Norwegian Church Aid DCA/NCA PALESTINE JOINT COUNTRY PROGRAMME

Transcription

1 Norwegian Church Aid DCA/NCA PALESTINE JOINT COUNTRY PROGRAMME

2 Abbreviations AIDA AVH CEDAW CHS CHO EIDHR ELCJHL HCT HRP ICC ICCG ICCPR ICT IESCR IHL IHRL L2GP NDP NFI OCHA OECD PA PCBS PNA PNGO PNIN TOC UN HC UNCTAD UNSCR 1325 UPR Association of International Development Agencies Augusta Victoria Hospital Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women Core Humanitarian Standard EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights Evangelical Lutheran Church in Jordan and the Holy Land Humanitarian Country Team Humanitarian Response Plan International Criminal Court Inter Cluster Coordination Group International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights information and Communication technology International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights International Humanitarian Law International Human Rights Law Local to Global protection study National Development Plan Non-Food Items Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Palestinian Authority Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics Palestinian National Authority Palestinian NGO Network Palestinian National Institute for NGOs Theory of Change UN Humanitarian Coordinator United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UN Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security Universal Periodic Reviews 2

3 1.0 Introduction DCA and NCA have both been active in the Palestinian areas since the early 1950 s, and started their engagement in the region with relief to Palestinian refugees on the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem. Both organizations have been working closely together with a variety of local Palestinian and Israeli faith based (mainly local churches and organizations representing local churches, as well as Jewish faith based organizations) and secular organizations. In March 2015, a decision was taken to develop a DCA-NCA Joint Country Programme (JCP) in Palestine (and Israel for the rights of Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories) with DCA as lead agency. The background for the decision is that both NCA and DCA currently experience a strong push to further focus our work and see improvements in our effectiveness and efficiency. This push is both internal and external. For example, the Norwegian Directorate of Development (Norad) has strongly encouraged NCA to reduce the number of countries, and in DCA the Board has commissioned an external consultancy group to conduct a study to assess improvement in DCA's efficiency. What is presented in this document is therefore the strategy for the DCA-NCA Joint Country Programme in Palestine. 1.1 Learning and Experience The programme development process has been guided both by learning from our many years of experience working with partners and projects in the region, and by a number of key studies, analyses and assessments undertaken by DCA and NCA. The latter have all been important milestones for accessing data and analysis that have been taken into consideration when producing this programme document and the key learning points are presented below. There is a need to mainstream protection measures, strengthen links between protection and advocacy, strengthen work on women s equal participation and leadership within decision-making fora, strengthen resilience by supporting cooperatives, and the need to create synergy across thematic objectives. Finding a long-term solution to the Occupation does not appear forthcoming, but given its centrality in the source of protection threats, it should take center-stage in the strategies of protection agencies in whatever form is appropriate to the capacity and skills of each organization. As for the continuation of these agencies' work to alleviate immediate suffering, it is important to change their approach in order to increase their effectiveness. The full study includes a detailed discussion of numerous general and Moreover, there is a need for designing more systematic planning, monitoring, evaluation, and reporting processes with partners, as well as the importance of establishing better baselines to be able to measure change against SMART indicators and ensure better quality of the achievements 1. Programme components such as civil protection, legal support and advocacy correspond highly to the priorities identified by relevant international organizations present in Palestine, and that they are aligned with the key protection concerns identified in the West Bank by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Protection Cluster as well as by the European Union policy through its European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Furthermore, the approach of using IHRL and IHL for the legal support is in line with the Rights Based Approach (RBA), central to our programming. In addition, there is an alignment with NCA s and DCA's positions on advocacy connected to land rights and settlement labeling. The relevance of the above- mentioned components to the targeted communities needs is also considered to be high. 2 DCA has been advised to limit its pure humanitarian support to Palestinians as much as possible so as to avoid emphasising the culture of dependency rather than reinforcing a culture of and capacity for 1 Evaluation for Rabbis for Human Rights (RHR) Mimat consultancy 2 Ibid 3

