some NGOs have argued that the withdrawal decision was political. 67 Frank Smithuis, Burma director of Doctors Without Borders-Holland, said that rather than canceling the program Global Fund should have delayed the funding and used it as leverage to win better government performance in health care. 68 The International Community s Response to Burma United Nations Burma has been a source of growing concern among UN members since 1990, when the country s military regime prevented the NLD from assuming power. In 1997, Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed Álvaro de Soto of Peru as Special Envoy for Burma to help facilitate national democratization and reconciliation. In 2000, Malaysian diplomat Razali Ismail replaced De Soto. The mediation efforts of Razali led to the release of political prisoners and limited progress on the political front; his most notable achievement was the unconditional release of Suu Kyi from house arrest in May Razali was last permitted to visit Burma in March 2004 but at that time he was not provided with the opportunity to hold substantive discussions with the regime. Despite repeated requests, Razali was denied permission for further visits and in January 2006, he resigned from his post. According to some analysts, the biggest limitation in the Special Envoy s mandate is that it is too loose and does not have the support of a binding UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution or of a key power like China. The Secretary-General has provided reports on the Special Envoy s efforts to the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights. These reports have included observations on the political situation in the country. In the March 2005 report to the Commission on Human Rights, the Secretary-General urged authorities to demonstrate their commitment to a genuine and credible process of democratization. 69 The UN Commission on Human Rights has had a Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Burma since The Special Rapporteur, currently Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro of Brazil, has reported annually to the Commission and the General Assembly. The Rapporteur has not been allowed to visit Burma since November Pinheiro has 24 Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

31 highlighted the plight of internally displaced persons in his reports to the Human Rights Commission and General Assembly. The Rapporteur s access to the ethnic nationality areas, where the most displacement is occurring, has been extremely limited and many of his sources of information are Thailandbased agencies. At the UNSC, the United States has been the driving force behind efforts to address Burma with the argument that the situation there, with its refugee flows and drug trade, constitutes a threat to international peace and security. It has raised the issue in private consultations under other matters, and sought to move it onto the agenda. By the beginning of December 2005, ten UNSC members were willing to place Burma on the Council s agenda. A decision was made by consensus that the UNSC would receive a briefing on Burma from a senior Secretariat official under an other matters item during informal consultations. 70 On December 16, 2005, Burma was discussed for the first time at the UNSC. The UN Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari, told Council members in a closed meeting that despite hopes of reform the past year had proven very disappointing. He also spoke about the rapid rise of AIDS, malnourishment of children, limited health care and inadequate education opportunities. Many diplomats described the briefing as a good first step, and the Secretary General, who attended the meeting, said afterwards the UNSC should now be given a bit of time to see how things progressed. 71 United States The political relationship between the United States and Burma worsened after 1988 and remains estranged. In 1990, the United States downgraded its level of representation in Burma from Ambassador to Chargé d Affaires. Immediate US policy objectives in Burma include securing the release of Suu Kyi, other key opposition leaders and political prisoners, encouraging a dialogue on democratic political reform and national reconciliation, and the re-opening of all NLD offices. 72 US sanctions are applied under various legislative and policy vehicles. Soon after a violent attack on Suu Kyi s motorcade on May 30, 2003, during which several NLD officials were killed, and following which she was once again placed under house arrest, the US Congress adopted the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act (BFDA), which includes a ban on imports from Burma, a ban on the export of financial services to Burma, a freeze on the assets of certain Burmese financial institutions and extended visa restrictions on Burmese officials. Congress renewed the BFDA in July 2004 and July The trade ban introduced by the United States under the BFDA had a big impact on several of Burma s export sectors, particularly garments and textiles. In 2002, exports to the United States made up some 13 percent of Burma s total exports, bringing revenues of US $345 million. 74 The US market had become Burma s second largest export destination. Garments are one of Burma s principal exports and it is estimated that 90 percent of garment exports went to US markets prior to the ban. 75 As a result of the ban an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 jobs were lost in the garment sector. 76 In October 2003, the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, US Department of State said, In the long term, the garment sector will likely lose 100,000 jobs, most of which are filled by young women. We have credible reports that the concern voiced by some international NGOs concerning the fate of these women is well founded and that some have entered the flourishing illegal sex and entertainment industries Much of the garment industry in Burma was already threatened by the impending end of quotas under the WTO s [World Trade Organization] Agreement on Textiles and Clothing in It is therefore unlikely that the textile companies and their associated employment will return to Burma As a result of the U.S. trade ban, an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 jobs were lost in the garment sector. 25

