IMO MEASURES TO ENHANCE MARITIME SECURITY. Report of the Working Group on Maritime Security

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1 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION E IMO MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE 83rd session Agenda item 4 MSC 83/WP.4 9 October 2007 Original: ENGLISH MEASURES TO ENHANCE MARITIME SECURITY Report of the Working Group on Maritime Security 1 General 1.1 The Working Group on Maritime Security (MSWG) met from 4 to 9 October 2007 under the Chairmanship of Mr. Jeremy Parkinson (Australia). 1.2 The MSWG was attended by delegations from the following Member Governments: ANGOLA AUSTRALIA BAHAMAS BARBADOS BELGIUM BRAZIL BULGARIA CAMBODIA CANADA CHINA CYPRUS DENMARK DOMINICA EGYPT ESTONIA FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GHANA GREECE ICELAND IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF) IRELAND ITALY JAMAICA JAPAN KENYA LITHUANIA MALAYSIA MARSHALL ISLANDS NETHERLANDS NEW ZEALAND NIGERIA NORWAY PANAMA PHILIPPINES POLAND PORTUGAL QATAR REPUBLIC OF KOREA RUSSIAN FEDERATION SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS SAUDI ARABIA SINGAPORE SOUTH AFRICA SPAIN SWEDEN TURKEY UKRAINE UNITED KINGDOM UNITED STATES and the following Associate Member: HONG KONG, CHINA For reasons of economy, this document is printed in a limited number. Delegates are kindly asked to bring their copies to meetings and not to request additional copies.

2 MSC 83/WP The session was also attended by observers from the following intergovernmental organizations: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (EC) MARITIME ORGANISATION FOR WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA (MOWCA) and by observers from the following non-governmental organizations in consultative status: INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF SHIPPING (ICS) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION (ISO) INTERNATIONAL RADIO-MARITIME COMMITTEE (CIRM) INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT TANKER OWNERS (INTERTANKO) OIL COMPANIES INTERNATIONAL MARINE FORUM (OCIMF) CRUISE LINES INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION (CLIA) INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT WORKERS FEDERATION (ITF) INTERNATIONAL MARITIME PILOTS ASSOCIATION (IMPA) INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF SHIPMASTERS ASSOCIATIONS (IFSMA) INTERNATIONAL SAILING FEDERATION (ISAF) Terms of reference 2 The MSWG was instructed, taking into account the relevant decisions taken and comments made in plenary, to:.1 consider and make proposals, taking into account the report of and actions requested by the Correspondence Group (MSC 83/4/2) and the comments contained in the documents submitted by Australia (MSC 83/4/4), on how to progress the issue of enhancing the security aspects of the operation of ships which do not fall within the scope of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code. This may include the development a set of draft guidelines for consideration by the Committee and, if appropriate, direction as to which categories of ships the correspondence group should concentrate on in its future work;.2 consider and make proposals, taking into account the comments contained in the document submitted by CLIA (MSC 83/4/3) on how the Committee should best reiterate to public authorities, emergency response services and pilots, the guidance contained in MSC/Circ.1156 and other related circulars and the importance of showing proper identification when boarding ships and entering port facilities; and.3 submit a report to plenary by Thursday, 11 October ACCESS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, EMERGENCY, RESPONSE SERVICES AND PILOTS ON BOARD SHIPS TO WHICH SOLAS CHAPTER XI-2 AND THE ISPS CODE APPLY 3 In considering the proposals of CLIA, the MSWG recalled the discussions in plenary and, noting that the ISPS Code, resolution MSC.159(78), MSC/Circ.1111, MSC/Circ.1132, MSC/Circ.1156 and MSC.1/1194 had all drawn attention to this issue, agreed that it would not be appropriate to issue a further circular in this regard.