4 resilience. This should be extended to more development long term related work where the distribution of hardware should be limited and use of own resources and capacities prioritised, privileged and supported. 3 The evaluation also recommended that DCA continues or enforces its support to grassroots advocacy efforts and support Palestinian grassroots and movements to develop visions for their own lives and build capacity to speak and act on their own behalf. Including grassroots in Gaza may be a particular priority in this respect. The value added for DCA and partners can be strengthened even more if DCA supports partners and grassroots in accessing international media, and using information and communication technology (ICT) as an instrument for advocacy. DCA should invest more time and efforts in nourishing its network of delegates visiting Israel and the Palestinian areas so as to increase the likelihood that DCA can capitalize on these relations later on. Working with donor agencies is a challenge facing both Islamic faith based organizations and the donor agencies themselves. It is important for donor agencies to prove to Islamic FBOs that there is no conscious marginalization or undermining of them based on Islamophobia. Islamic FBOs in turn need to work towards building organizations that can manage donor programs which require auditable accountability and transparency as well as employing a Rights Based Approach as an important way of working in order to address empowerment of the poor and marginalised and the root causes of need for charity. The study made the point that working with Islamic FBOs needs to be done in partnership whereby trust and respect, particularly in such an uncertain and fragile environment, are valued and practiced. Additionally, one of the main lessons learned across previous mentioned studies are recommendations to improve the gender sensitive approach of our programming and operations. This should be a crosscutting issue within the joint programme, partner organizations and at a programme level, and both DCA and NCA possess considerable experience and expertise in gender work, meaning we have capacity to ensure strengthening of this aspect of the joint country programme., 1.2 Process of Programme Development The programme development process has included a significant number of meetings and workshops between DCA and NCA staff, both at HQ and local level, to discuss programme content and modalities of implementation. From these discussions arose a number of themes and intervention areas based on both agencies' and partners' previous results, experiences and relevance to the context. Throughout the process, civil society organizations from a wide range of thematic backgrounds, including DCA and NCA partners, participated in shaping this joint strategy. Workshops and meetings with partners and stakeholders (i.e. conflict analysis workshop in April, theory of change workshop in June, scenario 2030 workshop), have been conducted to seek input to and create the basis for a common understanding on the joint programme.. The JCP process is one clear outcome of the intention of closer ACT collaboration. Regular updates were therefore made to keep the members of the local ACT Alliance forum and the member agencies of the 8 major European ACT Alliance members ( E8 ) abreast of the programme development. 2.0 Country Analysis 2.1 Country Analysis 3 Evaluation of DCA's Palestine Country Programme. Malene Sønderskov. March

5 Since the 1970s, there have been intermittent efforts made to reach peace terms between Palestine and Israel. The most recent of these efforts were the negotiations conducted in 2013 and 2014, overseen by the US, which collapsed when Israel suspended the process on the 24th April 4, mere days before the deadline of the 29 th April. Netanyahu cited Abbas s attempt to form a Palestinian Unity Government, unifying the Fatah-led West Bank and the Hamas-led Gaza Strip, as motivation for halting the negotiations, though the talks had been faltering for some time: the two sides could not reconcile differences in opinion regarding prisoner releases, PA moves to join UN bodies, and Israeli settlement expansion 5. The 1993 Oslo agreement established a framework and legal foundation to continue to manage the operations and cooperation between Palestine and Israel albeit not mutually respected or consistently applied. Since 1994, a consolidated system of legislation has been in effect in both the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. The most powerful political entity in the context of Palestine is the Israeli authority, whether exercising this power through civil law in East Jerusalem, martial law in the West Bank, or control over borders and movement of goods and people in relation to the Gaza Strip. In Area C which comprises nearly 60% of the West Bank, Israeli Civil Administration is the Israeli governing body that restricts Palestinian life in every aspect whether in regard to development, security, humanitarian assistance, or movement - and thus also the prospects for state-building. In fact, Israel conducts two separate legal systems in the West Bank - one for Palestinians and the other for settlers, providing preferential services, development, and benefits for the latter while imposing harsh conditions on the former. Beside obstacles faced in negotiating peace process with the Israelis, Palestinians have an internal division that is demonstrated in the conflict between the two main Palestinian political parties, Fatah and Hamas, resulting in the split of the Palestinian Authority in The reconciliation process and unification of Hamas and Fatah administrations has not succeeded as of August 2015 and is even severely challenged. The Unity Government, a concept opposed by Israel 6, was short-lived and ineffective: on the 30th November 2014, Hamas declared that the Unity Government had ended 7, and although Fatah subsequently denied the claim stating that the government is still in force, 8 due largely to the strict restrictions placed on travel between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, cooperation efforts between Fatah and Hamas are currently in hiatus. The current legal framework in the occupied Palestinian territory is a mixture of Jordanian, Egyptian, Palestinian, Ottoman and British laws. This is in addition to the Palestinian personal status laws in which the Jordanian Personal Status Law No. 61 of 1976 is applied in the West Bank and the Egyptian Law of Family Rights of 1954 in the Gaza Strip. When the military conflict between Israel, Hamas and other armed groups took place in Gaza in July 2014 a humanitarian crisis was declared by the UN. The military conflict lasted for 50 days, destroying over 100,000 homes and leaving more that 2,200 dead 9 ' the vast majority civilians. The disproportional use of force by Israel was widely condemned internationally as well as seen to be counterproductive to the security of Israeli citizens. The ceasefire is fragile with a constant risk of a new war breaking out, as none of the underlying causes behind the war have been resolved. Following the ceasefire a recovery and reconstruction plan was made, mobilizing international support for Gaza within a framework of longer-term sustainable development of Palestine as a whole. Although international donors pledged USD 5.6 billion for the plan and a monitoring system was designed by the 4 Guardian Online; Israel Suspends Peace Talks with Palestinians after Fatah-Hamas Deal; ; Can be accessed online here: 5 Ibid 6 BBC; Palestinian unity government sworn in by Mahmoud Abbas; 2014; Can be accessed online here: 7 Ma an News Agency; Palestinian Unity Government Has Expired; 2014; Can be accessed online here: 8 The Times of Israel; Fatah Official Denies Unity Government Mandate Has Ended; 2014; Can be accessed online here; 9 OCHA humanitarian Bulletin. October