32 even if we elect to lift sanctions at some future point. 77 Critics of the trade ban have noted that the entry of more women in the sex trade may contribute to higher numbers of HIV/AIDS cases. Research has shown that in Burma unprotected paid sex is a major driver of the epidemic. 78 Others have argued that the sanctions did not create a large pool of unemployed garment workers with no option but to join the sex industry. Instead many ex-factory workers were reabsorbed into the local economy, working in markets or as day laborers. Under the BFDA, the United States banned remittances to Burma, and the Act prohibits money transfers into Burma. Previously most trade was conducted in US dollars and Burma s international transactions and money transfers were largely cleared through US banks. 79 Local NGOs in Burma report problems with transfer of funds since the BFDA came into effect. On the humanitarian front, the United States suspended assistance to Burma after A 1993 fiscal year earmark of $1 million reinstated assistance, initially through the Department of State s Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Since 1998, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has co-managed the Burma assistance program with the Department of State. Funding has been used to support democracy in Burma and pro-democracy groups outside Burma, and to meet the humanitarian needs of Burmese in Thailand. 80 Researchers contend there are differences in the position of Congress and the Administration on the scope of the sanctions, with the latter favoring humanitarian aid to Burma. Two areas in which the United States remains involved inside Burma are HIV/AIDS and drug eradication. The US Congress earmarked funds for HIV/AIDS in Burma in 2001, and USAID began supporting international NGOs working on HIV/AIDS A woman works in a field near Buddhist temples. Many ethnic minorities accuse the predominantly Buddhist Burmese regime of a Burmanization campaign that suppresses them socially, culturally and religiously. Refugees International 26 Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

33 in the country. Implementation of program activities is through an agreement with the US NGO Population Services International, which in turn is funding other agencies like Save the Children US and Doctors Without Borders-Holland. In , the US provided $2 million to address the growing HIV/AIDS epidemic through international NGOs. No assistance was provided to the government through this program. 81 The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issues licenses to US-based NGOs which want to engage in humanitarian or religious activities in Burma that are otherwise prohibited. The US-based NGOs, including those able to use non-us government funds, are often discouraged from working in Burma due to the cumbersome and uncertain license application process. The United States has been engaging with the Burmese government in regard to narcotics control on a very limited level. The US Drug Enforcement Administration, through the Embassy in Rangoon, shares drug-related intelligence with the Burmese government and conducts joint drug-enforcement investigations with Burmese counternarcotics authorities. Additionally, the United States carried out opium yield surveys in Shan State in 1993 and 1995 and annually from 1997 through 2004 with assistance provided by Burmese counterparts. These surveys gave both governments an understanding of the scope, magnitude, and changing geographic distribution of Burma s opium crop. 82 In Shan State, the United States had been supporting the UNODC-Wa project since The project was initially a five-year supply-reduction program to encourage alternatives to poppy cultivation in territory controlled by the ethnic Wa army. In order to meet basic human needs and ensure the sustainability of a projected United Wa State Army-imposed opium ban in 2005, UNODC extended the project until 2007 and broadened the scope of the program to include a more systematic approach to alternative community development. In 2003, the agency also established a new project in the Wa and Kokang areas known as KOWI. 83 Under this initiative, UNODC has been coordinating 22 UN and NGO partners to provide for the basic needs of poor farmers and their families in the absence of their income traditionally derived from opium cultivation. The total funding required for the UNODC- Wa project from was about US$16.5 million; out of this the United States contributed approximately $8 million. While there were discussions in 2002 to have the United States augment its contributions to KOWI, these plans were shelved after the political events of May The United States decided to stop funding the UNODC-Wa project altogether since the indictment by the US Justice Department of Wa leaders in early 2005 on charges of heroin and methamphetamine trafficking. The decision to stop the funding surprised a number of people as the project is benefiting the vulnerable population of former poppy farmers and the Wa leadership was not being helped by this project in any way. Most of US funding related to Burma is presently directed towards activities and beneficiaries outside of Burma. There is a general agreement among missions and agencies in Rangoon that funds being spent outside the country have minimal impact inside Burma. They would like to see different approaches tried, which would be of greater benefit to the millions of people living well away from the border areas. European Union In 1996, the European Union adopted a Common Position on Burma. It confirmed previously imposed sanctions, such as an arms embargo and the suspension of all bilateral aid other than strictly humanitarian assistance, and introduced a visa ban on members of the regime and their families. It also suspended high-level governmental visits to Burma. 84 Most of US funding related to Burma is presently directed towards activities and beneficiaries outside of Burma. Funds being spent outside the country have minimal impact inside Burma. 27