3 - 3 - MSC 83/WP.4 4 However, the MSWG agreed to request the Committee to:.1 record in the report of the Committee, the need for port State control officers and other public authorities to show proper identification when boarding vessels;.2 invite the Memoranda of Understanding on port State control to reiterate to their member authorities the need for port State control officers and other public authorities to show proper identification when boarding vessels;.3 invite CLIA and other interested parties to provide full and specific details of such bad practices in the future; and.4 recommend that ships experiencing such bad practices should immediately notify the relevant authority of the port State and the flag State. ENHANCEMENT OF THE SECURITY OF SHIPS OTHER THAN THOSE ALREADY COVERED BY SOLAS CHAPTER XI-2 AND THE ISPS CODE 5 The MSWG, in the context of the report of the Correspondence Group (MSC 83/4/2 and MSC 83/INF.7) and the document submitted by Australia (MSC 83/4/4); and following the instructions of the Committee, considered and made proposals on how to progress the issue of security aspects of the operation of ships which did not fall within the scope of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code (non-solas vessels). 6 The MSWG appreciated and noted the content of a presentation by Singapore on the Harbour Craft Transponder System (HARTS), as described in document MSC 83/INF.11 (Singapore). 7 The observer from ISO advised the MSWG that the ISO series of standards on supply chain security were now published as full ISO standards and numerous ports, terminals and organizations were being certified by third party independent accredited auditors. Likewise the ISO PAS for uniform implementation of the ISPS Code was now being published as a full ISO standard. The observer from ISO further advised the MSWG that ISO standards could be applied to all ships, irrespective of size, type, purpose and whether operated internationally, domestically or within internal waters. 8 The MSWG recalled that the carriage requirements for shipborne automatic identification systems (AIS), as detailed in SOLAS regulation V/19.2.4, required a number of ships not covered by SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code to be fitted with AIS. Furthermore, SOLAS regulation V/ required, inter alia, that ships fitted with AIS shall maintain AIS in operation at all times except where international agreements, rules or standards provide for the protection of navigational information. 9 In this context, the MSWG noted that a number of recent reports of attempted piracy promulgated by the Organization (most recently in MSC.4/Circ.107 and MSC.4/Circ.108) had drawn attention to the fact that ships were not transmitting information by AIS. The MSWG further noted that the Secretariat had received periodic notification of AIS anomalies, submitted by naval forces of Member Governments. The MSWG considered that such information may be of use to Administrations and port State control authorities to help them to better implement SOLAS requirements.

4 MSC 83/WP The delegation of Finland reported that a significant number of vessels were operating in and around Finnish waters using the same maritime mobile service identity (MMSI) on AIS equipment. 11 The MSWG therefore agreed to recommend that the Committee should invite the Secretariat to:.1 request Member Governments and organizations with consultative status to submit details to the Organization of ships operating either without AIS or with AIS incorrectly configured, reported by ships entitled to fly their flag. Such details should include, where possible, ship name, IMO number, call-sign, date, position (latitude and longitude), and details of the anomaly; and.2 promulgate such information by means of an MSC Circular on a quarterly basis. 12 The MSWG further agreed to recommend that the Committee should consider ways to ensure the consistent implementation of SOLAS regulation V/19.2.4, including urging Contracting Governments to implement the Guidelines for the on-board operational use of shipborne Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) adopted by the Organization by resolution A.917(22), as amended by resolution A.956(23), thus enabling receiving stations to identify correctly the transmitting ships. 13 In reviewing the report of the correspondence group and its terms of reference as developed by MSC 82, the MSWG expressed strong support for continuing the work of the correspondence group. To this end, the MSWG initially considered the benefits of developing guidance based upon ship type versus a risk based approach. After some debate the MSWG agreed that the approach should involve a threat and risk assessment basis, under the purview of the individual Government concerned. The MSWG further agreed that developing guidelines based on vessel type would be beneficial in ensuring the guidelines could be properly targeted to different industry sectors. The MSWG also agreed that identifying different measures to be implemented according to different risk contexts would be beneficial in ensuring that the measures are appropriate to the differing risk contexts to which non-solas vessels are exposed. 14 The MSWG agreed that guidelines for enhancing the security arrangements for non-solas vessels should therefore take account of both different vessel types and different risk contexts. In order to keep the guidelines appropriately straightforward and user-friendly, the MSWG agreed to limit the guidelines to four vessel types, namely commercial non-passenger vessels; passenger vessels; fishing vessels; and pleasure craft; and two risk contexts, namely normal operations, and operations in a time or place of heightened security risk. 15 Given that many members of delegations attending the MSWG were also interested in participating in the working group on LRIT maters, which was meeting concurrently, it was agreed to form a smaller drafting group to develop new terms of reference for future work by the correspondence group. The terms of reference developed by the drafting group as agreed by the MSWG are attached in the annex to this report. 16 The MSWG anticipated that the guidance developed by the Correspondence Group would be promulgated by means of an MSC Circular consisting of guidance to Administrations and Designated Authorities with practical guidance for operators of non-solas vessels contained in the annex thereto. The MSWG agreed that the guidance to Administrations and Designated Authorities should include, but not be limited to references to:

5 - 5 - MSC 83/WP.4.1 the existing measures contained in SOLAS chapter XI-2, the ISPS Code, the 1988 and 2005 SUA Conventions and Protocols, as appropriate, and relevant IMO guidance;.2 the need for liaison between stakeholders and Administrations and Designated Authorities;.3 the need to encourage operators of ships engaged in international voyages but not listed in SOLAS regulation XI-2/2.1 to adopt the provisions of the ISPS Code as industry best practice, and to issue appropriate ship security certificates in respect of such ships when they demonstrate full compliance;.4 the need to promote a security culture both within Administrations in respect of non-solas vessels and among the operators of non-solas vessels;.5 the value in developing frameworks to assist in preventing non-solas vessels from posing a security threat, including frameworks for maritime situational awareness, frameworks for interdiction, such as the 2005 SUA Convention and Protocol, and frameworks for receiving, collating and investigating reports of suspicious activity; and.6 that non-solas vessels operating in ISPS compliant port facilities should already be regulated under port facility security programmes and that vessels such as barges and riverine traffic involved in the supply chain would probably be addressed under supply chain security regimes. 17 During consideration of the terms of reference, one delegation expressed concern that the terms of reference may give the impression that the Organization was trying to extend its competence to include barges and international riverine traffic. However the MSWG agreed that the terms of reference and proposed MSC Circular made it clear that any guidance produced was to be utilized by Contracting Governments and/or Administrations at their own discretion. 18 The MSWG accepted the offer of the United Kingdom 1 to continue to co-ordinate the work of the correspondence group, and accepted the offers of Japan and the United States to assist in the co-ordination of the correspondence group. 19 The MSWG agreed that in order to progress its work, the correspondence group should report to the Committee at MSC In considering how best to progress its work on maritime security, the MSWG considered whether or not it would need to meet at MSC 84, given that the correspondence group was not due to report until MSC 85 and noting that the work on long-range identification and tracking of 1 Mr. Paul Levey Head of Maritime Security Operations Branch Transport Security and Contingencies Directorate Department for Transport 9th Floor, Zone 5/5 Southside 105 Victoria Street SW1E 6DT Tel: +44 (0) Fax: +44 (0) paul.levey@dft.gsi.gov.uk