6 UN, only a tiny amount of the rebuilding materials needed have entered Gaza. The international community has not delivered as promised and Israel has allowed far from enough building materials to enter the Gaza Strip. Palestine comprises the West Bank including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. The areas are home to million West Bank Palestinians, and 1.73 million Gazan Palestinians. 10 The majority of Palestinians are Sunni Muslim, with this sect of Islam followed by 98% of the population. There are also 51,170 Christians in Palestine, 1.37% of the Palestinian population. Of the total Christians, 76.2% live in the West Bank, 17.9% in Jerusalem and 5.9% in Gaza. Youth, defined as those between the ages of 15 and 29, represent 30.0% of the total Palestinian population, with males for every 100 females. 11 Refugees constitute 44.2% of the total Palestinian population in Palestine. UNRWA records showed that there were 5.3 million Palestinian refugees registered in mid-2013, constituting 45.7% of the total Palestinian population worldwide. They were distributed as 59.0% living in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, 17.0% in the West Bank, and 24.0% in Gaza Strip. About 29.0% of Palestinian registered refugees live in 58 refugee camps, of which 10 are in Jordan, nine in Syria, 12 in Lebanon, 19 in the West Bank, and eight in Gaza Strip. In 2013, the average life expectancy at birth was 73.2 years, with the expected years of schooling 13.2 years, and the GNI per capita was $5, 168. There were some notable differences between females and males however: while the expected years of schooling for females were higher than males (at 14 opposed to 12.5), the NGI per capita was just $1,651 for females, yet $8,580 for males. 12 All recent data still indicates high rates of poverty and unemployment in Palestinian society in general and among youth in particular. More than one third of Palestinian youth are unemployed, with the highest unemployment rate among young people with higher education. In fact, nearly half of all graduates (diploma and higher) are unemployed. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) reports that 25.7% percent of Palestinians lives in poverty, in relative poverty or deep poverty, and nearly one quarter of Palestinian youth are classified as poor. Poverty rates are higher in the Gaza Strip with 38% living in poverty, with women in the Strip facing acute economic pressure 13 compared to 18.3% in the West Bank % of refugees in Palestine live below the poverty line, 15 it would appear that refugees and the Palestinian population within Gaza, and women within both these groups, struggle the most within issues relating to poverty. The poverty rate among Palestinian individuals was 25.8%, 17.8% in the West Bank, and 38.8% in Gaza Strip. Data revealed that 12.9% of the individuals in Palestine were suffering from deep poverty in 2011 according to consumption patterns, 7.8% in the West Bank, and 21.1% in Gaza Strip. 16 Using ILO standards, the unemployment rate in Gaza Strip is 41.5% compared with 15.4% in the West Bank in the 2 nd quarter of And the unemployment rate for males in Palestine is 21.0% compared with 38.9% for females at the same period. The highest unemployment rate in the 2 nd quarter 2015 is 41.7% among youth aged years. The labour force participation rate in the 2 nd quarter 2015 is 10 Miller, E., Times of Israel; Right-wing Annexation Drive Fueled by False Demographics; 2015; Can be accessed online here: 11 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics; Press Release on the Results of the Labour Force Survey (October December 2014); 2015; Can be accessed online here: 12 UNDP; Human Development Report 2014: Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience; Sala, H., Al-Monitor; Islamic Loans Give Gaza s Women Chance to Survive Poverty; ; Cane be accessed online here: 14 The Status of Youth inpalestine 2013.The future is knocking. A report by Sharek Youth Forum in partnership with the Youth Economic Empowerment Center Ma an News Agency; 31% of Refugees in Palestine Live Below Poverty Line; ; Can be accessed online here:

7 46.2% in the West Bank and 44.9% in Gaza Strip, the gap in the labour participation rate between males and females in Palestine still very big where it reached 71.2% for males compared with 19.6% for females. 17 Despite the Palestinian Authority s increasing ability to provide job opportunities through government positions. The PA currently employs approximately 160,000 employees in the West Bank and Gaza, while Hamas employs 42,000 persons in the Gaza Strip 18, the number of Palestinians seeking employment in Israel and Israeli settlements in the West Bank continues to increase with more than 100,000 Palestinians working for Israelis, one fifth of them working in settlements. 19 However, PA faces bankruptcy on regular basis and is often unable to pay government employees salaries, having a high dependency on donor countries to pay for these salaries. 20 Demolition of Palestinian property and forcible transfer of Palestinians in the occupied West Bank has been record high, first in 2013 and then in In 2014, according to OCHA figures, the Israeli authorities destroyed 590 Palestinian-owned structures in Area C and East Jerusalem, displacing 1,177 people the highest level of displacement in the West Bank since OCHA began systematically monitoring the issue in The threat of displacement through house demolitions and evictions makes daily life insecure for many Palestinians, both in East Jerusalem and in Area C. From the beginning of 2009 until the beginning of 2014, the Jewish settler population in the West Bank grew 23%, to 355,993 people. In comparison, the overall population has grown 9.6 percent to just over 8 million in that time. 22 Settler violence has increased and spreads fear and insecurity in villages close to settlements, as well as in some East Jerusalem neighbourhoods. The estimated Jewish settlers in the West Bank consume almost four times more water than the Palestinian population. On an average per capita basis, a Jewish settler in the West Bank uses four to six to times more water than a Palestinian. 23 A critical factor for growing the Palestinian economy and generating new jobs, particularly for youth entering the labour market, is the development of the Palestinian private sector. Vocational training contributes to reducing unemployment among youth and may protect people from becoming unemployed. Vocational trainings can also play an important role in improving economic conditions in disadvantaged regions such as Palestine by reducing the skill mismatch between workers and enterprises. Reduced access to land and markets constrain Palestinian livelihoods. This is critical given the importance of agriculture as both a labour sector and for food security. The Wall has led to the removal of fruit trees and other species. The reduced land available has been placed under heavy stress and is used unsustainably leading to degradation and desertification. The Israeli Wall is estimated to deprive Palestinians of almost 50 per cent of their forests and natural protected areas and up to 28% of their agricultural production. The Eastern portion of the Wall blocks access to about 275ha of Palestinian land, which comprises one fifth of Palestinian agricultural production, and about 88 per cent of rangelands. All these factors water, land, energy and biodiversity are threatened by climate change. The already arid region could become drier and unpredictable weather patterns will place additional pressure on resources and require a highly adaptive population. Palestinians lack a fundamental and substantive primary health care system that can reach out to the local population. Infrastructural challenges restrict the movement of physicians and medical supplies, and lack of efficient logistics prevents a coordinated effort by all healthcare service providers to 17 Labour Force survey. (April- June 2015) Round. Q2/2015. PCBS. 18 Al-Monitor; Palestinian Authority Faces Crisis Over Salaries; : Can be accessed online here: 19 Ma an News Agency; PCBS: Over 100,000 Palestinians Work In Israel; : Can be accessed online here: West Bank Settlement Expansion Surged Under Netanyahu. Haaretz, August B Tselem, 2013.Taking control of water sources in the Jordan Valley 7

8 provide the necessary primary care. 24 According to the World Bank, only 44 % of all Palestinians have access to reasonable and customary health care. In other words, only 44 % of all Palestinians have access to all of the treatment that they should. This leaves a startling 56 % of the population with access to little of no healthcare whatsoever Civil Society Analysis, including the Role of Faith-Based Organisations Both the Palestinian and Israeli civil society is saturated with non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Palestinian NGOs: There are an estimated 2,400 Palestinian NGOs operating in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza according to data collected in Palestinian civil society comprises grassroots and communitybased organizations; non-governmental and civil society organizations; aggregations of CSOs focused on one sector, area, or issue; and general aggregations of CSOs and national civil society platforms. As well as event focused social movements that are often geographically focused. Considering the differences in mandate, size, and capacity of these different levels of organizations, each has its own niche and level of success in bringing about social change, while common strengths, weaknesses, and constraints are presented below. Grassroots and community-based organizations, are generally distinguished by a lack of specialization, with many working in more than five sectors, although their range of activities is mostly limited to service provision. CBOs rarely have systems and detailed policies that govern their work, and administrative and financial management and reporting is basic. Despite these weaknesses, CBOs are often considered closer to local communities, target groups, and beneficiaries than other NGOs, making them more able to understand community needs and gain the trust of the communities in which they implement projects. Between 50-60% of all organizations NGOs and CSOs and the majority of organizations that receive external funding are based in the West Bank city of Ramallah and the Gaza Strip. These organizations are also mainly working in service provision, with advocacy also as a prominent sector. Networks/aggregations of CSOs focused on one sector, area, or issue, are not as prominent, with many created as a campaign or movement addressing a specific issue, and less than 10 permanent registered coalitions. In addition, there are currently four general aggregations of CSOs and national civil society platforms) that include only a portion of civil society organizations as members. 27 The Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO) is one of the most active of these networks, and has been a leader in promoting increased coordination and cooperation among Palestinian CSOs and networks, although it remains limited in membership by design, as CSOs must be invited to be a member in PNGO, and membership is currently only approximately 100 organizations, a small portion of Palestinian CSOs in total. The Coordination Council for Palestinian NGOs is an initiative piloted in late 2013 with the objective of serving as a common platform for civil society coordination, networking, and advocacy. The Council is run by three of the four 4 th level networks (PNGO, PNIN, and the General Union of Charitable Societies). Its effectiveness remains to be seen, as coordination and cooperation in development work and planning, as well as lobbying and monitoring governmental institutions, remains a weakness of 24 diplomacy.pdf Gerster, K., Baumgarten, H., Palestinian Rosa Luxembourg Foundation; NGOs and Their Cultural, Economic and Political Impact on Palestinian Society; Gianfrancesco, C., Atamneh, J., Khaled, A., Husseini, F.; Mapping Study of Civil Society Organizations in the Occupied Palestinian Territories;