34 While the Japanese government is eager to see democracy restored, it is worried that if it does not maintain influence with the Burmese regime, China will monopolize political and economic access to Burma. The 1996 Common Position was strengthened in October 1998, by widening the visa ban on Burmese officials. In April 2000, the EU Council added an export ban on equipment that might be used for internal repression or terrorism, published the list of persons affected by the visa ban, and imposed a freeze on the funds held abroad by persons on the list. At the same time, the Council reiterated its desire to establish a meaningful political dialogue with the SPDC. The Council agreed in October 2004 to revise the Common Position and further tighten sanctions on Rangoon. Specifically, it extended the visa ban on senior military officials traveling to the European Union to cover all officers holding the rank of Brigadier General or higher, while authorizing new restrictions on EU companies investing in Burmese state-owned enterprises. The Common Position was renewed for one year on 25 April EU sanctions are more limited in scope than those of the US. Investment sanctions prohibit EU companies from making financing available to certain businesses owned by the state, but place no ban on actual investment by EU companies or citizens. No action has been taken to halt the import of goods and services from Burma, and the most profitable sectors for the junta such as oil, timber and gas are omitted from sanctions. 86 Some EU members favor stronger economic sanctions, but others are concerned about the legality of trade embargoes against a fellow WTO member, as well as the social costs of these measures on the Burmese population. 87 Since 1994, the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) has funded programs aimed at helping vulnerable groups inside Burma and along the Thai-Burma border. In response to the deteriorating humanitarian situation, ECHO has tripled its annual funding from 6.5 million in 2001 to 19.4 million in In Burma, 60 percent of ECHO financing is spent on the fight against malaria and the provision of basic health care in remote areas. The rest is dedicated to water and sanitation projects and nutrition programs with special emphasis on women and children. 88 In 2005, ECHO opened an office in Rangoon and during the past year the European Union has made available a 6 million grant for projects related to uprooted people in Burma. It is seeking proposals for this grant. Japan Japan has attempted to bring about improvements in human rights and democratization in Burma through diplomatic contact and aid incentives. It is believed that Suu Kyi was released from house arrest in 1995 due to Japanese diplomatic efforts. Japan was promising to resume full-scale development aid if the regime restored political and economic openness in Burma. 89 While the Japanese government is eager to see democracy restored, it is worried that if it does not maintain influence with the Burmese regime, China will monopolize political and economic access to Burma. 90 The Japanese government has expressed concern that Western criticism of the junta will make the SPDC stiffen its position and isolate itself further, making the chances of democratization even more remote. Japan has engaged in a tactic of constructive dialogue and supports the ASEAN approach on Burma as a workable one. It believes ASEAN efforts to promote democracy in Burma should be supported by the international community. Japan was Burma s biggest donor prior to Following the pro-democracy uprising, it suspended all new assistance but continued to disburse funds committed for humanitarian aid projects prior to the democracy crackdown. Japan officially resumed some aid in From , Japan was the only country to provide significant humanitarian assistance to Burma, supporting half a dozen health care, education, and food production projects, as well as a grassroots assistance program. 91 After the 28 Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

35 May 2003 attack on Suu Kyi s convoy, Japan suspended economic cooperation and the distribution of new bilateral development aid to Burma via the Official Development Assistance program. The suspension excludes grassroots grants aid, which has been going primarily to NGOs, and permits disbursement of previous agreements. Japan continues to provide humanitarian assistance to Burma on a case-by-case basis. In August 2005, the Japanese government donated more than US$50,000 to Burma for the fight against malaria following the decision of the Global Fund to pull out of the country. China Since 1988, China has been an important supporter of Burma in international forums such as the UN because it too opposes foreign demands to improve its domestic human rights record. 92 China sees Burma as an important gateway through which it can expand its strategic influence into Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. China is Burma s key defense ally and provides the military with hardware and training. During the last decade, China s military sales to Rangoon have been valued at around US$2 billion. This has led to the Burmese military becoming more technically sophisticated and has enabled the army to expand from 180,000 to more than 450,000 soldiers. China has also provided Burma with more than US$200 million in economic assistance and helped with the development of Burma s infrastructure, including the construction of roads, airfields, ports and dams. 93 China is believed to be the largest foreign investor in Burma, though the size of this investment is not recorded and remains invisible in international statistics. 94 Many parts of northern Burma are heavily influenced by China. Chinese investment in Mandalay is believed to be so high that most of the property in the city is owned by businessmen of Chinese origin. Burma sends raw materials like teak and bamboo to China, and in exchange, receives cheap Chinese goods. Some analysts consider China to be one of the few countries to have some influence over Burma. An example is Chinese pressure on the SPDC to cut back the cross-border drugs trade 95 which made the regime take steps in this direction. The SPDC is also believed to have recanted its decision to leave the ILO 96 at China s bidding. India In 1988, India was the only neighboring country to stand on the side of democratic forces in Burma. The Prime Minister at the time, Rajiv Gandhi, declared that India must strengthen the democratic aspirations of the people of Burma. When student activists fled to India for shelter after the military takeover in September 1988, India willingly harbored them. 97 Additionally, it permitted refugees from Chin State to live in camps in the northeastern state of Mizoram. Since 1989, New Delhi has watched anxiously as Chinese capital, aid, and military equipment have poured into Burma. In the early 1990s, a major policy switch came about as India too became afraid of the close cooperation between China and Burma. New Delhi began establishing better bilateral relations with Rangoon through increased political, trade, and military ties. 98 The camps in Mizoram, which used to shelter Chin refugees, were dismantled in In 2004, the Congress party, with Rajiv Gandhi s wife at its helm, came back to power in India. Some analysts believed that India would once again push for democracy in Burma. However, that has not been the case and ties continue to improve between the two countries. Economic collaboration plans include a pipeline project which would transport gas from Burma s Rakhine State to India. During the last decade, China s military sales to Rangoon have been valued at around US$2 billion. 29

