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1 CA A Vancouver BETWEEN: Sharon Donna Mclvor, Charles Jacob Grismer AND: Respondents (Plaintiffs) The Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, The Attorney General of Canada AND: Appellants (Defendants) Native Women's Association of Canada, Congress of Aboriginal Peoples, First Nations Leadership Council, West Moberly First Nations, T'Sou-ke Nation, Grand Council of the Waban-Aki Nation, the Band Council of the Abenakis of Odanak and the Band Council ofthe Abenakis ofw6linak, Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto REPLY TO THE RESPONDENTS' WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS (NOVEMBER 19, 2008) The Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, The Attorney General of Canada Sharon Donna Mclvor, Charles Jacob Grismer Intervenors Counsel for the Appellants: Mitchell R. Taylor, a.c., Glynis Hart, Brett C. Marleau, Sean Stynes Department of Justice Canada Howe Street Vancouver, BC V6Z 2S9 Counsel for the Respondents: Robert W. Grant, Gwen Brodsky Heenan Blaikie LLP West Hastings Street Vancouver, BC V6E 2E9 Telephone: Facsimile: (604) (604) Telephone: Facsimile: (604) (604)

2 Court of Appeal File No.: Supreme Court File No.: Supreme Court Registry: CA A Vancouver COURT OF APPEAL BETWEEN: Sharon Donna Mclvor, Charles Jacob Grismer AND: Respondents (Plaintiffs) The Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, The Attorney General of Canada AND: Appellants (Defendants) Native Women's Association of Canada, Congress of Aboriginal Peoples, First Nations Leadership Council, West Moberly First Nations, T'Sou-ke Nation, Grand Council of the Waban-Aki Nation, the Band Council of the Abenakis of Odanak and the Band Council ofthe Abenakis ofw6linak, Aboriginal Legal Services oftoronto REPLY TO THE RESPONDENTS' WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS (NOVEMBER 19, 2008) The Registrar, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, The Attorney General of Canada Sharon Donna Mclvor, Charles Jacob Grismer Intervenors Counsel for the Appellants: Mitchell R. Taylor, a.c., Glynis Hart, Brett C. Marleau, Sean Stynes Department of Justice Canada Howe Street Vancouver, BC V6Z 289 Counsel for the Respondents: Robert W. Grant, Gwen Brodsky Heenan Blaikie LLP West Hastings Street Vancouver, BC V6E 2E9 Telephone: Facsimile: (604) (604) brett. ma rlea Telephone: Facsimile: (604) (604)

3 Native Women's Association of Canada Counsel for the Intervenor: Mary Eberts c/o: Maegen M, Giltrow Ratcliff & Company LLP West Esplanade North Vancouver, BC ~ V7M 3J3 Telephone: (604) Facsimile: (604) First Nations Leadership Council Counsel for the Intervenor: Anja p, Brown Anja p, Brown Park Royal West Vancouver, BC V7T 1A2 Telephone: (604) Facsimile: (604) T'Sou-ke Nation Counsel for the Intervenor: Roberl Janes Miller Thomson LLP Howe Street Vancouver, BC V6Z2M1 Telephone: (604) Facsimile: (604) Aboriginal Legal Services oftoronto Counsel for the Intervenor: Kimberly R. Murray c/o: David Eby Pivot Legal LLP 678 Hastings Street East Vancouver, BC V6A 1R1 Telephone: (604) Facsimile: (604) Congress of Aboriginal Peoples Counsel for the Intervenor: Joseph E, Magnet, Janet L. Hutchison c/o: Maegen M.Giltrow Ratcliff & Company LLP West Esplanade North Vancouver, BC V7M 3J3 Telephone: (604) Facsimile: (604) West Moberly First Nations Counsel for the Intervenor: Christopher G. Devlin Devlin Gailus 556 Herald Street Victoria, BC V8W 1S6 Telephone: (250) Facsimile: (250) Grand Council of the Waban-Aki Nation, the Band Council of the Abenakis of Odanak and the Band Council of the Abenakis ofw61inak Counsel for the Intervenor: David Schulze c/o: Peter R. Grant Peter Grant & Associates Homby Street Vancouver, BC V6Z 1S4 Telephone: (604) Facsimile: (604)