9 the Palestinian civil society. 28 Additionally, the PNGO and the PA are always in constant dialogue and communication to strengthen their relationship and coordination. As many Palestinian CSOs were created in the absence of a government framework, many were mandated to fill gaps in service provision. This trend has only decreased slightly with the establishment and development of the Palestinian Authority, with more than 23% of CSOs focusing on relief and assistance provision, and only 4% of CSOs working on contributing to and monitoring government policy in the sectors in which they work. 29 Civil society efforts to network and cooperate have proven to be fragmented, non-comprehensive, and reactive, and much of the networking effort is ad-hoc. Furthermore, there is still a lack of a common identity and voice for the Palestinian CSOs, which, in turn, renders CSO s voice unheard on the national stage, especially in development planning Cooperation with the Palestinian Authority in the work of CSOs has also faced many constraints. Most common obstacles to effective and efficient cooperation are: lengthy bureaucratic processes that ministries require of CSOs in order to form a partnership; a lack of knowledge of project cycle management and development methodologies of government staff; and externally imposed funding constraints and limitations on both CSOs and ministries. Palestinian faith-based organizations, Christian and Muslim, have with their long histories, rootedness in communities and well established networks played an important institutional role in the Palestinian nation building in the past and in the present. They are to a large degree a positive force for the development of a multi-religious Palestinian state that also fosters inclusive trends in all religions. Faith-based organizations comprise an important aspect of Palestinian civil society working in the sectors of service provision, peace building, advocacy, and charity. Many also engage in inter-religious and ecumenical dialogue in Palestine, Israel and regionally. FBOs are as such a crucial sub-sector within Palestinian civil society, although constraints include for many a persisting focus on charity work rather than the adoption of a rights-based approach 32. Most local Palestinian Islamic organizations focus on charity work and channelling in-kind and monetary donations to the poor and vulnerable, orphans 33 in particular. This kind of work has been criticised as more patronizing than rights-based, and as not effective in bringing about social change. Local Muslim religious leaders, on the other hand (sheikhs, imams, and female religion teachers) hold positions with the local population that have the power to influence attitudes and spread awareness about social and political issues. Local Muslim FBOs are also constrained by the global, and even local, stereotype that equates Islam with terrorism, which may prevent many Muslim FBOs from adequately addressing social issues that openly criticise either the Israeli occupation or the notably secular Palestinian Authority. Indeed, many Muslim FBOs are tied to Islamic-based political parties such as Islamic Jihad and Hamas, which are labled as terrorist organizations internationally. Christian-and church-based local organizations also often focus on service delivery to the poor and vulnerable. Onthe other hand, they do not suffer from the aforementioned stigma, and are often strengthened by international ties to individuals and organizations of the same faith in support of social justice for their brothers and sisters in Palestine. As a result of this, or possibly intrinsically, Palestinian Christian FBOs are more inclined to engage in advocacy and have a long history of including social justice and rights based approaches in their diaconal mandates. They are in many cases an integral part of Palestinian civil society, engaging in coordination with general civil society networks such as hospital networks, educational networks, cluster coordination groups, etcetera, in both Gaza, East Jerusalem and the West Bank. 28 The EU support to the four NGOs platforms has been instrumental in improving the relationship and cooperation among the networks as well as to foster the dialogue and partnership between EUREP and civil society networks. 29 Ibid 30 ABC Consulting; Needs Assessment Study on Civil Society Coordination in Palestine; EU; Palestine: EU Country Roadmap to Engagement with Civil Society, ; Can be accessed online here: pg.s ABC Consulting; Needs Assessment Study on Civil Society Coordination in Palestine; The Arabic and Islamic definition of an orphan is a child who has lost one or both of their parents 9