36 Over the past few years, ASEAN members have become increasingly frustrated with the lack of reform in Burma. ASEAN Burma joined ASEAN in The regional organization has been reluctant to push Burma towards political reform out of deference to the ASEAN doctrine of non-interference in internal affairs of member states. It deals with Burma under a policy of constructive engagement. Over the past few years, ASEAN members have become increasingly frustrated with the lack of reform in Burma. Under ASEAN s rotational leadership, Burma was scheduled to take the chairmanship of the organization s Standing Committee in The United States and European Union, which attend the annual ASEAN meetings as dialogue partners, threatened to boycott the 2006 meetings if Burma was the chair. A diplomatic crisis was averted in July 2005 when agreement was reached among ASEAN members that Burma would relinquish its turn at the chairmanship. 99 In December 2005, ahead of its summit in Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN made public its call to Burma to quicken its pace of reform and get on the road to democracy. 100 Malaysia, the current president of ASEAN, planned a delegation to Burma in January 2006 to discuss democratic transition with the SPDC given the repeated refusals of the regime to allow the UN Special Envoy into the country. In the first week of January 2006, Burma called off the fact-finding trip saying the government was too busy to host the mission because it was in the midst of switching its capital. 101 Outside of Asia, regional organizations such as the Organization of American States and the African Union have urged their members to adopt the Guiding Principles into national law and apply their standards to the internally displaced. It is, however, unlikely that ASEAN most of whose members are themselves not in favor of being held to international standards on internal displacement will embrace the Principles anytime in the near future and put pressure on fellow member Burma to enforce them. Thailand ASEAN member Thailand has been in an especially difficult position due to its proximity to Burma. In 1998, Thailand, beleaguered by refugee flows, drug smuggling and border conflicts with Burma, proposed a flexible engagement approach, 102 meaning that ASEAN would be able to discuss internal issues in member states that have implications for other ASEAN members. The Thai proposal did not result in a dramatic break with established policy but did mark a subtle shift in thinking about intra-asean relations. A reason for this shift was the collapse of the Suharto regime in Indonesia that was Burma s closest ideological ally and ASEAN s largest member. 103 Prior to the 1990s, Thai military quietly supported the armed ethnic nationalist groups controlling virtually all of the Burmese side of the Thai-Burma border. This was part of a Cold War strategy to keep a buffer zone to prevent communists in the region from linking up. As the communist threat faded and opposition groups began losing ground to the Burmese army, Thailand s generals improved relations with the junta. They cooperated in pressuring the ethnic nationalist armies to make ceasefire agreements with the regime. 104 As Thailand s trade and foreign investments in Burma have risen, Thai governments have had to balance a concern about the regime s repressive behavior, which often leads to refugee flows into Thailand, and the Thai business community s call for better relations with the junta. 105 Thaksin Shinawatra, who became Thailand s Prime Minister in 2001, has received criticism for his close ties to Burma s military leaders, as well as for his reluctance to openly criticize the regime. Since coming to power, he has brokered ceasefire negotiations between the KNU and the SPDC and sponsored the so-called Bangkok Process, an initiative involving high-level officials from Burma, Thailand, regional and European countries and the UN to further democracy in Burma. The plan foundered when junta representatives pulled out. 30 Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

37 RATIONALE FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE INSIDE BURMA This country lacks democratic institutions, social capital and trust between members of various ethnic groups. For there to be sustainable democratic change in this country, the international community needs to lay the groundwork for the change now by helping build a robust civil society and foster trust between the different communities. An international aid worker in Burma Donor governments should fund humanitarian agencies based in Burma now. These agencies must continue operating as long as they can work with a sufficient level of autonomy and control over resources and programs. Setting benchmarks, as many organizations have already done, 106 is important so that if the junta encroaches on their work, they will have standards in place to determine whether they should remain operational in Burma. Most agencies in the country report that despite increased restrictions, they are able to carry out their mandate and uphold monitoring standards. International aid is responding to a number of crises threatening millions of people. The country s population cannot wait for a civilian government before receiving assistance from the outside world. If these crises are not addressed immediately, their long-term impact will be enormous and will affect many generations to come, not only in Burma, but in the surrounding region. Beyond humanitarian relief, international assistance can also create the forums for sustainable change and contribute towards peace-building among the various groups in the country. As the UK Department for International Development has stated, It is difficult to overstate the enormity and complexity of the changes that will be needed to transform Burma into a prosperous, democratic state capable of eliminating poverty. It will involve creation of new and strengthened institutions to promote faster development, greater accountability, reduced poverty and injustice as well as mediation of conflict. Changes to incentives, mindsets and attitudes that have prevailed for decades will be needed. These changes will take a long time, even with the full support of the leaders of Burma. 107 The principal reasons the international community must provide aid to Burma are: Aid is needed to respond to humanitarian crises on multiple fronts and control their spread in the region. The humanitarian needs are clear enough. Burma ranks 190 out of 191 countries in terms of health care delivery and is facing an AIDS epidemic. Additionally, Burma suffers 60 percent of all malaria deaths on the Asian continent. About 600,000 cases of malaria are reported annually in Burma, with the disease being the leading cause of death for children under age five. Burma s tuberculosis rate is one of the highest in the world, with 97,000 new cases detected annually. Multi-drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis are spreading within the country and across the border. 108 Even as the Global Fund was pulling out of Burma, it acknowledged that the situation of Burma as regards HIV/ AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria is extremely precarious and that [w]ithout resolute interventions these diseases could soon reach catastrophic proportions, affecting the entire region. 109 With the exit of the Global Fund and the needs in Burma so enormous, UN officials and half a dozen foreign governments are attempting to find a new source of support to replace the Global Fund and another international health care program that ran its scheduled course. 110 The country s population cannot wait for a civilian government before receiving assistance for the outside world. It is especially frightening that many people living in armed conflict and border zones in Burma are unaware of epidemics ravaging the country and the region. For a 2005 report on internal displacement in Burma, Human Rights Watch interviewed forty-six Karen IDPs living in the Papun hills in midwww.refugeesinternational.org 31