4 INDEX Page A. Overview... 1 B. A Different Case Comparing s. 6(1)( c) Indians to other s. 6(1)( c) Indians or their Forebears does not Change the Retrospective Nature of the Comparison to those Registered under s. 6(1 )(a)....2 C. This Court Should Not Consider a New Claim that has Not been Plead and lacks a Proper Evidentiary Foundation....4 D. Further Reply to Specific Paragraphs of the Respondents' Submissions... 7 i. Benner Does not Provide the Authority for Transmission of Status Between Grandparent and Grandchild... 7 ii. Additional Points... 8 E. Conclusion... 9 List of Authorities

5 1 A. Overview 1. The Appellants have two main points in reply. 2. First, a finding that a distinction may have been introduced prospectively on April 17, 1985 between two classes of s. 6(1 )(c) reinstatees or their forebears is immaterial to the issue of whether the Respondents, who seek parity with s. 6(1 )(a) Indians, are attempting to apply s. 15 of the Charter retrospectively. Canada's retrospectivity argument responds to the distinction impugned by the Respondents, that is, the distinction between s. 6(1)(c) reinstatees like Ms. Mclvor and s. 6(1)(a) Indians. This was the Respondents' challenge as framed in their Notice of Constitutional Question 1 and their Statement of Claim 2, and as adjudicated by the trial judge. 3. The question of retrospectivity in the context of s. 15 of the Charter should not be determined in the abstract, in a manner divorced from the particular claim before this Court. The key question is whether accepting a claim would entail applying the Charter to revisit an old pre-charter distinction, or, whether the impugned distinction occurred after s. 15 of the Charter came into force. 3 This determination can be made only in light of the particular distinction brought before the Court, and adjudicated at trial. 4. As explained in Appellants' Submissions of October 31, 2008, at paragraphs 9-11, this Court's identification of a potential different distinction within the broad, complex scheme contained in s. 6, but outside the scope of the present claim, has no bearing on Canada's retrospectivity, argument, which addresses the distinction that is the subject of this appeal, that is between s. 6(1 )(c) and s. 6(1 )(a). 1 Amended Notice of Constitutional Question, Appeal Record ("A.R.") p Third Amended Statement of Claim, A.R., pp at paras. 1-6, 33-37, 45 and the prayer for relief, pp. 15, Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 398 at paras

6 2 5, Second, if this Court were to reject Canada's retrospectivity argument on the basis of a different distinction than that which has been plead, it would be doing so in a factual vacuum, something the courts have cautioned against 4 6, While the Court is not bound by the comparator group chosen by the claimant 5, there IS an important distinction between a Court, based on the factual record before it, adjusting the comparative framework (as was done in Granovskl), and the Court introducing a new s, 15 challenge in the absence of a trial of the issue and a proper evidentiary record? B. A Different Case Comparing s. 6(1)(c) Indians to other s. 6(1)(c) Indians or their Forebears does not Change the Retrospective Nature of the Comparison to those Registered under s. 6(1)(a) 7, Even if this Court were to compare the Respondents to those reinstated under s, 6(1 )(c) because of the double-mother clause or those persons' forebears, (which Canada submits the Court should not do) this does not undermine Canada's retrospectivity argument. 8. A separate case that seeks to compare those entitled under s, 6(1 )(c) to other 6(1 )(c) reinstatees or their forebears is fundamentally different from the present case and does not detract from the retrospective nature of the comparison of persons entitled under s. 6(1)(c) to those with acquired rights under s, 6(1)(a), That a complex scheme such as that contained in s, 6 might contairi other distinctions that do not implicate s, 6(1 )(a) and pre-charter distinctions is immaterial to the present claim, which is a collateral attack on repealed Indian Acts, 9, That said, it should be noted that the Respondents, in their submissions on the impact of reinstating individuals excluded by the double-mother clause, continue to challenge pre-1985 events and the acquired rights provision in s, 6(1 )(a), 4 Mackay v, Manitoba, [1989] 2 S,C,R. 357 at 361; Danson v, Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] 2 S,C,R at ; British Columbia (Attorney General) v, Christie, [2007J 1 S,C,R. 873, 2007 SCC 21; Kaska Dene Council v, British Columbia (Attorney General), 2008 BC CA 455, 5 Granovsky v, Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [2000J 1 S,C.R. 703, 2000 SCC 28 at para, 46,. Granovsky, supra at para, 46, 7 Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999J 1 S,C,R. 497 at para, 58,