10 The freedom of association and space for Palestinian civil society to play its important role is curtailed by the three de facto governments. In the West Bank and the Gaza Strip the civil society is an arena for the battle between Fatah and Hamas. The PA has closed down around 200 Islamic charities in the West Bank during the last two years claiming that they represent infrastructure for Hamas 34. In the Gaza Strip, the Hamas government is considering the NGO sector as representing opposition and NGOs with staff and board members associated with the Fatah party are harassed and organisations closed by different means. Palestinian civil society organizations are regulated through the Palestinian Law 1/2000 on Charitable Associations and Community Organizations, which preserves associations right to practice social, cultural, professional and scientific activity in all freedom, including the right to establish and run Associations and Community Organizations (Article 1). 35 However, government attempts to interfere in Palestinian civil society work have often been protested by civil society actors, citing the newlycreated CSO Affairs Commission 36 as the body through which this will happen. The Decision No. 20 of 2007 requiring associations to submit registration procedures to security agencies has also been seen as an infringement on the freedom of association, and there has been debate about the government decision to seize all assets of organizations that have dissolved or have been rejected for registration. CSOs in East Jerusalem are required to register under the Israeli Law of Association (1980), however Palestinian CSOs are obliged to register under the PA informally under the Palestinian Law 1/2000. Israeli authorities often take measures against Palestinian associations in Jerusalem arbitrarily based on political and military reasons through legal means such as the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (1948) and the Law on the Prohibition of Terror Funding (2005). This dual registration with both Israeli and PA authorities also puts an administrative strain on Jerusalemite organizations. The Gazan government has also been accused of infringing on the right to association by requiring permission from the government to conduct collective activities. 37 The civil society sector in Israel is comprised of very vibrant, active and diverse CSOs, working in almost every realm of life, from civil and human rights, democracy and minority rights to the environment, gender equality, social justice and welfare, education, culture and religious freedom and pluralism. To date, there are over 34,000 NGOs, non-profit making companies and foundations in Israel registered with the Registrar of Associations in the Israeli Ministry of Justice. 38 According to the EU Roadmap for Engagement with Civil Society in Israel Israeli CSOs which work on issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may identify as peace building organizations, human rights organizations or as nonaligned actors which are engaged in cross-border cooperation around mutual interests such as the environment or economy. The conflict tends to create a politicized environment for CSOs working in these fields, and recent attempts to restrict foreign funding appear to be linked to some CSOs' views and activities related to the conflict. Attempts to work cooperatively with Palestinian civil society on peace building issues, supported under the EU Partnership for Peace programme (EUPfP), have been impacted by anti-normalization and boycott movements in Palestinian society. 39. Networking efforts, though intensifying in recent years, are not yet sufficiently developed to counterbalance the individualistic pattern that characterizes mainstream Israeli civil society. It must be underlined that coming together in formal networks and structures, beyond ad hoc coalitions and campaigns, is a relatively new phenomenon among CSOs in Israel (with the exception of those in some 34 See Hilde Granås Kjøstvedt Mot en politistat Morgenbladet Gianfrancesco, C., Atamneh, J., Khaled, A., Husseini, F.; Mapping Study of Civil Society Organizations in the Occupied Palestinian Territories; 2011; pg Al-Haq; Unconstitutional Presidential Decrees Seek to Control Civil Society Organisations; 2013; Can be accessed online here: 37 Gianfrancesco, C., Atamneh, J., Khaled, A., Husseini, F.; Mapping Study of Civil Society Organizations in the Occupied Palestinian Territories; Mapping of Civil Society Study. EU mission in Tel Aviv, June