38 Civil society networks can prepare the way for democratic participation. late 2003 and along the Thai border in early None of the interviewees had heard of HIV/AIDS. There may be little public awareness about another potential human pandemic, avian influenza, cases of which are being reported in Southeast Asia. According to the representative of an NGO which provides assistance to communities in an ethnic state along the eastern Burma border, people in parts of the state are finding dead birds and do not hesitate to consume them as they have never heard of avian influenza. The extent of health crises in conflict and war-affected areas is probably underreported as they remain off limits to most health care workers, making data unavailable. International involvement is necessary in Burma so agencies can attempt to determine the extent of the public health situation and spread awareness about diseases with the potential to have a devastating impact on the entire region. With most agencies focusing on health, as this is one of the few sectors that donors are willing to support, less visible crises in education and agriculture receive little attention. It is imperative that donors and international agencies become more involved in these sectors as well. Aid is required to build the capacity of CBOs and NGOs which can access areas that are off-limits to international organizations. Burma is experiencing a rapid growth of private organizations, but their capacity is limited. Improving the effectiveness of these organizations through international assistance is critical because for many international agencies the only way to access sensitive and remote areas is through partnerships with local organizations. A number of international agencies are working with local organizations to channel aid to otherwise inaccessible populations such as internally displaced persons in relocation sites and areas of armed conflict and border zones. The local civil society can not only provide assistance to a vulnerable population but also educate and spread basic awareness about epidemics like HIV/AIDS in communities not being reached by health workers. Aid can lay the foundations of democracy and contribute to a bottom-up social and political transition. Burma is not a country with democratic traditions and institutions. In order to lay the groundwork and foundations of democracy and sustainable change, international assistance is needed now. According to anthropologist Christina Fink, For a political transition to succeed in Burma, democratic practices need to be inculcated and the division of political power must be resolved in a way in which most people feel satisfied. After centuries under the absolutist rule of kings and decades under repressive military generals, people in Burma today have little experience with democratic norms. Even members of the pro-democracy movement find it difficult to develop the openness and tolerance required of a democratic culture. 111 Civil society in Burma can be a long-term tool to bring about socio-political change. Foreign aid can play a role in contributing towards the formation of an environment in which local efforts to reach peace and development are strengthened. External support for civil society organizations can begin the process of creating a sustained bottom-up social and political transition in Burma. 112 A re-emergent civil society by itself is insufficient to bring about a political transition at the national level. That will require concerted, explicitly political actions by political elites, but in the meantime, civil society networks can prepare the way for democratic participation. 113 Aid can help create a national identity and be used for conflict-resolution and peacebuilding initiatives. A prime challenge facing Burma is nationbuilding. Decades of civil war between the 32 Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

39 This displaced woman in Karen State lives in a temporary settlement and hopes it will someday be safe enough to return to her village. Refugees International country s diverse ethnic nationalities have created a legacy of hostility and distrust that remain a justification for continued centralization of state power under military rule as well as a source of long-term instability. 114 While there is a national identity, it often coalesces at the ethno-national level, rather than that of the nation-state. Historian and journalist Bertil Lintner who trekked in 1985 through the Naga territory, a remote mountain region immediately to the north of Chin Hills, found that hardly any Naga spoke Burmese and they clearly considered Burma an alien country. His conclusion was that the majority of the Naga had never heard of Burma, let alone agreed to belong to it. 115 Lintner doubts anything has changed in the perspective of the Naga since He had a similar experience with the Wa community in northeastern Shan State of Burma, where Wa soldiers told him they had never been to Burma. the different ethnic groups. For example, in Rakhine State, many Buddhist Rakhine view the Muslim Rohingya with antipathy. 116 Divisions even exist among the subgroups within each ethnic group. According to one analyst, similar conflicts exist between majority and minority subgroups of the ethnic nationalities as they do between the majority Burman and minority ethnic groups. International agencies in Burma, in conjunction with local organizations and civil society, are undertaking conflict resolution and peace-building initiatives with ethnic minorities. Much more needs to be done in this field and the international community must fund initiatives that promote better understanding among the diverse groups of Burma. Not only are there divisions between the majority ethnic Burmans and the ethnic minorities, there are also divisions between 33

40 Humanitarian work is as much about ensuring respect for international humanitarian and human rights norms as it is about giving aid. TOWARDS A MORE EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT In my lifetime I have never seen peace in my land. We have to rely on aid because there is no possibility for us to return to our native villages and earn a livelihood. An internally displaced person in Karen State The premise of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement is that ensuring an appropriate response to the needs of internally displaced persons is above all the responsibility of the state. In Burma, the immediate prospects for the government fulfilling its fundamental responsibilities towards its displaced citizens are bleak. Any strategy for providing assistance and protecting the displaced in Burma must consist of realistic actions given existing constraints, and must be carried out with an eye to opportunities to convince the government to live up to its international obligations. Assistance and protection are two crucial components of humanitarian action. Protection means that humanitarian work is as much about ensuring respect for international humanitarian and human rights norms as it is about giving aid. 117 Traditionally, humanitarian and development agencies involved in providing assistance to affected populations have considered protection and human rights monitoring to fall outside their mandate. The widespread view has been that keeping people alive through food and medical supplies guarantees the population s most basic human rights, and through their presence alone, agencies discourage governments or rebel groups from committing serious human rights violations. 118 While this view has an element of truth, responding to the internal displacement situation in Burma requires efforts to take an approach that encompasses protective actions. Burma-based Agencies Inside Burma the leadership and actions of the United Nations agencies are critical. Their presence in Burma carries with it a responsibility almost at the level of the Burmese authorities. Their collective impact is insufficient to use the risk of jeopardizing it as an excuse to neglect the crisis of internal displacement. In the Khin Nyunt era, no UN agency in Burma appears to have pushed or carried out a dialogue with the SPDC about access to the internally displaced living in armed conflict and border zones. As mentioned previously, the government is sensitive about the IDP topic, yet international organizations have been able to carve space around other sticky subjects and the authorities have changed their attitude towards these issues. When the ICRC was able to get access to the conflict and war-affected areas, it is unclear why no UN agency attempted to press for similar permission. Given the reduced humanitarian space now, it is possible the UN lost an opportunity to reach this vulnerable population, at least in the near future. The commissioning of an action-oriented study of the internal displacement phenomenon is an important first step, but collective action is needed by the UN Country Team. The Team must develop a strategy to respond to the needs of internally displaced persons, taking into account their specific vulnerabilities. In the more restricted climate, two UN agencies are particularly important: UNHCR and UNICEF. UNHCR is in the privileged position of having received an opportunity from the SPDC to prepare the groundwork for the return of refugees in areas close to conflict-affected zones in eastern Burma. This has given them the chance to attempt to identify and respond to the needs of internally displaced persons present in these communities. While the government has restricted access to UNHCR s international personnel, they should continue to work with the authorities to loosen these restrictions. Their staff should be sensitive to the importance of this access 34 Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

41 and look for opportunities at the local level to include internally displaced persons in whatever community development projects they are able to initiate. They should insist on working with legitimate partners: international NGOs and their affiliated networks or directly with local NGOs and CBOs with the capacity to organize activities in these zones. UNICEF also has the opportunity to engage with the government and access internally displaced persons. The agency s previous efforts have led to much progress with regard to a number of sensitive subjects in Burma, such as official recognition of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the outline of a government plan to address under-age recruitment in the Tatmadaw. UNICEF has not, however, attempted to initiate specific programs focusing on the internally displaced even in ceasefire areas and instead uses the tactic of targeting everyone in the community. Although the internally displaced have special protection needs, and the majority of IDPs are women and children, UNICEF s approach is no different than that of a small NGO with much less clout. In certain border states, UNICEF has been present for decades in areas inaccessible to other UN agencies until recently and has advocated with authorities for children affected by armed conflict, arguably a topic of political sensitivity. UNICEF needs to utilize its credibility with the Burmese authorities to advocate on behalf of the internally displaced, especially children, and their recognition by the government. Access to conflict zones for data gathering purposes would be an important first step. UNICEF should use the protection of displaced children as an entry point to becoming explicitly engaged in the IDP issue. Training in protection concepts and approaches is vital, and all international agencies in Burma must mainstream protection in their assistance activities. Organizations should train personnel to recognize human rights threats to civilians and to document abuses. Staff should have the skills needed to carry out low-profile advocacy with local authorities who are most likely to be in a position to stop abuses or initiate protective actions. Additionally, staff of international agencies, if witnessing violations by the regime, must relay that information either to agencies within Burma that have the mandate to investigate such cases or to human rights bodies outside the country that can document and advocate against such abuses. Until a time when access becomes easier for international agencies, the best strategy for organizations is to partner with CBOs and civil society representatives that may be able to access communities where internally displaced persons are present. Given the limitations of local organizations, international agencies should combine direct support to communities channeled through these organizations with training for their staff. Collaboration between international organizations and civil society and CBOs can strengthen local community protection. International agencies can train local networks to enhance their data collection skills on human rights violations and vulnerabilities affecting the population. The local groups can act as the eyes and ears of the international organizations. They can work with the communities to identify and monitor abuses, and report the information to agencies that can investigate such incidents. Also, the local networks can help build awareness about protection among communities, and similar to staff of international organizations, undertake lowprofile advocacy actions, so as to prevent violations from occurring in the first place. International agencies will have to be patient with their local partners. Most of the organizations lack the means to meet monitoring standards required by western donors. When collaborating with local NGOs and CBOs, agencies and donors must outline acceptable guidelines for accountability in the light of The best strategy for international organizations is to partner with community-based organizations that may be able to access communities where internally displaced persons are present. 35

42 their existing capacities, while supporting the gradual strengthening of these institutions. Finally, international organizations are working with some of the most marginalized minorities in eastern and western Burma to enable them to secure access to land and property rights. Such initiatives are much needed to improve the protection situation and bring stability in the lives of ethnic minorities who are at high risk of being displaced. Attempts should be made to replicate such initiatives in more parts of the country. Thailand-based Agencies At present cross-border assistance is virtually the only means of providing aid directly to internally displaced persons living in conflict and war affected areas along the eastern Bur- A woman sells eggs in a marketplace in Shan State. Commerce in parts of the State is carried out in the same way it has for centuries, in isolation from the outside world. Refugees International 36 Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

43 ma border. This means that donors should complement increased funding to assistance programs managed by Burma-based organizations with increased support to agencies implementing cross-border programs. Lack of capacity is also an issue among the Thailand-based ethnic organizations and while donors are encouraged to provide more funds for cross-border intervention, they should be aware that many of the CBOs doing the cross-border work do not have the capacity to absorb large amounts of funds. It is vital that the international community build the capacity of these groups. Some donors don t provide funds for stipends or administrative costs. Consequently, the agencies have problems running basic operations and managing day-to-day communication and logistics. Certain donors also maintain monitoring requirements that the small ethnic organizations are unable to meet. Additionally, donors sometimes enforce a strict timeframe for spending the money when the pace of disbursement should be based on what the situation allows. Donors, therefore, should be more flexible about administrative costs, monitoring requirements and the time frame for utilization of funds by ethnic organizations. An important protection strategy in the conflict zones is organizing advance warning systems. They prepare civilians for an attack and allow them to escape before the Tatmadaw can reach their villages. Presently walkie-talkies are used as a means of alerting people about the military s movement. Although there is debate about whether as many civilians as possible should have access to walkie-talkies, or whether the walkie-talkies should remain in the hands of armed resistance groups and possibly the leader of the village, it is clear that there is a need for more communication equipment in the conflict and war-affected areas. By contributing to the acquisition of more walkie-talkies and training in their usage, donors will be assisting in the creation of a more comprehensive early warning system. The Government of Burma As an initial step, the Secretary General s Special Representative on the Human Rights of IDPs should attempt to engage with the SPDC. He is in the best position to raise the overall issue of the Guiding Principles and their importance. The Special Representative can raise the issue of the significance of government actions towards recognizing the extent of internal displacement in the country and the SPDC s responsibilities under international human rights and humanitarian law. He should encourage government representatives to attend international forums on internal displacement. In 1992, the SPDC acceded to the Geneva Conventions of The government should endorse additional international protocols related to protection and assistance to civilians in internal conflicts, and abide by them. Until the internal conflicts in the country are resolved, the overall goal of donor governments and international organizations should be to convince the Government of Burma that it must allow international agencies and representatives access to the entire population in all parts of the country. Humanitarian needs in Burma have reached a stage when they need to be addressed immediately and international organizations with the expertise to respond to these crises must be permitted to carry out their activities. At the same time, organizations must be allowed autonomy in undertaking operations. The government should respect the right of agencies to monitor their projects in an independent manner. The SPDC must also allow more international organizations into the country and make the process of their acquiring MOUs less cumbersome. The overall goal of donor governments and international organizations should be to convince the Government of Burma that it must allow international agencies and representatives access to the entire population in all parts of the country. 37

44 REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL S RECOMMENDATIONS Refugees International recommends that: The Government of Burma respect the human rights of its people and end violations and abuse against the civilian population. allow international agencies access to all populations in Burma. permit international organizations to carry out their monitoring activities independently of Burmese authorities. make procedures for international organizations to obtain permission to work in Burma less lengthy and bureaucratic. recognize that there is an internal displacement crisis in Burma and permit international agencies access to the displaced in all parts of the country. ratify and endorse all international covenants and protocols relating to the protection of, and assistance to, civilians in situations of armed and state-society conflict and adhere to these principles. Donors and International Aid Community channel more aid into Burma and target areas beyond health, such as education, food production, and capacity building. more international agencies consider operating in Burma; increased numbers of international NGOs in the country will mean more implementing partners for UN agencies. provide funding for IDP assistance to agencies based both in Burma and Thailand, and ensure that funding to one side of the border is not at the expense of the other. modify reporting requirements for Burmaand Thailand-based local NGOs which at present are unable to meet complex reporting requirements. grant support for administrative requirements of Burmese CBOs operating in Thailand. avoid micromanaging programs from overseas; allow those having better understanding of situation to have more say in utilization of funds; at the same time build strong partnership with fledgling local NGOs. develop protection strategies for internally displaced persons in the conflict and war-affected zones of eastern Burma and provide funding to put strategies in action; this would involve support for measures such as provision of walkie-talkies. Support initiatives to build the capacity of CBOs and civil society in Burma, as well as CBOs in Thailand. conduct human rights awareness training for Burmese military, police and civilian officials. urge the Burmese government to increase humanitarian space. invite Burmese officials to global forums on the issue of displacement so they realize they are not the only ones dealing with an IDP situation, thus reducing the sensitivity of the issue. Specifically the United States: expand funding for humanitarian initiatives in Burma. allocate more resources for Burmese IDPs. earmark funds for response to the IDPs by Burma-based agencies. expeditiously approve Office of Foreign Assets Control requests from NGOs seeking to work in Burma. members of the US Congress and their staff travel, or continue traveling, to Burma 38 Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma

45 and the region and meet extensively with all relevant actors (governments, UN agencies, international and local NGOs, academics, activists, and the people of Burma, including refugees and internally displaced persons) to gain a greater understanding of the political and humanitarian situation. Specifically the United Nations: the UN as a whole develop a common strategy to respond to the humanitarian and human rights crises in Burma. the Security Council put Burma on its agenda and explore possibilities for a lasting political solution in the country. office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Internal Displacement Division make Burma a priority. the Secretary General s Representative on the Human Rights of IDPs promote the start of a dialogue with national authorities and help identify a focal point in the administration on the issue of internal displacement. the Special Rapporteur on Burma keep on disseminating information on the conditions of IDPs in his briefings to the Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly. if Special Rapporteurs with politically sensitive mandates continue to be denied access to Burma, Rapporteurs who cover sectors such as the right to education and right to food consider undertaking missions to Burma to find out more about the humanitarian and human rights situation there. International Agencies Based in Burma and Agencies with a Burma Focus Based in Thailand take more steps to understand each other s role and responsibilities when it comes to alleviating suffering in Burma, and more specifically responding to the pressing needs of IDPs. exchange information regularly on humanitarian needs and challenges. develop better cooperation and coordination on humanitarian response. International Agencies Working in Burma Build capacity of CBOs and civil society engaged in community assistance so they can act as conduits to areas that international agencies cannot access. encourage the emergence of CBOs and civil society among minority and underrepresented groups. advocate with government on behalf of civil society. collect more data on displacement in all parts of Burma; right now most of the information on the displaced is focused on eastern Burma and coming from agencies based in Thailand. monitor human rights violations and quietly report abuses to advocacy organizations and to agencies within Burma which can investigate the cases. create a protection strategy based on humanitarian presence. provide protection training to all international and national staff. train local networks in information gathering and reporting, as well as spreading awareness about protection and human rights among local communities. assist ethnic nationalities in acquiring land and property rights. When IDP return is feasible, recognize that IDPs may not want to return to their original homes. make certain that IDP return is carried out in accordance with the Guiding Principles 39

46 28-30 and the displaced have complete understanding and participate in the planning and management of their return or resettlement and reintegration. avoid collaborating on humanitarian programs with GONGOs; instead seek partners among CBOs and local NGOs, which initially may have limited capacity. maintain unity in opposing regulations which could benefit the junta. Specifically the UN agencies working in Burma: unhcr seek access to displaced persons in eastern Burma as their preparatory work on refugee returns continues. unicef become involved in the protection and assistance of displaced children. explore possibilities of access to the internally displaced population living in conflict and war-affected areas through sectoral approaches. advocate with the SPDC to recognize IDPs as a concern and to allow more access by the international community to the IDPs, especially the most vulnerable population in the conflict and war-affected zones. formulate a Strategic Action Plan on internal displacement. The National League for Democracy raise awareness about the issue of internal displacement in Burma and the related humanitarian needs in domestic and international forums. ASEAN urge Burma to allow UN officials, such as the Secretary General s Special Envoys and the Special Rapporteur on Burma, and humanitarian agencies into the country so they are able to carry out their mandates. Burma s Neighbors: Thailand, Bangladesh, India and Malaysia provide temporary asylum to Burmese seeking refuge. grant UNHCR full access to Burmese refugees and asylum seekers. cooperate with international efforts to resettle Burmese refugees. Hundreds of Karen people have sought safety from Burmese military attacks and human rights violations in this temporary settlement located near the border with Thailand. Refugees International 40 Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma