Communism s Shadow: Historical Legacies and Contemporary Political Attitudes Grigore Pop-Eleches & Joshua A. Tucker
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1 Communism s Shadow: Historical Legacies and Contemporary Political Attitudes Grigore PopEleches & Joshua A. Tucker Supplemental Appendix May, 2017 Version 1 CHAPTER 1. CHAPTER 2. CHAPTER 3. CHAPTER 4. CHAPTER 5. CHAPTER 6. CHAPTER 7. CHAPTER 8: CHAPTER 9: INTRODUCTION: COMMUNISM S SHADOW LIVING THROUGH COMMUNISM (NO MATERIALS) METHODS AND DATA DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDES STATE VS. MARKET SOCIAL WELFARE GENDER EQUALITY TEMPORAL AND COHORT EFFECTS CONCLUSION: LEGACIES AND COMMUNISM CODEBOOK A note on the organization of this appendix: We have attempted to make it is easy as possible to find the material referred to in the text of the manual by organizing this appendix by chapter. Within each chapter, we label tables that are directly related to figures or tables in the text with the same number but preceded by SA for Supplemental Appendix. These will be found in the order they appear in the chapter. If there are multiple tables in the appendix related to a single table, they will be followed by a lower case a, b, c, etc., e.g., Table SA1.1a. For analyses not tied to specific tables/figures but which are referenced in the chapter, they will be preceded by SAE for Supplemental Appendix Extra. These will be listed at the end of each chapter section, such that all SA tables will precede all SAE tables within a chapter.
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3 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: COMMUNISM S SHADOW Table SA1.1. Postcommunist Attitudinal Differences VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) Democracy support Market support Welfare state support Gender equality support Postcommunist.273**.125**.312**.080 (.069) (.047) (.037) (.074) Observations 227, , , ,826 Rsquared Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1 This table contains the results from the regression analysis that was used to create Figure 1.1 on p.2 3
4 CHAPTER 3. METHODS AND DATA In footnote 28 on p.75, we note that we reran tables 4.1, 4.3, 5.1, 5.3, 6.1, 6.3, 7.1, and 7.3 using hierarchical linear models. These tables are found in the respective chapters. On p.86 we note that the tables used to construct figures in Chapters 47 will be found in the supplemental appendix. These tables are found in the respective chapters. On p.89, we note that the codebook for our variables will be in the supplemental appendix. The codebook can be found at the end of this appendix. On p.93, we reference a supplemental analysis in Ch.7 using International Social Survey Program data; the related tables can be found in Ch.7. 4
5 CHAPTER 4. DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDES Table SA4.1a. Living in a Postcommunist Country and Attitudes toward Democracy Full Regression Results VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Postcommunist.273**.541**.532**.405**.467**.426**.304*.315** (.069) (.099) (.087) (.120) (.115) (.120) (.130) (.048) Urbanization 1920s * (.165) (.171) (.178) (.166) (.179) Landlocked.195#.182# (.102) (.100) (.104) (.101) (.096) Distance from equator # # (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) Distance from Greenwich.004**.005**.003**.003**.004** (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) British colony.308**.357**.310**.185#.212* (.100) (.104) (.093) (.105) (.099) French colony (.124) (.123) (.115) (.111) (.103) Spanish colony (.080) (.080) (.084) (.085) (.091) German empire (.216) (.242) (.184) (.178) (.191) Habsburg empire (.103) (.104) (.111) (.094) (.097) Russian empire (.129) (.129) (.120) (.116) (.115) Ottoman empire.293**.208*.272**.361**.226* (.091) (.092) (.096) (.083) (.093) Other European colony.120# *.006 (.070) (.075) (.068) (.083) (.071) Mean elevation.106# #.087 (.060) (.060) (.070) (.061) (.077) Log GDP/capita # * (.091) (.080) (.085) (.088) (.076) Literacy 1920s.198**.183**.174**.168**.152** (.040) (.040) (.033) (.039) (.034) PreWWI regime (.008) (.008) (.008) (.007) (.007) PreWWI regime*overseas colony (.013) (.012) (.012) (.010) (.010) Overseas colony prewwi.294**.289**.291**.184#.153 (.090) (.088) (.083) (.095) (.094) Imperial territory prewwi (.106) (.105) (.107) (.105) (.103) Muslim majority (.139) (.123) (.136) (.148) (.116) Christian majority (.135) (.124) (.140) (.139) (.131) Ethnic fractionalization.431**.591** (.152) (.129) 5
6 PostSecondary education.433**.437**.590* (.034) (.029) (.149) Secondary education.194**.193**.354# (.032) (.027) (.145) Primary education (.027) (.022) (.121) HH income.039**.046**.037 (.015) (.011) (.045) Town resident (.021) (.021) (.055) City resident (.032) (.028) (.081) Large city resident.062*.059*.098# (.031) (.027) (.040) Male.047**.046**.022 (.007) (.007) (.023) Age.001#.001*.001 (.000) (.000) (.002) Relig attendance often ** (.014) (.012) (.027) Relig attendance never * (.014) (.012) (.033) Atheist #.077* (.032) (.027) (.022) GDP chg.007*.010** (.004) (.003) Unemployment (.004) (.003) Inflation (log).056*.016 (.028) (.029) GDP as % of (.141) (.137) Income inequality.011**.011** (.004) (.004) Corruption ctrl index (.051) (.050) Health&education spending as % GDP (.014) (.014) FH democracy (.015) (.012) PR system (.063) (.053) Mixed electoral system (.068) (.062) Presidential system.114#.210** (.068) (.067) Parliamentarypresidential system.331**.357** (.069) (.060) Observations 227, , , , , , ,373 6,018 Rsquared Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1 This table lists the full set of regression results that are summarized in Table 4.1 in the text. 6
7 Table SA4.1b. Living in a Postcommunist Country and Attitudes toward Democracy Hierarchical Linear Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Postcommunist.269**.365**.523**.230#.238*.275** (.075) (.107) (.073) (.126) (.108) (.097) (.114) (.119) Urbanization 1920s #.552**.435** (.172) (.177) (.183) (.153) (.185) (.164) Landlocked (.101) (.098) (.104) (.098) (.095) (.097) Distance from equator # #.008# (.004) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.005) Distance from Greenwich.004**.005**.003**.003**.004**.003* (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) British colony.288**.344**.264** #.100 (.094) (.101) (.088) (.096) (.096) (.133) French colony (.111) (.123) (.107) (.110) (.108) (.150) Spanish colony (.080) (.085) (.085) (.087) (.092) (.107) German empire #.158 (.185) (.197) (.194) (.149) (.183) (.162) Habsburg empire (.113) (.113) (.119) (.096) (.109) (.099) Russian empire (.141) (.137) (.145) (.127) (.133) (.146) Ottoman empire.174# **.210#.321* (.103) (.103) (.114) (.089) (.109) (.133) Other European colony # (.074) (.079) (.071) (.086) (.071) (.097) Mean elevation (.059) (.063) (.074) (.062) (.079) (.088) Log GDP/capita # *.151# (.094) (.088) (.086) (.085) (.083) (.091) Literacy 1920s.196**.174**.175**.154**.139**.136** (.041) (.042) (.034) (.038) (.033) (.039) PreWWI regime (.009) (.009) (.008) (.007) (.007) (.008) PreWWI regime*overseas colony (.013) (.013) (.012) (.010) (.011) (.013) Overseas colony prewwi.310**.311**.305** (.095) (.090) (.086) (.095) (.093) (.113) Imperial territory pre WWI # (.111) (.109) (.111) (.104) (.102) (.100) Muslim majority # (.151) (.139) (.139) (.160) (.132) (.172) Christian majority (.137) (.124) (.137) (.138) (.138) (.198) Ethnic fractionalization.283#.507**.406* (.164) (.145) (.166) PostSecondary education.458**.458**.460** (.024) (.024) (.029) 7
8 Secondary education.215**.215**.216** (.021) (.021) (.025) Primary education.042*.042*.044* (.017) (.017) (.020) HH income.068**.068**.066** (.009) (.009) (.010) Town resident.038**.038**.054** (.014) (.014) (.016) City resident.081**.081**.081** (.020) (.020) (.020) Large city resident.093**.093**.093** (.019) (.019) (.022) Male.044**.044**.056** (.007) (.007) (.008) Age.001**.001**.000 (.000) (.000) (.000) Relig attendance often (.010) (.010) (.011) Relig attendance never (.010) (.010) (.012) Atheist.043*.042*.036 (.021) (.021) (.026) GDP chg *.012** (.004) (.003) (.004) Unemployment * (.004) (.003) (.005) Inflation (log).063* (.027) (.031) (.036) GDP as % of (.145) (.136) (.151) Income inequality.008*.009*.010* (.004) (.004) (.004) Corruption ctrl index.089# (.048) (.050) (.058) Health&education spending as % GDP (.014) (.015) (.018) FH democracy (.015) (.013) (.018) PR system (.066) (.059) (.077) Mixed electoral system (.071) (.067) (.086) Presidential system **.209** (.071) (.074) (.080) Parliamentarypresidential system.333**.346**.260** (.071) (.065) (.083) Observations 227, , , , , , , ,926 Number of groups This table replicates Table 4.1 in the text, only using a Hierarchical Linear Model instead of OLS with country clustered standard errors. 8
9 Table SA4.2. Communist System Features and Support for Democracy Full Regression Results VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Postcommunist.541**.650**.592**.669**.582**.851** (.099) (.124) (.110) (.129) (.102) (.148) Urbanization 1920s (.165) (.248) (.174) (.166) (.167) (.167) Landlocked.195# *.199#.191#.206* (.102) (.095) (.098) (.101) (.100) (.099) Distance from equator (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) Distance from Greenwich.004**.003**.005**.004**.004**.004** (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) British colony.308**.188#.369**.347**.313**.364** (.100) (.110) (.117) (.103) (.099) (.103) French colony # (.124) (.126) (.104) (.114) (.123) (.108) Spanish colony # (.080) (.082) (.105) (.084) (.083) (.084) German empire (.216) (.187) (.207) (.226) (.204) (.221) Habsburg empire (.103) (.101) (.107) (.105) (.102) (.105) Russian empire (.129) (.125) (.127) (.133) (.126) (.130) Ottoman empire.293**.286**.312**.304**.288**.304** (.091) (.093) (.095) (.092) (.091) (.092) Other European colony.120#.189* # (.070) (.073) (.074) (.070) (.069) (.071) Mean elevation.106#.122* #.114#.136* (.060) (.061) (.071) (.061) (.061) (.063) Log GDP/capita (.091) (.080) (.092) (.089) (.090) (.087) Literacy 1920s.198**.232**.198**.207**.199**.203** (.040) (.043) (.041) (.040) (.039) (.041) PreWWI regime (.008) (.009) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) PreWWI regime*overseas colony (.013) (.013) (.012) (.013) (.013) (.013) Overseas colony prewwi.294**.325**.320**.345**.286**.347** (.090) (.099) (.095) (.096) (.089) (.096) Imperial territory prewwi (.106) (.105) (.111) (.107) (.107) (.111) Muslim majority (.139) (.134) (.150) (.133) (.145) (.134) Christian majority (.135) (.132) (.155) (.128) (.144) (.133) Urbanization (.198) Primary school enrollment.003 (.002) 9
10 Energy Intensity (4.762) Industry as % GDP.005 (.004) Literacy (.003) Log GDP/capita * (.065) Health&education spending (.014) Income inequality (.005) State sector size late (.031) Avg regime score (.006) (.007) Left gov't share * (.083) (.078) Avg regime score * Left gov t share (.012) Observations 227, , , , , ,373 Rsquared Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1 This table lists the full set of regression results that are summarized in Table 4.2 in the text. 10
11 Table SA4.3a. Living through Communism and Attitudes toward Democracy Full Regression Results VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Total communist.0068**.0069** (.0010) (.0008) Stalinist total.0060#.0115** (.0036) (.0016) NeoStalinist total.0119**.0066** (.0033) (.0019) Posttotalitarian total.0117**.0051** Reform comm. total (.0042) (.0019) ** (.0026) (.0015) Early communist (.0028) (.0019) (.0038) (.0027) Adult communist.0070**.0070**.0056**.0059** (.0010) (.0008) (.0017) (.0012) Early communist * Adult communist (.0001) (.0001) Postcommunist.2014# *.3168* (.1196) (.1285) (.1231) (.1235) Age.0029**.0033**.0029**.0033**.0030**.0034**.0030**.0034** (.0005) (.0004) (.0005) (.0004) (.0005) (.0004) (.0006) (.0004) PostSecondary education.4532**.4789**.4580**.4767**.4489**.4763**.4492**.4763** (.0358) (.0245) (.0366) (.0244) (.0356) (.0243) (.0357) (.0243) Secondary education.2115**.2299**.2142**.2274**.2065**.2269**.2069**.2270** (.0330) (.0210) (.0337) (.0210) (.0329) (.0208) (.0329) (.0208) Primary education **.0470#.0542** ** ** (.0277) (.0169) (.0283) (.0169) (.0275) (.0169) (.0276) (.0169) HH income.0371*.0579**.0311*.0578**.0369*.0574**.0370*.0576** (.0150) (.0091) (.0146) (.0091) (.0150) (.0091) (.0150) (.0091) Town resident # # # # (.0218) (.0156) (.0215) (.0155) (.0217) (.0156) (.0217) (.0156) City resident ** ** ** ** (.0327) (.0211) (.0327) (.0210) (.0327) (.0211) (.0327) (.0211) Large city resident.0631*.0893**.0708*.0894**.0642*.0904**.0645*.0905** (.0317) (.0193) (.0312) (.0192) (.0318) (.0193) (.0317) (.0193) Male.0461**.0446**.0459**.0445**.0461**.0446**.0461**.0447** (.0069) (.0067) (.0069) (.0068) (.0069) (.0067) (.0069) (.0068) Urbanization 1920s (.1679) (.1645) (.1674) (.1675) Landlocked.1955*.2063*.1957*.1949* (.0985) (.0994) (.0979) (.0980) Distance from equator.0079#.0087*.0080*.0079# (.0040) (.0042) (.0040) (.0040) Distance from Greenwich.0051**.0051**.0051**.0051** (.0011) (.0011) (.0011) (.0011) British colony.3572**.3674**.3585**.3584** (.1044) (.1107) (.1044) (.1044) 11
12 French colony (.1204) (.1237) (.1202) (.1203) Spanish colony (.0801) (.0807) (.0800) (.0800) German empire (.2094) (.1868) (.2081) (.2085) Habsburg empire (.1103) (.1090) (.1095) (.1095) Russian empire (.1306) (.1278) (.1299) (.1298) Ottoman empire.2132*.1972*.2132*.2125* (.0928) (.0919) (.0924) (.0924) Other European colony (.0757) (.0772) (.0758) (.0756) Mean elevation (.0605) (.0609) (.0603) (.0603) Log GDP/capita (.0810) (.0829) (.0809) (.0809) Literacy 1920s.1869**.1986**.1887**.1881** (.0401) (.0399) (.0400) (.0401) PreWWI regime (.0084) (.0081) (.0084) (.0084) PreWWI regime*overseas colony (.0124) (.0125) (.0124) (.0124) Overseas colony prewwi.2885**.2694**.2884**.2883** (.0886) (.0926) (.0886) (.0886) Imperial territory prewwi (.1069) (.1053) (.1061) (.1061) Muslim majority (.1278) (.1300) (.1278) (.1280) Christian majority (.1270) (.1320) (.1271) (.1270) Ethnic fractionalization.4240**.4774**.4245**.4250** (.1530) (.1599) (.1525) (.1528) Country f.e. No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Observations 227, , , , , , , ,373 Rsquared This table lists the full set of regression results that are summarized in Table 4.3 in the text. 12
13 Table SA4.3b. Living through Communism and Attitudes toward Democracy Hierarchical Linear Model VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Total communist.0063**.0063** (.0008) (.0008) Stalinist total.0095**.0097** (.0016) (.0016) NeoStalinist total.0079**.0077** (.0018) (.0018) Posttotalitarian total.0049**.0047** (.0017) (.0017) Reform comm. total.0035*.0037* (.0016) (.0016) Early communist (.0017) (.0017) (.0026) (.0026) Adult communist.0065**.0065**.0053**.0053** (.0008) (.0008) (.0011) (.0011) Early communist * Adult communist (.0001) (.0001) Age.0030**.0030**.0030**.0030**.0031**.0031**.0031**.0031** (.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004) PostSecondary education.4727**.4733**.4718**.4722**.4697**.4704**.4697**.4704** (.0239) (.0238) (.0239) (.0239) (.0238) (.0237) (.0238) (.0237) Secondary education.2268**.2272**.2255**.2257**.2234**.2238**.2235**.2239** (.0206) (.0206) (.0207) (.0206) (.0206) (.0205) (.0206) (.0205) Primary education.0541**.0541**.0536**.0535**.0524**.0524**.0528**.0528** (.0168) (.0167) (.0168) (.0167) (.0168) (.0167) (.0168) (.0167) HH income.0646**.0642**.0644**.0640**.0639**.0635**.0640**.0636** (.0089) (.0088) (.0089) (.0087) (.0089) (.0087) (.0088) (.0087) Town resident.0380**.0377**.0375**.0373**.0381**.0378**.0382**.0379** (.0144) (.0144) (.0143) (.0143) (.0143) (.0144) (.0143) (.0144) City resident.0799**.0798**.0793**.0793**.0804**.0803**.0805**.0804** (.0197) (.0196) (.0195) (.0195) (.0197) (.0196) (.0197) (.0196) Large city resident.0928**.0931**.0925**.0929**.0938**.0941**.0940**.0943** (.0185) (.0185) (.0184) (.0184) (.0186) (.0186) (.0186) (.0185) Male.0435**.0435**.0433**.0433**.0435**.0435**.0435**.0435** (.0067) (.0067) (.0068) (.0068) (.0067) (.0067) (.0067) (.0067) Postcommunist (.1274) (.1307) (.1284) (.1298) Urbanization 1920s (.1769) (.1737) (.1766) (.1766) Landlocked (.0985) (.0980) (.0981) (.0981) Distance from equator.0081#.0087#.0082#.0081# (.0044) (.0045) (.0044) (.0044) Distance from Greenwich.0054**.0055**.0054**.0054** 13
