Small arms and human security in Kosovo An agenda for action

Transcription

1 February 2007 Small arms and human security in Kosovo An agenda for action V E N D i SIGUR TË BEZBEDNOMESTO S A F E P L A C E

2 The Forum for Civic Initiatives (FIQ) is a Kosovar non-governmental organisation promoting the involvement of Kosovar citizens in social and decision-making processes through programmes designed to focus attention on the values and functioning of an open and democratic society. Saferworld is an independent non-governmental organisation that works with governments and civil society internationally to research, promote and implement new strategies to increase human security and prevent armed violence.

3 Small arms and human security in Kosovo An agenda for action Acknowledgements This briefing note was prepared by Astrit Istrefi (Forum for Civic Initiatives) and Anna Richards, Simon Rynn, Henry Smith and Juliana Sokolová (Saferworld).

4 SAFEPLACE Building security in Kosovo

5 3 1. Introduction There can be no doubt that the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW) poses a fundamental challenge to the stability of Kosovo. This challenge will come into sharper focus as the decision on Final Status approaches. Underlying this is the fact that exercising control over SALW in Kosovo since the end of the conflict in 1999 has been fraught with difficulty. Key to this has been the complex set of political arrangements introduced after the conflict, which place the territory under interim international administration (UNMIK) with a NATO-led international security presence (KFOR) until the final status of the territory is decided. While many powers have gradually been transferred to the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), most aspects of SALW Control remain the responsibility of international rather than Kosovar actors. Ensuring that the system post-final Status for controlling SALW is both workable and effective is critical to Kosovo s future safety, security and development. This briefing paper explains the importance of SALW Control in Kosova/Kosovo (hereafter referred to as Kosovo) and proposes a series of practical measures that the government and international authorities in Kosovo together with civil society should take in the coming months to better control SALW and improve human security. Its starting point is the SALW Survey of Kosovo 1 a study jointly conducted by the non-governmental organisations Forum for Civic Initiatives (FIQ) and Saferworld between February and June 2006 at the request of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Kosovo and the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC). Additional research focusing specifically on the transfer of SALW and associated goods and services and on the use of force and firearms by private security personnel has also been conducted by Saferworld and partners and the recommendations from these studies provide an in-depth accompaniment to issues raised here. 2 In recent months, the PISG and UNMIK have demonstrated commitment to SALW Control by participating in the recent 2006 SALW Survey and through establishing an inter-ministerial SALW Control working group, convened by the UNDP. In addition, two further developments could provide new openings for the establishment of a comprehensive system of SALW Control in Kosovo in The first of these is the completion of the Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR), a year-long process led by the UN to assess Kosovo s security needs and design a new internal security architecture for the territory. Among its recommendations, SALW Control is an area highlighted for particular attention. The second of these is the launch of UNDP s Kosovo Small Arms Control Initiative (KOSSAC) which has the explicit objective of 1 Sokolová J et al, Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey of Kosovo, (Saferworld/SEESAC, 2006). Available at: publications.php?id= Isbister R et al, Analysis of National Legislation on Arms and Export Transfers in the Western Balkans, (Saferworld/SEESAC, 2006). Available at: Page M et al, SALW and Private Security Companies in South Eastern Europe: A Cause or Effect of Insecurity?, (Saferworld and International Alert/SEESAC, 2005). Available at: SMALL ARMS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN KOSOVO

6 4 improving co-operation and co-ordination of SALW Control interventions between the various agencies involved, including through the development of an integrated SALW Control strategy. The 2006 SALW Survey of Kosovo, conducted according to research guidelines issued by the UNDP, covers four main areas of analysis: the distribution of SALW across Kosovo; the impact of SALW on human security; the attitudes of the public towards SALW and security in their communities; and the capacity of institutions for addressing SALW problems effectively. A variety of methods were used during the research, including a Kosovo-wide household survey of 1,258 respondents, ten focus group discussions, interviews with more than one hundred key officials and analysts, and a review of official data and media reports. The Survey s findings, together with the research team s recommendations, were presented to the PISG and international authorities in draft form at a roundtable discussion in May Following the publication of the Survey in September 2006 (the main findings of which are summarised below), this paper presents a revised and updated set of recommendations to be taken forward in concert with ongoing work to enhance the rule of law and improve community safety in the territory. SAFEPLACE Building security in Kosovo

7 5 2. Key findings of the 2006 SALW Survey of Kosovo SALW distribution As of June 2006, there were approximately 400,000 SALW in Kosovo. Of these, 33,936 were in the legal possession of individual citizens; 45,217 were in the hands of official agencies and international private security companies; and at least 317,000 were in the illegal possession of individual citizens and other groups. Recent decisions or plans to arm some Customs and Forestry Service personnel may represent an increasing trend towards arming state officials who are authorised to use coercive force. There is currently a two-tier system for arming private security companies, with international firms and personnel permitted to carry weapons, and their local counterparts prohibited from doing so. Kosovo Police Service (KPS) evidence rooms often contain significant quantities of seized SALW, some of which have been stored for a number of years and are not adequately secured. Slow judicial proceedings however block the envisaged destruction of many stocks. According to focus group respondents, weapons possession is more prevalent in rural and border areas, and many Kosovars consider this to be legitimate given the level of insecurity in these locations. Efforts to establish a regulated civilian firearms registration system have been undermined to date by an absence of channels for the legal acquisition of SALW. The current system for the issuance of civilian weapon permits may have the unintended effect of legalising some illicit weapons and of fostering the development of the illicit market for SALW. Regulations and procedures for licensing civilians to hunt with weapons and for registering weapons used for hunting remain confused. Impact of SALW Medical records from the Pristina University hospital indicate that the impact of SALW misuse on public health, while accounting for 3.5% of all recorded deaths, has not been severe in the period from 2003 to The level of firearm-related injuries rose sharply during the period of heightened tension and violence in March 2004, but was much less severe in the years before and after. Household survey responses show that since the end of the conflict, Kosovo Serbs are proportionally more likely to have been a victim of SALW-related crime than Kosovo Albanians It is frequently the perception among Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs alike that members of the other ethnic group are well armed and that maintaining SALW ownership is important to sustain a balance of fear. Perceptions of insecurity among minority communities are magnified by a belief that even if reported, crimes will not be promptly and properly investigated, nor perpetrators brought to justice. According to KPS data and civil society groups working on the issue, firearms are used in violent domestic incidents, most frequently by men to intimidate women. SMALL ARMS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN KOSOVO

8 6 Attitudes and perceptions regarding SALW 87% of household survey respondents believe illegal firearms pose a threat to the future prosperity of Kosovo. However, issues such as unemployment, poor electricity supply, bad roads and environmental problems were perceived as the most pressing concerns by all social groups. The majority of Kosovo Albanians want to see the KPC become the national army, while a large majority of Kosovo Serbs believe that it should be completely disbanded. In addition, although there is no supporting evidence for this belief, many Kosovo Serbs are suspicious about the quantities and types of SALW possessed by the KPC that have not been declared to KFOR. Of the 23.6% of the household survey respondents who said that they would eventually acquire a weapon, an overwhelming majority (76.8%) stated that their main reason for doing so would be to protect themselves and their family. Insufficient protection from crime offered by the criminal justice system was the most oftencited reason for personal firearm possession. Kosovo Serb respondents are much more likely to perceive their area as being unsafe than other ethnic groups (20% of Kosovo Albanians versus 84% of Kosovo Serbs fear that they may become a victim of crime in the future). Perceptions of security were more likely to be positive in mono-ethnic areas. HHS and focus group discussions results show that the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) is the body most trusted to provide border security by Kosovo Albanians, followed by the NATOled Kosovo Force (KFOR). In contrast, almost two-thirds of Kosovo Serb respondents thought that other forces should protect Kosovo s borders. In addition, evidence suggests that many Kosovo Serbs perceive the Serbian Army as the only competent and trustworthy body to undertake this role. Capacity to control SALW The legislative framework for regulating the international transfer of arms and military equipment to and from Kosovo contains many loopholes. Previous voluntary SALW collection programmes have returned few weapons, and there has been no system-wide evaluation of previous campaigns, a fact that may hinder future attempts. Evidence from a variety of sources indicates that there would be no purpose in organising a Kosovo-wide voluntary SALW collection until after Kosovo s final status has been agreed. It also appears that the factors that would stimulate the surrender of SALW during a future SALW collection programme are: 1) a decision on the final status of Kosovo; 2) an improvement in economic conditions; and 3), the use of individual or collective incentives. Kosovars consider the failure of previous SALW collection programmes to be the result of a continuing fear of conflict and instability, and of minimal trust in security providers. This is more pronounced among the Kosovo Serb population. However, a significant pro- SAFEPLACE Building security in Kosovo

9 7 portion of Kosovo Albanians consider family tradition to be the primary factor preventing people from surrendering their SALW during amnesty periods. There are major gaps in the production, collection and analysis of SALW-related statistics by Kosovo s public health and law enforcement institutions. No comprehensive data on deaths and injuries due to firearms is collected, making it difficult to measure the direct impact of firearms on public health. The fact that different sets of crime statistics are seen to be kept by the KPS and UNMIK Police makes it difficult for institutions to develop public policy responses to the impact of SALW. A majority of justice sector professionals perceive security for courts to be inadequate. Many of them express a desire for additional protection through the right to bear arms or to hire bodyguards, citing threats against their person. Police and judicial capacity to implement the law regulating SALW possession is lacking, with exceptional problems arising in northern parts of Kosovo due to the operation of parallel structures and the significantly lower capacity and legitimacy of the KPS. Institutional arrangements for the development or implementation of SALW Control policy are still very weak. While most relevant institutions demonstrate welcome levels of transparency and share information on SALW, others fail to display a genuine willingness to share this knowledge to inform more effective SALW Control. SMALL ARMS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN KOSOVO

10 8 3. Priorities for improved SALW Control in Kosovo The recommendations below are based on those contained in the 2006 SALW Survey, which were developed following consultations with PISG, UNMIK and other relevant organisations prior to and following its publication. They attempt to introduce the areas in which change is required in order to establish control over SALW in Kosovo. However, for them to contribute significantly they should form part of a detailed and time-sequenced strategy and operational plan which are agreed and supported by all key government departments and law enforcement agencies. Further, for SALW Control to be a truly effective component in promoting and safeguarding community safety and security, all SALW efforts should be co-ordinated with, and connected to, the range of broader development, governance and security sector reform programmes at all administrative levels within Kosovo. Ideally, a high-level SALW Control co-ordination body, bringing together a range of relevant agencies (see footnote 3 below), should take these recommendations forward, allocating specific tasks among its members and requesting external assistance as required. Improving human security and reducing the impact of SALW misuse While many people in Kosovo feel that they need to possess weapons to provide security for themselves and their families, the presence and use of SALW is often a factor that affects security on the ground. Improving PISG capacity to provide security Continue developing targeted policing strategies for tackling armed crime, drawing in part on information contained in the 2006 SALW Survey, that can be integrated into a wider SALW Control programme. Strengthen KPS investigative capacity, especially in relation to organised and firearm-related crime, to inform the development and implementation of such a strategy. Build the capacity of the KPS Crime Analysis Unit to analyse trends and patterns of firearm crime and misuse, and build KPS internal capacity to develop and implement effective crime-prevention strategies on the basis of this analysis. Target police responses against firearm crime in areas identified in the 2006 SALW Survey as being most affected, most notably the Pejë/Peć and Prishtinë/Priština regions. Controlling illegal weapons in circulation Commence an evaluation of lessons learned from previous SALW collection processes and initiate planning for future collections, which should only take place after Kosovo s Final Status is agreed. Ensure that any future civilian SALW collections fully take into account geographic disparities across Kosovo and the different reasons motivating weapons possession. A major focus of any strategy to control SALW should be to reduce their impact on society. As such it is recommended that urgent steps are taken towards: Prepare the ground for voluntary SALW collections by supporting relationship and confidence-building initiatives, such as community safety projects, and consider how best to SAFEPLACE Building security in Kosovo

11 9 make use of existing structures such as Local Public Safety Committees and Municipal Community Safety Councils during such initiatives. Provide targeted policing support to communities in rural and border areas, linked to border control strategies, where illegal SALW possession is reported to be driven by higher levels of insecurity. At the appropriate time, introduce new regulations for SALW amnesties to make it easier for local amnesties to be organised in response to approaches from individual communities. Developing legislation on civilian firearms ownership Agree new legislation (preferably through the Assembly of Kosovo) to control civilian possession of weapons that removes loopholes and ensures clarity. New legislation should: Regulate the acquisition, possession and use of firearms by civilians and non-state legal entities such as PSCs Clarify the types of weapons that civilians can legally own and specify what constitutes a hunting weapon and a self-defence weapon Introduce suitable mechanisms for inter-agency co-ordination, community consultation and donor support at local level prior to any localised amnesty/voluntary surrender periods. Improve the security of evidence storage rooms in KPS police stations across Kosovo; expedite the legal proceedings to avoid the storage of these weapons for extended periods of time; and ensure their prompt destruction upon the completion of legal proceedings. Stipulate the necessary background checks and bodies responsible for them Require the completion of compulsory training in the use and storage of firearms before the issuance of a firearm licence Specify the conditions in which licensed weapons and ammunition must be kept Specify penalties that are realistically enforceable Regulating non-state possession and use of SALW The current legislation governing non-state SALW possession (by both civilians and entities, including private security companies (PSCs)), while stipulating tight controls and relatively severe punitive measures, has not been well enforced and has given rise to some confusion. It is crucial that this situation is addressed and as such the following steps are recommended: Conform to EU standards and best practice Ensure that the introduction of new SALW Control legislation is preceded by a locally-led public discussion on illicit weapons possession and its impacts for Kosovo, and a public awareness campaign to inform the population of the new regulations. Consider the feasibility of opening up legal channels for firearm acquisition in Kosovo to reduce demand for illegal weapons. Ensure SMALL ARMS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN KOSOVO

12 10 that a strong legal and institutional basis for the import and internal trade in firearms, and provisions for their monitoring, is in place prior to any such decisions and that until a decision on the above is taken, ensure that weapons issued through the Weapons Authorisation Section (WAS) are taken only from official stocks. Ensure that prior to the licensing of selfdefence weapons, a rigorous assessment is made of the type of weapon most suitable to the threat faced by applicants. Review the licensing and regulation of PSCs, and of the use of force and firearms by PSC staff. Gradually harmonise regulation for international and local PSCs while introducing a general prohibition on the use of inappropriate (e.g. military-style) weapons by PSC staff. Undertake an accompanying campaign within the KPS and among the public to promote the importance of strict controls on possession and demonstrate the new enforcement policy. Continue to support the implementation of a well-resourced and professional weapons registration system. Produce detailed guidelines and training for staff working within local police stations on how to conduct background checks for firearm licence applicants and how to prepare and submit reports to the WAS. Continue monitoring likely arms caches in the pre- and post-final Status period to support intelligence-led operations against militant or organised criminal groups. Ensure a clear demarcation of roles between the KPS and PSCs to avoid undue competition between the police and the industry and ensure effective co-operation between the private and public sectors for crime prevention purposes. Ensure security and justice professionals are fully acquainted with any new arms control legislation and are able to uphold it effectively. Where necessary, consider organising targeted training. Increasing PISG enforcement capacity Begin strictly enforcing the current prohibition on the possession and carriage of nonhunting weapons by civilians. Strengthening the regulation of international arms transfers The regulation of export, import, transit, transshipment and brokering is currently unacceptable and should be comprehensively overhauled to create an effective system of control over international transfers of weapons and related goods and services. Steps should be taken to: Adopt new arms transfer control legislation that is fully compliant with the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and international best practice. Ensure new legislation regulates the import, export, transit, trans-shipment, brokering and licensed production of conventional weapons, their components and ammunition and that current legal loopholes in this area are removed. SAFEPLACE Building security in Kosovo