7 3 10, For instance, at paragraph 9, the Respondents set out four ways in which those who were subject to the double-mother clause purportedly had their status improved under the 1985 Act, However, their first three examples concern individuals who were not affected by the double-mother clause, were entitled to registration immediately prior to April 17, 1985, and accordingly, had their existing entitlement preserved under s, 6(1 )(a), 11, As to the fourth example in paragraph 9 and elaborated upon at paragraphs of the Respondents" Submissions, the Respondents advance a new statutory interpretation for s, 6(1 )(c), The Respondents suggest that the wording of s, 6(1 )(c), in conjunction with the language of ss, 11 and 12 of the 1970 Act, rnay create an entitlement so that not only the male Indian excluded by the double-mother clause would be reinstated under s, 6(1)(c), but also, any subsequent male descendent along the male line born prior to April 17, Canada disputes the Respondents' statutory interpretation argument. While this new statutory interpretation argument should not be decided on the basis of supplementary written submissions, the language of s, 12(1 )(a)(iv) is clear: it only applied to exclude individuals who satisfied the criteria in that section. Once excluded, their offspring were not also excluded by virtue of this provision because they would never have had an entitlement to Indian registration. 13, The Respondents similarly challenge s. 6(1 )(a) entitlements in paragraphs 21, 28-30,33,41,47-48 and In reply to paragraph 29, it is immaterial to the issue of retrospectivity in this case that there were some individuals who, though disentitled under the 1970 Act, had not yet been removed from the Indian Register by April 17, 1985, and had their existing entitlement preserved under s. 6(1 )(a). This was the case for all persons who had not yet been removed from the Register as of April 17, 1985, including women subject to s, 12( 1 )(b) of the former Act.

8 4 15. As to paragraph 33, those persons whose bands were exempted from the doublemother clause did not lose status and therefore had their existing entitlement preserved under s. 6(1 )(a). This is no different from bands who chose to be exempted from s. 12(1 )(b)s Women who qualified for such exemptions did not lose entitlement, and had it preserved under s. 6(1 )(a). 16. In slimmary, events occurred prior to 1985 and these led to consequences under the former Indian Act. The 1985 Act preserved all rights acquired prior to April 17, 1985 under s. 6(1 )(a) and reinstated those who themselves lost status for certain reasons under ss. 6(1 )(c),(d) and (e). So long as the Respondents compare themselves to those with pre-charter acquired rights (i.e. persons entitled under s. 6(1 )(a)), they seek an impermissible retrospective application of the Charter. This is the claim before the Court. That there are other alleged distinctions is immaterial to the retrospective nature of the Respondents' claim. C. This Court Should Not Consider a New Claim that has Not been Plead and lacks a Proper Evidentiary Foundation 17. This Court's question raises the issue, and the Respondents' argument is, that comparing those entitled to registration under s. 6(1 )(c) because of marrying-out, to the forebears of those entitled to registration under s. 6(1 )(c) because of the double-mother clause, creates a new inequalityh The Respondents argue that a logical corollary of this finding is that Canada's arguments on retrospectivity must fail. 'o 18. Canada's reply is that this conclusion is predicated on a new claim which is not plead and for which there is insufficient evidence. Canada's retrospectivity argument should not be dismissed on the basis of a different claim, which does not implicate s. 6(1 )(a) and which is not before the Court. 19. Any alleged inequality between different classes of s. 6(1)(c) reinstatees or their forebears is a case for another day and immaterial to the issue of the alleged inequality 8 Reasons for Judgment ("R.F.J."), A.R. p. 101 at para. 61 and the evidence cited therein. 9 Respondents' Written Subm issions. p. 11 at paras. 42, Respondents' Written Submissions, p. 16 at para. 60.

9 5 in this case between the Respondents who are entitled under ss. 6(1 )(c) and (6)(2) and individuals entitled to registration under s. 6(1 )(a). The question of retrospectivity should be decided on the constitutional challenge at issue, that is, the distinction adjudicated by the trial judge, not on the basis of a potential different distinction in another part of the Indian registration scheme. 20. Courts have repeatedly cautioned against deciding constitutional issues in a factual vacuum. " In addition to the jurisprudence cited in the Appellants' Submissions of October 31, 2008, this Court recently stated in Kaska Dene: [16] In addition, the absence of any factual context provided by the pleadings in a case in which a constitutional question is raised, militates against the exercise of the Court's discretion (see this court's decision in Ches/atta, supra, at para. 12) in favour of expressing its opinion concerning the questions posed by the Council. The Supreme Court of Canada has noted on many occasions that factual context is particularly important in constitutional cases and in cases concerning aboriginal rights: see R. v. Gladstone [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723, at paras. 56 and 65. As stated by the Court in MacKay v. Manitoba [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357 in another context, "the presentation of facts is not... a mere technicality; rather, it is essential to a proper consideration of Charter issues. A respondent cannot, by simply consenting to dispense with factual background, require or expect a court to deal with an issue such as this in a factual void. Charter decisions cannot be based upon the unsupported hypotheses of enthusiastic counsel." (At ) The same must be true of decisions relating to aboriginal rights protected by the Constitution Act, (See also Katlodeeche First Nation v. Canada, [2003] NW.T.J. No. 85, [2004] 8 WW.R. 233 (NW.T. S.C.), at paras. 29_31.), Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Appellants' Submissions of October 31, 2008, provided some examples of evidentiary shortcomings that arise in any consideration of the distinction between different classes of s. 6(1 )(c) reinstatees or their ancestors. 22. As an additional example, in paragraphs 9(3), 24 and 30, the Respondents raise the notion of individuals who "regained status" as a result of exemptions granted by Cabinet under s. 4(2) of the Indian Act. This statement is made without an evidentiary basis. 11 Mackay, supra at 361; Danson, supra at ; British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie, supra; Kaska Dene Council, supra. 12 Kaska Dene Council, supra at para 16.

10 6 23. The Respondents, in their pleadings, seek to compare themselves with those entitled to registration under s. 6(1 )(a). Nowhere do they mention s. 12(1 )(a)(iv) of the 1951 Act, nor is it in their prayer for relief. 13 The Respondents' Notice of Constitutional Question does not mention s. 12(1 )(a)(iv) of the 1951 Act. Instead, it focuses on the denial of"... full s. 6(1 )(a) registration status... " I mportantly on this point, the adjudicative facts of this case do not provide the, necessary foundation to compare the Respondents to the forebears of those reinstated under s. 6(1 )(c) because of the double-mother clause. Contrary to the proposed comparison at paragraphs 40 and 41 of the Respondents' Submissions, Mr. Grismer was born in 1971 and did not reach the age of 21 prior to the repeal of the doublemother clause in Even if he was the direct descendant of a male Indian, he could not have been affected by the double-mother clause. Similarly, both of Ms. Mclvor's parents were found to be entitled unders. 11(e) of the 1951 Act Accordingly, if the Respondents had brought a claim challenging their treatment in comparison to grandparents and parents of persons previously affected by the doublemother clause, Canada would have argued that they are not in the same "universe" as such persons due to these factual differences At paragraph 59 of their Submissions, the Respondents argue that the new distinction, with the forebears of s. 6(1 )(c) reinstatees as the comparator group, is properly in issue because the Appellants raised this argument in general terms at trial and on appeal. 17 What Canada argued at trial is that the appropriate comparators for Ms. Mclvor are other s. 6(1)(c) reinstatees, not their parents or grandparents. As noted in the Appellants' Submissions of October 31, 2008, there is no distinction between women such as Ms. Mclvor and persons previously excluded under s. 12(1 )(a)(iv) of the 13 Third Amended Statement of Claim, A.R., pp at paras. 1-6, 33-37, 45 and the prayer for relief, pp. 15, Amended Notice of Constitutional Question, supra, note Reasons for Judgment on the Statutory Appeal, A.R., pp. 69, 70 at paras. 22, Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2004]3 S.C.R 357, 2004 SCC 65 at para There appear to be two typographical errors in the Respondents' Submissions at paragraph 59. In the third sentence the Appellants assume "the Respondents" was intended to be "the Appellants" and in the last sentence, "improperly" was intended to be "properly".

11 Act; both groups are entitled under s. 6(1)( C).'8 With regard to a comparison between Ms. Mclvor and the ancestors of double-mother clause reinstatees, the deficiency of the pleadings and lack of evidence as outlined above preclude this issue from proper judicial determination on appeal. 27. For the foregoing reasons, it would be improper to address the constitutionality of s. 6(1 )(c) with respect to the effect of reinstating individuals excluded by the doublemother clause or to use any other potential distinction within s. 6(1)(c) to negate Canada's retrospectivity argument. Canada's retrospectivity argument addresses the distinction before the Court, that between s. 6(1 )(c) reinstatees and their children, and persons whose acquired rights were preserved under s. 6(1 )(a). The evidence adduced on the double-mother clause is insufficient to form the factual basis necessary for a full Charter analysis. D. Further Reply to Specific Paragraphs of the Respondents' Submissions i. Benner Does not Provide the Authority for Transmission of Status Between Grandparent and Grandchild 28. At paragraphs 54 and 55 of the Respondents' Submissions they state that "[i]n light of Benner, there can be no doubj"19 that transmission of status is a benefit of law and that "".discrimination based on the sex of Aboriginal ancestor, is sex discrimination for both the progenitor and the descendant whether that discrimination occurs between parent or child or between grandparent and grandchild" [emphasis added].20 As Canada stated in its factum 21 and in its Submissions 22, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court of Canada in Benner 3 would have accepted a claim brought by Mr. Benner's grandparent. Indeed, subsequent citizenship cases such as Veleta 24 and Forward 25 did not extend the rea'soning in Benner to the grandparent-grandchild relationship. 18 Appellants' Written Submissions, pp. 10, 11 at paras Respondents' Written Submissions, p. 14 at para Respondents' Written Submissions, pp. 14, 15 at para Appellants' Factum at pp at paras Appellants' Written Submissions at para. 29 and Benner, supra at Veleta v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2005), 273 F.T.R. 108 at para. 65. Rev'd on appeal on other grounds, 268 D.L.R. (4"') 513,2006 FCA 138. Note that the appeal did not concern

12 8 ii. Additional Points 29. In paragraph 5, the Respondents say that "transmission of status along the female line was never possible if an Indian woman parented with a non-lndian,,26 However, s. 11 (e) of the 1970 Act did provide for the transmission of status along the female line. In f~ct, as a child born out of wedlock to an Indian woman, Ms. Mclvor was entitled under s. 11 (e) of the 1970 Act, prior to her own marriage to a non-lndian In paragraph 34, the Respondents say the double-mother clause is not predicated upon any discriminatory treatment and at paragraph 57 refer to it as "less onerous than the second generation cut-off.,,28 As set out in Appellants' Submissions 29, the doublemother clause affected only children born in wedlock, and applied only at the age of 21. Whether such distinctions would now be considered discriminatory is immaterial, because they pre-dated the coming into force of s. 15 of the Charter. However, given these distinctions and the impact of s. 12(1 )(a)(iv) on families, it was reasonable for Parliament to reinstate affected persons. In contrast, and contrary to the Respondents' Submissions, the operation of ss. 6(1 )(f) and 6(2) of the 1985 Act does not differentiate on the basis of age or marital status. 31. The Respondents' say at paragraph 40 that, "Jacob, as the child of a woman who married out could not transmit status to his children." However, because Jacob is a s. 6(2) Indian, if he parents with another person entitled to be registered, his offspring will be entitled to registration under s. 6(1). 32. In paragraph 47 the Respondents assert that Parliament could have, in addressing concerns about exclusions under the double-mother clause, preserved the entitlement of women who had "married in" and gained status under s. 11 (f) of the former Act, but excluded any consequential entitlement of their descendants. There are several problems with this submission. the application judge's Charter analysis which was abandoned by the Applicants at the hearing of the appeal. See 2006 FCA 138 at paras. 2 and Forward v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 CHRT 5 (Cdn. Human Rights Tribunal). 26 Respondents' Written Submissions, p. 1 at para Reasons for Judgment on the Statutory Appeal, A.R., p. 69 at para Respondents' Written Submissions, pp. 9, 15 at paras. 34 and Appellants' Written Submissions, pp. 6, 7 at paras

13 9 33. First, it is an argument properly made in the context of a s. 1 proportionality analysis, in that it concerns whether any alleged inequality between double-mother clause reinstatees and s. 12(1 )(b) reinstatees is nonetheless justified as "minimally impairing". The fact that no such s. 1 submissions have been advanced by Canada or adjudicated by the trial judge underscores the prejudice that would ensu~_in the event of. a finding concerning the reinstatement of persons previously excluded under s. 12(1)(a) (iv). Second, like the Respondents' original claim, it is a challenge to the pre-1985 treatment of women who married-in and simply had their existing entitlement preserved under s. 6(1 )(a). Third, if Parliament had chosen to do this it would have resulted in immediate families having children (born before April 17, 1985) with entitlement under s. 6(1 )(a) and others (born after April 17, 1985) with entitlement under s. 6(2). This final point would have been part of Canada's s. 1 justification if the Respondents had challenged the reinstatement of persons previously excluded under s. 12(1 )(a)(iv) of the 1970 Act. 34. Contrary to the Respondents' Subrnissions at paragraph 58, the Appellants reiterate that any distinction between reinstatees such as Ms. Mclvor and the grandparents of double-mother clause reinstatees (which is not before the Court), does not amount to discrimination in the substantive sense. The principle of "the restoration of rights to those who lost them,,3o, far from being a "narrow, revisionist statement of purpose,,31, was, in Minister Crombie's words, the third "basic underlying principle" of the Bil1. 32 E. Conclusion 35. To determine whether a s. 15 challenge implicates a retrospective application of the Charter, it is necessary to consider whether the distinction impugned by the claimants is, in fact, an event which pre-dated the coming into force of s. 15 on April 17, This Court's identification of a potential different distinction within the 1985 Act's registration scheme, but outside the scope of this claim, has no bearing on Canada's 30 R.F.J., A.R., p. 106,201 at paras. 74 and Respondents' Written SubmisSions, p. 15 at para. 58. ~~ ~:n;~~~' ~~!d~0(1:~r~;:;;o%~~te), [1997] 1 S.CR 358 at para. 44.

14 10 retrospectivity argument in this case as plead and tried. The retrospectivity argument advanced at trial and in this appeal pertains to the special nature of s. 6(1 )(a) as a provision preserving rights already afforded under a previous Indian Act, Any distinctions that may be within s. 6(1)(c), independent of s. 6(1)(a), are immaterial to the, present claim. 36. If this Court were to reject Canada's retrospectivity argument on the basis of a different distinction than has been plead, it would do so in a factual vacuum, something courts have cautioned against. 34 Canada's retrospectivity argument should not be addressed in the abstract, on the basis of facts not before this Court. To dismiss Canada's retrospectivity argument on the basis of the double-mother clause necessitates a constitutional analysis of a different claim which was neither adjudicated in the Court below nor argued on appeal. All of which is respectfully submitted. Dated at Vancouver, B.C. this 19 th day of November Mitchell Taylor a.c., Glynis Hart Brett Marleau and Sean Stynes Counsel for the Appellants 34 Mackay, supra at 361; Oanson, supra at ; British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie, supra; Kaska Oene Council, supra.

15 List of Authorities Cases Cited Paragraphs Benner v, Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 3 S.C. R 358 (Appellants' Book of Authorities "AB.OA", Tab 6)... 3, 28 British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Ghristie, [2007]1 S.C.R 873, 2007 SCC 21 (AB.OA, Tab 9)... 5, 20, 36 Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1990]2 S.C.R 1086 (AB.OA, Tab 18)... 5, 20, 36 Forward v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 CHRT 5 (Cdn. Human Rights Tribunal) (Appellants' Supplementary Book of Authorities, Tab 1) Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [2000]1 S.C.R SCC 28 (AB.O.A., Tab 22)... 6 Kaska Dene Council v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2008 BCCA , 20, 36 Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999]1 S.C.R 497 (AB.OA, Tab 31)... 6 Mackay v. Manitoba, [1989]2 S.C.R 357 at 361 (AB.OA, Tab 36)... 5, 20, 36 Veleta v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2005), 273 F.T.R. 108 (AB.OA, Tab 70) Veleta v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 268 D.L.R (4th) 513, 2006 FCA 138 (AB.O.A., Tab 71) Statutes Cited Indian Act, S.C. 1951, c. 29, ss., 11, 12 (A.B.O.A, Tab 81) Indian Act, RS.C. 1970, c. 1-6, ss, 11, 12 (Appendix 1, p Appellants' Reply to Intervenors' Factums) Indian Act, RS.C. 1985, c. 1-5, s. 6 (A.B.O.A, Tab 84)