Historical United Nations: Kosovo Crisis

Size: px

Start display at page:

Download "Historical United Nations: Kosovo Crisis"

Howard Pierce
5 years ago
Views:

1 Historical United Nations: Kosovo Crisis Topic B: War in Kosovo Chairs: Annie Fu & Jacob Skaggs Moderator: Alexis Wache Vice Chairs: Parth Dalal, Nadya Teneva April 10 13, 2014 Fu & Skaggs 1

2 When the War Came Introduction: We have now reached March of 1998 and the violence in the Kosovar region of Serbia has escalated to the point of war. In response to attacks on the Kosovo Liberation Army resistance the KLA has in turn ramped up its violent struggle against the Serbian government 1. In response to the increased violence in Kosovo US diplomat Robert Gelard has refers to the KLA as without any question a terrorist group. 2 This increased violence has caused Kosovar shadow government leader Ibrahim Rugova to instruct Albanians in the Kosovo region to defend themselves if necessary against Serbian police and security officers 3. Possibly as a response to Robert Gelard s comments on the KLA being taken as a sign that the American government was in support of Serbian oppression of the KLA and Albanian Kosovars, Serbian security forces have murdered 50 members of the Jashari family including Adem Jashari, the leader of the KLA 4. At this point violence is no longer inevitable or a possibility but a reality that must be stopped. The question now has become how to best bring peace to the Kosovo region. Amongst these options include pushing for peace talks to encourage both sides to negotiate peace on their own terms. More realistically, the discussion may also include how to intervene, recommending military action or deployment of UN peacekeeper troops. While normally only the UN security council is allowed to deploy peacekeeper troops, if they are unable to fulfill this role the duty falls to the first committee of the UN. Act swiftly as events in this committee will take place in real time, so if a resolution is not reached quickly the consequences may be drastic 1 PBS, War in Europe. 2 PBS, War in Europe. 3 Timeline: Kosovo. 4 PBS, War in Europe. Fu & Skaggs 2

3 Background and Current Situation: The March 5 th siege of the Jashari compound proved to be the point of no return for hostilities in Kosovo, with KLA forces rallying following the death of their commander to rebuff further Yugoslav military activity in the Drenica Valley. A March 24 attempt by Yugoslav forces to eliminate a KLA unit in the village of Glodjane was successfully repelled by KLA forces, albeit with heavy casualties. Capitalizing on their early success in the face of a betterequipped adversary, the KLA continued operations to attempt to join their two bases of operations in Drenica and Albania. An April referendum in Serbia on the question of foreign intervention in Kosovo was rejected by 95% of voters, underscoring the complex political considerations of the conflict and indicating to the international community that the decision to intervene would not come easily. With foreign intervention off the table for the time being, Yugoslav forces were mobilized to take action against KLA forces along the border on May 31, NATO forces responded to these additional operations with Exercise Determined Falcon on June 15, a show of force along the Yugoslav borders aimed at demonstrating NATO s capability to rapidly project power if required to Yugoslav President Milosevic, although internally American commanders remained wary of the consequences of substantive military intervention. A June 16 meeting between President Milosevic and Russian President Boris Yeltsin led to President Milosevic accepting many, but not all, of the early demands set forth by NATO and the Contact Group, an informal group of concerned nations first established in response to the crisis in Bosnia. The concessions from Belgrade were hailed as a breakthrough by Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, and included a pledge to continue negotiations with the KLA, allow access to international organizations, and permit displaced persons to return home. The Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) was also created and commenced operations in July. Fu & Skaggs 3

4 During June and July, KLA forces continued to make territorial gains, including areas North of Pristina and the capture of the Belacevec coal pits and the town of Orahovac. August and September saw increased KLA/Yugoslav hostilities in south-central and Northern Kosovo. August and September also saw extensive hostilities, as KLA forces initiated offensives and were met with Yugoslav counteroffensives. On September 23, 1998, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1199, which condemned the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav army and demanded a cessation of hostilities and ceasefire. Shortly afterwards, NATO issued an activation warning to begin mobilization of military assets for limited intervention, specifically air operations within Kosovo. Two weeks later, NATO s activation order was given, and after the failure of additional diplomatic efforts, the North Atlantic Council issued activation orders for an air campaign to begin in 96 hours, though this proved unnecessary when the Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement for a ceasefire was signed on October 15. KVM monitors began to enter the country, and the Serbian withdrawal began on October 25. The KVM monitors proved wholly ineffective, however, and fighting resumed in December after both sides broke the ceasefire. A general deterioration of the situation followed, with insecurity rising in cities and murders and killings increasing. The Racak massacre was perpetrated on January 15, 1999, when 45 Kosovan Albanian farmers were massacred by Serbian security forces, which the international community decried as massacre over the objections of President Milosevic, who maintained that the dead were simply KLA fighters. A second round of high-level talks culminated in the January 30 issuance of non-negotiable principles by the Contact Group, which called for political conditions to revert to the pre-1990 situation in Kosovo and for a peace conference to be held in February at the Chateau de Fu & Skaggs 4

5 Rambouillet near Paris. The talks began on February 9, and while initially successful, fell through when the measures proposed proved inadequate for the Albanians and unacceptable to the Yugoslavs. An additional opportunity to decisively end the conflict has been forfeited. Independent of the Yugoslavs, the Albanian, American and British delegations became signatories to what would be known as the Rambouillet Accords on March 18, The measures included plans for a 30,000-strong NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo, permitting a small Yugoslav force to monitor the border. President Milosevic refused the agreement outright, even when confronted with the opportunity to amend the portions that had been declared unacceptable. On March 23, 1999, the Serbs accepted the non-military components of the agreement, providing for an autonomous Kosovo, but rejected NATO involvement. With the failure of the talks, NATO plans for an air campaign were immediately put into effect, and Javier Solana, the Secretary General of NATO, gave the order to initiate air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. NATO bombs began to drop on March 24, 1999 at 7:00pm. In the following weeks, NATO aircraft would fly 38,000 sorties over Serbia, attacking military and dual-use targets in an attempt to enforce a Yugoslav retreat from hostilities. The efficacy of the strikes proved to be overestimated, and what was intended to be a short campaign dragged on until June 11, during which time several misguided strikes resulted in civilian casualties and the misguided targeting of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Meanwhile, the humanitarian crisis on the ground grew to drastic proportions, as hundreds of thousands of Kosovars fled from a campaign of systematic ethnic cleansing by Yugoslav forces. With the apparent, albeit slow, success of the air campaign, NATO forces shifted their attention to ground operations, with intelligence assets and special forces mobilized in May and June. Fu & Skaggs 5

6 On June 3, 1999, President Milosevic accepted the conditions of an international plan for peace, and on June 10, the North Atlantic Council ratified the agreement and terminated air operations. The NATO ground troops, prepared for combat, in the end served only as peacekeepers, supervising the retreat of the Serbians and serving as the first international witnesses to the devastation wrought by over a year of bitter fighting. Fu & Skaggs 6

7 Bloc Positions: Seek peace talks between Kosovo and Serbian leadership: This bloc position believes that the proper course of action would involve pushing for peace negotiations between the Kosovo and Serbian leaderships. Also significant, members of this bloc would believe that military intervention in the Kosovo region is unwise. This belief could be driven by a desire for an existing conflict within their borders to be handled on their own terms, or the belief that this issue is not worth UN funding (which should be a small minority in any nations). Intervene Siding with Serbia This position believes, very similarly to US diplomat Robert Gelard, that the violence in the Kosovo region has been caused by the unlawful violent protest of the terrorist group known as the Kosovo Liberation Army. Nations making up this position may have oppressed ethnic populations within their borders. Additionally nations falling into this category may have a strong friendship or economic ties to either Serbia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and would not benefit from a weakened Serbian nation. Intervene Siding with Kosovo This bloc position believes that the oppression of ethnic Albanians within the Kosovo region is unwarranted and unlawful. The proper course of action for this group would involve encouraging nations to intervene in the Kosovar region supporting the KLA and attempting to discourage violence by the Serbian government. This military involvement could, in addition to sending troops, include supporting rebels with armaments, monetary assistance, or bombing Serbian oppressors. Those making up this position might include nations with a history of supporting Fu & Skaggs 7

8 victims of genocide, providing relief to refugees, or pressuring other members of the United Nations to intervene in genocide situations. Surrounding nations may also be sympathetic to Kosovo s plight as they may feel internal pressure from citizens within their borders who feel attached to those in the nation, contain significant populations of ethnic Albanians, or are informed about the crisis through local media coverage. Fu & Skaggs 8

9 Questions to Consider: Below is a list of questions that each delegate should research to develop a complex position that satisfies the queries below and goes beyond. These are a starting point, not a list of everything you should know. 1. Does your country have a history of oppressing ethnic minorities? 2. Does your country hold a region hostage containing a peoples or ethnic minority who wish to secede? 3. Does your nation have economic ties to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or Serbia? 4. Does the violence in Kosovo effect your nation or inspire a rebel group within your borders? 5. Should the Kosovo Liberation Army be considered a terrorist group? 6. Should Ibrahim Rugova be considered responsible for Kosovar violence? 7. What is the proper way to seek peace in the Kosovo region? 8. Should the UN Security Council send peacekeeper troops to avert violence in the region? 9. What is a fair amount of armaments, troops, monetary assistance, or bombing to direct towards the Kosovar or Serbian troops in Kosovo? 10. What level of intervention should be encouraged from UN member nations? Fu & Skaggs 9

10 Recommended Sources: Encyclopedia Britannica PBS Frontline, War in Europe BBC, Timeline, Kosovo Kosovo.net News Archive (features articles from Kosovo during Kosovo crisis) Encyclopedia of US National Security Encyclopedia of Terrorism Bidelieux, Kosovo s Conflict, History Today Europe Since 1914: Encyclopedia of the Age of War and Reconstruction Fu & Skaggs 10

11 Bibliography: Bideleux, Robert. "Kosovo's Conflict." History Today. N.p., n.d. Web. 6 Feb < Kushner, Harvey W.. Encyclopedia of terrorism. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, Print. Merriman, John M., and J. M. Winter. Europe since 1914: encyclopedia of the age of war and reconstruction. Detroit: Charles Scribner's Sons/Thomson Gale, Print. Moran, Michael. "Terrorist Groups and Political Legitimacy." Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, 16 Mar Web. 6 Feb < PBS, Frontline. "War in Europe." PBS. PBS, n.d. Web. 6 Feb < "Role of the General Assembly. United Nations Peacekeeping." UN News Center. UN, n.d. Web. 6 Feb < Samuels Jr., Richard J. Encyclopedia of U.S. National Security Vol. 1. Thousand Oaks, CA: Gale Virtual Reference Library, Print. "Timeline: Kosovo." BBC News. BBC, 24 Jan Web. 6 Feb < Fu & Skaggs 11

RESOLUTION 1244 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999

UNITED NATIONS S Security Council Distr. GENERAL S/RES/1244 (1999) 10 June 1999 RESOLUTION 1244 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999 The Security Council, Bearing