14 (.0011) (.0011) (.0011) (.0011) British colony.3375**.3442**.3377**.3375** (.1000) (.1022) (.1001) (.1001) French colony (.1209) (.1215) (.1209) (.1208) Spanish colony (.0848) (.0847) (.0848) (.0847) German empire (.1966) (.1878) (.1958) (.1961) Habsburg empire (.1145) (.1084) (.1140) (.1141) Russian empire (.1385) (.1380) (.1380) (.1380) Ottoman empire (.1039) (.1003) (.1035) (.1034) Other European colony (.0795) (.0795) (.0795) (.0795) Mean elevation (.0638) (.0636) (.0636) (.0637) Log GDP/capita (.0893) (.0891) (.0891) (.0891) Literacy 1920s.1722**.1736**.1736**.1731** (.0419) (.0423) (.0418) (.0418) PreWWI regime (.0086) (.0086) (.0086) (.0086) PreWWI regime*overseas colony (.0131) (.0132) (.0131) (.0131) Overseas colony prewwi.3075**.2985**.3067**.3067** (.0895) (.0918) (.0896) (.0895) Imperial territory prewwi (.1105) (.1067) (.1100) (.1100) Muslim majority (.1401) (.1410) (.1401) (.1402) Christian majority (.1262) (.1275) (.1264) (.1264) Ethnic fractionalization.2820#.3233#.2824#.2825# (.1662) (.1666) (.1657) (.1658) Ctry f.e. No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Observations 227, , , , , , , ,373 Number of groups This table replicates Table 4.3 in the text, only using a Hierarchical Linear Model instead of OLS with country clustered standard errors. 14
15 Table SA4.3c. Living through Communism and Attitudes toward Democracy Mediation Analysis Effect Mean [95% Conf. Interval] ACME Direct Effect Total Effect % of Tot Eff mediated 48% 44% 51% This table presents the full mediation analysis for Model 1 of Table 4.3, as referenced in the text on p
16 Table SAE4.1a. Questions in Democracy Index Indicator Democratic values index Survey question wording I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system (4 point scale) Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections. (4 point scale) Having the army rule (4 point scale) I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them? In democracy, the economic system runs badly (4 point agreedisagree scale) Democracies aren't good at maintaining order (4 point agreedisagree scale) Democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling (4 point agreedisagree scale) Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government (4 point agreedisagree scale) This table lists the questions used to construct the democracy index in Chapter 4. Questions excluded from the no use of the word democracy index analyzed in Table 4.6 and described on p.133 are listed in italics. 16
17 Table SAE4.1b. Additional Democracy Questions in Wave 5 of World Values Survey. Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means not at all an essential characteristic of democracy and 10 means it definitely is an essential characteristic of democracy ((Read out and code one answer for each)): Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor. Religious authorities interpret the laws. People choose their leaders in free elections. People receive state aid for unemployment. The army takes over when government is incompetent. Civil rights protect people s liberty against oppression. The economy is prospering. Criminals are severely punished. People can change the laws in referendums. Women have the same rights as men. This table lists the full question wording for the extra democracy questions used in the analyses in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. and referenced in the p
18 Table SAE4.2 Communist Exposure and Democracy Support: Country Moderators VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Literacy in 1920s* Total comm Total communist.0008 (.0005).0098**.0258#.0058**.0045#.0068**.0036**.0089**.0040*.0061** (.0019) (.0137) (.0009) (.0027) (.0009) (.0013) (.0013) (.0018) (.0012) Literacy 1920s.0502 (.0404) Age (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) PostSecondary education.5189**.5078**.5255**.5389**.5281**.5228**.5327**.5337**.5257** (.0529) (.0491) (.0541) (.0537) (.0566) (.0528) (.0522) (.0493) (.0554) Secondary education.2736**.2598**.2803**.2974**.2863**.2815**.2831**.2939**.2879** (.0490) (.0451) (.0498) (.0497) (.0519) (.0482) (.0481) (.0440) (.0522) Primary education.0818*.0743#.0879*.1094*.1046*.1055*.0818*.1150**.1322** (.0409) (.0384) (.0429) (.0473) (.0435) (.0442) (.0407) (.0433) (.0428) HH income.0575*.0702**.0622*.0839**.0680**.0759** **.0826** (.0284) (.0270) (.0286) (.0251) (.0249) (.0239) (.0313) (.0234) (.0224) Town resident.0697**.0713**.0669*.0706**.0763**.0731**.0702**.0731**.0822** (.0265) (.0276) (.0267) (.0263) (.0249) (.0238) (.0266) (.0256) (.0266) City resident (.0382) (.0391) (.0387) (.0396) (.0383) (.0356) (.0391) (.0384) (.0399) Large city resident.0792*.0958*.0803*.0855*.0829#.0780#.0782#.0778#.0911* (.0400) (.0413) (.0408) (.0428) (.0443) (.0411) (.0414) (.0404) (.0412) Male.0613**.0613**.0594**.0558**.0576**.0565**.0618**.0561**.0558** (.0105) (.0107) (.0106) (.0108) (.0113) (.0109) (.0105) (.0109) (.0106) Precomm GDP/cap* Total comm.0025 (.0018) Precomm GDP/cap.2178* (.1107) Avg. regime score (192039)* Total comm Interwar regime ( ).0003* (.0001).0094 (.0095) Comm econ growth*.0005 Total comm (.0007) Comm econ growth.0450 (.0579) Native communist regime* Total comm.0004 (.0021) 18
19 Native communist regime.0919 (.1065) Proportion hardline *.0074** Total comm (.0022) Proportion hardline.1429 (.1771) Comm regime type* Total comm Communist regime type Econ growth * Total comm.0014 (.0008).0993 (.0802).0019# (.0011) Econ growth (.0672) Regime score(1989)* Total comm (.0002) Regime score(1989).0317* (.0148) Observations 64,763 64,763 64,763 64,763 64,763 64,763 64,763 64,763 64,763 Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1 This table lists the full regression results used to produce Figure 4.3 in the text
20 Table SAE. 4.3 Communist Exposure and Democracy Support: Individual Moderators (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) VARIABLES Total communist.0074**.0073**.0075**.0103**.0057**.0076** (.0013) (.0009) (.0013) (.0021) (.0011) (.0010) Catholic resp.* Total comm.0035* (.0016) Protestant resp.* Total comm.0003 (.0022) Eastern Orthodox resp.* Total comm.0001 (.0013) Muslim resp.* Total comm.0002 (.0018) Catholic resp (.0756) Protestant resp..1430* (.0704) Eastern Orthodox resp..1549** (.0594) Muslim resp..1891* (.0946) Relig attendance often* Total comm.0018 (.0011) Relig attendance often.0930# (.0489) Catholic frequent attendance* Total comm Protestant frequent attendance* Total comm Muslim frequent attendance* Total comm Orthodox frequent attendance* Total comm.0041* (.0018).0006 (.0027).0004 (.0031).0002 (.0018) Other Catholic* Total comm.0029# (.0017) Other Protestant* Total comm.0002 (.0024) Other Muslim* Total comm.0005 (.0020) Other Orthodox* Total comm.0001 (.0012) Catholic frequent attendance.0949 (.1038) Protestant frequent attendance.1369 (.0914) 20
21 Muslim frequent attendance.1390 (.1039) Orthodox frequent attendance.2474** (.0709) Other Catholic.0250 (.0624) Other Protestant.1386# (.0786) Other Muslim.1960# (.1039) Other Orthodox.1330* (.0572) Primary educ* Total comm.0027 (.0019) Secondary educ* Total comm.0029 (.0018) Higher educ* Total comm.0063** (.0022) Urban resident* Total comm.0027* (.0011) Urban resident.0989* (.0442) Male* Total comm.0014# (.0008) Age (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) PostSecondary education.5381**.5251**.5341**.3133**.5723**.5204** (.0497) (.0528) (.0488) (.1093) (.0617) (.0551) Secondary education.2917**.2839**.2861**.1594#.3198**.2814** (.0461) (.0490) (.0447) (.0965) (.0547) (.0513) Primary education.0931*.1083*.0901* **.1052* (.0378) (.0456) (.0366) (.0952) (.0474) (.0463) HH income.0639*.0776**.0628*.0772**.0549#.0776** (.0278) (.0255) (.0276) (.0256) (.0287) (.0256) Town resident.0877**.0717**.0872**.0736**.0738** (.0251) (.0252) (.0247) (.0258) (.0257) City resident (.0368) (.0393) (.0367) (.0395) (.0394) Large city resident.1095**.0746#.1094**.0764#.0786# (.0402) (.0411) (.0403) (.0417) (.0416) Male.0532**.0547**.0497**.0547**.0547**.0170 (.0116) (.0107) (.0114) (.0109) (.0107) (.0238) Observations 64,763 64,763 64,763 64,763 64,763 64,763 This table lists the full regression results used to produce Figure 4.2 in the text 21
22 Table SAE. 4.3b Communist Exposure and Democracy Support: Individual Moderators (excluding Poland) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) VARIABLES Total communist.0075**.0074**.0076**.0103**.0060**.0079** (.0013) (.0009) (.0013) (.0020) (.0011) (.0010) Catholic resp.* Total comm.0028# (.0015) Protestant resp.* Total comm.0002 (.0021) Eastern Orthodox resp.* Total comm.0002 (.0013) Muslim resp.* Total comm.0002 (.0018) Catholic resp (.0694) Protestant resp..1456* (.0680) Eastern Orthodox resp..1510** (.0571) Muslim resp..1839* (.0846) Relig attendance often* Total comm.0008 (.0011) Relig attendance often.0125 (.0434) Catholic frequent attendance* Total comm Protestant frequent attendance* Total comm Muslim frequent attendance* Total comm Orthodox frequent attendance* Total comm.0015 (.0016).0003 (.0028).0004 (.0030).0003 (.0018) Other Catholic* Total comm.0032* (.0016) Other Protestant* Total comm.0006 (.0024) Other Muslim* Total comm.0004 (.0020) Other Orthodox* Total comm.0001 (.0012) Catholic frequent attendance.1516# (.0815) Protestant frequent attendance.1686# (.0924) 22
23 Muslim frequent attendance.1415 (.0968) Orthodox frequent attendance.2455** (.0684) Other Catholic.0038 (.0641) Other Protestant.1229# (.0742) Other Muslim.1904* (.0935) Other Orthodox.1283* (.0549) Primary educ* Total comm.0011 (.0019) Secondary educ* Total comm.0030 (.0018) Higher educ* Total comm.0066** (.0021) Urban resident* Total comm.0025* (.0012) Urban resident.0926* (.0460) Male* Total comm.0016* (.0008) Age (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) PostSecondary education.5219**.5148**.5185**.2951**.5541**.5053** (.0494) (.0544) (.0487) (.1053) (.0625) (.0558) Secondary education.2812**.2813**.2771** **.2739** (.0458) (.0506) (.0446) (.0955) (.0559) (.0525) Primary education.1304**.1503**.1272** **.1460** (.0344) (.0427) (.0333) (.0889) (.0455) (.0435) HH income.0821**.0974**.0806**.0960**.0776**.0969** (.0243) (.0216) (.0242) (.0215) (.0234) (.0214) Town resident.0903**.0694**.0923**.0692**.0693** (.0259) (.0259) (.0252) (.0268) (.0268) City resident.0756* * (.0375) (.0408) (.0370) (.0414) (.0413) Large city resident.1136** ** (.0424) (.0426) (.0425) (.0435) (.0434) Male.0526**.0559**.0519**.0509**.0515**.0106 (.0120) (.0111) (.0118) (.0110) (.0109) (.0243) Observations 61,741 61,741 61,741 61,741 61,741 61,741 This table reruns the tests in Table SAE. 4.3 above but without survey respondents from Poland in line with the discussion on p
24 CHAPTER 5. STATE VS. MARKET Table SA5.1a. Living in a Postcommunist Country and Attitudes toward Markets Full Regression Results VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Postcommunist.125**.288**.261**.212*.295** *.176 (.047) (.082) (.084) (.090) (.083) (.100) (.096) (.099) Urbanization 1920s.528**.518**.494**.557**.534** (.130) (.126) (.126) (.124) (.112) Landlocked.199**.235**.123#.194**.160* (.061) (.059) (.067) (.064) (.065) Distance from equator (.002) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.003) Distance from Greenwich * (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) British colony.234**.232**.253**.246**.270** (.063) (.070) (.063) (.062) (.064) French colony.229**.208**.241**.143**.136** (.056) (.055) (.060) (.054) (.051) Spanish colony.162**.148**.113*.131*.060 (.056) (.051) (.056) (.065) (.067) German empire (.106) (.107) (.095) (.108) (.103) Habsburg empire (.091) (.090) (.082) (.084) (.077) Russian empire.288**.197*.286**.285**.280** (.095) (.093) (.089) (.093) (.087) Ottoman empire # *.129# (.082) (.075) (.082) (.081) (.070) Other European colony # * (.054) (.055) (.056) (.058) (.061) Mean elevation #.019 (.039) (.040) (.044) (.044) (.044) Log GDP/capita *.125*.136**.143*.163** (.060) (.059) (.050) (.057) (.049) Literacy 1920s (.029) (.030) (.027) (.029) (.028) PreWWI regime (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) PreWWI # # regime*overseas colony (.006) (.006) (.006) (.007) (.007) Overseas colony prewwi.243**.244**.252**.264**.293** Imperial territory pre WWI (.063) (.066) (.057) (.066) (.064).257**.203*.218*.213*.165# (.099) (.095) (.094) (.104) (.097) Muslim majority # (.083) (.080) (.079) (.095) (.086) Christian majority #.182# (.094) (.093) (.090) (.099) (.093) Ethnic fractionalization (.111) (.100) PostSecondary education.216**.219**.057 (.023) (.022) (.095) 24
25 Secondary education.136**.136**.122 (.020) (.020) (.097) Primary education.044*.041*.093 (.017) (.016) (.078) HH income.083**.077**.071* (.011) (.011) (.025) Town resident (.015) (.014) (.034) City resident * (.022) (.019) (.024) Large city resident * (.021) (.019) (.019) Male.122**.123**.121** (.008) (.008) (.015) Age.001#.001*.000 (.000) (.000) (.002) Relig attendance often (.011) (.010) (.019) Relig attendance never.036**.042**.058# (.011) (.010) (.028) Atheist.072**.086**.097* (.020) (.019) (.038) GDP chg (.004) (.004) Unemployment (.003) (.002) Inflation (log) (.022) (.023) GDP as % of # (.084) (.079) Income inequality.007*.007** (.003) (.003) Corruption ctrl index.121**.086* (.035) (.035) Health&education spending as % GDP (.010) (.010) FH democracy (.010) (.009) PR system.079#.112* (.045) (.044) Mixed electoral system (.047) (.047) Presidential system.126**.105* (.044) (.042) Parliamentarypresidential system (.051) (.048) Observations 262, , , , , , ,299 8,857 Rsquared Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1 This table lists the full set of regression results that are summarized in Table 5.1 in the text. 25
26 Table SA5.1b. Living in a Postcommunist Country and Attitudes toward Markets Hierarchical Linear Model VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Postcommunist.130**.246**.333**.154#.256**.161*.173*.271** (.045) (.083) (.077) (.086) (.083) (.082) (.086) (.098) Urbanization 1920s.495**.443**.487**.534**.476**.496** (.112) (.113) (.112) (.111) (.108) (.118) Landlocked.161*.165* * (.064) (.065) (.071) (.069) (.074) (.082) Distance from equator (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.004) Distance from Greenwich #.002*.001 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) British colony.235**.245**.248**.249**.279**.247** (.064) (.072) (.061) (.064) (.065) (.082) French colony.230**.224**.253**.143*.147**.103 (.060) (.061) (.062) (.057) (.055) (.074) Spanish colony.161**.136*.120*.104# (.056) (.057) (.053) (.062) (.069) (.074) German empire * (.108) (.114) (.098) (.110) (.113) (.135) Habsburg empire (.084) (.088) (.076) (.079) (.077) (.091) Russian empire.296**.249*.266**.275**.278**.360** (.094) (.097) (.089) (.093) (.093) (.113) Ottoman empire.127# #.193*.154*.239* (.075) (.077) (.075) (.076) (.077) (.099) Other European colony #.171*.097 (.059) (.063) (.059) (.061) (.067) (.082) Mean elevation # * (.040) (.043) (.042) (.045) (.048) (.062) Log GDP/capita **.159**.170**.168**.186**.200** (.055) (.053) (.047) (.053) (.046) (.057) Literacy 1920s (.028) (.028) (.026) (.027) (.028) (.029) PreWWI regime (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.006) PreWWI regime*overseas colony #.009 (.006) (.006) (.006) (.007) (.007) (.008) Overseas colony prewwi.231**.231**.236**.228**.239**.171* (.069) (.073) (.058) (.071) (.066) (.077) Imperial territory prewwi.233*.189*.201*.214*.161#.304** (.093) (.095) (.089) (.097) (.097) (.109) Muslim majority # (.085) (.086) (.081) (.097) (.096) (.125) Christian majority (.098) (.101) (.094) (.105) (.103) (.139) Ethnic fractionalization (.120) (.103) (.136) PostSecondary education.215**.215**.240** (.019) (.019) (.024) Secondary education.120**.120**.134** 26
27 (.016) (.016) (.020) Primary education.026#.026#.036* (.014) (.014) (.017) HH income.078**.078**.078** (.009) (.009) (.010) Town resident.024*.024*.026* (.011) (.011) (.012) City resident.053**.053**.054** (.016) (.016) (.017) Large city resident.061**.061**.058** (.017) (.017) (.018) Male.123**.123**.132** (.008) (.008) (.009) Age.001*.001*.001* (.000) (.000) (.000) Relig attendance often (.009) (.009) (.010) Relig attendance never.027**.028**.035** (.008) (.008) (.009) Atheist.098**.099**.120** (.017) (.017) (.017) GDP chg (.004) (.004) (.005) Unemployment (.002) (.002) (.004) Inflation (log) (.024) (.025) (.025) GDP as % of (.085) (.083) (.093) Income inequality.008**.008**.005 (.003) (.003) (.004) Corruption ctrl index.120**.093**.027 (.033) (.034) (.041) Health&education spending as % GDP (.010) (.011) (.013) FH democracy (.010) (.010) (.012) PR system *.079 (.044) (.046) (.053) Mixed electoral system * (.050) (.053) (.069) Presidential system.128**.087#.091# (.044) (.045) (.052) Parliamentarypresidential system ** (.050) (.053) (.059) Observations 262, , , , , , , ,064 Number of groups Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1 This table replicates Table 5.1 in the text, only using a Hierarchical Linear Model instead of OLS with country clustered standard errors. 27
28 Table SA5.2. Communist System Features and Support for Markets Full Regression Results VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Postcommunist.286**.251**.392**.201*.334**.361** (.080) (.074) (.081) (.098) (.075) (.107) Urbanization ** (.123) Primary school enrollment.000 (.001) Literacy (.002) Energy Intensity (4.183) Industry as % GDP.010** (.002) Log GDP/capita # (.043) Health&education spending # (.010) Income inequality (.003) State sector size late ** (.017) Avg regime score (.004) (.005) Left gov't share **.147** (.048) (.047) Avg regime score * Left gov't share (.007) Urbanization 1920s.585** **.536**.553**.522** (.125) (.167) (.125) (.135) (.126) (.135) Landlocked.174**.109#.122*.169**.163**.173** (.061) (.056) (.060) (.062) (.062) (.062) Distance from equator (.002) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.003) Distance from Greenwich (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) British colony.237**.201**.146*.208**.240**.218** (.062) (.057) (.064) (.071) (.061) (.071) French colony.222**.277**.187**.235**.196**.198** (.055) (.062) (.062) (.057) (.056) (.058) Spanish colony.149**.136**.201**.129*.135*.117* (.055) (.051) (.061) (.055) (.056) (.056) German empire.271*.186#.287**.269*.246*.282* (.106) (.095) (.105) (.104) (.105) (.114) Habsburg empire (.077) (.072) (.073) (.077) (.076) (.076) Russian empire.280**.267**.308**.287**.280**.289** (.080) (.085) (.076) (.081) (.078) (.080) Ottoman empire * (.081) (.068) (.079) (.080) (.078) (.078) Other European colony
29 (.055) (.049) (.053) (.056) (.056) (.057) Mean elevation.067# #.075*.084* (.039) (.038) (.049) (.036) (.036) (.036) Log GDP/capita * *.127#.148*.133* (.060) (.057) (.057) (.065) (.057) (.061) Literacy 1920s (.028) (.025) (.030) (.029) (.026) (.027) PreWWI regime (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) PreWWI regime*overseas colony (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) Overseas colony prewwi.248** **.215**.233**.214** (.062) (.069) (.057) (.070) (.062) (.069) Imperial territory prewwi.307**.197*.348**.299**.285**.301** (.084) (.080) (.086) (.082) (.083) (.087) Muslim majority (.084) (.074) (.079) (.090) (.086) (.088) Christian majority (.095) (.090) (.093) (.101) (.101) (.105) Observations 262, , , , , ,299 Rsquared Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1 This table lists the full set of regression results that are summarized in Table 5.2 in the text. 29
30 Table SA5.3a. Living through Communism and Attitudes toward Markets Full Regression Results (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Total communist.0106**.0099** (.0009) (.0007) Stalinist total ** (.0026) (.0019) NeoStalinist total.0134**.0093** (.0020) (.0015) Posttotalitarian total.0251**.0077** (.0031) (.0021) Reform comm. total.0075**.0101** (.0019) (.0015) Early communist.0050*.0038*.0065*.0064* (.0024) (.0017) (.0032) (.0025) Adult communist.0106**.0099**.0071**.0068** (.0008) (.0007) (.0013) (.0009) Early communist * Adult communist.0004**.0004** (.0001) (.0001) Postcommunist * (.0887) (.0799) (.0942) (.0957) Age.0023**.0019**.0020**.0019**.0024**.0021**.0023**.0020** (.0004) (.0003) (.0004) (.0003) (.0004) (.0003) (.0004) (.0003) PostSecondary education.2278**.2388**.2373**.2373**.2253**.2364**.2259**.2365** (.0233) (.0193) (.0226) (.0193) (.0232) (.0192) (.0232) (.0192) Secondary education.1462**.1422**.1530**.1405**.1431**.1392**.1438**.1394** (.0201) (.0159) (.0195) (.0157) (.0200) (.0158) (.0199) (.0157) Primary education.0533**.0432**.0554**.0424**.0521**.0418**.0530**.0426** (.0168) (.0135) (.0166) (.0135) (.0167) (.0135) (.0167) (.0135) HH income.0775**.0681**.0703**.0682**.0773**.0677**.0776**.0680** (.0115) (.0088) (.0109) (.0088) (.0116) (.0088) (.0115) (.0088) Town resident (.0160) (.0120) (.0154) (.0120) (.0160) (.0120) (.0158) (.0120) City resident *.0395#.0375* * * (.0234) (.0162) (.0229) (.0162) (.0234) (.0162) (.0233) (.0162) Large city resident ** ** ** ** (.0222) (.0166) (.0214) (.0166) (.0223) (.0166) (.0222) (.0167) Male.1156**.1164**.1158**.1164**.1156**.1163**.1155**.1163** (.0080) (.0079) (.0080) (.0079) (.0080) (.0079) (.0080) (.0079) Urbanization 1920s.4726**.4825**.4734**.4752** (.1322) (.1277) (.1321) (.1314) Landlocked.2099**.2520**.2105**.2087** (.0604) (.0527) (.0603) (.0602) Distance from equator (.0026) (.0025) (.0026) (.0026) 30
31 Distance from Greenwich (.0008) (.0007) (.0008) (.0008) British colony.2334**.2433**.2346**.2349** (.0719) (.0699) (.0719) (.0719) French colony.2235**.2221**.2230**.2227** (.0561) (.0535) (.0560) (.0560) Spanish colony.1426**.1392**.1423**.1431** (.0537) (.0521) (.0536) (.0535) German empire (.1087) (.0933) (.1083) (.1080) Habsburg empire (.0874) (.0716) (.0876) (.0874) Russian empire.1916* *.1916* (.0913) (.0945) (.0915) (.0911) Ottoman empire (.0736) (.0664) (.0737) (.0736) Other European colony (.0582) (.0555) (.0582) (.0582) Mean elevation (.0386) (.0353) (.0386) (.0386) Log GDP/capita #.1106#.1132#.1142# (.0609) (.0565) (.0609) (.0609) Literacy 1920s (.0290) (.0270) (.0289) (.0289) PreWWI regime (.0052) (.0048) (.0052) (.0052) PreWWI regime*overseas colony (.0063) (.0057) (.0063) (.0063) Overseas colony prewwi.2280**.2304**.2286**.2288** (.0677) (.0679) (.0678) (.0678) Imperial territory prewwi.1981* *.1961* (.0925) (.0834) (.0926) (.0925) Muslim majority (.0829) (.0810) (.0829) (.0830) Christian majority (.0971) (.0947) (.0971) (.0970) Ethnic fractionalization (.1089) (.0944) (.1087) (.1087) Ctry f.e. No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Observations 262, , , , , , , ,299 Rsquared Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1 This table lists the full set of regression results that are summarized in Table 5.3 in the text. 31
32 Table SA5.3b. Living through Communism and Attitudes toward Markets Hierarchical Linear Model VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Total communist.0108**.0107** (.0007) (.0007) Stalinist total.0114** NeoStalinist total Posttotalitarian total Reform comm. total Early communist Adult communist Early communist * Adult communist.0118** (.0018) (.0018).0113**.0111** (.0014) (.0014).0107**.0098** (.0018) (.0019).0099**.0100** (.0014) (.0015) **.0050** (.0017) (.0017) (.0024) (.0023).0107**.0107**.0086**.0085** (.0007) (.0007) (.0008) (.0008).0003**.0003** (.0001) (.0001) Postcommunist.1469#.1484# (.0844) (.0866) (.0892) (.0904) Age.0023**.0023**.0024**.0024** (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) Urbanization 1920s.4257**.4085**.4261**.4280** (.1152) (.1188) (.1152) (.1147) Landlocked.1617*.1619*.1626*.1617* (.0655) (.0661) (.0656) (.0655) Distance from equator (.0025) (.0025) (.0025) (.0025) Distance from Greenwich (.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0008) British colony.2459**.2480**.2466**.2465** (.0728) (.0729) (.0728) (.0728) French colony.2349**.2352**.2346**.2343** (.0612) (.0613) (.0611) (.0611) Spanish colony.1345*.1349*.1345*.1350* (.0573) (.0571) (.0572) (.0571) German empire (.1142) (.1121) (.1138) (.1136) Habsburg empire (.0864) (.0860) (.0867) (.0865) Russian empire.2520* 32
33 .2475**.2482**.2471** (.0941) (.1004) (.0943) (.0941) Ottoman empire (.0750) (.0742) (.0750) (.0749) Other European colony (.0641) (.0635) (.0641) (.0640) Mean elevation (.0415) (.0412) (.0415) (.0415) Log GDP/capita **.1463**.1437**.1438** (.0547) (.0543) (.0547) (.0546) Literacy 1920s (.0274) (.0272) (.0274) (.0273) PreWWI regime (.0053) (.0052) (.0053) (.0053) PreWWI regime*overseas colony Overseas colony pre WWI Imperial territory pre WWI (.0063) (.0063) (.0063) (.0063).2239**.2221**.2240**.2240** (.0733) (.0738) (.0732) (.0733).1924*.1912#.1906*.1903* (.0927) (.0979) (.0928) (.0927) Muslim majority (.0871) (.0873) (.0871) (.0872) Christian majority (.1026) (.1017) (.1027) (.1027) Ethnic fractionalization (.1190) (.1172) (.1187) (.1187) PostSecondary education.2328**.2328**.2304**.2303** (.0191) (.0191) (.0190) (.0190) Secondary education.1351**.1349**.1322**.1322** (.0156) (.0155) (.0155) (.0155) Primary education.0423**.0423**.0410**.0415** (.0131) (.0131) (.0131) (.0131) HH income.0750**.0750**.0745**.0747** (.0087) (.0087) (.0087) (.0087) Town resident.0217#.0216#.0216#.0219# (.0113) (.0113) (.0113) (.0113) City resident.0477**.0476**.0481**.0484** (.0158) (.0158) (.0158) (.0158) Large city resident.0561**.0560**.0570**.0573** (.0169) (.0170) (.0170) (.0170) Male.1163**.1162**.1163**.1163** (.0078) (.0078) (.0078) (.0078) Ctry f.e. No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Observations 262, , , , , , , ,299 Number of groups This table replicates Table 5.3 in the text, only using a Hierarchical Linear Model instead of OLS with country clustered standard errors. 33
34 Table SA5.3c. Living through Communism and Attitudes toward Markets Mediation Analysis Effect Mean [95% Conf. Interval] ACME Direct Effect Total Effect % of Tot Eff mediated 150% 136% 171% This table presents the full mediation analysis for Model 1 of Table 5.3, as referenced in the text on p
35 Table SAE5.1. Questions in Markets Index Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. Private ownership of business should be increased vs Government ownership of business should be increased The state should give more freedom to firms vs The state should control firms more effectively This table lists the questions used to construct the Markets index in Chapter 5. 35
36 Table SAE5.2 Communist Exposure and Markets Support: Country Moderators (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) VARIABLES Total communist *.0122**.0107**.0109**.0118**.0124**.0080**.0107** (.0023) (.0138) (.0008) (.0023) (.0008) (.0012) (.0015) (.0013) (.0010) Literacy in 1920s* Total comm.0002 (.0006) Literacy 1920s.0840** (.0324) Precomm GDP/cap* Total comm.0013 (.0018) Precomm GDP/cap.1986* (.0907) Avg. regime score (192039)* Total comm.0003* (.0001) Interwar regime (192039).0253** (.0086) Comm econ growth* Total comm.0019** (.0006) Comm econ growth.0783* (.0383) Native communist regime* Total comm.0026 (.0016) Native communist regime.1037 (.0847) Proportion hardline * Total comm.0002 (.0020) Proportion hardline.0376 (.1239) Comm regime type* Total comm.0005 (.0009) Comm regime type.0052 (.0433) Econ growth * Total comm.0025** (.0008) Econ growth (.0716) Regime score(1989)* Total comm (.0002) Regime score(1989).0379**
37 (.0073) Age (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) PostSecondary education.3226**.3253**.3172**.3178**.3161**.3185**.3162**.3339**.3079** (.0454) (.0473) (.0471) (.0497) (.0491) (.0487) (.0500) (.0616) (.0466) Secondary education.1377**.1400**.1345**.1316**.1277**.1298**.1280**.1454**.1260** (.0390) (.0412) (.0403) (.0438) (.0437) (.0431) (.0441) (.0560) (.0406) Primary education (.0320) (.0325) (.0318) (.0331) (.0346) (.0339) (.0328) (.0414) (.0324) HH income.0790**.0627**.0750**.0552**.0552**.0590**.0573**.0536**.0596** (.0216) (.0215) (.0225) (.0197) (.0207) (.0197) (.0215) (.0202) (.0176) Town resident.0370#.0335#.0395#.0343#.0361# # * (.0203) (.0197) (.0203) (.0200) (.0202) (.0206) (.0205) (.0204) (.0189) City resident.0734*.0717*.0817*.0821*.0878*.0806*.0828*.0848*.0897** (.0326) (.0318) (.0331) (.0339) (.0341) (.0356) (.0346) (.0352) (.0333) Large city resident.1092**.1013**.1064**.1074**.1145**.1103**.1099**.1129**.1281** (.0340) (.0324) (.0331) (.0328) (.0335) (.0353) (.0354) (.0360) (.0322) Male.1607**.1627**.1627**.1640**.1642**.1640**.1643**.1629**.1631** (.0119) (.0116) (.0116) (.0113) (.0111) (.0111) (.0113) (.0111) (.0110) Observations 76,799 76,799 76,799 76,799 76,799 76,799 76,799 76,799 76,799 Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<.01, * p<.05, # p<.1 This table lists the full regression results used to produce Figure 5.2 in the text 37
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