6 MSC 83/WP ships was likely to continue at MSC 84. The MSWG also considered the idea of reconvening the joint MSC/FAL working group at FAL 35, but decided that due to the short time between FAL 35 and MSC 85, there would be little benefit. The MSWG therefore agreed to recommend to the Committee that maritime security should remain on the agenda at MSC 84, with provision for a drafting group on maritime security if required, and that provision should be made for the MSWG to reconvene at MSC 85. Action requested of the Committee 21 The Committee is invited to:.1 record in the report of the Committee, the need for port State control officers and other public authorities to show proper identification when boarding vessels (paragraphs 3 and 4);.2 invite the Memoranda of Understanding on port State control to reiterate to their member authorities the need for port State control officers and other public authorities to show proper identification when boarding vessels (paragraphs 3 and 4);.3 invite CLIA and other interested parties to provide full and specific details of such bad practices in the future (paragraphs 3 and 4);.4 recommend that ships experiencing such bad practices immediately notify the relevant authority of the port State and the flag State (paragraphs 3 and 4);.5 invite the Secretariat to:.1 request Member Governments and organizations with consultative status to submit to the Organization, details of ships operating either without AIS or with AIS incorrectly configured, reported by ships entitled to fly their flag. Such details should include, where possible, ship name, IMO number, call-sign, date, position (latitude and longitude), and details of the anomaly; and.2 promulgate such information by means of an MSC Circular on a quarterly basis (paragraphs 8, 9 and 11)..6 consider ways to ensure the consistent implementation of SOLAS regulation V/19.2.4, including urging Contracting Governments to implement the Guidelines for the on-board operational use of shipborne Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) adopted by the Organization by resolution A.917(22), as amended by resolution A.956(23), in order for receiving stations to identify correctly the transmitting ships (paragraphs 10 and 12);.7 establish a correspondence group on security aspects of the operation of ships which do not fall within the scope of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, under the co-ordination of the United Kingdom, with terms of reference as set out in the annex (paragraphs 13 to 19 and annex);

7 - 7 - MSC 83/WP.4.8 agree that maritime security should remain on the agenda at MSC 84 and MSC 85, with provision for a drafting group on maritime security at MSC 84 if required, and with provision for the MSWG to reconvene at MSC 85 (paragraph 20); and.9 approve this report in general. ***

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9 MSC 83/WP.4 ANNEX DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE CORRESPONDENCE GROUP ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR VESSELS WHICH DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF SOLAS CHAPTER XI-2 AND THE ISPS CODE 1 The correspondence group on security arrangements for vessels which do not fall within the scope of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code (non-solas vessels) is instructed, taking into account the relevant discussions of the Maritime Security Working Group and decisions of MSC 82 and MSC 83, to develop recommendatory guidelines to enhance maritime security to complement measures required by SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code, which could be utilized by Contracting Governments and/or Administrations at their own discretion. The correspondence group should take the following into account:.1 the guidelines should address security measures for possible application by non-solas vessels in order to:.1.1 protect non-solas vessels against security threats; and.1.2 prevent non-solas vessels from posing a security threat to other vessels and port facilities;.2 the guidelines should reiterate the importance of undertaking a risk assessment to determine if and to what extent such guidelines are to be applicable;.3 the guidelines should draw attention to existing IMO instruments and guidance material, for example guidance on suppression of piracy, drug smuggling, and stowaways;.4 the guidelines should complement other security procedures, for example the need for port service craft to comply with port facility security plans, and the need for barges and other craft involved in the supply chain to comply with measures for supply chain security;.5 the guidelines should be developed for four broad categories of non-solas vessels:.1 commercial non-passenger vessels;.2 passenger vessels;.3 fishing vessels; and.4 pleasure craft;

10 MSC 83/WP.4 ANNEX Page 2.6 the guidelines should set out a list of basic security measures, and additional security measures for operations in higher-risk environments, for non-solas vessels in the following areas, where appropriate:.1 Security Awareness and Culture maintaining security vigilance and reporting suspicious activity; understanding practices for interacting with ISPS compliant ships and port facilities, including dialogue with SSOs and PFSOs, and procedures for completing declarations of security; and awareness of security levels set by Contracting Governments in accordance with SOLAS chapter XI-2..2 Security Measures preventing theft or hijack of the vessel; preventing unauthorized access to the vessel; conducting a search of a vessel; verifying identity of persons on board a vessel; communicating intended destination (international voyages); and using available means of vessel identification, where appropriate..3 Planning for security events undertaking training and drills to ensure familiarity with contingency plans and procedures; knowing how to respond to bomb threats or discovery of suspicious items; and maintaining a means for reporting security concerns..4 Other security considerations for international voyages avoidance of piracy; prevention of trafficking in drugs and illicit cargoes; and prevention of stowaways.

11 MSC 83/WP.4 ANNEX Page 3.7 the guidelines should be accompanied by practical examples of best practice for the implementation of each of these measures, in the context of suitable risk scenarios where appropriate. 2 The correspondence group should submit a written report to MSC 85.