13 11 Make provision for prior scrutiny of proposed arms transfers by the Assembly of Kosovo in order to assess whether transfers are in line with Kosovo s security needs and international laws and norms. Ensure that implementation of legislation by the Government is subject to Assembly oversight through mechanisms such as the Assembly Security Committee. Ensuring effective control of official SALW holdings The current regulatory framework does not effectively address the question of management, security and use of SALW by official agencies. Steps should be taken to: Elaborate the Law on Police as rapidly as possible to ensure that firearms use by police officers corresponds with United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and that the handling and storage of firearms belonging to KPS is fully regulated. In the meantime ensure strict adherence to internal police regulations on the use of force and firearms. Ensure that the use and storage of firearms by other government agencies authorised to hold weapons (e.g. Forestry Agency, Customs) are effectively regulated by law. Ensure that any future decisions on arming official bodies not currently entitled to hold arms are based on a thorough threat and needs assessment. Ensure that any official bodies entitled to hold firearms under new security sector arrangements are subject to effective stockpile, storage and usage controls. Ensure that armed PISG actors acquire the capability to plan and manage SALW and ammunition procurement and storage as well as the disposal through destruction of any surplus. Improving border management policy and practice Effective border controls are critical to Kosovo s security, not the least as they are an important tool in combating cross-border organised crime and SALW trafficking. It is recommended that action is taken to: Continue to build the capacity of Kosovo authorities, in particular the Border and Boundary Police, to conduct intelligence-led operations to prevent cross-border crime, including the trafficking of weapons, in conjunction with the relevant international bodies. Review data collection and collation systems to identify how disaggregated information on different categories of border incidents can be compiled and released. Such a review would allow for analysis and targeted profiling of the trafficking threat to different parts of Kosovo and assist intelligence-led operations. Participate in international and regional police co-operation arrangements, including the Southeast Europe Co-operative Initiative (SECI) Centre for Combating trans-border crime, EUROPOL and INTERPOL, in line with the outcomes of the Final Status negotiations. SMALL ARMS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN KOSOVO

14 12 Continue to support the work of the Integrated Border Management Working Group, and provide strategic support to ensure the group is capacitated and receives political backing to develop an action plan to combat SALW trafficking as part of a wider SALW Control strategy. Ensure the action plan identifies clear strategic objectives developed on the basis of a thorough risk assessment. Improving co-ordination and policy formulation Insufficient co-ordination between the various agencies engaged in SALW Control and poor policy formulation has been one of the major impediments to tackling SALW proliferation and misuse in Kosovo. Accordingly, new co-operative arrangements are required that contribute to: Building policy co-ordination mechanisms Create a high-level SALW Control co-ordination body to co-ordinate policy development and implementation within PISG, and between PISG, civil society and international institutions. Ensure political, technical and financial support to this co-ordination body over a significant period of time in order to create conditions for success and embed the required changes in working cultures. SALW Control strategy for Kosovo proceed in concert. This should entail, among other things, detailed reflection and public debate on the appropriate level of armament for all security institutions in Kosovo, with a strong presumption of the provision and use of firearms as an exceptional measure. Improving data collection and information-sharing Ensure uniform data gathering and processing by various government and law enforcement institutions. In particular, introduce new and continue to improve existing data collection and processing systems to ensure the production of reliable statistics on firearms-related crime and public health impacts. Provide targeted training to hospital and police staff engaged in data collection and processing. Ensure policies are developed on the basis of the data collected and provide appropriate responses to the situation on the ground. In the short term, enhance co-ordination between the security information systems operated by UNMIK and PISG. In the longer term, ensure the different systems are rationalised and harmonised to enable effective transition to PISG control. Develop a comprehensive SALW Control strategy and operational plan, informed both by the 2006 SALW Survey and the recommendations contained in this paper to guide the work of UNMIK/PISG to control SALW in Kosovo. Ensure that the development and reform of Kosovo s security sector and any future Increasing transparency and accountability Accountability of the PISG and international agencies involved in SALW Control is key to addressing SALW proliferation and misuse. In particular, the involvement of the Assembly and Kosovo s civil SAFEPLACE Building security in Kosovo

15 13 society in this area should be enabled and encouraged. It is recommended that steps are taken to: Further enable and encourage the meaningful involvement of the Assembly of Kosovo, general public and civil society on security issues, ranging from SALW procurement and licensing decisions to the future growth of security institutions. Enhance the transparency and accountability of law enforcement and security institutions across Kosovo, including UNMIK Police, KPS and KFOR, to demonstrate to the public that the misuse of force or firearms will not be tolerated. Ensure that civil society is represented on relevant SALW co-ordination bodies. Ensure public access to SALW-related information, such as crime and public health statistics, policy decisions and procedures used to manage and procure SALW. Ensure a framework supporting effective parliamentary oversight of the government institutions on security issues is in place, including governmental reporting to parliament and the adoption of a freedom of information law. Regularise the contact between government bodies and civil society, through for example, holding regular civil society consultations as part of the SALW Control strategy development process. SMALL ARMS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN KOSOVO

16 14 4. Conclusion and next steps Developments such as the 2006 SALW Survey, UNDP s KOSSAC programme and the ISSR all provide opportunities for PISG/UNMIK to develop systemwide mechanisms for effective control of SALW. In order to make best use of this opportunity however, it is crucial that the issues raised above are addressed through co-ordinated planning and strategy development and that appropriate links are made with relevant institutions and processes. It is therefore recommended as a first step that the current inter-departmental working group on SALW Control convened by UNDP Kosovo is further developed into a formal SALW Control Commission which is mandated to develop a SALW Control strategy and operational plan for Kosovo and oversee its implementation. Since the scope of the SALW Control Commission should be comprehensive, taking into account all areas of conventional arms control and human security, it should include representatives from a wide range of government departments and international bodies, 3 as well as from Kosovo s civil society. The SALW Control strategy should be developed over a suitable period (e.g. three to six months) and cover all relevant issues including civilian licensing, weapons registration, collection, destruction, stockpiling, trade, transfers, possession by non-state actors, public education, anti-trafficking and law enforcement. In addition, it is critical that the strategy draws on a detailed analysis of the current and potential drivers of conflict, as well as demonstrating connectivity with the range of broader development, governance and economic reform programmes and policies. It is only by addressing the underlying drivers of insecurity that SALW proliferation and misuse will ever be controlled effectively. The SALW Control Commission should also consult other stakeholders while drafting the strategy, including relevant international organisations, donors and civil society groups. Following the agreement of the strategy, an operational plan should be developed, clearly allocating responsibility for implementation of its various components to relevant actors. The plan should also include a clear budget and implementation timeline, as well as indicators for use in monitoring and reviewing both project implementation and its impacts on the ground. A combination of PISG, the Kosovo Assembly, international and civil society representatives should then monitor implementation of the strategy and operational plan. Experience demonstrates that there are a number of guiding principles which are essential in directing the work of a SALW Control Commission and for the drafting and implementation of a SALW Control strategy. It is recommended that these principles (identified below) are central to any such efforts in Kosovo. Conflict prevention and confidence building: The potential benefits for building confidence between conflicting parties and creating an environment conducive to conflict resolution through the process of establishing a SALW Control Commission and strategy for action should not be overlooked. Therefore, dialogue on this issue should include representatives from all Kosovo s ethnic and social groups and the wider civil society. This is important not only for the success of SALW Control interventions but also as a wider confidence and security building measure. 3 Including, but not restricted to, the Prime Minister s Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry for Local Government, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, Customs and Border Guards Services, the Ministry of Economy, the Office of Public Safety, the Assembly s Security Committee, the KPS, the OSCE, and the UNDP. SAFEPLACE Building security in Kosovo

17 15 Consultation: The success of a SALW Control programme depends upon open consultation with all relevant stakeholders and partners, both within government as well as with international organisations, and civil society, including in minority areas of Kosovo. Creating an enabling environment: It is vital that a SALW Control Commission and strategy receive full backing at the senior political level, and that the necessary administrative capacity to operationalise it is in place. Since Kosovo at the present time faces a number of important challenges, the danger of establishing a 'paper commission' in response to international prompting, with no real power or ownership, should be avoided at all costs. De-politicisation: While questions of SALW Control are political in one sense (successful control programmes require high-level government backing and scrutiny by parliaments), undue politicisation of these issues is to be avoided so that mid-ranking government officials can freely implement government policy. Given the sensitivities involved with regard to Kosovo s Final Status, it is all the more important to put safeguards in place to prevent any SALW Control Commission and strategy from becoming political tools in disputes. An emphasis on transparency and human security may prove useful to those preparing and implementing any strategy. Evidence-based policy-making: The SALW Control strategy and operational plan must reflect evidence gained from reliable research. Human rights and human security: Whether in terms of the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials, or the criteria to guide decisions on arms transfers to destinations overseas, respect for human rights, including international Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, should be consistently recognised and upheld in all areas. Ultimately all SALW Control interventions however technical should focus on improving human security and promoting human rights. Ownership: The PISG should play a lead role in the development, implementation and oversight of the SALW Control strategy and related policies, with support from relevant international bodies. Policy coherence: Any SALW Control strategy should take into account ongoing reform processes within Kosovo (e.g. security sector reform, governance and administrative reforms). Provision should also be made for a SALW Control Commission to liaise with other relevant government and international structures. Sustainability: Provided it is proven to be an effective measure for improving human security, efforts should be made to sustain a SALW Control programme in Kosovo over the medium to long term. The drafting of a detailed action plan for the implementation of any SALW Control strategy, with appropriate costings, is an essential preparation for this. Transparency, oversight and accountability: It is important that the Assembly and civil society are appropriately involved in the process of developing and implementing a SALW Control programme in order to ensure high levels of accountability and oversight. For this purpose it is important to continue to develop the capacity of the Assembly s Security Committee to perform this function. SMALL ARMS AND HUMAN SECURITY IN KOSOVO

18 16 Acronyms and abbreviations EU European Union FIQ Forum for Civic Initiatives ISSR Internal Security Sector Review KFOR Kosovo Protection Force KOSSAC UNDP Kosovo Small Arms Control Initiative KPC Kosovo Protection Corps KPS Kosovo Police Service MIA Ministry of Internal Affairs MOJ Ministry of Justice NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe PISG Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (Kosovo) PSC Private Security Company SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons SECI Southeast European Co-operative Initiative SEESAC South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of SALW UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo WAS Weapons Authorisation Section SAFEPLACE Building security in Kosovo

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20 V E N D i SIGUR TË BEZBEDNOMESTO S A F E P L A C E Duke ndërtuar sigurinë në Kosovë Izgradimo bezbednost na Kosovu Building security in Kosovo The SafePlace Project is a joint programme of work by the non-governmental organisations Saferworld and FIQ which supports the development of an effective, accountable and conflict-sensitive security sector in Kosovo. w w w. s a f e p l a c e p r o j e c t. o r g Saferworld Company no , Charity no Saferworld The Grayston Centre, 28 Charles Square London N1 6HT, United Kingdom +44 (0) Forumi i Iniciativës Qytetare 29 Andrea Gropa Street Pristina, Kosovo +381 (0)