11 sectors such as the environment) and has often been driven by external forces and actors. Therefore the appreciation and understanding of the benefits that networks and platforms may bring is relatively underdeveloped even within the well-established civil society sector. 40 A new trend is the emergence of new social-change actors and social movements linked to the 2011 protests. These actors are mainly engaged in economic and social issues and aim to strengthen democratic governance processes by increasing the role of the active citizen. These new actors often find it difficult to move from the stage of a spontaneous protest mass movement to a sustainable institutionalized organization, taken seriously in policy debates, without betraying the initial momentum and set of values that brought them into being. Israeli civil society organisations are registered either under Israel s Law of Associations of 1980 or under the Companies Law of In Israel, the government decision number 3190 was a significant step forward in opening up invited spaces for CS engagement and promoting cooperation across the three sectors (public, private and not-for profit). The venture was, and continues to be, the first initiative in Israel aiming at inter-sectorial discussion at national level. Moreover invited formal spaces for CS engagement are still limited in Israel, and are still very much led by widespread misperception and lack of trust. According to a recent study about CS involvement in social initiatives in Israel (Almog-Bar et al, 2010), whereas CSOs perceive themselves as partners and engage in policy-making hoping to be able to influence the process and its outcomes, Government officials often tend to see CSOs as service-providers, who implement social programmes on behalf of the Government and do not necessarily see an interest in involving them in the discussions around policies. The research also suggests that the main reason explaining the difficult interaction between the Government and CSOs is the absence of a common language and framework, which can be shared by both actors. It also appears that processes do not always count on the political will and commitment of senior decision-makers (in all sectors involved), which would be necessary to promote dialogue and, even more importantly, enforce its outcomes. 41 Furthermore, the Israeli government is pressing for new legislation and regulation of the NGO sector. Human Rights organisations risk being labelled as political entities and tax exemption is suggested by lawmakers to be withdrawn. Organisations and their staff are increasingly subject to harassment as well as arrests 42. To date few studies exist that actually analyze the level of the enabling environment for civil society organizations to operate in Palestine and Israel. For instance, a quite controversial rating has been published by Freedom House on the level of civic and political rights in different countries 43 : In this study Israel is performing well, and Gaza and WB the opposite, but there is no analysis to suggest which duty bearers are actually causing the situation in Gaza and WB. Reports by Amnesty International highlight that the enabling environment for civil society organizations to operate in Palestine and Israel is challenging: 44 The report highlights: "Authorities in the West Bank and Gaza restricted freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, carried out arbitrary arrests and detentions, and tortured and otherwise ill-treated detainees with impunity. While for Palestine, the report highlights that: Women and girls faced discrimination in law and practice, and were inadequately protected against gender-based violence. 45 Interaction between Palestinian and Israeli civil society has become less prevalent over the past years. Many of the Israeli new social change actors and social movements have had fruitful partnership or cooperation with Palestinian organizations, although the issue of normalization 40 Ibid 41 EU Mapping study of Civil Society Organisations in Israel, December See Human Rights Watch news release

12 remains dominant and a formidable constraint to Israeli CSOs working on occupation issues, as well as for Palestinian CSOs partnering with Israeli organizations. As such, the anti-normalization movement has been seen by some as a significant barrier with regards to grassroots peace-building, particularly concerning fostering cooperation and dialogue between Israeli and Palestinian communities even though interaction at this level can be ever more relevant in the context of the collapsed peace talks at the official level 46.Cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian human rights defenders are also challenged by the risk of contributing to a normalization of the occupation s unequal power relationships. This to an extent were it at times becomes a barrier to joint human rights and antioccupation activism Thematic Specific Analysis (using relevant international and human rights standards) Active Citizenship a) Key problems/rights issues The political context in Palestine is one of complex emergency. The context is marked by the absence of a legitimate peace process, a lack of peace building structures, and severe democratic deficits both internally in the governance structures of the PA in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza, and due to the prolonged occupation and the continued full Israeli control over the majority of the West Bank. The occupation and the occupational practices applied entails a number of institutional barriers to meaningful participation, active citizenship and legal protection against rights-violations The following are some of the key issues: Constrained Abilities for Influencing Local and National Decision-Making Processes In Area C under martial law the Israeli permit and planning regime has transferred control over all planning and zoning from the Palestinian population to the Israeli Civil Administration while facilitating unlawful practices such as the demolition of private property, forcible transfer of the Palestinian population and settlement expansion. The regime is violating the Palestinian population s right to self-determination. According to Diakonia, the regime continuously deprives the local Palestinian population of any control over the land, natural resources, demography and development in Area C for an undefined period.. While the Israeli planning regime is a major component in the determination of the future of Area C, the local protected population has little or no involvement in deciding what this future should be 48. In the recent concluding observation of the Human Rights Committee on Israel s four periodic report, the Committee recommended that Israel should refrain from implementing evictions and demolition orders based on discriminatory planning policies, laws and practices affecting Palestinians, including Bedouins, in the West Bank, including the East Jerusalem periphery; remove discriminatory provisions from relevant planning and zoning legislation; provide for procedural protection and due process guarantees against forced evictions and demolitions; ensure the participation of Palestinians in the planning and zoning process and withdraw the so-called Bedouin Regulation plan. 49 Palestinian communities in East Jerusalem annexed in violation of IHL - suffer from a similar planning crisis. This crisis impacts virtually every aspect of Palestinian life in East Jerusalem, whether it is housing; availability and distribution of public or open spaces; mobility and accessibility; or planning sufficient education and health facilities. While lacking a 46 ABC Consulting; Needs Assessment Study on Civil Society Coordination in Palestine;

13 secure residency status the Palestinian population of East Jerusalem thus experience serious gaps in basic service provision and a lacking ability to plan and develop their communities The possibility for the Palestinian residents to hold the authorities accountable are limited and engagement in local accountability work in East Jerusalem risks contributing to legitimizing governance structures put in place in violation of IHL. At the same time the PA is not taking on as proactive a role as it could in maintaining presence and creating pressure for securing the rights of the residents of these areas. In addition, Israel s construction of its Separation Wall in and around East Jerusalem in 2002 has made the situation even worse by segregating the Palestinian communities severely limiting access to East Jerusalem for residents of the rest of the West Bank and Gaza 52 The Palestinian National Authority, in its National Development Plan , is recognizing the need for inclusive, regionally balanced development and is supporting local government institutions and processes on participation. To promote guidance, and accountability mechanisms within local government units promoting community participation in local government functions, building partnership with private sector and local communities. However, an important constraint is recognized by the National Development plan in that there is limited public participation in policy and decision-making processes, especially for youth and women, and it recognizes that community participation should be promoted in public budget preparation and discussions. The lack of Palestinian national adherence to international human rights standards also contributes to excluding the public from participation and protection against violations. The division between Hamas and Fatah and the inability of the Palestinians to resolve the disputes over the elections results in 2006, deepen the crisis of legitimacy. Local, parliamentary and presidential elections should be held every 4 years according to the constitution, but have been delayed since Barriers to Women s and Youths Participation in Decision-Making Processes and Structures The supreme law of Palestine is the Basic Law, ratified in 2002 and amended in 2003 and It acts as a temporary constitution until the establishment of a Palestinian state53, after which the latest draft constitution will take force. Under Article 9 of the Basic Law, Palestinians are equal before the law and the judiciary, without distinction based upon race, sex, color, religion, political views or disability. Article 11 describes personal freedom as a natural right that shall be guaranteed and may not be violated. Article 4, however, stipulates that Shari a (Islamic law) is a main source of legislation, opening the door to discriminatory provisions based on conservative interpretations of Islamic principles. Despite the Basic Law s guarantees, many laws currently in force do not penalize gender discrimination, while those that do are difficult to enforce due to weak institutional mechanisms for handling such cases 54. Women are formally discriminated against among other things in family- and inheritance law 55. Palestinian women s participation in West Bank and Gaza in public life has witnessed some advancement in the past decade, although equal representation in government offices remains to be achieved Women's Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Progress Amid Resistance edited by Sanja Kelly, Julia Breslin 54 Palestine: PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY AND ISRAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORIES by Suheir Azzouni

14 However, patriarchal structures negatively influence the possibility for a meaningful participation of women and youth who are generally excluded from and/or underrepresented in both local and national formal and informal decision-making processes and fora. Palestinian women remain underrepresented in decision-making bodies at various levels of public life including in the peace negotiation process and any gains continue to be uncertain due to continuing political upheavals. 56 Lacking Protection Against Rights-violations According to OCHA Weekly Highlights several physical attacks on Palestinians (children and women) are happening on a weekly basis in the West Bank. Random arrests, settler attacks and property damage is taking place and access to religious sites is being prohibited. Demolition of Palestinian owned structures in Area C and East Jerusalem and the displacement of people is also a frequent phenomenon 57. Legal protection of Palestinians in both Gaza and the West Bank including East Jerusalem against rights violations is limited and applied inconsistently. Israel offers some legal mechanisms where Palestinians can try their cases, but the result or for that matter the mechanism itself - are seldom in accordance with IHL and HR, and are primarily used by Palestinians to delay destructive processes 58. The mere fact that a dual legal system is in place in the West Bank assigning different rights and responsibilities to Palestinian and Israeli residents - is a strong indicator of the status of the justice system in the occupied territories. For Israel, the Universal Periodic Reviews on their reports submitted in relation to the signed conventions, show many violations of Palestinians human rights and many IHL violations. Recommendations from the recent UP review in 2013 for Israel include complying with IHL provisions, in particular with the IV Geneva Convention, ratifying the Rome Statute of the ICC, to fully align its national legislation with all of the obligations under the Rome Statute. Furthermore, the CEDAW Committee urges Israel to take immediate action to prevent human rights abuses and violations against women and girls in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and to protect them against such acts, including at checkpoints. 59 Shrinking Space for Civil Society and Protection of Human Rights Defenders Shrinking space of CSOs inside Israel, East Jerusalem, Area C, West Bank and Gaza strip constricts the normal operations of public mobilization and activism to the extent that it violates the right of freedom of assembly, asscociation and to some extent freedom of speach 60. This limits the role of CSO as watchdogs for government policies. The Association of Civil Rights in Israel raises serious concerns about the shrinking space for Israeli CSOs and what they define as intensifying infringements on democratic freedoms in Israel both through formal policies and in the public sphere 61. ACRI furthermore criticizes the Israeli high court of justice for not properly safeguarding against this development. In relation to the recent rejection to invalidate the so-called anti-boycott law ACRI states that the High Court of Justice has refrained from taking the necessary steps to defend freedom of speech in Israel. The Anti-Boycott Law is a Silencing Law, whose sole purpose is to mute legitimate criticism. The decision of the High Court of Justice enables severe harm to freedom of expression and the basic right to political action on controversial matters This responds to the Norwegian National Action plan on women, peace and security with peace processes, negotiations and building as main components: